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ACHAEMENID SYSTEMS OF GOVERNING IN ANATOLIA

University of California, Berkeley

PH.D. 1982

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Achaemenid Systems of Governing in Anatolia

By

Michael Norman Weiskopf

A.B. (Herbert H. Lehman College
of the City University of New York) 1974
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DISSERTATION

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Erin M. Hume

Chairman

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Date

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J. R. Hume

.....
Raphael S.aley

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Achaemenid Systems of Governing in Anatolia

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by

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We can most clearly perceive both the abruptness and the uncertainty of Fortune from those instances where a man who thinks that he is undoubtedly labouring at certain objects for his own benefit suddenly finds out that he is preparing them for his enemies.

Polybius 30.10.1 (Paton trans.)

Benefactors

I must begin by thanking my patrons, the Trustees of the Mabel McLeod Lewis Memorial Fund, without whose generous and timely subvention I would not have undertaken to complete this project.

I owe much gratitude to my dissertation committee for their guidance, assistance, and tolerance in this lengthy endeavor: Professor E.S. Gruen of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley, Committee Chair; Professor R. Sealey of the Department of History at the University of California, Berkeley; Professor G. Azarpay, Chair of the Department of Near Eastern Studies at the University of California, Berkeley.

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Many thanks to Chris Endo for typing and to Terry Irwin for supplying necessary electronic equipment.

This is a far too lengthy project and in its present form possesses many defects. To those who understand the exigencies imposed by resources I offer my apologies. To my detractors I can only offer the words of Polybius on the previous page.

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CHAPTER I. Ethos and Mechanisms

Section I. Introductory

Historians who seek to examine the constitutional history of Greek city states are fortunate: the wealth of ancient evidence, including substantial bodies of public documents and, for some political entities, ancient constitutional studies, facilitates the development of guidelines for investigations. One may establish the titles of officers, their functions, the length they may hold their offices. Basic administrative hierarchies, including checks and balances set down by a discrete body of written legal documents, can be constructed. Special issues such as citizenship and the ties between mother city and colony may be pursued. In sum, these scholars may refine a system which is presented to them by those who actually lived within it. But to apply this methodology to a monarchy, in particular a multi-ethnic empire with no single written "constitution" is dangerous. Such an approach does not elucidate the workings of empire.

This is the case with the Achaemenid empire, and in particular with Achaemenid Anatolia, the sector most elucidated in the ancient source material. For over a century scholars have sought to explain the administrative structure of the Achaemenid Empire and Achaemenid Anatolia as if they were studying a very large Greek city state. The standard perception of Achaemenid administration holds that there existed a precise

administrative hierarchy which can be reconstructed on the basis of ancient evidence: There existed a number of distinct levels of officers. Series of checks and balances, including separation of powers, was achieved by regular and constant direct interference by the central government at Susa, i.e. the Shah, in provincial affairs. Susa initiated and carried out thorough-going administrative reforms. The names, numbers, and boundaries of administrative units may be established--and with some precision.¹ Persian rule was uniform in expression and content. Its ethos was evil and oppressive. And by the fourth century mechanisms established by the great Darius had deteriorated to the point where the collapse of the empire was imminent.²

Why such a portrait? One may seek a partial explanation in the backgrounds of the modern scholars themselves. Most lived either in states which were republics with written constitutions or in monarchies whose rulers' powers were circumscribed by written law: there may have existed a bias to perceive the Achaemenid monarchy in the same fashion, as a state ultimately based upon a body of written law, perhaps to be attributed to a single political figure. But the true reason and best explanation lies in the nature of the ancient source material and the modern perception thereof. What follows below, while applicable to the Empire in general, is most concerned with Anatolia, a border region far distant from the seat of central authority.

With the exception of a handful of documents, our source material comes not from Achaemenid sources, but from often hostile outsiders, and those who later used the accounts of those outsiders: Greeks of the Balkans and western Anatolia who lived during the time of the Achaemenid

empire, Greek and Roman writers of the post-Achaemenid period. Most of their accounts are in no sense legal documents, but general historical narrative, anecdotes, or political oratory designed to persuade, not record the truth. Modern scholars however, have culled this evidence in the belief that the titles given to Achaemenid officers possess some precise juridical value. Their analysis is based not on deeds, but titles first.³

These occasionally hostile ancients lived under regimes which had political institutions based on statutes, codes, and established practices by which citizenship rights were granted and officials elected. Many ancient authors were accustomed, in the examination of their own history, to gather up a group of characteristics in their state's political structure and assign them to a specific, occasionally near-legendary, politician (e.g. Solon in Athens, Lycurgus in Sparta). This tendency to view political structures in terms of constitutions and reformers affected the ancient perceptions of the Achaemenid empire. There appear in a number of sources passages which I call "systematizing passages", i.e. they purport to outline, with sweeping statements, administrative structure, or give general rules for administrative practice. Commentary on these passages will be given below, but it should be noted here that they possess various degrees of accuracy. Unfortunately, modern scholars have not paid due consideration to accuracy, but have removed these passages from context and added them up in order to construct a picture of Achaemenid administration. Here, too, is the overemphasis on material believed to possess juridical value at the expense of the data in historical narratives relating directly to those activities Achaemenid officers undertook.

Modern scholars have not questioned the Greek tendency to discuss Achaemenid administration in terms of constitutions and reformers.⁴

There has been a similar and unfortunate lack of success in reconstructing the historical events of the Empire, this due to a failure to subject the literary and archaeological evidence to the scrutiny normally accorded to data relating to the more "civilized" peoples of antiquity. And problems are particularly thorny for the fourth century, on which this present study focuses. Misrepresentation of Achaemenid administration and officers in Isocrates' speeches has not been questioned seriously. Imprecisions, particularly in terminology, have not been duly recognized by those using Diodorus. A good deal of the source material for the period after 387, but before Alexander's conquest, is anecdotal: Important data are given in Polyaeus, but without chronological context. Numismatic evidence is often presented to support historical reconstructions, but without real examination of the nature of the evidence. Too often outdated numismatic work is accepted as state of the art.

Until now the history of fourth century Achaemenid Anatolia has been written commonly as a history orchestrated by long dead Balkan Hellenes, as a history of an empire in decline, collapsing under the weight of corruption, tyranny, and brutality.⁵

I present here an inquiry into the mechanics of empire, a study of personalities and deeds. My work will examine the methods by which the Achaemenid Shahs of Persia exercised control over ancient Anatolia and its environs, regions far from the seat of central authority in southwest Iran. There will be analysis not only of the principles underlying

Achaemenid hegemony, but also of their application, elucidated in a series of studies focusing on the major events in fourth century Anatolia.

Section II: Officers and Provinces

Earlier studies of provincial administration have begun with an examination of the types of officers found in Anatolia and the territories they controlled. However, too little attention has been paid to the nature of the source material from which the evidence relating to administrative titles is drawn. In the following examination I shall distinguish between two basic types of source material, those materials from or close to a chancery source, and those not from a chancery source. One must also consider each particular source separately--a title used in one may not have the same value in another. Attention should be paid to deeds as well. I will have to refer the reader at different points to chapters which follow, for they elucidate the careers of officers who may be mentioned here very briefly.

A. Titulature for Provincial Officers

An examination of the titulature for Achaemenid officers reveals elasticity, imprecision, and variety in terminology. It will not be possible to answer decisively a very basic question about provincial government: what were the different Achaemenid officers called?

Our survey should begin with documents generated by the Great Kings themselves. The earliest reference to provincial administrators appears in Darius' Bisutun inscription, in which an officer known as

khshahthrapavan appears (DB III 14, 56). The title is paired with a territory, e.g. Dadarshi is khshahthrapavan in Bactria (DB III 14), Vivana in Arachosia (56). These officers command military personnel, but their rank in the administrative hierarchy is not known. Their names and Darius' words mark them out as Parsa, Iranians apparently from Persis. The term khshahthrapavan appears in the far west in Greek sources as satrapēs (or some form thereof), i.e. satrap, and signifies in Old Persian "upholder/supporter of the crown/kingdom." I shall return to this connotation of service presently.⁶

The term satrapēs--or a variant spelling--appears in Greek documents which are from a chancery source, and frequently forms part of the formula by which the decree is dated. This practice combined with an examination of the data relating to the activities of the officer named permits us to establish that the title satrapēs refers to the highest Achaemenid provincial officer controlling the sector in which the producer of the document is located. Such is the case with a number of inscriptions naming the satraps of fourth century Caria, to be discussed in the chapter on the Hekatomnids (e.g. SIG³ 167, 170, SIG² 573, the Greek version of the Xanthos decree).⁷

The region known as Lycia provides inscriptions in Lycian and Aramaic in which the term satrap is used.⁸ In the Xanthos decree's Lycian and Aramaic versions that term refers to the highest officer, Pixodaros. TAM I 40d, found on the tomb of one Payava, makes reference to the "satrap" Autophradates. After an analysis of the evidence for his career (given in part in the next chapter) we can determine that Autophradates the satrap was a highest officer; he was satrap at Sparda (satrap of

Lydia, working out of Sardis).

At this point we have reached a rather obvious conclusion: in official documents the office of khshahthrapavan signifies the office of the highest provincial administrator in an administrative unit. One should note that both Iranians and non-Iranians can hold this office, evidence for regional variety (Iranian satraps in Iranian central Asia, Carians in Caria).

When we examine the ancient authorities who wrote about the Achaemenid Empire we find that a variety of terms are used instead or alongside satrap to signify the same type of officer. Usage in Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, major sources for the Empire from the sixth through early fourth centuries, has received some attention from modern scholars, and a brief examination may suffice here.⁹ The first, Herodotus, eschews the use of the title satrap, although he does indicate (1.192, 3.89) that the territory controlled by such an officer is called a satrapeia, a satrapy. Instead he uses the term hyparchos quite frequently to refer to men who are the most important Achaemenid officers in sectors (e.g. 5.25, 73, 123, 6.1, 42 of Artaphernes, satrap of Sparda, i.e. Lydia). Unfortunately that same title is also used of Achaemenid officers of lower status (7.194) and of indeterminate status (7.105). Thucydides, too, does not use satrap, but will fix an Achaemenid officer in a geographical sector, occasionally a precise one (e.g. 1.129.1). Both historians also have recourse to the depressingly vague title stratēgos, military leader. Neither writer is operating with legal precision, but is presenting job descriptions. To make any sense of administrative structure one must subordinate title to activity. One

cannot systematize what was never intended to be systematic.

It is Xenophon who introduces the use of satrapēs into extant historical prose (the term does appear in the fragments of Ctesias). But, here, too, one notes what may be imprecision: The title satrap is used to signify one who seems the most important provincial official (e.g. Xen. Anab. 1.1.2, Cyrop. 8.6), but we find Achaemenid officers who are certainly less powerful also characterized as satraps (e.g. the local Greek leaders Zenis and Mania in Hell. 3.1.10, 12) and their office as a satrapeia (Hell. 3.1.10). And elsewhere we find the most important provincial administrators called stratēgos (e.g. Hell. 4.8.12).¹⁰ Xenophon's use of satrapēs, satrapeia, and the verb satrapeuein for lesser officers does preserve the service connotation of the Old Persian original. Defense of the realm is a service which can be performed by individuals without regard to their political status or nationality. His use of these terms is evidence for their flexibility, and the flexibility and fluidity within Achaemenid administration in Anatolia. With Xenophon's evidence, too, one must subordinate titulature to activity.¹¹

The source which has not received due attention in regard to the use of terminology has been Diodorus, an important source for fourth century Anatolia. In the next paragraphs I shall try to sort out the various titles the historian uses in references to Achaemenid officers.

Scholars, such as Osborne, have noted that Diodorus did possess a "rather irregular usage vis-à-vis Persian officials" and pointed to blatant cases in which the term satrap was used for a lesser level of officer.¹² Unfortunately, Osborne did not pursue the matter further, for he investigated it with the underlying assumption of a strict hierarchy in which

a satrap had a number of "sub-satrap" directly subordinate to him. A more complete examination of Diodorus' terminology reveals that he will use titles, particularly satrapēs, in a non-technical manner, simply to refer to a Persian officer, regardless of his actual level of power, influence, and dignity.

I begin my examination with Diodorus 15.90: This is a passage which contains all the terms commonly used by Diodorus to refer to officers of the Achaemenid empire. It is also a passage which has raised serious difficulties (see chapter 6) in our understanding of Achaemenid Anatolia during the 360's. In 15.90.1 there is talk of tines tōn satrapōn "some/certain of the satraps and general." In 15.90.3 Diodorus speaks of tous toutōn symmachous satrapas kai strategous, again the pairing of satraps and generals.¹³ Then we are presented with a list of officers who supposedly have rebelled against the Shah: Ariobarzanes, Orontes, and Autophradates are called satrapēs; Maussollos is Karias dynasteuōn, essentially dynast of Caria; then, "among the Ionians" (tōn de Iōnōn), are the Lycians, Pisidians, Pamphylians, and Cilicians. Beyond the obvious difficulty of the last statement, there are problems with Diodorus' characterization of Ariobarzanes and Maussollos.¹⁴ Ariobarzanes' title and the means by which he obtained his satrapy (note Diodorus' term basileia instead of satrapeia) are inaccurate and will be discussed in the next chapter. As for Maussollos, official documents make it clear that he and members of his family were called satraps, and that satrap was his proper juridical title.¹⁵

Diodorus often pairs titles of officers. The pairing of satrapēs and strategos may be found a number of times and seems designed for

emphasis rather than for comparison between civil and military officials (16.41.2, 17.18.2, 17.27.3, 17.64.2, 17.105.2). Satraps were military as well as civil figures (see below) and strategos is occasionally used as part of Diodorus' description of the activities a man known to be satrap is expected to undertake (Diod. 11.74.1--cf. Hdt. 7.7--14.99.1, 15.8.3; cf. 14.85.4). There is a variant of this pairing: satraps and hegemon (Diod. 12.4.4--see below--17.111.2). A third type of pairing is more significant for our investigation, satraps and cities (14.35.2, 14.80.7, 14.98.3).¹⁶ Perhaps there is a desire to characterize the two different political organizations in the Achaemenid far west, the Persian (with its satraps) and the Greek (with its city-states). In this case satrapēs may serve as a general indication for officers of Persian extraction.

Imprecision in Diodorus' use of satrapēs can be found elsewhere. Occasionally officers labeled as stratēgoi are later called satrapeis, and vice-versa. Diod. 12.4.4-5 describes events leading to the "Peace of Kallias." Artaxerxes I writes to his hegemon and satraps around Cyprus. In the treaty the "satraps of the Persians" are to stay three days' ride away from the coast. The strategoi of the king act according to this directive: in this passage the satraps commanded are the strategoi who obey. As for the satraps around Cyprus who receive letters, they are not satraps of Cyprus, i.e. the highest Persian officers in Cyprus, an island ruled by kings who held sway over individual cities. Here, too, satraps may simply mean Persian officers in general. A second instance of the same officer being entitled satrap, and then strategos, is found in Diodorus' treatment of Pharnabazos, satrap at Dascylium.¹⁷ An instance

related to this interchangeability of satrap and strategos can be found in book 14: The epimeletai of Cyrus the younger (14.19.6) are later called the satraps who fear Tissaphernes (14.35.2-3). Included among them is Tamos, who we know not to have been highest officer, i.e. satrap.¹⁸ We also find satraps used in a military context (16.34.1-2), where one might expect strategoi.

At times Diodorus is simply wrong in using the title satrap. Ariaios, i.e. Xenophon's Ariaaios, a subordinate of Cyrus the Younger, is called (14.24.1) ho Kyrou satrapēs, satrap of Cyrus, a sense reminiscent of Pharnabazos' Zenis and Mania (Xen. Hell. 3.1.10ff.).¹⁹ Mithrines is called satrap (Diod. 17.21.7), although he is known to have been only the garrison commander at the citadel of Sparda (Arr. Anab. 1.17.3). Harpalus, Alexander's finance minister, is called satrap mistakenly (Diod. 17.108.4). Tiribazos, who was never highest officer in Armenia (see next chapter), is called satrap (14.27.7). But most interesting is Diod. 14.11.3: Diodorus has decided to tell Ephorus' version of the arrest and death of Alcibiades (14.11.1), which appeared in Ephorus 17 (Diod. 14.11.2). Unable to obtain safe transport from Pharnabazos to Artaxerxes to reveal the plans of Cyrus the younger, Alcibiades set out to the satrap of Paphlagonia, ton satrapēn tēs Paphlagonias, to obtain safe conduct. No such officer ever appears in Achaemenid history. Paphlagonia was a sector whose inhabitants were highly mobile recalcitrants organized into tribes. The highest officers who dealt with this region are Pharnabazos, satrap at Dascylium, and then Datames, as satrap of Cappadocia. I can find no evidence for a satrap of Paphlagonia in the sense of a single highest officer in charge of that sector.²⁰

What we have then is a body of evidence which suggests that when Diodorus uses the term satrapēs, he often uses it descriptively, to signify an officer of the Achaemenid empire who is of Persian extraction (and has a name which does not sound very Greek).²¹ Such a usage can be spotted in the interchangeability of "satrap" with some other title (but always in reference to Persians), and the misuse of the term, its application to officials known not to have been highest officers. To return to 15.90: When the list of rebel officers is reexamined, one notes that among the non-Greek personnel in Anatolia listed by name, the non-Persian, Maussollos, is made a dynast (Diodorus' usual term for the Hekatomnids), although in Susa's eyes he is satrap, while the Persians, Ariobarzanes, Autophradates, and Orontes are satraps. The term satrap is applied to Achaemenid officers of Persian extraction, and need not have a special juridical meaning in the passage. In Diodorus as well close attention must be paid to the activity an officer undertakes, not to the titles assigned him.

What conclusions can be drawn? In sources from the chancery (imperial or local), the most important provincial officer is called a satrap. In historical narratives the most important provincial officer is assigned a number of titles, even within the same narrative. For purposes of this investigation I shall refer to the most important provincial officer as satrap and describe him as the highest officer for a particular sector. And before an officer can be so labeled, all the evidence relating to his career must be examined.

The picture for officers somehow subordinate to the satrap is far less clear. The evidence does not permit the determination of titles

or the levels of rank, if any existed at all. Old Persian documents do not record any title or officer who might be marked out as in a subordinate position. There is only one chancery document which may refer to a lesser Achaemenid officer of Iranian origin, but its terminology and late date (it is a post-Achaemenid translation into Greek) raise many problems.²² Certain officers mentioned in the ancient sources can be marked out as subordinate on the basis of their activities, but the titles they bear vary widely from source to source.²³ So few such officers are mentioned for a particular sector at a particular point in time (e.g. a period of five to ten years), that any ranking based on deeds is impossible. For the purposes of this investigation I shall refer to officers subordinate to the satrap, the highest officer, as lesser officers.²⁴ They may be Iranian or non-Iranian.

Thus all but a very basic administrative hierarchy eludes us. In an administrative unit there is a single highest officer known as the satrap. Below him are many lesser officers, but we do not know exactly how they are subordinate to the satrap. Flexibility and fluidity are implied.

B. What is an Administrative Unit Called?

When we consider the question of what an administrative unit in Anatolia was called, we again find imprecision, variety and flexibility in terminology. Until very recently it was believed that the number and composition of the Achaemenid satrapeiai could be determined with some precision. A systematizing passage is to blame: Herodotus 3.89-96 presents a detailed list of administrative units, designed to impress

his readers with the size and wealth of the Achaemenid Empire. He fixes the number of units at twenty (excluding Persis, which occupies a special position) and establishes rules by which the units were set up. The amount of revenue collected and the ethnic composition of each district are then enumerated. Herodotus has given here a "Darius-constitution" for the empire, a series of reforms which replaced the earlier, sloppier arrangements of Cyrus and Cambyces. This ancient treatment created the impression in the minds of scholars that evidence relating to administration could be handled with a high degree of precision.

When Old Persian documents were analyzed, scholars discovered that a number of them gave lists of peoples under Achaemenid control. But these scholars viewed them as lists of provinces, administrative documents containing precise information and devoted their efforts to reconciling the Old Persian data with Herodotus' "satrapy-list," also believed to be administratively precise. Here was a basic error in methodology, for the Old Persian lists in the documents of Darius, Xerxes, and Artaxerxes I (?) were not lists of administrative units, but of those peoples over whom the Shahs exercised control, the type of control expressed in very basic terms (they obey, then send tribute). In the lists appearing in the documents of Darius there is variety in the number, identity, and order of peoples mentioned.²⁵ The Old Persian documents, material from a chancery source, are designed to illustrate power; they are not legal documents detailing administrative structure.²⁶

Imprecision and general terminology are characteristics found throughout Achaemenid usage in referring to those parts of their empire in the far west. SIG³ 22 is a Roman date Greek translation of a letter

of a letter written by Darius to his administrator Gadatas. The Empire is simply called the "King's House" (see below), while the sector in which Gadatas is located is specified only as ta katō tēs Asias merē, the lower portion of Asia. It is the inscription's content and find-spot which permits us to place Gadatas near Magnesia-on-the Maeander.²⁷ Broad geographical descriptions also appear in the Old Persian documents when reference is made to the far western frontier: the designation tayaiy drayahya is used to describe the inhabitants of the Hellespont, "those who live by the sea." Precise administrative units or the name for an administrative unit do not appear in Achaemenid terminology for the far west, peoples do. Personal politics, along with flexibility and fluidity in administration, are implied.

The use of broad geographical characterizations noted in official Achaemenid usage is echoed in the historians who wrote about the empire. The "coast," "inhabitants of the coast," "lower Asia," "regions along the coast," and similar expressions are frequently found as the geographical designation paired with an equally imprecise administrative title in all the Greek historians. One must examine an officer's activities in order to determine with greater precision the region in which he is stationed unless such a region is specifically assigned to him in his title (as in Thucyd. 1.129.1).²⁸

When the ancient sources do speak in more particular terms about the region an Achaemenid officer controls, they use a variety of titles for an administrative unit and apply them to officers who are highest officers, lesser officers, or those of special or indeterminate status. Herodotus introduces the term satrapeia as the name of an administrative district

of seemingly larger size and controlled by a highest officer (1.192.2, 3.89.1). *Satrapeia* is given as a specifically Persian term and is equated with arche and nomos. The term does not carry with it any connotation of specific minimum size or of the degree of control exercised by the one who controls it. The term appears in Thucydides (1.129.1); the man who controls it is certainly a highest officer. This is the sense in which I shall use satrapeia, satrapy: the name of the district controlled by a highest officer. The term will not carry with it any judgments about minimum or maximum size, or the degree of control exercised over it.

A second term used by Herodotus, nomos, preserves more of the true nature of Achaemenid control. A nomos is a "cut," a "piece of the action" in administrative, military, and economic senses, but does not have a connotation of size. It is used in these senses in Herodotus 5.102.1 when the Persians who come to the aid of the satrap Artaphernes are described: they are hoi entos Halyos potamou nomous echontes (note the broad geographic characterization). One may find nomos used to describe the illegally large sphere held by the rebel Oroites (3.127.1), and the region controlled by the officer Artayctes (9.116), whose status I have not yet been able to determine. The related nemesthai is used to describe the activities of the half-Macedonian, half-Persian Amyntas (8.136.1) when he is given political power in Achaemenid Anatolia. Nomos is an apt term for the "cut" controlled by a successful officer; for he is the one who introduces and maintains a nomos in the district he controls.

The other terms used to describe what an officer--highest or lesser--controls carry with them connotations of governing and of property. Arche

is used in IG II² 207 to describe the cut controlled by Orontes. The property which is to pass to the son of Parapita and Pharnabazos is an arche in Xen. Hell. 4.1.40, an oikos in Plut. Ages. 13. Basileia is used by Diodorus (15.90.3, 19.31) for administration, but in Xenophon it refers to a physical plant (Xen. Anab. 1.4.10, Hell. 4.1.15). The King's House (oikos) as term for the Empire has been mentioned above, and appears in Thucydides 1.137.4 and Philochorus FGrH 328 fr. 149.²⁹ Oikos as property is used for estates (Tissaphernes': Xen. Hell. 3.2.12; Metiochus': Hdt. 6.41).

Chora, when used, signifies property, although the size may vary. Hence the King's chora is the entire empire (as in scholia to Dem 4.19), while Tithraustes' may be only estates (FGrH 105 fr. 4). Memnon's (Arr. Anab. 1.17.8, Poly. 4.3.15) and Hermeias' (SIG³ 229) are somewhere in the middle.

To sum up: all Achaemenid officers in Anatolia--highest and lesser--possessed a sphere of influence. The highest officer in a province was called the satrap, and he controlled a satrapy. There is no single term which can be applied to a lesser officer, nor can lesser officers be ranked. There is no single term which can be applied to the area they controlled. The sources permit no greater precision than the above.

Section III. The Anatolian Spheres³⁰

Although the ancient sources do not permit exactitude in describing the geographical extent of the Anatolian satrapies, it is possible to sketch in general terms the various spheres of influence which will appear

in the chapters following. Only those spheres which abutted on the Greek world received full documentation (and even that is highly lacunose). One should note that there is variety and transition in the spheres.

1. Dascylium: a coastal sphere, also called Hellespontine Phrygia; ruled by Iranian noblemen at the satrapial capital, Dascylium. Not as wealthy or urbanized as Sparda (below), Dascylium was marked by a long continuity in personnel, remaining in the hands of a family known as the sons of Pharnaces (see next chapter). The strategic value of Dascylium lay in its proximity to Europe: more successful satraps could dominate both sides of the Hellespont and exercise influence in the southwest part of the Black Sea. The satraps of Dascylium were often rivals with those of Sparda: both competed to resolve the Greek problem and argued over liminal territory (see chapter 6). The sons of Pharnaces were of higher social status than some of the highest officers in Sparda, but controlled a lesser sphere. Status variance bred resentment.

2. Sparda: Ruled by Iranian nobles, Sparda was the flagship satrapy on the Anatolian west coast, for it was the centerpiece of the old kingdom of Lydia (Sparda is the Old Persian name for Sardis, which gave its name to the entire satrapy). Continuity in personnel does not seem to have been common in the fourth century, and most of the satraps were drawn from nearby sectors. Sparda undergoes a transition, shrinking in size. At the end of the fifth century its satraps controlled Sparda, the west coast (also called Ionia), Caria, and Lycia. The last two passed to the Hekatomnids during the fourth century.

3. Caria: Caria undergoes a transition from being controlled by

many small dynasts under the general tutelage of Sparda to a third major center of Achaemenid power on the Anatolian west coast under the control of the indigenous Hekatomnids, recognized at Susa as satraps. Fourth century Caria was marked by continuity in personnel and development of the physical plant. The satrapial capital shifted from Mylasa to Halicarnassus. Further discussion in chapter 5.

4. Lycia: There was no formal satrapy of Lycia. The region underwent a transformation from being the domain of native dynasts to a region pacified and controlled by the Carian satraps.

5. Cyprus: There was no single highest Achaemenid officer on Cyprus. The island was ruled by dynasts who were both kings and city bosses. See chapter 3.

6. Cilicia: The transition here is from rule by a significant native dynast, the Syennesis, to the installation of Achaemenid appointed satraps, i.e. highest officers not indigenous to Cilicia (e.g. Datames was a Carian). The satrapial capital is not known. Under Datames, Cilicia was held along with sections of the interior; under Mazaios, with Ebir-nari. Cf. chapter 4.

7. The interior: Documentation is very poor; the evidence presents flexibility in the arrangement of individual spheres and the number of highest officers, who are a mix of Iranians and non-Iranians. One can mark out Inner Phrygia, Cappadocia (later two sectors), and Armenia. There were many pockets of recalcitrance (e.g. the Pisidians).

A final consideration--why did the Achaemenids persist in holding

Anatolia, particularly the coastal regions in the west? For most of the fifth and early fourth centuries the Greek problem prevented much of Anatolia from generating any sizeable revenues; disruptive tribal peoples were always a drain on resources. A partial answer may be hazarded here. There were a number of considerations which balanced out the losses: Cyrus had conquered Anatolia and to give up Sparda and Dascylium would have been a serious blow to royal prestige. When stable, Anatolia did provide good warriors (the Greeks) and materials for a fleet. These resources were needed to help protect and later recapture the important profit centers of the Levant and Egypt. Anatolia was strategic in the sense that it provided a frontline defense against invasion from the west--better to hold it imperfectly than to allow the unchecked growth of an indigenous Cyrus the younger. Anatolia probably did not rate very high in the Achaemenid scheme of things--certainly it was less valuable than Mesopotamia and Egypt. It seems that the Shahs preferred the certainty of limited losses in Anatolia to the possibility of total loss in more profitable parts of the empire.

Section IV. Personnel

Earlier I indicated that imprecision in the source material compelled the use of rather bland terms in describing Achaemenid officers (highest, lesser). This imprecision, combined with the flexibility and fluidity in the status of an officer, the existence of continuity in personnel and intermarriage (which blurs national origin) make it difficult to delineate distinct categories of personnel in Achaemenid Anatolia. One may point

to a number of theoretical types, but all will overlap in some form with each other. Imprecision is dictated by the evidence.

For purposes of this study I will refer to the following types of political entities:

1. satrap: the highest officer for an administrative district of larger size (see section II, above). The satrap need not be Iranian in nationality; his real estate need not be confined to the immediate environs of the center at which he is stationed,³¹ particularly if he is of great influence and high social status. Tissaphernes, and their successors in Sparda and Dascylium are examples.
2. nobles with estates (local nobles): this category encompasses most of the significant lesser officers, mostly of Iranian extraction. In the fourth century in Anatolia one will find non-Iranian significant lesser officers possessing large tracts of real estate (e.g. Carians Camisares and Datames, Rhodians Mentor and Memnon, and probably Tamos and Glos, Egyptians from Memphis).
3. special officers: usually officers of high status not indigenous to the sector from which they operate. They are posted to meet extraordinary threats to the Empire. The officer called karanos falls within this category (see below). A satrap may receive extraordinary powers and so be regarded as a special officer (e.g. Pharnabazos after 395, while operating in the Aegean).
4. political boss: an important politician in a relatively urbanized community. I will use this term to refer primarily to the tyrannoi of Greek and/or Hellenized city states.

5. tribal chieftain: an important politician of a relatively less urbanized or more nomadic community. I will use this term to refer primarily to non-Iranians and non-Greeks. Examples include Aspis of Cataonia and Thuys of Paphlagonia (see chapter 4).

6. dynast: I will use this term to refer to a political leader indigenous to Anatolia who controls a sector substantially larger than the sector controlled by a tribal chieftain, and which contains a larger proportion of urbanized communities than that of a tribal chieftain. The dynast may be regarded as the highest officer of a particular part of the native order. He is usually non-Iranian but may also be termed a satrap by Susa. Such examples are the Syenneseis of Cilicia, the native kings who were regarded as the Achaemenid satraps of Cilicia, the Hekatomnids of Caria and the kings of Cyprus. The satrapy at Dascylium remained in the hands of a single family for many generations. One may regard that family with some fairness as Iranian dynasts.

7. leaders of a fortified strongpoint, i.e. garrison-commanders.

A. The Satrap

The entire empire was the "King's House." In theory, the Shah was the ultimate arbiter of all entities and activities within his "House," although in practice the King's hand was not seen in every affair. These sentences may be applied to the satrap: The satrap was his "House;" in theory he had final say in his sphere of influence and its environs. As the Shah was to the Empire, so the satrap was to the satrapy.

For the satrap to be highest officer in his sphere, it was necessary

for him to be recognized as such by Susa. Most frequently this recognition took the form of the appointment of a noble to the post of satrap by the Shah. We find this regularly in the satrapy at Sparda, as in the cases of Tiribazos and Struthas, whose careers are detailed in the next chapter. Information is much more nebulous in those cases in which there is continuity in personnel or in which a dynast is titled satrap. For the satrapy at Dascylium we have evidence that Artabazos was posted to Dascylium by Xerxes I (Thucyd. 1.129.1), but we do not know how that man's descendents were invested with the title of satrap. Certainly they would have already taken a hand in satrapial affairs during the lifetime of their fathers. It is reasonable to assume that the crown acquiesced in the choice of the reigning satrap if both he and the son trained as successor were competent. As for dynasts, e.g. the Hekatomnids, we possess no data. Diod. 9.31.3 implies that the Shah could extend an offer of co-optation; Xenophon Cyrop. 8.6.8³² a royal proclamation following the assurance of compliance. A process of negotiation may be supposed.

The satrap was stationed at an administrative center. From here his power emanated, and here was located at least a portion of his property holdings. Sparda and Dascylium remained administrative centers for their respective satrapies through the history of the empire; both centers were administrative centers under the supplanted Lydian kings. But in Caria the satrapial seat moved from inland Mylasa to coastal Halicarnassus, a move made by the Hekatomnid satraps and not objected to by Susa. Hence we see an acceptance by the crown of local conditions. For the satrapies of the Anatolian interior there is only uncertainty.

Evidence does not exist which allows us to determine the relationship

between the post of satrap and the property owned by a noble while he was satrap, i.e. alienability of land. When son succeeded father as satrap he appears to have taken up at least part of the estates (so Pharnabazos, Xen. Hell. 4.1.33). After Tissaphernes was killed, at least part of his property was seized by Tithraustes, but it appears to have been bullion, not land (Hell. Oxy. 19, cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.26).

The satrap's responsibility was to follow the broad administrative guidelines set down by the Great King. He was to maintain a semblance, at least, of order in his sphere, the satrapy, and its environs; the specifics required to meet these goals were left to the satrap, and would include military and diplomatic activities designed to bring recalcitrant elements into the Achaemenid system as compliant members. He was not, however, to disrupt the activities of already compliant elements, but rather supervise them with a guiding hand. The maintenance of stability facilitated the meeting of the second guideline, the forwarding of tribute. The satrap seems to have had primary responsibility for collecting revenues (see below). He also was able to mint coins for the purpose of paying troops in times of military operations.³³ The fifth century provides a convenient example: Artaphernes, a member of the Achaemenid family, was named as highest officer for Sparda by his brother, King Darius I. He intervened in the environs of his sphere (Hdt. 5.30-36) in hopes of extending Achaemenid control to encompass new revenue producing sectors. Following damage to his own satrapy he supervised the necessary political and diplomatic arrangements to facilitate restabilization and the assessment and collection of tribute (Hdt. 6.42).

The rather broad guidelines by which a satrap would act were occasionally elaborated upon by the Great King, both during the tenure of a satrap

and when a new officer was sent out.³⁴ However, the specific commands were also stated as goals, i.e. "accomplish 'x'", the mechanics left to the officer. Hence Tissaphernes is told to eliminate Amorges (Thucyd. 8.5.5), but is not told precisely how. The satrap also consulted with the Shah, either by messenger or in person. There do not seem to have been stringent guidelines indicating when such consultations were to take place.³⁵ Occasionally, the large discretionary power held by a satrap led to setbacks, particularly when he undertook new policies with which the crown found complaint. The careers of Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes will illustrate this point. Supposed checks on satrapial activities will be considered below, section 6.

B. Lesser Officers

In the construction of the Achaemenid Empire in Anatolia the building block was the estate (see below, section 7) and the backbone for Achaemenid personnel was the noble who owned estates, a lesser officer. He was to his immediate region what the satrap was to the satrapy. Front-line responsibility for the maintenance of political order and agricultural productivity lay in the local noble. Not only did he police his estate and its environs, but he provided military personnel for campaigns within the satrapy in which he was located.

The activities of Asidates (Xen. Anab. 7.8.7-23), a local noble in Sparda, illustrate the above considerations and the interactions of the various types of personnel enumerated in the introduction to this section. Asidates' estate dominated the plain and was fortified (12-14). Villages were attached to it (15, 21-22). This property made Asidates wealthy (9)

and supplied him with his own military force (13). But the high land was controlled by now recalcitrant Greek political bosses, descendants of Gongylus and Demaratus, fifth century Balkan Hellenes implanted in Anatolia to facilitate Achaemenid control. They viewed Asidates' property and prosperity as objects for attack and obtained the services of foreign invaders, men led by Xenophon (8-9). When they moved against Asidates, his own fortifications forestalled destruction. The estate owner also cooperated with other Achaemenid political entities, including a noble (Itamenes) and troops of non-Anatolian origin (Hyrceanians, Assyrians 15), probably stationed at a strongpoint nearby. Regrettably, their efforts were not totally successful. Although Asidates' activities are attested in this instance only, they should be regarded as representative of the day-to-day policing activities incumbent upon an estate owner.

It is impossible to speak of local nobles as a uniform class. A number of variables such as descent and past service for the empire come into play in determining a lesser officer's influence and social status. One may add the source of his property (a gift of the Shah? the satrap? both? was he a benefactor of the Shah?), and the length of time the owner or his family resided in the sector in which the estate was located. And to these may be also added whether the local noble held some title in the court hierarchy at Susa: the local nobles Megaphernes in Cappadocia (Xen. Anab. 1.2.20) and Tiribazos in west Armenia (4.4.4) held such titles (philos, phoinikistēs) and would possess a greater nobility than those who did not. Nationality and specific family ties played a dual role: while an Iranian related to the Achaemenid family might initially possess a higher status, the tendency for intermarriage would

disperse that superiority among a variety of lesser officers within a few generations, thereby reducing the initial status variance.³⁶

City bosses, tribal chieftains, and dynasts, like satraps and propertied nobles, were expected to follow the same administrative guidelines. But here too it is impossible to speak about these officials as uniform classes. Very few of these lesser officers are well-attested (Zenis and Mania of the Troad, below, and the Hekatomnids, chapter 5, are notable exceptions). What should be stressed is the overall mobility which existed among all types of lesser officers, a result of the service and status orientation of Achaemenid administration (see below, section 3), personal capabilities, and intermarriage. A few examples, to be considered in detail in later chapters, may be listed here. Tiribazos began his career as a lesser officer, a local noble with estates in western Armenia, and was promoted to be satrap at Sparda. Datames, a Carian, began as a local noble in Cilicia, and went on to control large sectors of the Anatolian interior. The Hekatomnids began as lesser officers--a mix of city boss in Mylasa and dynast in Caria--and became satraps of Caria and Lycia. The brothers Mentor and Memnon began their chequered careers as mercenary captains, but rose to own large estates after their sister married into the satrapial house of Dascylium. One can note that original status, nationality, and geographic location posed no hindrance to advancement--if the personal abilities existed.

C. Special Officers: The Karanos

Extraordinary threats to the Achaemenid Empire and extraordinary

demands on Achaemenid officers necessitated the creation of special officers, i.e. officers who represented an exception to the normal series of administrators present in a given sector. Such officers were created to deal with a specific task; once the task was completed the need for such an officer no longer existed. The creation of such an officer carried with it advantage and disadvantage. The special officer could possess the ability to muster a variety of resources and deal with a problem beyond the abilities of a single highest officer and encompassing more than a single satrapy. However, that special officer represented a discontinuity in administration in that those men normally highest in status in a given sector were reduced to subordinate position. A long term presence of a special officer could create personnel problems in that he was a relatively accessible alternative to the highest officer who might be sought out by those lesser officers on less than the best of terms with the highest officer and who might countermand orders and oppose policies of the highest officer. The special officer was thus in theory and practice an infringement on the highest officer's arche and philotimia (see section 5). It would be hoped that loyalty to the crown, who dispatched the special officer, would overcome the satrap's resentment.

The above is theory, but what of practice? The specifics are much harder to get at. In only one instance are we given both the name and title of a special officer, Cyrus, a man not previously stationed in Anatolia. Xenophon Hell. 1.4.3 indicates he was karanos tōn eis Kastōlon athroizomenōn. Hirsch has examined this title and the comparative passages (Xen. Anab. 1.1.2, 1.9.7) and argues that karanos is Old Persian

for the Greek strategos, a man who leads an army. Karanos thus becomes a rather vague title in itself, e.g. how large an army is led? and for how long? tōn eis Kastolon athroizomenōn adds an element of specificity. The title is distinct from the other portion of Xenophon's description (Xen. Anab. 1.9.7): Cyrus is satrapēs of Lydia (Sparda), Inner (or Great) Phrygia, and Cappadocia. This characterization raises a problem which I will touch upon briefly below.

If karanos simply means general, then it is possible to point to a number of men, special officers at some point in their careers, who led large numbers of men and could thus be entitled karanos.³⁷ Pharnabazos is one such officer on the Egyptian campaigns of the 380's and 370's. He was originally highest officer at Dascylium, passed the satrapy to his eldest son Ariobarzanes (see next chapter) and journeyed to the court to marry one of Artaxerxes' daughters. He was then posted to lead forces drawn from Anatolia and Ebir-nari against rebel Egypt (Iso. 4.140, Plut. Artax. 24, 27, Nepos Datames 3, Diod. 15.29, 41-44, Xen. Hell. 5.1.28). What makes Pharnabazos a special officer is that he was dispatched by the Shah, was not an officer from Ebir-nari (or Egypt), does not appear to reside in Ebir-nari after the campaigns, and dealt with a specific problem, rebel Egypt. Pharnabazos' colleague on both campaigns, Tithraustes, also appears to have been a karanos. More than one special officer could be dispatched to complete a single job. In sum, with the title karanos used in only two passages (Xen. Anab. 1.9.7, Hell. 1.4.3) and applied to only one man by name (Cyrus), it is not possible to determine whether the title is a technical or a descriptive one.

Cyrus' career as karanos (407-401) is well attested, but is somewhat

exceptional because of his high status--he was son of Darius II--and the length of time he remained in Anatolia. Unlike Pharnabazos, Cyrus does not appear to have led troops in a major campaign against a sector outside Anatolia. The fact that Cyrus remained so long in a relatively stationary mode created severe discontinuities in provincial administration even before he rebelled against his brother, Artaxerxes II. Our principal source, Xenophon, Cyrus' employee, calls him satrap of Sparda, Inner Phrygia, and Cappadocia (Anab. 1.9.7, cf. Hell. 1.4.3, Plut. Artax. 2.2, Diodorus 14.19.2), implying that he supplanted the officers previously in charge of those sectors. Data are lacking on the second and third sectors in the list, but we know Tissaphernes had been satrap at Sparda for a number of years. If one accepts Xenophon's use of satrap as legally precise, i.e. that Cyrus was now highest officer at Sparda, then Darius II is guilty of a serious error in personnel management. Cyrus was made *karanos* to get him out of a position in which he could intrigue for the throne and into a position in which he could end the cut-throat competition between Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes for the use of the Spartan fleet as a means of removing the Athenians from Anatolia. To dismiss Tissaphernes summarily and send him off to brood in Caria may end competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos but creates a dangerous situation in Anatolia, in which Cyrus is resented by those supplanted. To preserve Darius' good sense, I suggest that Xenophon's use of satrapēs is more a description of the political situation at the time Cyrus rebelled. The *karanos* had in fact, but not in theory, supplanted the normal state of affairs in Anatolia. In Sparda, his long residence at Sardis (e.g. Xen. Hell. 1.5.1, cf. Oec. 4.20-25) caused him to eclipse Tissaphernes' influence

in large measure (Anab. 1.2.4). Legally, Tissaphernes was highest officer at Sparda, but in reality people looked to the less dour karanos (e.g. Xen. Anab. 1.1.5). We hear of accusation made by Tissaphernes at the outset of Artaxerxes' reign (Anab. 1.1.3), and warfare between the supporters of the satrap and karanos (1.1.6-9). Cyrus' rebellion brought to completion the development of the worst possible case of discontinuity created by the presence of a special officer.³⁸

Documentation is too poor to permit discussion about other specific types of special officers. Their titles are not known. Their identities, save for Tithraustes (when he executed Tissaphernes, Xen. Hell. 3.4.25), are not given. To the Greeks who provide our documentation, only the karanos maintained a high enough visibility to attract attention consistently among outsiders.

D. Military Organization

Unlike officers in some modern constitutional states, the officers of the Achaemenid empire possessed military, as well as civil, authority. As a result the structure of the military in Anatolia paralleled civil administration. The basic unit in Achaemenid forces was a body of loyal local men led by their local officer. An estate owner, like Asidates, led his retinue into battle. This arrangement could be found in small policing campaigns as well as in large invasion forces (Hdt. 7.96). Officers familiar with and to their troops campaigned in regions with which they were familiar (e.g. Datames' operations near Cilicia before 374 B.C., cf. chapter 4). There were disadvantages to this decentralization: forces took a long time to mobilize and assemble (Xen. Anab. 1.5.9),

usually at some central point (e.g. the Castolus, Xen. Anab. 1.1.2, 1.9.7, Hell. 1.4.3). A lengthy build-up of troops in a particular locality created problems for the sector in which they were stationed (e.g. Diod. 16.41, on preparations for an Egyptian campaign). The most dangerous aspect of mobilization was that sectors from which troops were drawn were partially denuded of loyal local men, and the potential existed for stepped up activity by recalcitrants, particularly tribal peoples.

The high command of campaigns followed a pattern of division according to armament types and the home sector of the commander. One commander was placed in charge of the fleet, another of the land forces; one was a local man, the other more closely tied to Susa. For example, in 490 forces were led by the local Artaphernes of Sparda and the centrally-appointed Datis. The same type of arrangement is found in the Cypriote operations of the late 380's (see chapter 3). This arrangement offered advantages and disadvantages. One major officer could be absent to consult with the Shah. The Shah would believe that his interests would be represented in the person of the commander who was not local, while the other commander was a man familiar to the troops, one for whom they could easily find loyalty. Occasionally, the man sent by Susa could have already acquired some expertise and visibility in the campaign theater or the source of troops. Pharnabazos, once satrap at Dascylium, appears as *karanos* in the Egyptian campaigns on which troops from Anatolia are used (see chapters 2 and 3). But personal differences among the commanders, e.g. rivalry or resentment over favorite son status, were constant, accompanying disadvantages.

The campaign served as a proving ground and an outlet for advancement. Mazaios, satrap of Cilicia, performed well in Ebir-nari, and thus Phoinicia and Syria were added to his sphere of influence (see chapter 7). Military ability propelled Mentor and Memnon to high status. Possible objections to the pro-Spartan tilt of Artaxerxes' Greek policy after 387 were avoided by posting Pharnabazos, with high status and power, to Ebir-nari.

E. Replication

The different administrative elements of the Achaemenid empire, in particular the Shah, highest officers, and lesser officers, face the same types of problems, undertake the same types of activities, and--save for the Shah--follow the same types of guidelines for operation, although all of the above takes place on a variety of scales. For example, Asidates, in his warfare with local Greek political bosses, faced a miniature of the Greek problem with which his superior, Tissaphernes, was dealing. Replication is found outside Anatolia, too: Herodotus 1.192 preserves a rather full description of the wealth of the satrap of Babylonia, Tritantaechmes. Like the Shah from his Empire, so Tritantaechmes drew bullion and kind from his satrapy as revenues.

The careers of Zenis and Mania illustrate replication rather well because they are well documented in Xenophon's Hellenica (all references which follow are to that work). The two were subordinate to Pharnabazos of Dascylium and controlled part of Aiolis. Zenis was a compliant local man (3.1.10) and was left in control. He operated along the same guidelines as the satrap, maintenance of order in his sector, payment of

tribute--but to the satrap (3.1.11). When he died, leaving behind his wife Mania and a teenage son (3.1.14), the store of good will he had laid up in Pharnabazos' house guaranteed that power would continue to be centered in his own family. Mania maintained order, forwarded tribute, assisted the satrap on major campaigns, and expanded her sphere of influence to encompass regions not previously under secure Achaemenid control (3.1.12-13). She became quite wealthy (3.1.15), and was a valued officer of Pharnabazos (3.1.12, 13). Service had led to status.

However, the status and service orientation of Achaemenid administration which had benefitted Mania led to her downfall as a result of bitter rivalry generated by a status variant. Earlier Zenis had sought to increase his own status by making a dynastic marriage: he married his daughter to the political boss of Scepsis, Meidias (3.1.14, 20, 21, 28). Meidias was insulted (3.1.14) that he was in a position subordinate in status and influence to Mania. He executed Mania and her son--his own relatives--and then attempted to have himself rubberstamped--coopted--by Pharnabazos (3.1.15). But Mania's service outweighed considerations of continuity in personnel.

The invasion by Dercylidas of Aiolis (3.1.16ff) at this time offered a chance for Meidias, now a rebel in Pharnabazos' eyes, to continue to hold power. His attempted exploitation of Dercylidas' forces led only to his being exploited by the Spartan, who used Meidias' administrative structure to seize the entire region for Sparta (3.1.20-28). One notes that tension between Pharnabazos' subordinates cost the satrap territory by creating an opportunity for the Greek invaders to score gains. The same would happen later in the fourth century on a

larger scale when satraps squabbled.

Hence on a very local scale the subordinates of Pharnabazos functioned as did he throughout the entire satrapy. One should recall that Zenis and Mania were called satraps by Xenophon (3.1.10), for they did indeed uphold a realm--Pharnabazos'.

Section V. The Ethos of Achaemenid Control

The bluidity and flexibility inherent in the terminology used by the Achaemenids and their observers for the very basic facets of administration become more intelligible when one examines the ethos which lay behind the activities of and interrelationships between Achaemenid administrators in Anatolia.

A. Arche = Philotimia

Following the death of Tissaphernes, satrap at Sparda, Pharnabazos, satrap of Sparda's northern neighbor, Dascylium, met with the Spartan king, Agesilaus, who had just damaged both satrapies. In the previous years, Pharnabazos, although highest officer of his own district, had found himself subordinated to Tissaphernes. He complains openly to his enemy, Agesilaus (Xen. Hell. 4.1.37): If the Shah sends down another strategos and subordinates me to him, I will wish to be both your friend and ally. The satrap then goes on to make the equation of arche (command) and philotimia (here, a mark of honor or distinction). These words say much about the noble ethos of rule in the Empire: Pharnabazos is willing to turn his back on the King if his status and service are not

recognized. But if they are, then he will use all his power to crush the foreign threat to lands entrusted to him (polemēsō humin hōs an dunōmai arista). Achaemenid administration and control were status and service oriented. The concepts of status and service are so closely intertwined that it is difficult to separate them, but one may point to a number of variables which affected one's status and the manner in which one's service was viewed.

These variables are generated by the personal nature of politics in the Achaemenid far west. Status will be affected by one's ancestry, visibility (how prominent an officer seeks to make himself in the performance of his duty), and performance (does he make the right judgments). Ancestry is a complex variable: is the officer a descendent of one of the Seven, how closely is he related to the ruling Achaemenid house, was he born and raised in the district which he controls, was his father or any male relative or ancestor an officer of this or a neighboring sector? Ancestry alone is not enough. Individual personal characteristics, an officer's ability to command respect and honor and to instill fear and terror, are important keys to success. Tissaphernes' inability to be a "team player" hindered him in achieving success and eventually cost him his life.³⁹

Visibility and performance are closely tied to service, a concept included in the term khshathrapavan, and will help overcome any deficiencies in an officer's ancestry. An officer's career is significant: did he always play a military and political role in the sector he governs? To what degree is he an "outsider?" To what degree would he be associated with the court at Susa or with the provinces, i.e. would he be perceived

in the far west as "Susa's boy"? Type and timeliness of service are important, and translate directly into increased status. Artabazos' defense of the northwest in 479 and Tiribazos' bravery at Cunaxa led to promotion for both men. Service is the key to the rise in status of many significant officers of the fourth century: the family of Hekatomnos, Camisares and his son Datames, Autophradates, and Memnon and Mentor.

This status and service orientation in Achaemenid administration made possible the ability for Achaemenid officers to look beyond political differences and treat as equals those who were close to them in status (cf. the overly systematized account presented in Hdt. 1.134.1-2). Hence the ability of Pharnabazos to sit with Agesilaus: both men were of high status and could trace their ancestry back through a number of generations of men who were also of high status. Political differences could be put aside temporarily. It is this noble ethos, the tendency to treat one's equals with honor and respect in recognition of their own status and service, but to deal more formally with one's subordinates in status and service, that Isocrates perverts (4.152).⁴⁰

The roles that status and service play in Achaemenid administration can be noted in Achaemenid terminology. In the King's House, the empire, there was only one master, the Great King. He was King of Kings, his status so high that all other officers were addressed by him as "slave", i.e. bandaka (SIG³ 22, DB II 20, Plut. Alex. 10).⁴¹ Judgment of those who resided within the King's House was passed on the basis of service, how much good will was laid up in the King's House (SIG³ 22, cf. Thucyd. 1.129.3, Diod. 15.10-11).

The close tie between status and service is apparent in one of the basic tenets of administration, the rewarding of benefactors, the punishment of malefactors. In the words of Darius: ". . . the man who was loyal, him I rewarded well; (him) who was evil, him I punished well . . ." ⁴²

Service to the crown, or to any other officer, translated into higher status. To become a benefactor, or orosanga (Hdt. 8.85), of the crown was thus a key to advancement. Ancestry, nationality, or present status ⁴³ did not hinder the process.

The importance of becoming a benefactor to the king will be noted in the careers of many of the officers of the empire. Attaining this status carried with it monetary, property and political gain (e.g. Hdt. 3.154, 160, 8.85). An officer might attain special privileges (which could pass to heirs), a sort of immortality in the King's House. Such was the case for Darius' six companions (Hdt. 3.84), and for the officers who stood out in the defense of the northwest (e.g. Mascames and Boges, Hdt. 7.106-107). If present at the scene of some action, the King could be instrumental in determining the identity of his benefactors (so Xerxes at Salamis, Hdt. 8.90.4, or Artaxerxes II with Tiribazos while hunting, Diod. 15.10.3).

There were negative aspects to this orientation of administration, and they may be mentioned here briefly. Because arche was philotinia and because a key to success was the building up of one's status through visible and timely service, an undercurrent of competition and rivalry existed in the relations between Achaemenid officers (though some individuals were able to cooperate very well with their contemporaries). The deleterious effects of this undercurrent are illustrated by the

statement made by Pharnabazos to Agesilaus.

B. Decentralization and Continuity

Earlier I complained about the use of systematizing passages, especially when they are removed from context and their accuracy untested. At this point attention should be focused on two such passages which are quite accurate and which both illustrate and encapsulate a number of features of Achaemenid administration alluded to above and to be discussed in greater detail below.

In the previous section imprecision, variety, and fluidity in the terminology applied to administrators and districts were noted. A passage in Herodotus (1.134.3) indicates one cause for these characteristics: provincial government is decentralized and replicating. In the pre-Achaemenid period, the Medes controlled the entire empire, but each portion of the empire was responsible for governing not only itself but also its environs. The same type of activity thus took place on a number of different levels (what we may call "replicating"). The Medes controlled the empire and its environs, each provincial administrator controlled his province and its environs. The Persians maintained this same scheme. While Herodotus makes this scheme a bit too rigid in his description, thereby paralleling his account of the principles regulating relations between individuals (1.134.1-2), his assessment is basically accurate. When we examine the activities of officers in the far west we find them concerned not only with an administrative district, but also that district's environs. Control encompasses a sphere of influence.

Within the sphere of a highest officer one will find multiple spheres belonging to lesser officers.

This first passage, in which the Achaemenids maintain and adapt an administrative practice of those from whom they wrested control, points to continuity. Such continuity is illustrated in a second passage from Herodotus (3.15.2-3). The historian has just been discussing Cambyses' conquest of Egypt and his inability to leave the old royal family in control though as subordinate to himself. He goes on to state that the Persians are accustomed to honor the sons of kings, and give to the children of rebel kings the kingdoms held by their fathers. Herodotus gives examples from the history of Persian Egypt. Here is continuity in administrative personnel: leave in charge those already of high status, if their service will be in the Shah's interest.⁴⁴ This continuity, along with support for the native order, reliance on local men, and a desire to reuse rebels will receive more detailed attention below.

C. General Guidelines in Provincial Administration

A number of characteristics of Achaemenid administration have begun to emerge. In order to place them in context and understand their interconnections one must examine the minimum goals set for administration, the guidelines according to which all administrators should operate. And here, too, one can note broad characteristics. Darius defines his control as follows (DPe 5-18, cf. DB I 17-20, DNa 15-30)⁴⁵: "By the favor of Ahura-Mazda, these are the countries (i.e. peoples) which I got

into my possession with this Persian folk, which felt fear of me (and) bore me tribute . . ." This represents the basic requirements: obedience and money (i.e. revenue). The successful administrator will be one who maintains a semblance of order in his sphere and its environs, and forwards, with some semblance of regularity, tribute--bullion, goods, or services--to his superior.

These are general guidelines, and we shall see that in Anatolia all officers had much discretionary power. But the guidelines are intertwined, and an example is provided by Thucydides 8.5.5-6.1: Tissaphernes, satrap at Sparda, is told to get in his taxes and remove the rebel Amorges, who is operating in Caria, in the southern portion of Tissaphernes' sphere of influence. Pharnabazos, satrap at Dascylium, is also commanded to get his taxes in. But it is the lack of internal order, i.e. the presence of hostile foreign forces in Anatolia, who also support those hostile to Achaemenid administrators, which hinders the collection of revenues and reduces the potential source of revenues. Note that the Shah, Darius II, has issued a general command--the local administrators must work out the particulars for themselves.

Up to this point a number of basic features in Achaemenid administration, with special reference to Anatolia, have emerged: a status and service orientation, decentralization, continuity, broad guidelines for administrators. All are generated by the personal nature of politics in the empire (and its ensuing fluidity) and the empire's multi-ethnic nature (thereby building in variety and flexibility). Now it is proper to turn to a further elucidation of characteristics already alluded to.

Section VI. Techniques and Characteristics

The mechanics of Achaemenid administration in Anatolia were based on practical considerations of time and space which separated the far west from the seat of central authority. Both central and local authorities desired to run the border region with some measure of cost-effectiveness, i.e. the desire to generate steady sources of revenue without extensive capital outlays. To do so required a) the flexibility to deal with local variety, b) continuity in administrative practice and personnel, i.e. maintenance of mechanisms by which revenue was generated in the past. The techniques and characteristics are so closely intertwined that it is difficult to display them as discrete entities, and there will be some repetition in presentation. But, by examining the same events from different angles, different facets of a whole appear in brighter illumination.

A. Local Independence

Officers, both highest and lesser, possessed a high degree of local independence in formulating and effecting policy. The satrap possessed a high level of discretionary power, in large part due to the very broad guidelines by which he was to act to meet the requirements of successful administration, i.e. maintenance of the goals referred to in the previous section. Local independence may be seen in the small scale diplomatic and military efforts designed to maintain stability and agricultural productivity in a sector. Asidates' warfare with local Greeks (Xen. Anab. 7.8), discussed above, is an illustration. The highest officer could

undertake more wide-ranging activities such as Artaphernes' administrative restructuring of the western parts of his sphere following disturbances in the early fifth century (Hdt. 6.42).

Communications in the empire had to be carried out by land and one should not be at all sanguine about the certainty with which information passed from distant border regions to Susa.⁴⁶ Detailed regulations requiring constant direct intervention by the central government will only have consumed time and money without generating revenue. Such regulations could also be viewed as an infringement on an officer's status.

B. Intersecting Spheres and Rivalries

Control in all aspects is to be defined as a sphere of influence, the size of which is directly proportional to an officer's competence in practice, to his status and service in theory. Competence is to include his ability to co-exist and cooperate with other officers and political entities of various status and situated in various localities. One should think of these spheres as intersecting and enclosing, although very rarely does the evidence permit one to detail exactly how and where. The spheres of adjoining officers will intersect, the spheres of the highest officer will enclose the spheres of lesser officers. It may even be possible for the sphere of a lesser officer to lie within the intersection of the spheres of higher officers.

Spheres of varying sizes, broad guidelines, the status and service orientation of administration, and the fact that arche equals philotimia all general personnel problems. Rivalry among officers is one such problem, and for the earlier parts of the fourth century we find the

satraps at Sparda and Dascylium in a constant competition (Tissaphernes v. Pharnabazos, Autophradates v. Ariobarzanes).

A more serious problem is rebellion, a result of rivalry and overriding personal concerns. The loose guidelines by which officers are to operate give rebellion an interpretative nature, i.e. how Susa or superior officers (in the case of more limited concerns) assess first hand local information, including information concerning activities generated as a consequence of local independence and rivalries.

C. Continuity in Personnel

In the empire there was the tendency for a prominent family to remain prominent within a sector or its environs, if that family was competent; the desire of officers to support such families or members thereof and keep them in that sector or its environs because of their familiarity to and with that sector and its personnel. Achaemenid administration in Anatolia was dependent upon local men familiar to and with their sectors.

Continuity in personnel is a result of the personal nature of politics in the Empire, and this nature generates additional aspects: the use of relatives, the training of youngsters in diplomacy and government, the tendency to make political/dynastic marriages. Officers will make use of relatives in the hopes of drawing upon a group of potentially more loyal personnel or of offsetting rivalry at home. Officers will often train their sons in the arts of politics and diplomacy (Pharnabazos' son by Parapita attended the meeting with Agesilaus, Xen. Hell. 4.1.39-40), this as a means of assuring a supply of future and competent

administrators. As these children grow older they can serve as an extension of that officer, a means to extend one's sphere and solidify control within it. One should note that in Anatolia there does not, in spite of Greek characterizations, seem to have been the legal concept of "bastard sons." Polygamy was the norm among administrators (Pharnabazos had at least two wives) and political/dynastic marriages were often contracted. The basic goal in such a marriage was to attain some political advantage, at the very least reduced tension, at most the potential for common political action and, with reference to the next generation, an enlarged and strengthened sphere.

A specific type of continuity in personnel and a result of the desire to run the empire with some measure of cost-effectiveness is the Achaemenid tolerance and support for compliant members of the native order, i.e. those non-Iranian political entities not the result of appointment made by Susa, but who maintain order and dispatch tribute, or at least do not prevent other officers from so doing. A compliant member may be a single individual (a native dynast such as Hekatomnos of Caria), a group of individuals (local indigenous politicians, such as those in control of Ephesus and Miletus in the 340's), or a collective entity (a city state, a tribe or collection of tribes).

D. Cooptation

The desire for cost-effective administration and continuity in personnel resulted in an Achaemenid tendency to coopt rebels. A successful rebel was one who maintained the guidelines set down for officers, but only for his own benefit, not the crown's. Cooptation countenanced

maintenance of the guidelines, but in the interests of both the ex-rebel, who continued to hold his sphere, and the crown and its local representatives, i.e. the ex-rebel would not damage the spheres of his neighbors. By coopting a rebel one saved the expense of thoroughly destroying that rebel's power-base and did not lose future revenue as a result of the damage done to the rebel's holdings and personnel. Cooptation was usually preceded by some sort of punitive campaign or the threat thereof. Occasionally the latter sufficed.

An example is provided by the career of the dynast Euagoras, king of Salamis on Cyprus (see chapter 3). When Euagoras' expansionism threatened stability on Cyprus, punitive campaigns were decreed by Artaxerxes (in the 390's and 380's). Once military force restored the status quo, Euagoras was permitted to remain ruler of his home sector, the city of Salamis, so long as he operated within the administrative guidelines set down by Susa.

E. Checks and Balances

The standard perception of the checks which existed on the power and influence of officers is normally built around the systematizing passages in Xenophon Oec. 4 and Cyrop. 8.6. A rough separation of powers is depicted: Apparently there is a civil official called the archon or satrap (4.5, 7), who is to assure the province's well-being. Military authority resides in two officers. The first is that civil official, whose chiliarchs (4.7, Cyrop. 8.6.1) command troops in the countryside. The second is a phrourarch (4.7, Cyrop. 8.6.1, cf. 8.6.9 where the man is called a chiliarch), a royal appointee with full power over troops

in strongpoints. But the troops the phourarch commands depend on the satrap for supplies. Each year the Shah or a trusted man makes an inspection of the provinces; rewards and punishment are distributed. We have here three elements which make up a system of checks and balances: separation of powers, royal appointees who are not commanded by the satrap but who are provincial officers, and roving investigatory officers. Hirsch has demonstrated that Xenophon's terminology is vague enough to prevent a precise definition of each title and job. An examination of specific examples will indicate that each of the elements is illusory.

The garrison commander is taken to be an example of the first two elements, appointed by the Shah and possessing a force not under satrapial control.⁴⁷ But the only example of a garrison commander who displays any independence from the satrap and resists the authority of a highest officer is Orontas, garrison commander at Sardis (Xen. Anab. 1.6.1). His difficulties are not with Tissaphernes, but with Cyrus, whose long stay at Sardis has made him satrap in fact, but not law (see above). Orontas' difficulties may be traced not to a theoretical series of circumscriptions, but to personal differences based on status. Orontas was of high social status (prosekōn basilei) and performed valuable service (1.6.1, 3). Like Tissaphernes, Orontas resented Cyrus, and by 401 had used his access to troops to create trouble for the karanos. If the satrap and garrison commander checked each other it was more a function of personality than any separation of powers.

A second officer seemingly outside satrapial control, or so his title suggests, is reported in Hdt. 3.128.3, the basileios grammatistēs.

Each satrap supposedly had one, but it is difficult to perceive how such an officer could check the highest officer.

Roving investigatory officers who report to the Shah have been the most problematic. Very often one finds discussions in modern sources⁴⁸ of the "King's Eye", an officer of high status who makes regular inspections, and reports his findings to the crown. Hirsch has made a thoroughgoing study of the evidence and concludes there existed no such officer, the opinion voiced by Xenophon Cyrop. 8.6.16.⁴⁹ Evidence contemporary with the Achaemenid Empire does not agree on the number, status, or function of the officer (Aeschylus Persae 978-985, Hdt. 1.114, Aristophanes Acharnians 91-125, Ctesias ap. Plut. Artax. 12.1-3). Post-Achaemenid era material is hopelessly confused. The Shah relies on a variety of sources for information, not on a single official who can be deluded, bribed, or put out of the way with an "accident". If there existed investigatory officers in Anatolia, I believe they would be found on a very local level, i.e. individual satraps or local nobles might create such officers as a means of keeping up with affairs in the sectors. Such officers could operate with some degree of efficacy because the amount of time required to report to the satrap or noble would be a matter of days, not months. The existence of such local investigatory officers might account for those who are mentioned in the Oeconomicus.

Checks and balances depended not on written regulations, but on the multiplicity of political entities, and on the competition and rivalry generated by the ethos and orientation of Achaemenid administration. It was in the interest of no one political entity that another achieve an

unchallengeable supremacy. Excessively high status attained by one entity translated into a larger arche, but into lower status and smaller arche for those comparable to that first entity. Hence satraps will try to balance each other out, to maintain some sort of parity. Lesser officers will try to balance each other out; many lesser officers to balance a single highest officer; a crown appointee to balance an indigenous political entity; a special officer to balance more than one highest officer or a single quite powerful highest officer. There are literally an infinite number of combinations and permutations, but all are based on the overwhelmingly personal nature of politics and the fluidity which accompanies that nature. We shall presently come to the problems generated by rivalry and competition when we examine the role taken by the Shah in provincial affairs, but first an examination of the properties from which control emanated is in order.

Section VII. Estates and Fortifications

In the previous sections the control exercised by officers was defined as a sphere of influence and the role played in an officer's status was alluded to. These characteristics will become more clear when the properties from which officers operated are examined. One may distinguish, particularly in Anatolia, two basic types of physical plants: estates and fortified strong points. The basic difference between the two is the ratio of men who can be placed under arms to the units of potentially arable land. In an estate, there is a far smaller number of potential warriors per unit of arable land; in a fortified strongpoint there is an

extremely high number of men, but a small amount of arable land. These two types of physical plants are not, in practice, mutually exclusive; on the property of any given officer one can find elements of both.

The typical Achaemenid estate consisted of different types of specialized structures and plots of land.⁵⁰ The size and value of the estate will be directly proportional to the status of the officer holding it, while the ability to increase an estate's size and value will enhance the owner's status. An example is provided by the holdings at Dascylium of Pharnabazos, the satrap (Xen. Hell. 4.1.15-16, 33; Hell. Oxy. 22.3, which implies some royal construction). By the 390's the estate was well-appointed: there was a residence (ta basileia), which we may think of in the sense of a manor house with associated buildings serving more specialized functions. Here would be the seat of all activity-- political, military, economic. Prosperous villages were attached, assuring a supply of agricultural products and workers to produce them. Game was provided by fenced and open enclosures (the former the famous paradeisoi). The nearby Rhyndacus river supplied fish. These natural resources would generate material to satisfy the needs of the estate owner's household, and additional sources of revenue. According to Hell. Oxy. 22.3 Pharnabazos had a store of gold and silver laid up on his estate--profits generated by successful activity. The state of defenses, i.e. the existence of protecting walls for all or part of the estate is uncertain (Xen. Hell. 4.1.17), but I believe their existence to be implied by the presence of military forces at hand for Pharnabazos' use (Xen. Hell. 4.1.25, cf. Arr. Anab. 1.17.2 for guards). Among the oikemata (Xen. Hell. 4.1.33) of Pharnabazos' estate we may assume to

have been fortified strongpoints. Such estates, fortified, with agricultural holdings and attached villages, could be found through Anatolia.⁵¹

There is a paucity of data concerning fortified strongpoints, and it is difficult to make anything but very obvious and general statements about them. We know that they could form part of an estate (cf. Asidates': Xen. Anab. 7.8.12-14), and could act as forward positions and baffles for use against land based recalcitrants (e.g. Hdt. 4.124), but data is lacking on the number, position, and composition in nationality on all but the most prominent forts.⁵² The division of power between satraps and the crown in regard to garrisons, implied in systematizing passages (Xen. Cyrop. 8.6.1-14, Oec. 4.5-11), will be taken up later.⁵³

It is quite proper to speak of the estate and strongpoint as the building blocks of Achaemenid control in Anatolia for they were the focal points from which spheres of influence emanated on the most basic level. Granting property, i.e. giving someone a region of influence, was the means by which one established and increased the Achaemenid presence. Those who received real estate would in their owe allegiance to the one who granted it. In practice, the recipients of an estate were liable for some sort of monetary payment to their superior (cf. Xen. Hell. 3.1.11); in their own self-interest, the recipients would act to prevent any threats to their property, either internal or external. Hence we are back to the goals of administration--money and obedience--on a local level. To hold their estates successfully, owners had to assure the stability which would permit them to generate revenue, part of which was owed to a superior.

Fortified strongpoints protected the estates, while checking local

recalcitrants and dissuading estate owners from disloyal stances. The strongpoint, along with the estate, functioned as a frontline defense against trouble, and held primary responsibility on a local level for the maintenance of those conditions permitting the meeting of the broad administrative guidelines of stability and revenue. The creation of new physical plants solidified Achaemenid control because the number of units possessing that primary responsibility would be increased.

Closely tied to the granting of estates, a practice which both the Shah and the satrap could undertake, was the practice of placing a community under the control of an Achaemenid official. In Anatolia we commonly find Greek communities placed under the control of Achaemenid nobles (e.g. Cyrus' and Tissaphernes' cities in Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-9). Such cities provided the controlling noble with goods and services and increased that officer's political influence and status. The granting of cities was a means of rewarding former enemies for taking a new pro-Achaemenid stance. The most famous cases are the cities controlled by Themistocles, who was a standard by which the Shahs measured the value of later ex-recalcitrants (Plut. Them. 29.9).⁵⁴

Briant has studied the estate and fortified strongpoint with a high measure of sophistication and finds them an expression of Achaemenid ideology.⁵⁵ He argues that this ideology held that an aim in administration--and responsibility for administrators from the Shah on down--was the maintenance of agricultural productivity achieved through the protection of the land and its fertility. The estate and strongpoint are mechanisms by which to achieve this aim, and are generated by geographic considerations. The estate, located on flat land, is an enclosed

and regulated agricultural unit, and should be a physical expression of that aim: stable, fertile, productive, a place in which the human and natural resources of the Empire are nurtured. It is to be a model for its environs. The fortified strongpoint, situated on high ground, serves a dual purpose for Achaemenid administrators. It provides storage for the products generated by the estate and, more importantly, protects the surrounding flat land (i.e. a sphere emanates from the strongpoint) on which the estates are situated and on which significant agricultural activity takes place. Both the estate and strongpoint must act in concert in order to facilitate successful administration: If the high ground is held by recalcitrants, the estate will no longer be productive. If the flat land is in hostile hands, revenues are not collected and the high ground is placed in a state of siege.

To those outside the Achaemenid system, the estate and fortified strongpoint represent quite different things. The estate's property offers a contrast to the surrounding area's poverty, and the estate becomes a focal point for aggression. The fortified strongpoint is a yoke placed upon indigenous peoples by the Shah and coerces them into the compliance which facilitates the existence of the estate, generator of the revenues which fund the Empire and its growth. Briant is to be congratulated for his ability to examine Achaemenid holdings from both perspectives.

In sum, Achaemenid control was based upon two types of structures which existed in a symbiotic relationship: the estate on a plain and fortifications on higher ground. The former provided goods to the latter, while the latter provided protection to the former, thus allowing the

production of those goods. Successful administration of those structures was in the interest of both the occupants and the crown.

Section VIII. Imperial Intervention in Provincial Affairs

Provincial officers possessed large discretionary powers and needed to act within very broad administrative guidelines. Yet they were subordinate to the Great King: when was his hand seen in provincial affairs in Anatolia? Three broad categories can be delineated among the instances when the Shah became involved directly in administration, yet in all these cases he still remained somewhat in the background: communications, tribute, and problems with personnel.

A. Communications and Record-Keeping⁵⁶

Although Hdt. 8.98 waxes eloquent about the speed with which messengers could travel in the Empire, one must assume that outlying regions of the Empire were more often than not not in constant communication with Susa. One should assume long gaps in communication and long turn-over times between dispatch of messages and receipt of replies, particularly in a complex matter. Aristagoras' three months from the coast of Anatolia to Susa (Hdt. 5.50.2) is a most realistic figure. This communications lag circumscribed the degree to which the Great King could intervene directly in frontier affairs.

Royal messages were sent; Dascylium provides archaeological evidence for their existence, but not their content.⁵⁷ We do know that the King's words were the object of awe and respect (Hdt. 3.128.1-5, Polyaeus

7.21.5): Datames performed proskynesis before a royal letter and then offered sacrifice. The existence of a "royal road", or rather a network of relatively well maintained roads, complete with stathmoi basileioi, running through relatively stable sectors (Hdt. 5.52-53, Xen. Cyrop. 8.6.17-18) guarantees the existence of easier travel, but not great speed.⁵⁸ High officers could travel rapidly, but probably because of both their high status and the importance of their mission.⁵⁹

While the existence of the Persepolis Fortification Tablets points to a highly organized bureaucracy in Persis, the heath of the empire, they do not point to a uniform bureaucracy in the empire.⁶⁰ Similar forms of record keeping may well have existed in the Anatolian satrapies, but one must make allowance for variety from satrapy to satrapy. The mere act of record-keeping does not translate into policy-making. A traveller from Susa may expect to receive certain supplies at Sparda--and this expectation accords well with the status and service orientation in administration--but that does not mean that his presence effects any new policy. The tablets are skeletal as evidence: we can point to travel and to rationing systems, not to any political activity associated with travel.

B. Tribute

One might expect to see the royal hand quite clearly in matters of tax assessment and collection, but even in this area of activity one can note flexibility, decentralization, and a somewhat passive attitude on the part of the Shah in times of normalcy. Herodotus 3.89-97 gives a deceptive picture of Achaemenid finances by assigning to each satrapy

an exact and vast amount to be paid, and by crediting the entire arrangement to Darius. The bulk of the evidence points to a reliance on local information, and a resulting flexibility. Polyaeus 7.11.3 and Plut. Mor. 172F report an anecdote in which Darius has the satraps set assessments and then halves the assessment as a means of gaining popularity. The point here is that local information is used in establishing assessments. Theopompus (FGrH 115 fr. 113 = Athen. 145a) reports that it was a long-standing custom that tribute and deipnon, i.e. feeding the royal retinue, were paid according to the size of a locality. Assessment is based on local conditions. Such an assessment would be possible upon receipt of data from local officials. The possibility is also raised for reassessment: if capital development occurs, the tribute owed can be raised. It is in the crown's interest that officers develop their sectors. Assessment based on an ability to pay is noted in Aristotle Oec. 2.1345b 28-1346a 5 on a satrapial level, and in Ael. v.h. 1.31 as an important custom applied to the giving of gifts to the king. Reassessment based on development is reported by Xenophon in the Cyropaedeia (3.2.17-23, 3.1.34) and probably does reflect contemporary practice.

Tribute consisted in bullion, goods, kind, and services. This flexibility in content is indicated in the broad categories Aristotle sets up for the revenues comprising both the royal and satrapial economies (Arist. Oec. 2.1345b 14 - 1346a 5). Local conditions determined the exact nature of the materials offered as tribute: We find frequent mention of horses being paid by those regions noted for horse-breeding (Cilicia: Hdt. 3.90.3, Arr. Anab. 1.26.3, 1.27.4; Armenia: Xen. Anab. 4.5.24, 34; Strabo 11.530; cf. Thessaly, Hdt. 8.113.2). Ideally the

tribute offered would translate into an increased military capacity for Achaemenid forces, and this would be the case in supplying horses. The same close tie between tribute and the military (hence echoing money and obedience) can be noted in fifth century Egypt, when the Egyptians supplied grain to the Persian fort of the White Wall at Memphis (Hdt. 3.91.3).

Frontline responsibility for the collection of tribute and forwarding it to Susa lay with the satrap. The lack of evidence prevents discussion of royal tax collectors, i.e. officers appointed from Susa, who operate in Anatolia, and I find no evidence for any impact of tax collectors on local policy. The high visibility of the phorologoi in Egypt (Diod. 11.71.1-2), who are expelled during the revolt of Inarus, may be due to Egypt's having been a major profit center in the west. In Anatolia, one notes that it is Artaphernes, satrap at Sparda, a local man, who carries out reassessment in his sector (Hdt. 6.42). Dascylium's revenues were forwarded in a caravan led by Mithridates, son of the satrap Ariobarzanes (Nepos. Datames 4; see chapter on Datames, below).

A good part of our evidence for the fourth century concerns the activities of Maussollos, satrap of Caria, and will be discussed in detail in the chapter on the Hekatomnid dynasts. What may be noted here is that the satrap Maussollos is the one who collects tribute (which is assessed with a measure of flexibility and is varied in composition: Polyaeus 7.23.1, Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 4-17), and that he and his subordinates can interpret orders from the Shah for special imposts by taking into consideration local conditions (the basis for the trick in

the last anecdote in Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 18-34). The view that satraps operated with limited resources and limited discretionary power in finances' based only on the example of Tissaphernes (e.g. Hell. Oxy. 19.2, Thucyd. 8.29), who seems to have made it his policy to try to get as much service as possible for as little pay to his mercenaries.⁶¹

C. Problems in Personnel Management

In the Achaemenid Empire political differences were based primarily on personality, not program: officers, particularly satraps, possessed a large amount of discretionary power; their arche was a matter of pride; administration in general was service and status oriented. All these factors generated competition, occasionally unhealthy competition. The results of such competition and the means by which the crown could deal with such competition will be examined here.

1. Satrapial Rivalry

Satrapial rivalry was almost a constant in administrative calculations. It was very rare for highest officers to get on as well as the Hekatomnids and Autophradates (see chapters 5 and 6). Three causes for rivalry may be delineated, but they are somewhat artificial as categories and certainly overlap. The first is variance in status: In the late 380's Orontes and Tiribazos fought in Cyprus against Euagoras (see chapter 3). Tiribazos, once Orontes' subordinate in Armenia, was far more popular with the troops, most of whom were drawn from the sectors he controlled as satrap. Tiribazos and Orontes were equals--both satraps--but Orontes' old superiority to Tiribazos plus Tiribazos' increased popularity created

a status variance which led to accusations and the arrest of Tiribazos. A second cause for rivalry was cut-throat competition in achieving the same goal. Both Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos sought to remove Athenians from Anatolia by securing the use of the Spartan fleet (Thucy. 8.5-6, esp. 8.6.2) and ended up in a competition which did remove some of the Athenians, but permitted the esconcement of Spartan forces. A third cause was intersecting spheres of influence: two highest officers must deal with a single region, each desiring as much gain from it as possible. It is closely related to the second, and may be regarded as its cause.

Satrapial rivalry offered the crown one advantage: an undercurrent of rivalry among highest officers prevented their combining forces to move against the crown. There were disadvantages as well: expenses in the form of lost time and money in the resolution of difficulties in a sector, and breathing room for the Achaemenids' enemies, who could exploit rivalry as a means of achieving temporary, if not permanent, advantage.

The royal response might take a variety of forms, depending upon the seriousness of the rivalry. Such responses made alterations in the status of the officers involved: promotion, demotion, transfer, execution, installation of a special officer. The appointment of Cyrus as karanos in Anatolia was a means by which Darius II hoped to end competition between Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, for Cyrus would be superior in status to both and have full control over the funds to be paid out for use of the Spartan fleet.

2. Rebellion

Rebellion is the worst possible case of rivalry: Here an officer's self-interest, his desire that the fruits of maintaining order and collecting revenues belong only to himself, overcomes his loyalty to his superiors. But because administrative guidelines were broad and flexible, rebellion was often a matter of interpretation and can be clearly defined only in its most serious manifestation: preemptive and wanton destruction by an officer of the physical plant and personnel belonging to a sector controlled by a clearly loyal officer (cf. Polyaeus 7.29.1, Nepos Datames 10.2). In order to determine whether someone was in a state of rebellion his superior made use of first-hand local information, interpreting it on the basis of the nature of the data presented and the status of the one presenting them (cf. DNb 21-24). The response may be varied, ranging from rejection of the data, to investigation, to outright acceptance. The paradox of rebellion is that a highly successful officer may arouse such a high level of resentment among his contemporaries that they will portray his successful activities as the preparation of a power base for use against his superior. The personal nature of politics created many situations in which an officer thought he was preparing something for himself, but was in fact preparing it for his enemies.

As for rivalry, the causes for outright rebellion were based overwhelmingly on personal considerations. None of the rebels discussed in the succeeding chapters opposed the basic guidelines of Achaemenid administration. They simply wanted all of the take, not just a portion. Techniques for dealing with rebellion were similar to those for rivalry,

but more harsh. Often a combination of a punitive campaign and cooption was applied. The key was to get the officer to use the skills he applied in his own self-interest alone to apply them in the service of the Empire as well. Cooptation was cost-effective, time-efficient, and insured a continuity in personnel. Examples may be found in my discussions of Euagoras (chapter 3), Datames (chapter 4), and Mentor (chapter 7).

Very often rivalry and rebellion could be avoided by judicious reduction of an officer's or political entity's status and influence. Particularly recalcitrant tribal peoples might be isolated from their traditional physical plant by transplanting en mass into entirely different sectors (e.g. Hdt. 4.204, 6.20, 6.119, 5.12-16, 98). As a result they would be compelled to be compliant as a means of assuring their future existence. As we shall see in the next chapter, highly successful officers might be posted to different sectors where the king might use their talent without the risk of the types of tensions which might have developed if they remained in their old sectors. Such cross-imperial transfers could also be applied en masse in the case of compliant and valued peoples: Assyrian infantry and Hyrcanian cavalry could be found residing in early fourth century Anatolia, where they aided the estate owner Asidates (Xen. Anab. 7.8.15, cf. Strabo 13.629).

To sum up: The Shah appeared to the far west as a distant regulator who took an active role only in times of abnormal conditions or severe discontinuities. Frontline responsibility resided in the local officers--only their continued failure in meeting guidelines brought in the Shah. But that imperial intervention commonly involved a new set of directives to be carried out by men already on the scene (e.g. the

proclamation of a punitive campaign against Datames, chapter 4) or the dispatch of new local officers to carry out old directives not followed by those who were already in the far west (e.g. Struthas' replacing Tiribazos at Sparda, chapter 2). The Shah remained in the east, moving westward only when the chance existed to recapture the potentially profitable satrapy of Egypt (chapter 7) or when the empire itself was in danger of collapse.

Section IX. The Native Order

A. Tribally-Organized Mobile Recalcitrants

The long description in the title represents only a part of the native order, that part which was the most annoying and expensive with which to deal and which drained the resources of both Iranian and non-Iranian alike. The determining factor in how one dealt with the native order was the degree of internal organization found in the native political entities. Those entities with which it was easier to deal were those who possessed a high degree of internal stability: The inhabitants lived in fixed abodes, were at least partially urbanized, and possessed readily identifiable physical plants whose destruction would terminate the inhabitants' existence as political and economic entities. Such natives, i.e. indigenous peoples, possessed a single readily identifiable form of government, i.e. a single ruler or group of rulers. That government formed the avenue by which the natives could be brought into the Achaemenid system out of a concern for their physical plant. Examples

of such members of the native order included the Cilicians under the Syenneseis, the Carians under the Hekatomnid dynasts, Phoinician city-states, and Lydia under Croesus (see Diod. 9.31.3).

Those peoples who were not urbanized, but were organized into tribes and somewhat nomadic were in need of constant supervision.⁶² There were no large physical plants to threaten with destruction, no single political leader to coopt and command that he see those in his sector did not become disruptive. There were many techniques with which officers could deal with such peoples when they were recalcitrant, but no one technique was sufficient, and many had to be constantly applied.

One may enumerate a number of these techniques: construction of physical barriers and fortified strongpoints; the use of diplomacy, including monetary gifts, to set tribe against tribe as a means of directing their efforts away from damaging Achaemenid resources; marriage with the family of a temporarily superior element as a means of insuring its continued superiority and eventual cooption of the entire group; hiring out forces from such peoples as a means of subduing recalcitrants in their own sector; resettlement en masse; treaty arrangement. But the most significant means of controlling tribally organized recalcitrants was to launch periodic campaigns against them with the aim to keep them away from the Achaemenid physical plant and personnel.

Two examples may suffice here. In eastern Anatolia, in Armenia, were the Carduchi, one of Xenophon's autonomous peoples (Anab. 7.8.25), i.e. governed by no single Achaemenid officer, either indigenous or centrally appointed.⁶³ A river separated the tribes from Achaemenid territory (Anab. 4.3.1), but they had persistently raided the plain and

had destroyed a large army. Although they remained outside Achaemenid control in the fourth century, the satrap, Orontes, had negotiated an agreement by which they were allowed to live in the high country as long as they left Achaemenid property and personnel alone (Xen. Anab. 3.5.16-17, cf. 4.1.4-9). The Pisidians, further to the west, were a constant source of trouble and the objects of campaigns carried out by officers in both Sparda (Polyaenus 7.27.1, Anab. 1.9.14) and Dascylium (Hell. 3.1.13). Cyrus used them as a cloak for his rebellious preparations (Anab. 1.1.11, 1.2.1, 4), by claiming to be organizing his forces for use against them. We find the Pisidians recalcitrant throughout Achaemenid history (Diod. 11.61.4, Xen. Mem. 5.26, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103, Diod. 15.90.3, Nepos Datames 4.4, 6, Polyaenus 7.27.1). Both pro- and anti-Achaemenid forces used them as mercenaries.

B. The Greek Problem

One of the more difficult peoples to control were the Greeks, and until 387 Anatolia was plagued by a most virulent form of the Greek problem, the presence of foreign forces from Balkan Greece which damaged the Achaemenid physical plant and killed Achaemenid officers, regardless of their nationality. These forces were esconced in the Hellenic and Hellenized city-states of the Anatolian coast and off-shore islands, and collected revenues which were normally to go to Achaemenid officers. It was difficult to coopt the Greeks or otherwise regulate their activities because they were not organized into a single state with a single ruler in whose family lay a clear supremacy. The naval superiority which accrued to the Balkan Hellenes gave them high mobility, and the ability

to disrupt Achaemenid activities throughout the eastern Mediterranean. Hence the Greeks, although highly urbanized, were tribally organized mobile recalcitrants.

A variety of techniques were used in regulating Hellenic activity, but they were only stop-gap measures. Many of these techniques were those used in dealing with non-Greek Anatolian recalcitrants. More compliant elements were coopted, and those in exile from their home cities were promised restoration. In times of political instability in a Greek polis Achaemenid officers lent support--usually after being sought out--to those groups who seemed to offer the best possibility of being compliant in the future (e.g. Thucyd. 1.115-116, 3.34). Bribery was used to buy compliance (Thucyd. 1.109.2) or set polis against polis (Xen. Hell. 3.5.1, Paus. 3.9.8 and Hell. Oxy. 7 for variants on the opening of the Corinthian War). Marriage alliances were unsuccessful since there was no single dynast (Pausanias in the early fifth century offered the best hope: Thucyd. 1.95, 128-130). Gifts of land and revenue in Anatolia rendered some major politicians compliant (see above on physical plants).

In the late fifth and early fourth centuries the key to solving the Greek problem lay in achieving a naval advantage. It would have been impossible to expel all Hellenes from Anatolia, but the presence of forces from the Balkan Hellenes could be restricted by possessing the capability to launch attacks directly against them. Since the only secure source for an Achaemenid fleet, Phoenicia, was needed to guard the more valuable Egypt and Levant, it was necessary for the highest officers of the Anatolian coast, Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos, to exploit tensions in the Balkans and coopt the most compliant member of the native

order, and use its naval capabilities. In this case, the Spartans. But rivalry between the two satraps led to setbacks: Spartan forces expelled, but then replaced, Athenian forces in Anatolia. Cyrus used his post as karanos to rebel. Tissaphernes' personality cost him his life. The Achaemenid officers found themselves the exploited as well as the exploiters.

Success came when Artaxerxes II authorized expenditures for the creation of an independent fleet under the command of Pharnabazos. Although made up of Hellenic elements, the fleet personnel obeyed an Achaemenid high command. Yet in this instance, too, Achaemenid officers were trying to coopt the most compliant elements of the native order, using, among others, the Athenians to remove the Spartans. Diplomacy, now aided by naval superiority, did tip the balance in favor of Achaemenid authorities. In 387 the Shah was able to solve the Greek problem decisively by threatening the Balkan Hellenes with destruction if they again damaged his lands. This was the King's Peace.

Much has been written about the peace, but a few elements should be mentioned here.⁶⁴ The terms of the royal proclamation represented a continuity with past policy. Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos aimed for the removal of foreign politicians and troops from Anatolia (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.2.20). Later Tithraustes called for a removal of the foreign order from Anatolia and the resumption of payments to Achaemenid authorities by those sectors under foreign control (Hell. 3.4.25). Later Tithrvustes called for a removal of the foreign order from Anatolia and the resumption of payments to Achaemenid authorities by those sectors under foreign control (Hell. 3.4.25). One should not be confused by the

use of autonomos in these passages: autonomy was a term defined by that power with superior military force, and meant that those under Achaemenid control or just beyond Achaemenid territory were to do nothing to disrupt orderly administration. These are the terms which reappear in 387:⁶⁵

The Greeks are to stay out of Asia. If they do not, the Shah, supported by those who obey his proclamation, will attack mainland Greece in full force. All territory and personnel in Asia, Clazomenae and Cyprus are under the Shah's command. Although other Hellenic cities (with the exception of Athenian Lemnos, Imbros, and Scyros) are called autonomous, it is clear that Artaxerxes intends to be the final arbiter of events. In his threat of waging war he indicates that he will divide the native order against itself.

On the whole the royal proclamation is a document which makes broad and sweeping demands, and is in character with the types of guidelines found in Anatolia. Scholars have wondered whether there were more specific provisions.⁶⁷ That seems doubtful: The King's words about Anatolia, the region of greatest concern to him, are very specific. Additional provisions would have related to activities on the Greek mainland and would limit the options open to Artaxerxes and the nearby satraps in dealing with any resurgence in the Greek problem. Specific provisions would have been out of character with Achaemenid administration. The supervision of activities in the environs of a sphere of influence was the responsibility of the officer holding that sphere, here the satraps at both Sparda and Dascylium. Foreign elements had been removed from Anatolia--that was a royal concern. What these elements did on their own territory was of concern to local Achaemenid

authorities, unless those activities posed serious threats to a number of satrapies.

After 387 we do find the Balkan Hellenes creating problems for Achaemenid authorities, but the disruptive activities take place during times when Achaemenid officers are in conflict with each other, thereby providing an opportunity for the Greeks, whether hired as Achaemenid mercenaries or not, to score gains for their homestates. No unified forward policy was launched by the Greeks during the fourth century, and the growth of the Hekatomnid navy and the kingdom of Macedon restricted the activities of those states which had traditionally damaged Achaemenid territory.

But a new Athenian sea league did develop, and was tolerated by the Shah and his representatives. There seems to have been no concerted effort by Achaemenid authorities at any level to bring to an end the League's existence, although local officers, such as the Hekatomnids, did not hesitate to exploit internal Anatolian and off-shore tensions to lend assistance to those who would seem the most compliant towards a more direct Achaemenid control. A clue to the tolerance of the Second Athenian League seems provided by Cargill's re-examination of the League's structure.⁶⁷ He holds that it offered a system of free alliances, was not aggressively expansionist, and Athenian authorities did not intervene in members' internal affairs in the ways they had during the existence of the earlier protection-arrangement. If Cargill is right, then the League did not represent a perceived threat to Achaemenid control. It did give Achaemenid authorities the advantage of a single group with which to deal; Athens and the other members could be held responsible

for the anti-Achaemenid activities of any member. When organized, the League had recognized the supremacy of the King's Peace.⁶⁸ After 367, when the Shah tilted towards Thebes (see chapter 6), Athens did exploit Persian troubles, but there was no concerted effort to topple Achaemenid control. From the 350's on, the Social War and the rise of Philip blocked the formulation and execution of any forward anti-Achaemenid authorities to launch a preemptive attack to end the League as a political entity.

In sum, both the tribal peoples of Anatolia and the Greeks required the constant attention of Achaemenid officers. Regulating the activities of mobile recalcitrants placed local officers in a continual problem-resolving situation by no means unique to Anatolia (in the far east there was what might be called a Scythian problem). The conflict between more nomadic peoples and more sedentary administrators was one with which the Achaemenids came to grips, but one which outlasted the empire.

Section X. The Aim of This Study

Unlike my predecessors I have not attempted to write in this introduction a "constitutional" history in which I establish a single theoretical hierarchy of imperial administration or fix boundaries of individual administrative units. The primary source material will not permit such a reconstruction. Instead, Persian administration in this complex border region was marked by flexibility, diversity, and, above all, continuity, a continuity which extended beyond the temporal bounds of Achaemenid control into the period of Macedonian domination. There

were many hierarchies of administration existing side by side, replicating each other, acting as checks and balances on each other. It is more accurate to speak of spheres of influence than discrete boundaries: the size of spheres of influence, the ability to control both politically stable and unstable sectors, was dependent upon the competence and power of a variety of local officials.

I will conduct my examination of the fourth century empire from the viewpoint of local authorities as well as central authority. One major focus is the relationships between central and local authority: the great independence of the latter, the relatively mild demands of the former (maintenance of a semblance of order, payment of tribute on a regular basis). A second focus is the relationships between the various local authorities, those who owe their position to appointment by the crown, and those who are political leaders indigenous to their sectors, leaders whose families were left in control because the crown or its representatives believed them to be compliant with the wishes of the central administration.

Prosopographical analysis plays a significant role in my investigation. By examining the backgrounds and activities--as well as titles--of local officials I will be able to elucidate the mechanisms of Achaemenid rule and explain their origins and growth. The continued support by the Achaemenid Shahs of native dynasts, the desire to make continued use of personnel (or their descendants) skilled in, familiar with, and familiar to particular sectors of the empire, the willingness to co-opt rebels and leave them in control of their own spheres of influence are all part of the flexibility and continuity of Achaemenid rule. Flexi-

bility is inherent in the thin and hazy line which separates rebel from loyalist in districts far from the crown, and which divides crown appointees (whose families have already been prominent in a sector for many generations) from indigenous, non-Iranian political leaders.

My emphasis on diversity, flexibility, and continuity in the previous paragraphs is dependent on a recognition of the basic characteristics of the Achaemenid empire: large in geographical extent, multi-ethnic, monarchical. Communications between the capital, Susa, and the outlying regions of the empire, such as Anatolia, will normally be long and difficult. Different regions of the empire will be of different monetary and strategic value to the crown, make different demands on administrators, and meet different responsibilities. In a monarchy, power rests foremost in personalities, not in a single written body of laws applicable in all sections of the realm. As a result, I intend this study to be a regional one. I do not anticipate that the systems of rule I have elucidated for Anatolia will be found throughout the ethnically heterogeneous empire, although similar approaches to similar problems might have been taken elsewhere by the crown.

Footnotes

¹ So in the standard modern history of the Achaemenid Empire in English: A.T. Olmstead History of the Persian Empire (Chicago, 1948) 59.

² Compare Isocrates 4.150-153, 5.101-104 to C. Hignett Xerxes' Invasion of Greece (Oxford, 1963) 91: ". . . the empire owed its creation to brute force and was held together by brute force. . . . most of the peoples in the western half of the empire felt little loyalty to rulers whose rule remained alien to the end, and had no zeal for wars of conquest in which they had to serve against their will." And 93: ". . . but most of the subject peoples were at best apathetic and had no zeal for the cause of an alien despotism." I refer the reader to my examination of the Hekatomnid dynasty of Caria in chapter 5 for one refutation of the sentiments held by Isocrates and Hignett.

³ One may note two trends in modern attempts to study the administration of the Achaemenid Empire, Anatolia in particular. The first is an attempt to draw up satrap-lists, i.e. present a list of officers with as few blank spaces as possible. The second trend, which encompasses the first, seeks to present a single theoretical administrative hierarchy complete with precise satrapial boundaries and separation of power.

The earliest work I have examined is P. Krumbholz De Asiae Minoris Satrapis Persieis (Leipzig, 1883), who tried to draw up lists of satraps for those sectors he believed to be provinces. The chief flaws in his work are the excessive attention paid to titles given Persian officers in the sources, at the expense of their functions, and his unwillingness to reject the evidence of Hdt. 3.89ff when that systematizing passage did not reflect officers' activities elsewhere in Herodotus. Th. Nöldeke's review of the work (Göttingische gelehrte Anzeiger, 1884, 290-300) added an important element--prosopographical analysis. Questions about Achaemenid administration could be answered by going beyond title, and onto an examination of personalities. Beloch² 3:2 pp. 131-156 is representative of more modern attempts to draw up satrap lists with few blank spaces.

The tendency to set precise boundaries for satrapies, found to an extent in the works cited above, derives from Hdt. 3.89ff, which purports to give Darius' rearrangement of the empire into 20 administrative units. I leave aside for the moment the depressingly large amount of literature generated by attempts to reconcile Herodotean evidence with Old Persian documents, but will note some early studies which did attempt to delineate administrative units: Lehmann-Haupt "satrap" RE 2A:1 cols. 82-188; Ernst Meyer Die Grenzen der hellenistischen Staaten in Kleinasien (Zurich, 1925) 1-12; Oskar Leuze Die Satrapieneinteilung in Syrien und im Zweistromlande von 520-320, Schriften der Königsberger gelehrten Gesellschaft, Hft. 11.4, 1935 (review: Bengtson Gnomon 13 [1937] 113-129) is of some value for Anatolia, and does offer corrections to some of Lehmann-Haupt's less satisfactory conclusions. In all of these works the "Darius-constitution"

looms large, and nearly unassailable. For the later Achaemenid Empire see: P. Krumbholz De discriptione regni Achaemenidarum (Eisenach, 1891) and Berve Alexanderreich I 253-258.

⁴The works cited in notes 1 and 3 have all accepted in some form that Greek belief. The most offensive passages are Hdt. 3.89-96 and Xenophon Oec. 4, Cyrop. 8.6. These formed the basis for the unfortunate work by Adolf Buchholz, Quaestiones de Persarum Satrapis Satrapiisque (Leipzig, 1894), which develops in detailed form the data presented later in Olmstead (note 1). Buchholz did not question the basic validity of the systematizing passages in Herodotus and Xenophon, and set about delineating the types of officers, complete with separation of powers. He believed Xenophon's data to reflect the state of affairs established by Darius, and so combined them with Herodotus' (pp. 8-22): before Darius, the satrap was an officer who held power for a long period of time and possessed civil and military authority. Then Darius instituted the collection of tribute in fixed amounts (cf. Hdt. 3.89.3). As a result a separation of powers (per Xenophon's scheme) was instituted. The satrap became a purely civil authority who also collected tribute. Military authority lay in an imperator, who held office for only one year. The satrap and imperator were to check each other.

Buchholz' fixation on titles culminates in an unsatisfactory list of officers (p. 59), which displays an excessive reliance on the creation of special officers to explain away troublesome titles in the Greek sources, titles which were not of legal value in the first place. For example, Thucydides' characterization of Tissaphernes as stratēgos tōn katō (8.5.4) troubled Buchholz (p. 30) and continues to plague scholars who believe the titles to be official administrative terminology, and not a somewhat imprecise job description. Cf. A.W. Gomme, A. Andrewes, and K.J. Dover A Historical Commentary on Thucydides. Vol. V.: Book VIII (Oxford, 1981) 13-16.

For some of the problems inherent in making the systematizing passages a starting point without questioning their accuracy see D.M. Lewis Sparta and Persia (Leiden, 1977) 53 n. 21.

There have been advances in perceiving provincial administration: Richard N. Frye "The Institutions" Beiträge zur Achämenidengeschichte (Gerold Walser, ed., Historia Einzelschriften 18 [1972]) 88-91; Chester G. Starr "Greeks and Persians in the Fourth Century B.C." Iranica Antiqua 11 (1975) 41-76; Lewis Sparta and Persia 55-56 on satrapial boundaries.

On the office of the "King's Eye" (see text below) consult the excellent study by Steve Hirsch Xenophon and Persia (diss., Stanford, 1981) 185-233.

⁵The standard reconstruction of fourth century Achaemenid Anatolia remains Walther Judeich's Kleinasiatische Studien (Marburg, 1892). Judeich deserves high praise for taking all available source material (in 1892) and setting it into some order. However, he did not subject his reconstruction (or the sources on which it was based) to serious

scrutiny. The same fault--tying together source material without source criticism--appears in his linear descendants, Olmstead included. Judeich has marred recent works such as Starr's (above, note 4) and John Buckler The Theban Hegemony (Cambridge, Mass., 1980).

The earliest portions of the fourth century, which lie somewhat outside the scope of this work, have recently received attention in two superior studies by H.D. Westlake, whose perception of Achaemenid administration is somewhat more sophisticated than his predecessors': "Ionians in the Ionian War" CQ 29 (1979) 9-44, and "Decline and Fall of Tissaphernes" Historia 30 (1981) 257-279. For the fifth century there is the long-overdue corrective to Herodotus provided by T. Cuyler Young, Jr., "480/479 B.C.--A Persian Perspective," Iranica Antiqua 15 (1980) 213-239.

⁶An up-to-date linguistic study of the term satrap with full references is provided by Rudiger Schmitt, "Der Titel 'Satrap'," in Davies and Meid, eds. Studies in Greek, Italic and Indo-European Linguistics (Festschrift Leonard Robert Palmer) Innsbruck, 1976, pp. 373-390 (373-4 on Old Persian documents); one may still consult C.F. Lehmann-Haupt "satrap" RE 2A:1 (1921) 82-85. Also Kent Old Persian 125-6, 181.

⁷There are problems in these inscriptions. In SIG³ 134a Struthas is called satrap of Ionia, yet Ionia did not exist as a separate administrative unit. I discuss this problem in the next chapter.

⁸Evidence from Lycia in general: Schmitt Palmer Festschrift (above, n.6) 376-380. Further discussion appears in the Hekatomnid chapter.

⁹One may consult, for examples of terminology--and how not to systematize it--Krumbholz 4-5, note 1; Gomme HCT V:VIII 13-16; Robert CRAI (1975) 312-313.

¹⁰I will discuss the vexed question of the status of Cyrus and Tissaphernes later in the text. For the problems with terminology regarding Tissaphernes see Gomme HCT V:VIII 13-16.

¹¹Evidence from Xenophon's admirer, Arrian, will not enter into this study until the last chapter. His use of satrapes and hyparchos for highest officer is discussed most recently in Bosworth Arrian I 111-112.

¹²Osborne Grazer Beiträge 3 (1975) 296 n.9.

¹³Emendations have been proposed, but without any foundation in the mss.

¹⁴Here, too, a number of emendations have been proposed, but the mss. (except for v) read tōn de Ionōn.

¹⁵Eg. SIG³ 167, 170, the Xanthus decree. A complete discussion is given in the chapter on the Hekatomnids. Diodorus normally applies the term dynastes or some form of the verb dynasteueim to the Hekatomnids: 14.98.3, 15.2.3; 16.7.3; 16.36.2; 16.42.6; 16.45.7; 16.69.2; 16.74.2.

The terms dynast is also applied to native, i.e. indigenous, rulers within the Achaemenid empire who are not of Persian extraction and whose names are non-Greek. In Diod. 14.20.2 the Syennesis is the dynast of Cilicia. Tennes of Sidon is called king in 16.42.2, but is dynast in 16.43.1 (probably the result of varietio, since Diodorus has just mentioned the king of the Persians).

I have found the term dynasteia used to describe the power of Oroites, satrap at Sparda, in 10.16.4, but this passage is from the fragmentary sections of Diodorus and may not be his exact words.

¹⁶The unusual characterization of the satraps in 14.98.3 as commanding cities is probably a recognition of their ultimate power over the Greek cities of their sectors, although another interpretation might even be that these satraps are actually city bosses, but erroneously labelled.

¹⁷Satrap: Diod. 13.37.4, 13.63.2, 13.104.6, 14.11.1; Strategos: 13.40.6 (this may be used here because Diod. is talking about military leaders).

In book 13 Diodorus seems oblivious to the fact that there are two Persian satraps active in the Ionian War, Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes, and so creates a single officer, a "mega-Pharnabazos." On this, see Andrewes Phoenix 25 (1971) 213-214 n.5 and Krumbholz 90-92.

Variatio may explain what seems to be a third example in 17.48.3 where Amyntas arrives as a "replacement" for the satrap of Egypt, but calls himself strategos as he tries to take up the dead man's office.

¹⁸Noted by Osborne GB 3 (1975) 296 n.9.

¹⁹Cf. Leuze Satrapieneinteilung 19.

²⁰Paphlagonians as trouble for Pharnabazos: Xen. Hell. 4.1 (cf. note 46, above), Plut. Ages. 11, Xen. Ages. 3.4. As a concern for Datames: Nepos Datames 2-3, Theopompus FGxH 115 fr. 179.

I strongly doubt that Korylas (Xen. Anab. 6.1.2ff, 7.8.25) is an Achaemenid nobleman; from the goings on he seems a tribal chieftain.

A brief summary of Paphlagonia under Achaemenid and Macedonian hegemony may be found in Easworth Arrian I 188-189; he mistakenly believes Spithridates' Otyes to be Datames' Thys. Paphlagonia continues to be an object of concern throughout the fourth century for the satraps

of Dascylium and Cappadocia, whether their overlords are Persian or Macedonian.

²¹I add the words in parentheses to cover Datames, who is actually a Carian by birth, and who is found as satrap of Cappadocia in Diod. 15.91.2. All this is discussed in the later chapter on Datames.

²²Published by Robert CRAI (1975) 306-330.

²³Tamos, a subordinate officer operating in the satrapy of Sparda, offers a convenient example: He is subordinate to the satrap Tissaphernes during the early stage of his career, and is called hyparchos (Thucyd. 8.31.12, 8.87.1), Herodotus' term for satrap. Later in his career he is subordinate to Cyrus and is called epimeletēs (Diod. 14.19.6) and then is included among the satrapai (14.35.2-3) who worked for Cyrus.

²⁴I leave aside for the moment special types of officers: garrison-commanders, investigatory officers, and the karanos. All will be considered below when I produce a list of theoretical types of officers operating in the service of the Achaemenid Empire.

²⁵For the Old Persian documents in general see Kent Old Persian esp. pp. 107-163. The literature which attempts to analyze Herodotus' satrapy-list and reconcile it with Old Persian documents is vast. All the works cited in notes 3 and 4 (above) offer discussions. Attempts at reconciliation were called to a halt by George G. Cameron "The Persian Satrapies and Related Matters" JNES 32 (1973) 47-56. Also valuable are the remarks in Richard N. Frye "Remarks on Kingship in Ancient Iran," Acta Antiqua 25 (1977) 75-82, esp. 75-78. Frye responds to the unfortunate efforts at systematization in Cl. Herrenschmidt, "Désignation de l'empire et concepts politiques de Darius I d'après ses inscriptions en vieux-perse," Studia Iranica 5 (1976) 33-65.

One may generate earlier bibliography from the following more recent studies on the literary and artistic records of peoples under Achaemenid control: Gerold Walser Die Völkerschaften auf den Reliefs von Persepolis (Berlin, 1966); Ernst Herzfeld The Persian Empire (ed. Gerold Walser; Wiesbaden, 1968) 288-297; Erich F. Schmidt Persepolis III (Chicago, 1970); M. Roaf "The Subject Peoples on the Base of the Statue of Darius," Cahiers de la D.A.F.I. 4 (1974) 73-160; O. Kimball Armayor "Herodotus' Catalogues of the Persian Empire in the Light of the Monuments and the Greek Literary Tradition," TAPA 108 (1978) 1-9.

A highly unsatisfactory list of administrators and provinces is tacked onto the end of Xenophon Anab. 7.8. The best discussion may be found in Leuze Satrapieneinteilung 163-192.

²⁶In this respect the list of peoples given by Aristagoras in Hdt. 5.49 comes much closer to the character of the Achaemenid documents than Hdt. 3.89ff.

²⁷ On the veracity of this document and its usages see Brandenstein and Mayrhofer Handbuch des Altpersischen 91-98.

²⁸ Examples are cited in Gomme HCT V:VIII 15 for Herodotus, Xenophon, and Thucydides. These vague terms will be considered in my discussion of individual officers.

Diodorus, here, too, has not received due attention: these broad geographical designations are his most common way of referring to regions controlled by Achaemenid officers.

1. with satrapēs or satrapeia: 14.19.2, 14.35.2, 14.98.3, 16.52.2, 16.75.1-2
2. with strategos or strategeia: 9.35.1, 13.36.5, 14.99.1, cf. 16.50.7
3. in general: 15.90, 16.44.4, 17.23.6

²⁹ Cawkwell CQ 31 (1981) 72 n. 10 resolves the problem faced in Lewis Sparta and Persia 146 n.68 and provides additional references.

³⁰ Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 51-56 on Sparda and Dascylium.

³¹ Tissaphernes, satrap of Sparda, owned property in Caria (Xen. Hell. 3.2.12), probably a reward for his efforts against Amorges. Lewis Sparta and Persia 83 gives an opposite view: Tissaphernes was an Iranian who possessed estates in Caria and was a local man sent against Pissouthnes, Amorges' father. Arsames, long-time satrap in Egypt and member of the Achaemenid family, owned property in both Egypt and Mesopotamia. His affairs are conveniently detailed in G.R. Driver Aramaic Documents of the Fifth Century B.C. (abridged and rev. ed., Oxford, 1957).

³² In this passage Xenophon uses satrapēs as signifying a highest officer of Iranian origin who is not indigenous to the sector he will control.

³³ The point in Hdt. 4.166.2 should be that it is not the striking of coinage which is an act of disloyalty, but the ways in which that coinage will be used (e.g. building up a force to use against elements loyal to the Shah).

³⁴ Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 58.

³⁵ Diod. 15.41.5 implies constant communication even on small matters between the satrap and Shah. However, this passage, which occurs in the context of the Egyptian campaign of the mid-370's, is designed to draw an unfavorable comparison between the vigorous Iphicrates and the slow and over-cautious Pharnabazos (cf. 15.41.2, 44). Consultation was normal for significant policy moves (e.g. Hdt. 5.31-32, Diod. 15.4).

³⁶Non- or partial Iranians appear as the recipients of estates: Metiochus (Hdt. 6.41), Amyntas (Hdt. 8.136.1), Phylax (Hdt. 8.85.3).

³⁷For earlier periods one may point to Harpagos in the sixth (Hdt. 1.177) and Mardonius in the fifth (Hdt. 6.43) centuries.

³⁸Regrettably, a detailed consideration of Cyrus is beyond the scope of this study. I confine myself to these few observations: While Cyrus' status and mission are given in the sources (Xen. Hell. 1.4.3, cf. 1.5.3), it is difficult to determine how much of his resources were due to his post as karanos. He possesses a war-chest (Xen. Hell. 1.5.3), but also private funds generated by possessions, which may be personal, i.e. due to his status as a member of the royal family (cities: Xen. Hell. 1.5.3, 2.1.14, Anab. 1.1.6-8; cf. Xen. Anab. 1.4.9, 2.4.27 for those belonging to Parysatis; estates: Xen. Anab. 1.2.7-9, Oec. 4.20-25). His political power is quite large: he issues commands to satraps (Xen. Hell. 1.4.5, 1.5.8-9), executes nobles (Hell. 2.1.8-9), appoints officers (Diod. 14.19.6, Xen. Anab. 1.9.14), while carrying out military and diplomatic operations (e.g. Anab. 1.1.11, 1.2.1, 1.2.4, 1.9.14; Hell. 1.5.4-6, 1.6.6-7, 20, 2.1.11-12).

A convenient recent discussion may be found in Lewis Sparta and Persia 119-120, 136-138.

³⁹See Westlake Historia 30 (1981) 257-279.

⁴⁰Note here the elasticity of the term satrap and the broad geographical characterization of the sector the satraps control. For a similar expression of the noble ethos, see Plut. Ages. 23.

⁴¹For the concept of bandaka see Brandenstein and Mayrhofer Handbuch des Altpersischen 94, 110. This concept will play an important role in the campaign against the rebel Euagoras (chapter 3).

⁴²DB I 20ff (cf. DNb 8c 16-21): Kent Old Persian 119, Brandenstein and Mayrhofer Handbuch des Altpersischen 95-96.

⁴³A starting point is provided by J. Wiesehöfer "Die 'Freunde' und 'Wohltäter' des Grosskönigs," Studia Iranica 9 (1980) 7-21. Note that Xen. Oec. 4, although erroneous in its separation of powers, does correctly note rewards for those who perform good service.

⁴⁴This is illustrated in the case of Scythia in DB V 20-30, Kent Old Persian 133-134.

⁴⁵Kent Old Persian 117-119, 136-138.

⁴⁶ Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 56-58.

⁴⁷ Lewis Sparta and Persia 53.

⁴⁸ E.g. Balcer AJP 98 (1977) 252-263.

⁴⁹ Hirsch Xenophon and Persia 185-233.

⁵⁰ On estates, see Lewis Sparta and Persia 51-55 for a brief account with bibliography. Regrettably, even at the satrapial capitals of Dascylium and Sparda, the literary evidence outstrips the archaeological data available. To my knowledge no Achaemenid-era estate has been excavated and published thoroughly.

⁵¹ In addition to references provided by Lewis (above, note 50), one should consult the following works by Pierre Briant:

"Forces Productives, dépendance rurales et idéologie religieuse dans l'Empire Achéménide," Centre de Recherches d'histoire ancienne, 32 = Religions, Pouvoir, Rapports Sociaux = Annales littéraires de l'Université de Besançon, no. 237, pp. 15-68, esp. notes 109, 112, 116-146, 153-158.

Of principal interest are the following:

west of the Halys in general: Hdt. 5.102.1

Kelainai: Xen. Anab. 1.2.7-9

Sparda: Diod. 14.80, Plut. Alcibiades 24.7, Xen. Oec. 4.20-24, Strabo 13.1.17

Armenia: Xen. Anab. 4.4

for attached villages: "Villages et Communautés Villageoises d'Asie Achéménide et Hellenistique," JESHO 18 (1975) 165-188, list on pp. 174-175.

⁵² E.g. The Cilician gates in 401 (Xen. Anab. 1.4.4) were occupied by a mixed force of indigenous Cilicians and a "royal" garrison. But was the ethnic make-up of that garrison? Hdt. 3.90.3, 5.52 are no help. For some of the difficulties in locating Iranian troops in the west see P.R.S. Moorey, "Iranian Troops at Deve Hüyük in Syria in the Earlier Fifth Century B.C.," Levant 7 (1975) 108-117.

For forts see Briant "Contrainte militaire, dépendance rurale et exploitation des territoires en Asie achéménide," Index 8 (1978-1979) 62-70.

⁵³ Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 53, 53 n.21.

⁵⁴ Frost Plutarch's Themistocles 218-223. The principal passages are Plut. Them. 29 and Thucyd. 1.138. Some years later we have the example of Lycon, who received both estates and cities after abandoning his employer, the rebel satrap Pissouthnes of Sparda (Ctesias FGrH 688

fr. 15). On the chora of Greek communities as a base for pro-Achaemenid elements see Balcer in Arktouros 261-268.

⁵⁵To Briant's studies cited above one may add: "'Brigandage', Dissidence et Conquête en Asie Achemenide et Hellenistique", Dialogues de histoire ancienne 2 (1976) = Centre de Recherches d'Histoire Ancienne, vol. 21 = Annales Littéraires de l'Université Besançon, no. 188, pp. 163-279.

⁵⁶Cf. Lewis Sparta and Persia 56-57, 24-25.

⁵⁷Kemal Balkan "Inscribed Bullae from Daskyleion-Ergili," Anatolia 4 (1959) 123-128.

⁵⁸Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 18-34 suggests that although a road was called royal the responsibility for its upkeep lay with local authorities.

⁵⁹E.b. Datis: Lewis JHS 100 (1980) 194-195.

⁶⁰A brief account of tablets: Lewis Sparta and Persia 4-26; as indicative cf provincial bureaucracy: Briant Index 74-84.

⁶¹This erroneous view is held in Altheim and Stiehl Die Aramäische Sprache unter den Achämeniden, I. 1963, 150-155.

⁶²For a general discussion of such peoples: Briant "Brigandage" (above, note 43) 163-279.

⁶³The others are as follows (all refs. to Anab.): Khalybes (cf. 4.7.15-16, 4.5.34, 4.6.5), Chaldaei, Macrones (cf. 4.8), Kolchi, Massynoeci (cf. 5.4), Coeti, Tibareni, Drilae (cf. 5.2), Mysians (1.6.7, 1.9.14).

⁶⁴The literature on Greco-Persian relations is massive. For the final stages of the Greek problem one should consult Lewis Sparta and Persia and Gomme HCT V:VIII.

⁶⁵Xen. Hell. 5.1.31; cf. Diod. 14.110.3, Plut. Artax. which accurately reflect that the Shah is the arbitor of Asia.

⁶⁶Two recent studies may be cited here:

Sinclair Chiron 8 (1978) 29-54 who rightly argues that the Persians are not interested in the detailed application of terms on the Greek mainland.

Cawkwell CQ 31 (1981) 69-83 argues that there must have been much more to the terms and attempts to reconstruct provisions relating to exiles, armaments, and sanctions. I believe Sinclair to be right: vagueness worked in the Shah's favor on the Greek mainland. Note the immediate difficulties reported in Xen. Hell. 5.1.33ff. If the Greeks are killing each other, they will not have the time to damage the King's House.

⁶⁷ Jack Cargill The Second Athenian League: Empire or Free Alliance? Berkeley, 1981.

⁶⁸ Cargill 10, 31-32.

Chapter II. The Officers of Sparda and Dascylium, 390's-360's.

During the three decades preceeding the imposition of the King's Peace on the weakened, yet still recalcitrant Greeks, affairs on the far western frontier had been dominated by two figures, the overly optimistic Tissaphernes, satrap at Sparda, and the vengeful Pharnabazos, satrap at Dascylium.¹ Once Tissaphernes passes from the scene in 395, there seems to be confusion in the sources and among scholars as to the identity of his ultimate successors: imprecision in the ancient sources--their use of descriptive, not chancellory, titles--and the expectation of precision by moderns have clouded our perceptions of the personnel in charge at Sparda. Recent epigraphical discoveries have created yet additional confusion. In Dascylium the sources present fewer difficulties, but leave open the possibility that the transfer of power may have not been above board.

Some attempt should be made to clarify the identities and positions of the personnel operating in the far west between the years 390 and 362/1, when confusion over their identity is greatest. Only then can one turn to a thoroughgoing analysis of the activities of these personnel and of the administrative and military problems which faced Achaemenid control in Anatolia.

In the previous chapter the imprecisions displayed in the ancient sources concerning titulature for Achaemenid officers were discussed. It will be useful to set out the terms which will be used in the present consideration. The highest officer in a satrapy was called the satrap. Although an officer's nationality was not highly significant, in the period here examined (390's - 360's) the highest officers of Sparda and Dascylium were Iranian. Subordinate to the highest officer were lesser officers--no precise administrative hierarchy is attested. These officers were most commonly men who owned estates, local nobles. Occasionally, extraordinary demands on administrators necessitated the creation of special officers. Most commonly these officers were placed in charge of military forces drawn from more than a single satrapy for use in a campaign of large scale.

As for the nature of Achaemenid control, one should refrain from perceiving in the far west a series of clearly demarcated administrative divisions. Instead, one ought to think in terms of spheres of influence. The size of these spheres, on a satrapial and lesser level, and the very efficacy of Achaemenid control are dependent on a number of variables: the competence of officers, the demands of their sectors, the relations between officers, superior, equal and subordinate. Spheres may intersect or overlap: the result--and the effect on Achaemenid control--will depend upon the relative power of the officers involved and the relations between them. All these variables reflect the overall personal nature of politics within the Achaemenid empire.

Section I: Tiribazos, Struthas, Autophradates, and the Satrapy at Sparda

Following the liquidation of Tissaphernes² and Tithraustes' appointment of Pasiphernes and Ariaaios as caretakers at Sparda, the next man to appear as the highest officer is Tiribazos (Xen. Hell. 418.12-16, Diod. 14.85.4, Nepos Conon 5.3). Nothing is reported, however, about his earlier career, and in Xenophon, at least, he seems to drop out of the historical record after proclaiming the King's Peace. Persian officers with the name Tiribazos appear in a number of sources, and are placed in a number of localities: with the Shah in Plutarch Artaxerxes, in Armenia in Xenophon Anabasis, in the Cypriote campaign later in Diodorus. Examination of the sources by previous scholars suggests that we may follow a single individual from before 401 until his death in the later 360's.³

An outline of Tiribazos' career may be drawn up: a nobleman with the king in 401; a lesser officer in Armenia in 400; satrap at Sparda in 393; then back to court; then out to Sparda by 387, during which time (382-380) he operates against Euagoras; and finally, after 374, a nobleman at court, where he dies before 359/8. We may set his birth at least by the mid-420's. It now remains to analyze the particulars.

A. Tiribazos' Career until 393/2

In outline form the career given above for Tiribazos is of interest, for it suggests promotions of honor both at court and elsewhere. With a closer examination of the particulars of Tiribazos' career some of the mechanics of provincial administration, and some of the problems, can come into clearer focus.

Tiribazos first appears in Achaemenid history as a man of unquestioned

loyalty to the Shah (Plut. Artax. 7, 10). In late summer 401 he is the first, apparently, to urge Artaxerxes to resist the advancing Cyrus (7). At Cunaxa, so Deinon's version goes (FGrH 690 fr. 17 = Artax. 10), Tiribazos fought close by the king's side, although the nobleman is absent in Ctesias' account (FGrH 688 fr. 20 = Artax. 11). It was Tiribazos who helped Artaxerxes to a new horse during the battle. Tiribazos' actions translated directly into honorific titles--and higher social status: Xenophon (Anab. 4.4.4), referring to the period after the death of the traitor Cyrus, describes Tiribazos as a philos of the Shah and reports that when he was in the Shah's presence he helped Artaxerxes to mount his horse. In the period through summer 401 Tiribazos may be characterized as a local noble who mobilized his retinue to defend the crown.

Tiribazos, in winter 401/400, holds what might be regarded as a threefold position. He is a local noble, a noble who possesses a large estate (Xen. Anab. 4.4.7). To it are attached villages in which supplies are stored. It is no doubt from these villages and from his estates that Tiribazos drew his military forces (4.4.4, 7; cavalry seems prominent). He possessed enough wealth (cf. 4.4.21) and influence--based on that estate--to be able to incorporate into his militia elements hired from tribal peoples who cannot be characterized as solidly under Achaemenid control (4.4.18, cf. 7.8.25). The appearance of Cyrus' old army presented him with a dilemma: a large mobile band of potential hostiles must be contained perhaps until he can bring to bear his full power (4.4.18) and dispose of them. The rigors of winter caused a temporary arrangement to collapse, and the Greeks, after inflicting minor damage to the noble's military, withdraw quickly beyond his sphere

(4.4.19-4.5.2).

At the same time Tiribazos is described both as a hyparch (4.4.4) in west Armenia and as a possessor of noble titles. Hyparch, a title whose difficulties were noted in the previous chapter, may be translated in this instance--based on Tiribazos' activities--as lesser officer.⁴ Given his loyalty at Cunaxa, and his closeness to the king at that time, what counted as a reward after Cunaxa, if any? It is unlikely that his estate was a gift later in 401.⁵ He seems rather well set-up in winter 401/400. The title hyparch might reflect something of a reward: Tiribazos is now of higher status than other local nobles in Armenia, west Armenia in particular, but still subordinate to the satrap, Orontes, himself rewarded with a royal princess (Xen. Anab. 2.4.8, 3.4.13; Diod. 15.2.2; Plut. Artax. 27.8).⁶ Most likely Tiribazos' rewards were his new titles as "friend" of the king and the man who helped the king to his horse (4.4.4). The reality at Cunaxa became royal honor.

One may create the following scenario for Tiribazos in 401-400: Before the revolt of Cyrus became known, Tiribazos was a local noble in west Armenia, perhaps already a lesser officer subordinate to the satrap, but superior in power and influence to other Persians in his own sector. When Cyrus was deemed disloyal, the Shah called upon Persian notables for military assistance: Tiribazos, after having drawn military forces from his own sphere, journeyed eastward in the king's service. Orontes the satrap did the same. Tiribazos gave good advice and served loyally. As best as can be made out, his reward consisted at least of new honorific titles.⁷

Apparently Tiribazos did well in Armenia, for he was again rewarded. He was transferred westward to Sparda, and promoted to the position of

highest officer, i.e. he became satrap (Xen Hell. 4.8.12, Diod. 14.85.4, Nepos Conon 5.3).⁸ He does not seem to appear in the satrapy until 393, as much as two full years after Tissaphernes' liquidation. How does one explain this "delay" in appointing a new satrap and the choice of Tiribazos in particular? The two questions are related, and for both a major part of the answer would be a desire on Artaxerxes' part to avoid a recurrence of the deleterious rivalry which had marked Pharnabazos' relations with Tissaphernes.

Given the choice of Tiribazos as satrap some delay in his arrival in Sparda would be necessary: He would have to wind up affairs in Armenia, steps would have to be taken to guarantee that his absence would not have any deleterious effects on that sector (a successor would have to be found). There may also have been a desire to allow Pharnabazos a free hand in clearing out the Spartans from Asia in general before naming a new, permanent satrap to the more prestigious post at Sparda. When we first hear of Tiribazos in the west (Xen. Hell. 4.8.12) Pharnabazos has made considerable progress (4.8.1-11).

One might point to Tiribazos' past service to the crown as sufficient cause for his appointment. But there were many loyal men--why not select one already in the far west? Here, too, we may see the ghost of Tissaphernes: an outsider, without any visible ties to personnel in Sparda or Dascylium (as far as we can tell from the sources), had certain attractions. Tiribazos would be less likely to question or attempt to rival the prestige of Pharnabazos, who was now senior man in the far west in age and position. He would have neither natural enemies nor friends. His past record of loyalty and competence would point to his being able to maintain order within his sector and dispatch tribute from it.

Tiribazos' earliest activities do display elements of circumspection, tempered with what might be regarded as lapses of political intelligence (a policy not unlike Tiribazos' own character as reported in Plutarch).⁹ He refuses to be drawn into open rivalry with Pharnabazos (Xenophon in Hell. 4.8.12--or the Spartans--are excessively sanguine to believe apostēsai), but listens to all envoys. The chance to suddenly coopt the Spartans, now at the nadir of their power, as compliant members of the native order before the Athenians forgot that their new strength was a Persian gift seemed attractive. Conon was arrested (Xen. Hell. 4.8.16, Nepos Conon 5.3, Diod. 15.85.4), Sparta received funds, but secretly, in a reprise of Tissaphernes' old policy of wearing down both sides at once. These acts were the extent of Tiribazos' kouphotēs: He left Sparda and journeyed to Susa to account for his actions and explain Antalcidas' suggestions. Sparda was again without a satrap.

B. Struthas, Autophradates, and the "Satrapy of Ionia"

Following Tiribazos' journey to Susa, matters in the satrapy of Sparda seem to become more confusing. In 392 the man who seemingly has the greatest influence in that sector is Struthas, whom Artaxerxes had sent epimelēsomenon tōn kata thalattan (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17, cf. Diod. 14.99.1: stratēgos) while Tiribazos was absent. Struthas maintains a policy consistent with Pharnabazos' anti-Spartan attitudes, and operates against the Spartan general Thibron (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-19, Diod. 14.99). But two other contemporary pieces of evidence contradict this picture: An undated inscription from Miletus,¹⁰ SIG³ 134a (Tod II 113), refers

to Struses (i.e. Struthas) as exaitrapēs eōn Iōniēs, "being satrap of Ionia" (1.41).¹¹ Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103, in the description of the initial operations against Euagoras in 390, calls Autophradates ton Lydias exatrapēn, satrap of Lydia (Sparda).

Modern attempts to reconcile Struthas' great influence in Xenophon and Diodorus with his title in SIG³ 134a and Autophradates' in Theopompus have usually had recourse to the office of karanos (a title used in the sources, however, only with Cyrus the younger). Struthas is satrap of Ionia, a relatively smaller district, and Autophradates holds the more prestigious Sparda. But Struthas is also high commander for the far west, i.e. he outranks the satrap at Sparda (and probably Pharnabazos, too). Hence his greater power and influence.¹² Military realities and a closer examination of the content and context of the source material suggest a different reconstruction: the satrap at Sparda was Struthas and as such he exercised influence over Ionia. Autophradates is a lesser officer, perhaps a local noble, too, but he is not yet satrap of Sparda.

When we examine the historical record for the years 392-388, the man who emerges as the most likely candidate for the highest officer in Sparda, the satrap, is Struthas. He is sent down specifically to replace Tiribazos, the previous satrap, and to pursue a policy in line with that followed for some years now by Pharnabazos, undoubtedly senior man in the far west. The titles Struthas is given in the historians Xenophon and Diodorus are job descriptions. The brief entries in the Suda and Harpocration, which call Struthas a satrap, are closer to the mark. Xenophon's account of the activities of

Thibron and Diphridas (Hell. 4.8.17-21, cf. Diod. 14.99.1-3) suggest that Struthas is using the citadel of Sparda as a base of operations and descends downcountry to attack Thibron when his campaigning becomes sloppy. In addition, it is on a journey to Sparda (Sardis) when Tigranes, son-in-law of Struthas, and Struthas' daughter are captured by Diphridas. Struthas himself is replaced later by the old satrap, Tiribazos (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28).

SIG³ 134a and the title "satrap of Ionia" can be explained without great difficulty. As satrap of Sparda Struthas exercises influence and control over surrounding districts, including the coast west of the citadel, i.e. Ionia, sectors in which he campaigns against Thibron. The inscription records how a border dispute between Myos and Miletus (the latter traditionally overseen from Sparda) was referred by the disputants to Artaxerxes II, who, in turn, handed the matter over to his man in the far west close to those cities, Struthas (Struses). Because the document is of concern to Ionian cities and is issued by one of them, it seems, Struthas is called satrap of Ionia, although his true sphere was larger. A parallel situation has recently appeared with the publication of the trilingual stele from Xanthus in Lycia. In 337 Pixodaros, satrap of Caria and Lycia, approved of a number of actions the Xanthians wished to undertake. This approval and the actions themselves were recorded on a stele. The Aramaic text represents Pixodaros' granting of approval: juridically, this text is the most important, and Pixodaros represents himself with a full and weighty title, satrap of Caria and Lycia. In both SIG³ 134a and the Xanthus stele a powerful official is given a seemingly less significant title when the matter he handles is a purely

local one and the locals claim him for themselves.¹³

In no sense does SIG³ 134a herald the creation of a new satrapy. Indeed, it is doubtful Ionia ever existed as a separate satrapy. The point of departure for those who seek to argue existence, Herodotus 3.90.1, is an unfortunate one. Herodotus mixes together as a single administrative and taxation district a farrago of nationalities: Ionians, Magnesians in Asia, Aiolians, Carians, Lycians, Milyans, Pamphylians. It is difficult to see how, in practice, these peoples could be administered by a single satrap and his subordinates. Ionia, alone, as recent studies have demonstrated, was itself a highly complex sector. Given the fact that the two satrapial capitals of the far west, Dascylium and Sparda, were set in-land, control over coastal sectors was a function of the competence of the highest officers stationed at these satrapies, and of their ability to cooperate.

Throughout Achaemenid history control over coastal sectors was exercised in practice by the satraps at Dascylium and Sparda, the latter controlling that part of the coast commonly called Ionia. In the sixth and fifth centuries one can note that the highest officer in charge of organizing, in its initial stages, the Naxos campaign and the man with whom the Greek bosses in Miletus conducted affairs was the satrap at Sparda, Artaphernes the Elder. He, and not a "satrap of Ionia," supervises the suppression of coastal recalcitrants and carries out local administrative reforms. As Struthas was arbitor of Milesian affairs in the fourth century, Artaphernes was in the fifth. When Achaemenid control began to return to the coastal sectors it was Tissaphernes of Sparda who appointed a lesser officer, Tamos, to supervise Ionian

affairs (Thucyd. 8.31.2, 8.87.1), and later himself holds Miletus (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-7). Once Tiribazos returns to Sparda to replace Struthas, his sphere of control as satrap at Sparda also includes Ionia (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28). In sum, Struthas, as satrap at Sparda, exercised control over the coast. To the locals he was also satrap of Ionia.¹⁴

If Sparda is held by Struthas, how does one account for Autophradates' title in Theopompus as satrap of Lydia? Theopompus, or his epitomator, Photius, is wrong in using the title satrap. Autophradates will eventually take up the satrapy, but does not hold it in 390 BC. ~~Present~~ events of the 390's suggest two reasons to doubt Theopompus' characterization: The first is the military situation in Sparda itself. It is still possible for foreign hostiles to land and ravage Achaemenid territory (Diod. 14.99.2, Xen. Hell. 4.8.17.18, 21). It makes little military sense to dispatch the satrap of Sparda to undertake a minor border war in Cyprus while his home sector is under attack. The second cause for doubt is the account of the operations against Euagoras: the most detailed is given in Diodorus 14.98 (cf. 15.2) and nowhere does Autophradates appear. Apparently he is not significant enough to mention. Hekatomnos alone seems charged with coordinating the attack force. But Diodorus is aware of most of the important events occurring in Sparda. Autophradates will not appear in Diodorus until 362/1 (15.90.3). He is also aware (14.110.5) of the problem which faced that Shah before the King's Peace. Until hostile Greeks were rendered compliant, full attention could not be paid to the Cypriote theatre. It is unreasonable

to believe that high level officers would be pulled from their own sectors and transferred to less important theaters.

To conclude: Struthas was dispatched to Sparda to succeed Tiribazos as satrap. In that capacity he defended his sector against invaders and exercised influence over the coast. SIG³ 134a, while it does not signify the creation of a new satrapy, does provide evidence for the Persian willingness to work with compliant members of the native order and tolerate compliant local institutions (some form of local Ionian organization).¹⁵ We are provided with information about the size of Struthas' sphere, for in addition to those from Myos and Miletus, the Ionian judges are drawn from Erythrae, Chios, Clazomenae, Lebedus, and Ephesus. Elsewhere in the far west, a Persian, Autophradates, fought Euagoras. We shall consider him shortly.

C. The Return of Tiribazos

By 388 the return of Tiribazos seems to have been imminent. Xen. Hell. 5.1.6 indicates that the Spartans chose Antalcidas as nauarch in hopes of pleasing the satrap. In 387 Tiribazos had returned, and proceeded to dictate the King's Peace (Xen. Hell. 5.1.25-31): The terms given in Xenophon are politely worded, but their significance was unmistakable. Henceforth, the Shah, or rather his officers in the far west, were the arbiters for Greek affairs. The European Greeks in future dealings with the inhabitants of Achaemenid controlled territory were given a choice: compliance with Persian wishes or destruction.

For the remainder of his tenure as satrap Tiribazos would enjoy the tactical and diplomatic advantages which accrued to Achaemenid

officers with the resolution of the Greek problem. Although his participation in the campaign against Euagoras will be discussed in the following chapter, a few items may be noted here. There seems to have been an absence of tension with the new satrap at Dascylium, Ariobarzanes, most likely because one of the chief causes of rivalry between their predecessors had been removed, the need to coopt a sizeable element of the native (Greek) order so as to use it in removing recalcitrant elements from the coast. By the end of the 380's Tiribazos was in command of the fleet elements sent against Cyprus, including forces drawn from the now compliant coast west of Sparda (Diod. 15.2-11). This successful campaign is the last of Tiribazos' recorded activities in the west.

It is unknown when or why Tiribazos was replaced as satrap. He is next mentioned as being with the king after 374, and there is some indication that at that point he had fallen somewhat out of favor. I might suggest that it would have been in the Shah's interest to have Tiribazos remain in Sparda during the time of Pharnabazos' Egyptian campaign.¹⁶ Since forces were being drawn from Anatolia for use in the campaign, it would be intelligent to leave skilled personnel in place to counteract any deleterious effects which might result from removal of military forces from one sector for use some distance away. After being withdrawn from Sparda it seems Tiribazos was at court and probably acted as a royal advisor.¹⁷ It would be at about this time that his marriage into the ruling Achaemenid house would have taken place had not Artaxerxes gone back on his word.¹⁸ It should be noted that the final stage of Tiribazos' career resembles Pharnabazos': attachment to the court, a royal marriage. One can only speculate why Tiribazos had

incurred royal displeasure at about the time of the Cadusian campaign. He then became embroiled in court intrigue and this cost him his life.

D. Autophradates' Early Career¹⁹

The successor to Tiribazos at Sparda was Autophradates, appointed sometime after 374 it seems. We have no information about his ancestry, and few fixed dates for his early activities. A closer examination of the sources will suggest that before his appointment to Sparda Autophradates was a lesser officer in the far west, and perhaps a local noble whose home sector lay some distance from the citadel of Sparda, in the southwest of Anatolia.

His first appearance is in 390s, as co-commander with Hekatomnos in the campaign against Euagoras (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103). I have already argued that it is wrong to make Autophradates satrap at Sparda at this point. By removing that title we have also deprived Autophradates of a home sector. How is his presence in the far west to be explained? There are two equally acceptable possibilities: Autophradates may have been sent down by the Shah to work with the local man already gathering troops, the satrap of Caria, Hekatomnos. It was common for the high command of Persian expeditions to consist of a mix of local men and "outsiders," who seem to represent royal interests. This pattern may be noticed in other fourth century operations. In the Egyptian campaign of 385-383 (Isocrates 4.140) forces were led by Abrocomas, satrap of Syria (a local man), and two officers sent down from Susa, Tithraustes (the chiliarch), and Pharnabazos (former satrap at Dascylium). The second campaign against Euagoras as led by a local man, Tiribazos,

and an outsider, Orontes. In both these examples the officers sent by Susa have some familiarity with the theatre of war and the personnel involved. This leads to a second possibility. Autophradates was already in the far west as a lesser officer, perhaps as a local noble who owned estates and exercised influence over some of the regions from which Hekatomnos was drawing troops. The presence of such local nobles and/or lesser officers in or near Caria is suggested by the fact that Tissaphernes owned estates in Caria (Xen. Hell. 3.2.12) and by the participation of an Artaphernes in the campaigning at Caunos in 397 (Diod. 14.79.5). In this scenario Autophradates would have received royal orders to take a leading role in operations.

The second appearance of Autophradates is in Nepos Datames 2.1, when he and Datames wage war against eos qui defecerant.²⁰ Unfortunately no specifics about the campaign are provided beyond the statement that it was iusso regis which sent Autophradates on the campaign. There is no compelling reason to believe that Autophradates is now satrap at Sparda or that the campaign takes place far from Cilicia, Datames' sector. Datames had only just taken up his post in Cilicia and we should probably see here a regional campaign involving local nobility as the commanders. The recalcitrants would be somewhere in southwest Anatolia.

Evidence from Lycia (TAM I 46, 61), too, suggests that Autophradates may have had a home sector in the southwest of Anatolia. Apparently when Autophradates was satrap at Sparda he was able to exercise some influence in Lycia and over local nobility there. This influence can be better explained if Autophradates had already spent part of his career close to that sector. Before 374, then, Autophradates is to be seen as an officer who is not satrap, who may own estates, and who is to be associated

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His appointment as satrap comes sometime after 374 (?). The earliest activity which he seems to undertake as satrap is a punitive campaign against his old companion, Datames (Nepos Datames 7-8), falsely painted as a rebel by his own son Sysinas. We find Autophradates commanding a large multi-national force and moving to and from the

interior through Cappadocia and Phrygia. His selection by Artaxerxes as the one to lead troops against Datames is as much a result of his position as satrap (with its access to large numbers of troops) as his past familiarity with the object of his campaign and, perhaps, with the rebel's sector. Previous familiarity with Caria was also of value to Autophradates for throughout his tenure as satrap (and into the time of his successor, Rhoesaces) good relations seem to have existed between Sparda and Halicarnassus. His future success in dealing with Lycian recalcitrants may also be a result of earlier familiarity with and to that sector and its personnel.

In outline, then, Autophradates' early career resembles Tiribazos': he begins as a lesser officer and local noble (?) who, on royal command, takes part in campaigns, some close to his sector, and in the company of nearby personnel. He is transferred to a new sector, when promoted to highest officer, satrap. Unlike Tiribazos, who was eventually unable to get along with his old superior, Orontes, Autophradates seems to have been able to make good use of at least some of the contacts he made before his promotion. His activities as satrap will be discussed in the succeeding chapters.

Section II. Droaphernes, son of Barakes

A. Robert's View

In 1975 Louis Robert published a short Greek inscription of the Roman period from Sardis. The text appeared to be a translation of extracts from an Achaemenid date Aramaic original relating the cult of

Baradates Zeus, Zeus the Legislator. Robert presented a masterful analysis of the inscription as a cultural document from the Iranian diaspora.²¹ Unfortunately, his analysis is marred by a serious historical problem he created and which, surprisingly, scholars have failed to note.²²

The first part of the decree provides the following information (1.1-5): in the 39th year of Artaxerxes, Droaphernes, son of Barakes, Lydies hyparchos, dedicated a statue (andrianta) to Baradates Zeus. The discussion of the historical information contained in these lines was rather perfunctory. The first two Artaxerxes ruled more than 39 years; Robert selected Artaxerxes II as the Shah in the inscription. Year 39 is 366/5 BC. He proceeded to establish Draophernes as a proper, but previously unattested, Iranian name, and corrected the spelling of Barakes, which appears on the stone with a lambda instead of a second alpha (Barlkes). Robert turned his attention to the title borne by Droaphernes, Lydies hyparchos, pointing to the ambiguous sense of the title hyparchos in our Greek sources (it can stand for either the highest officer or a lesser officer). He then states that because Sardis is a satrapial capital, the officer giving orders in the inscription must be the highest officer, the satrap. Hence Droaphernes has "toute chance" of being satrap in the year he issued the decree. In sum, Robert has made Droaphernes satrap at Sparda in 366/5.²³

Robert's conclusion is in direct contradiction to the historical record. In all the sources on the Achaemenid far west during the 360's it is Autophradates who operates in a capacity which cannot be any other than that of satrap at Sparda. In the early years of the decade

he conducts a punitive campaign against Datames. In the middle of the decade, in 366-365, in fact, he and Maussollos operate against Ariobarzanes. In 362/1 he is supposedly a rebel. We find him involved in policing actions against recalcitrants such as Orontes. By the very end of the decade he is at odds with Artabazos, the new satrap at Dascylium. He is also active in Lycia. Although one cannot characterize the sources for this period (e.g. Diodorus, Polyaeus, Nepos) as being the best in quality, the 360's are relatively well documented and it would be surprising for all mention of Droaphernes to have fallen out of the record. It would be even more surprising because the 360's is the decade of the "Great Satraps' Revolt," and it is difficult to imagine sources failing to tell about the simultaneous existence of two satraps (one of whom could be labeled a "loyalist") or at least confusing the two. But none of this appears.²⁴

Robert never tells us explicitly why he chose Artaxerxes II over Artaxerxes I when he tried to date the document, but I imagine it was because statuary was involved. Herodotus 1.131.1 claims that the Persians had no cult statues, temples, or altars. This is not an insuperable difficulty, as Robert himself goes on to show. Evidence for Iranian altars, temples, and statues is forthcoming from as early as the sixth century. He cites the classic passage relating to Achaemenid divine statuary: Clement Protrepticus 5.65.3, citing Berossus, describes how an Artaxerxes (garbled as Artaxerxou tou Dareiou tou Ochou) set up statues of Anahita in a number of cities, Sardis included. However, the evidence simply does not demand that Persian divine statuary could not have existed before the fourth century, particularly in a distance border region with a long indigenous history of divine statuary. There

is something to be said for the construction of a statue of Anura-Mazda in his guise as upholder of law in a region frequently plagued by recalcitrance. A reexamination is in order.²⁵

Given the ambiguities surrounding the identity of the Artaxerxes in the inscription (two choices) and the significance of the title hyparchos (either the highest officer--the satrap--or a lesser officer), it is possible to generate four scenarios. Droaphernes is:

1. highest officer for Sparda under Artaxerxes I
2. highest officer for Sparda under Artaxerxes II
3. lesser officer in Sparda under Artaxerxes I
4. lesser officer in Sparda under Artaxerxes II

Robert championed the second scenario. This is the one which will prove the least satisfactory.

B. Droaphernes: Satrap under Artaxerxes I?

If the Artaxerxes in lines 1-2 is Artaxerxes I, year 39 of his reign falls in 427/6, and it is at this time that Droaphernes should appear in Sparda as satrap. It is difficult, though not impossible, to insert a new satrap into the historical record at this juncture. To do so we must assume lapses on the part of the two sources which provide more than perfunctory accounts of the Achaemenid far west in the fifth century, Thucydides and the epitome of Ctesias.

Thucydides' account immediately provides a serious problem for the proposed scenario. In the "summer" of 427, i.e. the campaigning season, the satrap at Sparda is one Pissouthnes, who has been in office since at least the 440's (Thucyd. 1.115.4, Diod. 12.27, Plut. Per. 25-26). At this particular juncture Pissouthnes is perceived as a potential

source of military assistance by one of the contending parties in Colophon (Thucyd. 3.31, 34). One is, then, forced to insert Droaphernes as satrap either later in 427 or in the early parts of 426. Pissouthnes himself, after the passages just cited, drops out of Thucydides' account and does not reappear until 8.5.5, when he is identified only as the father of the rebel Amorges. One might justify this reconstruction on the grounds that Thucydides in general pays little attention to Persian affairs until book eight, when Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos begin a bidding war for Spartan naval power. For some unknown reason Pissouthnes is replaced by Droaphernes in the course of 427/6. We might then have a reason why Pissouthnes' son, Amorges, is dissatisfied with Achaemenid control some years later.²⁶

Ctesias' account (FGrH 688 fr. 15, sect. 53), preserved only in Photius' epitome, presents additional data on Pissouthnes, and in fact implies a list of satraps in which Pissouthnes is succeeded directly by Tissaphernes. According to Ctesias it seems that Pissouthnes went sour during the reign of Darius II, i.e. Artaxerxes' I successor. Three generals, including Tissaphernes, were dispatched. Tissaphernes and the others used diplomatic skill and convinced Pissouthnes to journey to court--and oblivion. Tissaphernes received the satrapy at Sparda. The exact chronology of all this is uncertain, but Pissouthnes' revolt is not the first event recorded under the reign of Darius II.²⁷ It may be excessively sanguine to trust in Ctesias' incompetence and argue that he has misplaced in Darius' reign a revolt which came near the end of Artaxerxes'. But there is something to be said in favor of Droaphernes' appearing on the scene as Pissouthnes' initial replacement

in 427/6: we would have a cause for the latter's rebellion. A statue of Zeus the Legislator, Baradates Zeus, set up by Droaphernes in a time of political instability, would be an intelligent propaganda move. Droaphernes may have been ineffectual in dealing with Pissouthnes and this ineffectiveness guaranteed his absence in our historical record. Tissaphernes took all the glory, and the satrapy. Embittered Amorges carried on the fight, until he, too, joined his ancestors.²⁸

In sum, a scenario which places Droaphernes in Sparda sometime in 427/6 is possible, but not probable. Thucydides' treatment is filled with lapses, and Ctesias is often a stranger to veracity and coherence. Droaphernes may well have been satrap. But why replace Pissouthnes in the first place? Neither scenario which makes Droaphernes a satrap is really acceptable. If Droaphernes is a lesser officer are there less serious problems?

C. Droaphernes: Lesser Officer?

The title hyparchos is an unusual one for an Achaemenid officer--in Greek inscriptions. In those inscriptions published to date, when an officer is mentioned by title, that title is some form of the word satrap.²⁹ The pairing of hyparchos with Lydiēs is also puzzling, for it suggests a rather large sphere of control at first glance. If one accepts Robert's hypothesis that the Greek text is based on some sort of an Aramaic original, can one explain the title Lydiēs hyparchos?

Is there an Aramaic title, standing for lesser officer, which might be rendered in Greek by Lydiēs hyparchos? An Aramaic equivalent of Lydiēs may be found without difficulty: some form of Sparda. But Sparda serves a dual purpose, standing for the satrapial capital, Sardis,

and for the sectors controlled from that capital, i.e. Lydia in general. A lesser officer who claimed as his sphere Sparda might exercise power either in the capital only or throughout the satrapy. There is evidence for the Aramaic titles assigned to officers subordinate to the satrap, but, unfortunately, none is from Anatolia. In Ebir-nari peḥā is applied not only to the highest officer, the satrap, but also to clearly subordinate officers. Here we have a situation analogous to the usage of hyparchos--a highest or lesser officer may be meant. A second possibility is found in Persian Egypt: there a governor of a nome, the political and military subordinate to the satrap, is called a fratakara. Thus there are terms which might appear in Aramaic and could be rendered by the Greek hyparchos.³⁰ But while one may suggest non-Greek equivalents for "lesser officer," one cannot state that all these terms always signify a lesser officer. In sum, if hyparchos means lesser officer in the Droaphernes inscription, then one may point to Aramaic words from which hyparchos might be translated and which can signify lesser officer.

The issue of the size of this officer's sphere of control remains unsolved. How large a sphere would be indicated by Sparda--the entire satrapy or the city known as Sardis? Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos can be of some assistance for we know about their subordinates. Pharnabazos has subordinates, Zenis and Mania, who are tied to a particular sector, Aiolis (Xen. Hell. 3.1.10ff.). But Xenophon calls them satraps, usage analogous to the problems with hyparchos and peḥā. We hear of three of Tissaphernes' subordinates during the Ionian War, and all are called hyparchos. Stages (Thucyd. 8.16.3) is "Tissaphernes' hyparch"; Tamos (8.31.12, 8.87.1) is first "hyparch of Ionia," and later "his (Tissapher-

nes') hyparch"; Arsakes (8.108.4) is "Tissaphernes' hyparch." When Gomme, Andrewes, and Dover examined these officers, they were uncertain whether they were to be tied to a particular sector.³¹ Although Arsakes appears only in the single passage of Thucydides, the data provided is illuminating. Arsakes is active at Atramyttium in 422 and at Antandrus in 411: it is reasonable to assume that he is located or, more realistically, owns property and lives somewhere nearby both cities. Pharnakes of Dascylium is the man responsible for introducing the Delians into Atramyttium (Thucyd. 5.1), but Arsakes feels no need to display a similar friendship towards them. That he is described as Tissaphernes' subordinate in 411 and acts in accordance with Tissaphernes' wishes at Antandrus is an index of Tissaphernes' greater influence, the result of his holding the flagship province of the Anatolian west coast. It would seem that Pharnabazos (Xen. Hell. 1.1.25) exercises some influence over Antandrus shortly thereafter: this section of the Troad is a liminal region, the intersection of the spheres controlled out of Dascylium and Sparda.³² Stages appears twice: in Thucydides 8.16.3 he operates at Teos; in Xen. Hell. 1.2.5 he is described as "the Persian around those regions," regions Thrasyllus passes as he moves off from Colophon. The two passages suggest that Stages is to be placed in a sector southwest of the citadel at Sparda, within striking distance of Colophon and Teos.³³ Tamos seems active in Ionia, i.e. in coastal sectors west of the citadel at Sparda: we find him at Clazomenae (Thucyd. 8.31.2), and involved in naval affairs (Thucyd. 8.87). When Cyrus arrives and eventually prepares sly infidelity Tamos appears as epimeletēs of the coastal sectors Ionia and Aiolis, regions from which

he can draw a fleet (Diod. 14.19.6). It would seem then that Tissaphernes' known subordinates are to be associated with a specific sector,³⁴ Thucydides uses the term hyparchos with consistency: when applied to an Achaemenid officer, it signifies lesser officer.

Thus there is evidence that hyparchos when signifying a lesser officer in the far west, at Sparda or Dascylium, is to be associated with a specific sector. This arrangement echoes the evidence from Egypt, and the position of Tiribazos in Armenia, elsewhere discussed. I am unable to cite evidence in Anatolia for a subordinate officer who is a true second-in-command to the satrap, i.e. who exercises power over the entire satrapy, but a power dependent upon the subordinate to the satrap. The closest possibility might be the type of influence and prestige enjoyed by Artaphernes the Younger while his father was satrap, or by Pharnabazus, while his father held Dascylium. In interpreting the title Lydiēs hyparchos I suggest it is most likely that this officer is a lesser officer, subordinate to the satrap, and that his sphere represents the city of Sardis, Lydiēs being an improper rendering of Sparda, i.e. the satrapial capital as opposed to the satrapy itself.

To make Droaphernes a lesser officer is more attractive than the scenarios previously reported. So few lesser officers are known by name that it is easy to insert Droaphernes into either the fifth or fourth centuries, under Pissouthnes or Autophradates, under Artaxerxes I or II. We may even keep intact most of Robert's analysis of the statuary recorded by the inscription. Droaphernes would be a subordinate to Autophradates, and would join the satrap's previously known subordinates, the hyparch Tigranes (Dem. 15.9) and Orontes (see section III, below).³⁵ In the inscription Droaphernes has control over religious

matters, but this is not a reason to question his status as a lesser officer. There is simply not enough evidence to permit a definitive judgment about who in the Achaemenid far west had control over religious affairs. One cannot state categorically that the satrap alone possessed regulatory power.³⁶

If we make Droaphernes a lesser officer, there are two possible scenarios: Droaphernes is at Sparda in 427/6 or in 366/5. I would prefer the latter scenario because it preserves most of Robert's analysis. The introduction of the cult of Baradates Zeus in the midst of Autophradates' moves against rebel Ariobarzanes is then an intelligent propaganda ploy.

To sum up: Lines 1-5 of the Droaphernes inscription permit us to generate four scenarios. The one proposed by Robert contradicts the known historical record and is the least satisfactory. To make Droaphernes a lesser officer possesses the advantages of complementing the historical record while preserving Robert's analysis. But there is a flaw, for one must make assumptions about a hypothetical Aramaic original. To make Droaphernes a satrap in 427/6 is possible, but is a less satisfactory scenario involving derogatory assumptions concerning important historical sources. The fourth scenario, Droaphernes as a lesser officer in 427/6 is possible: it contradicts no part of the historical record, but may create problems in the analysis of Iranian religion. The second scenario, Droaphernes as lesser officer in 366/5, is the most preferable, and after that, the third scenario, satrap in 427/6.

Section III. Orontes and the "Satrapy of Mysia"

In the list of "rebels" who participated in the so-called "Great Satraps' Revolt" the following officer appears: Orontēs men tēs Mysias satrapēs, Orontes, satrap of Mysia (Diod. 15.90.3). The identity of this Orontes has long been established as that Orontes, a son-in-law of the king, who held the satrapy of Armenia at the time of the revolt of Cyrus the younger.³⁷ However, the title "satrap of Mysia" has been the object of much puzzlement and discussion. Exactly what does the title signify? How, when, and why was it assigned to Orontes?³⁸

The most recent treatment of the problem was provided by Osborne in 1975.³⁹ It has won acceptance and is seemingly unchallenged.⁴⁰ But it is flawed. In sections I and II of this inquiry it was possible to resolve problems about an officer's title and sphere of control by looking at his deeds and the deeds of his predecessors and contemporaries in addition to his titles. Osborne, however, uncritically accepts the information provided by Diodorus about the identity of the rebels and adds a somewhat static view of the Achaemenid far west: there exists a stiff administrative hierarchy; there are precise and defineable satrapial boundaries. The activities of officials in the 360's are to be explained by their mechanical alternation of the stances "loyalist" and "rebel." Charges have been laid against Osborne. Before I can propose a reconstruction of events alternative to his, I must present and comment on his reconstruction.

A. Osborne's View⁴¹

Osborne set for himself the task of elucidating the nature of

Orontes' post as satrap of Mysia (291), and he begins by investigating when Orontes, last known to have been satrap of Armenia, is transferred to the west (291-293). He argues, and I agree, that Orontes, as punishment for his actions during the campaign against Euagoras, was removed from Armenia and eventually posted west (see Diod. 15.11.2, Plut. Mor. 174b, cf. Suda sv. Arbazakios).

He then turns to a consideration of "satrap of Mysia" itself (293-298), arguing that one is not to emend away Mysia from Diodorus' text. This is proper. But Osborne rules out any possibility that Orontes was what I have termed a lesser officer, what he calls a hyparchos. His reason for doing so (296-297) is his acceptance of Diodorus' list of rebels in 15.90.3 and Diodorus' characterization of Orontes as a seemingly important leader of the revolt, without attempting to determine the accuracy of Diodorus' evidence. Orontes has to be someone important enough to bear the title epi tēn tōn holōn dioikēsīn. . . stratēgon (which seems to be more a job description than formal title), to be in charge of so many rebels who are satraps, highest officers. A hyparchos, a lesser officer, will not do. Neither will a special command (297-298): Osborne notes there was not one for the Pisidians, who seem to have made a point of acting up in the 360's. So why should there be a special command and special commander for the Mysians? One should note that in this consideration Osborne does discuss titulature (his notes 6-8), but gives rather short shrift in considering Diodorus' terminology for Persian officers.⁴²

Osborne leaves himself with one possibility: "a new satrapy Mysia was organized for Orontes, and that Diodorus is precise in his description" (298-299). It remained to determine that satrapy (299-308), and

Osborne reduces the choice to territory encompassed by Dascylium or Sparda.⁴³ It is here that Osborne runs into difficulty. Because he has limited himself to making Orontes the highest officer of a sector (i.e. satrap of a satrapy), and because Dascylium is ruled out, Osborne must have recourse to the traditional belief that the satrapy at Sparda was at times divided into an interior sector, i.e. the satrapy of Sparda "proper," and a coastal sector, the satrapy of Ionia. The evidence for this "satrapy of Ionia" is not very good and is that already discussed above (section I), Herodotus 3.90.1 and SIG³ 134a. In addition, in his consideration of the personnel active in Sparda during 391-390 (note 21), Osborne fails to consider the possibility that Theopompus is simply wrong in his characterization of Autophradates as satrap of Sparda. Diodorus 16.47.2, a description of Rhoesaces as satrap of Lydia and Ionia is taken, too, as evidence for a previous existence of the satrapy of Ionia. But this is more of a descriptive rather than a chancellory title and so is not proof positive. For Osborne, the satrapy of Mysia ends up as the satrapy of Ionia, slightly mistitled in Diodorus (304-307).

Osborne finally considers the time of Orontes' appointment (307-309). He is limited by having to find a point when Sparda can be divided and by his belief Orontes must be a highest officer. Because Orontes is absent in anecdotal accounts of Autophradates' operations against Ariobarzanes in the mid-360's, Orontes' appointment is pushed closer to 362/1. Then, by making Autophradates beleagured by rebels on all sides, Osborne is able to propose that the supposedly rehabilitated Orontes is sent westward to assist the satrap. But this assistance involves the

division of the only "loyalist" province. Shortly thereafter, and for reasons our sources fail to enunciate, both Autophradates and Orontes go sour, the latter first.⁴⁴ In all of this Osborne has failed either to address any of the problems underlying the basic reconstruction of the Great Satraps' Revolt, or to consider the mechanics of the scenario he creates.

A reconsideration of the title "satrap of Mysia" is in order. First, an overall examination of the sector called Mysia: what political forces are active, what are the administrative problems, what Achaemenid personnel are present? Secondly, an examination of Diodorus' terminology for Achaemenid personnel: what might "satrap" signify in this passage (Diod. 15.90.3)? Need the title, when used in Diodorus, always signify the highest officer in a sector? Finally, an alternative reconstruction of events accounting for Orontes' presence in Mysia (and not some confusion) and for his later "popularity" with "rebel" forces.

B. Mysia

The sector of Mysia was often a particular source of grief to Achaemenid officials. It lay within the spheres of influence of the satraps at both Dascylium and Sparda, and although the regions around the Caicus river were properly part of the latter.⁴⁵ The native Mysians were impossible to control effectively: tribally organized, lightly armed, and highly mobile, they posed a constant threat to more settled regions (Hell. Oxy. 21.1, Xen. Mem. 3.5.26, Xen. Anab. 2.5.13). Campaigns, which must have approached in quality modern guerrilla warfare, had been launched from Sparda to keep the recalcitrant elements in check as early as the sixth century (Hdt. 6.28).

Achaemenid officers had open to them a number of means of counter-acting the destabilizing effects of Mysian tribesmen. Tribes may be played off against each other, compliant elements coopted and set against their neighbors. There was not an encumbering slogan "freedom of the Mysians." Corollary to cooption was the use of Mysians in local militias: they appear under the command of the younger Artaphernes of Sparda in 480 (Hdt. 7.74) and Pharnabazos in the fourth century (Xen. Hell. 4.1.24). Unfortunately, they might also make up part of the power base of recalcitrant Persian officers, such as Orontas, a lesser officer in Sparda who was at odds with Cyrus the younger (Xen. Anab. 1.6.7).⁴⁶ It also appears that the less unstable Mysians has organized themselves--or were encouraged to do so by Achaemenid officials--into settlements in fixed localities (Xen. Anab. 3.2.23), so forming a bulwark against less stable tribes.⁴⁷ Policing the Mysians must have been a constant, if not tiresome, activity for officers in Sparda and Dascylium: the karanos Cyrus, operating out of Sparda, had mobilized troops against the Mysians and attempted to stabilize the region by stationing loyal men in Mysia (Xen. Anab. 1.9.14). Later, Pharnabazos of Dascylium undertakes campaigns against disruptive Mysians, during which he relies on the assistance of his subordinates (Xen. Hell. 3.1.13). One aim in these campaigns must have been to secure high points from which the Mysians had staged raids (cf. Xen. Mem. 3.5.26). It is perhaps on these points that Cyrus placed some of his loyal men.

Tribally organized, highly mobile recalcitrants were not the only political force operative in Mysia. To them we may add Greek political bosses in nearby cities, local nobles who owned estates, and troops which

may have been stationed as garrisons and/or colonists upon royal command. The career of the local noble Asidates in Xen. Anab. 7.8 illuminates the interaction of these political entities. At the time of Thibron's campaign in 399, Asidates finds his fortified estate on the Caicus plain under attack by the Greek political bosses in Pergamum and nearby cities who are now strengthened with foreign troops led by Xenophon. Asidates, who possesses his own following, which he uses as a militia, is on good terms with his neighbors, and can obtain assistance from another noble, Itamenes,⁴⁸ and forces which may represent military colonists and/or a garrison (Xen. Anab. 7.8.14-15). However, he, his family, and possessions are captured eventually (7.8.22). What is portrayed here is an extension, to include the Greeks, of the conflict between settled forces on the plain (Persian estates) and disruptive forces on high points, such as those the Mysians held. It is uncertain how long this conflict continued in general, but OGIS 264 (1.5-10) implies that some action had been taken to lessen the threat posed by the Pergamenes by settling them on the plain where they might be dealt with more summarily by local Achaemenid officials.⁴⁹

It is now possible to construct a list of the types of Achaemenid personnel active in Mysia. Among the highest officers are the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium, and special officers such as the karanos Cyrus. We should assume that they will take an active part in Mysian affairs only in extreme circumstances, that is during instability of a level requiring their intervention with a large number of troops. Normal peacekeeping activities, day-to-day policing of recalcitrants, would be the job undertaken by local nobles such as Asidates and Itamenes, by military colonists

and/or garrison forces, by Greek political bosses (regardless of their stance toward the local Persians it would be in their own interests to keep the Mysians docile). In sum, Mysia does not seem to possess a single Achaemenid official of high status who might be characterized as satrap. In addition, although Asidates' power is certainly less than that of the satrap at Sparda, it is uncertain exactly how Asidates was subordinate to the satrap. We cannot resort to mechanical solution satrap and sub-satrap.

In the previous chapter I demonstrated that when Diodorus uses the term satrapēs, he often uses it descriptively, to signify an officer of the Achaemenid empire who is of Iranian extraction (and has a name which does not sound very Greek). In all other sources Mysia was a sector in which there was no single highest officer. Yet Diodorus has a satrap of Mysia. Diodorus is imprecise: the fact that he calls Orontes "satrap of Mysia" does not mean that Orontes possessed, in the eyes of Susa, the same official position as the other officers in 15.90, Autophradates, Ariobarzanes, and Maussollos. We need not create a new satrapy. There is a parallel: the case of Paphlagonia when Diodorus seems to be reporting directly from Ephorus (14.11), a sector which elsewhere never has a single highest officer is given a satrap. From Ephorus Diodorus has drawn his accounts of Persian affairs in books 11-16 (from which I have drawn most of my examples). Couldn't the "satrap" of Mysia be a similar misconception on the part of Ephorus in his original account or Diodorus' misunderstanding of Ephorus?⁵⁰

C. Orontes' Position and Appointment

It now seems likely that Diodorus is less than precise in his description of Orontes as satrap of Mysia. There is no reason to assume that Diodorus has suddenly decided to call Ionia, i.e. the coast west of Sparda, Mysia, a practice for which Osborne finds only one instance (Diod. 11.1.2; 306-307). If we consider the political entities in the sector of Mysia as enumerated above, what possible position could Orontes hold? The most reasonable choice is that Orontes' position is not unlike Asidates' or Itamenes':⁵¹ he would own an estate (with villages and fortifications), have something of a personal following, and deal with Greek cities and Mysian tribesmen. What evidence we do have for Orontes' activities in the west (e.g. OGIS 264, Polyaeus 7.14.2-4) indicate dealings with Greeks and Greek cities in sectors controlled out of Sparda and the possession of his own forces (Diod. 15.91.1 aside).⁵² Orontes' titular superior would be the satrap at Sparda.

And we should not assume that Orontes is the only such lesser officer in the sector.

Why should Orontes end up in Mysia as what may be termed, in spite of his ultimate Bactrian origin, a "local noble?"⁵³ The appointment should be taken as a sign of Artaxerxes' disfavor (as Osborne 291-293 argues). Orontes is no longer highest officer as he was in Armenia. He is far from his old estates, his old network of friendships. In addition to the paucity of attractions provided by Mysian tribesmen and rapacious city-bosses, Mysia is a sector over which influence can be exercised by the more powerful satraps at Sparda and Dascylium. Orontes also had displayed a skill which may have suggested to

Artaxerxes an appointment to a sector like Mysia: as satrap of Armenia, Orontes had been responsible for arranging a modus vivendi with the high country recalcitrant Kardouchoi (Xen. Anab. 3.5.16-17). Orontes might be able to do the same in Mysia. But it would be unlikely that Orontes, even if he pacified and coopted large numbers of Mysian tribesmen, regardless of his motivation in so doing, would have been able to rival his more powerful neighbors at Dascylium and Sparda--under normal circumstances. We should also count on the possibility of rivalry with other local nobles.

Under what circumstances did Orontes receive his post? Did he, as Osborne believes, arrive in Mysia in the midst of instability? According to Osborne, Orontes was appointed to the satrapy at Mysia after the years 366-364 (307-309). He based this statement on his observation that Orontes does not appear in our documentation between 380 and the late 360's, and on his belief that Orontes must be the highest officer of some distinct administrative unit, i.e. satrap, in order for him to command the rebels in 362/1. Because Osborne insisted on defining the satrapy of Mysia as those coastal sectors normally under the control of the satrap at Sparda, 364 or shortly thereafter seemed the most reasonable point to place Orontes' appointment. It seemed the only possible time for Autophradates' satrapy to be split in two.

If we abandon the belief that Orontes is the highest officer of a specific sector, his absence in the source material concerning Autophradates and Sparda before 362/1 is not surprising. Osborne made much of Orontes' absence in Xen Ages. 2.26.⁵⁴ Autophradates is in conflict

with Ariobarzanes and holds the northern part of Sparda, part of the supposed satrapy of Mysia. Since Orontes is not mentioned, he must not be in the west.⁵⁵ But his absence should not be a matter for great concern. The Agésilas is a work designed to praise the Spartan king, not to provide a list of Achaemenid personnel. The passage in question seeks to establish that Agesilaus carries great political weight even as an envoy. Xenophon does so by narrating a series of incidents in which major politicians must change their course of action when the old man appears. Autophradates, Cotys, and Maussollos must be accomodating. A second point which Xenophon makes in this same passage is that good king Agesilaus benefits his Persian friend Ariobarzanes. There is no reason why Orontes should be mentioned. He may well be in the west, but simply has had no contact with Agesilaus worth noting.

There is no reference to Orontes in Nepos' Datames. The life is designed to glorify Datames at the expense of other important Achaemenid personnel: Ariobarzanes, Autophradates, Artaxerxes. It is entirely possible that Datames had no contact with Orontes. What is surprising is that Nepos fails to refer to either Orontes or the "Great Satraps' Revolt" when narrating events in the late 360's (Datames 9-11). A third important source for the 360's, Polyaeus, reports a number of stratagems under the name Orontes (7.14.2-4) which may be placed comfortably within the context of the late 360's. The ancient record is simply silent on Orontes' appointment. There are no fixed dates in his career between 380 and 362/1. The question is how to best fill that gap.

Osborne leaves a rather large gap, removal from Armenia shortly after 380, appointment in Mysia before 362/1. The scenario is curious: a

rehabilitated "rebel" is sent to assist the only "loyalist," and shortly after his arrival revolts and fights the man he was to assist. This is the most reasonable explanation for the warfare reported in Polyaeus 7.14.3-4. But if Orontes' transfer to the west involves essentially giving him an estate in Mysia, we may place the appointment anytime between the conclusion of the Cypriote campaign and 362/1. An appointment in the first half of the 370's⁵⁶ would have attractions for Artaxerxes, for one of Orontes' neighbors would be his old nemesis, Tiribazos, satrap at Sparda, who would be sure to keep a sharp eye on his slanderer. Tiribazos would also be the superior of Orontes. To the north, the satrap at Dascylium was Ariobarzanes, who was apparently on good terms with Tiribazos. Add the Mysian tribesmen and the Greeks, and Orontes, isolated from his old power base, was in for a less than pleasant time in Mysia.

Finally, how does one explain Orontes' rise to prominence in Diod. 15.91.1 if he was only a noble with an estate or two and not a satrap? This prominence during the revolt was Osbornes' reason for ruling out any post for Orontes less significant than satrap. One should not rule out Orontes' age and relations. Since he had held an important post in Armenia in 401, there is every chance that he was born before 430, and is probably older than either Ariobarzanes or Autophradates, his more powerful neighbors.⁵⁹ He had married a daughter of Artaxerxes, a close tie to the ruling house which Ariobarzanes, Autophradates, and Maussollos could not claim.

But a good deal of Orontes' preeminence as a rebel leader is illusory, for it is based on the belief that Diodorus has represented correctly the forces involved in anti-royal activities (so Osborne,

291, first paragraph). There are good reasons to reject Diocorus' grandiose claims of a massive destabilization in the Achaemenid far west. Unfortunately, detailed argumentation and proof cannot be presented at this juncture, but are in succeeding chapters.⁵⁸ Briefly, I may state here that there exists no evidence that Autophradates or Maussollos acted against Artaxerxes II. Rather, they cooperate in a campaign against the rebel Ariobarzanes. Troubles in southern Anatolia, e.g. in Lycia and Pamphylia, involve local disputes in which it is quite difficult to determine which combatants are inimical to Achaemenid control. A third theatre is Egypt, which had long been destabilized. The temporary success of unified Egyptian rebels permitted some initial thrusts into Achaemenid Ebir-nari. There were a series of contemporary difficulties, not a single massive revolt. The list of rebels is shorter than Diodorus would have us believe. Orontes' title in 15.91.1 is somewhat grandiose and inaccurate.

His activities are best described as self-aggrandizement while his superior and more powerful neighbors fight each other. There was a tie with the Egyptian theatre, one of mutual exploitation. Tachos perceived Orontes as a compliant member of the order he wished to destabilize, and hopefully distract from Egypt, while Orontes saw Tachos as a source of money and material which he could use for his own purposes. Orontes' overall significance lessens, and with it a good part of Osborne's reluctance to make of Orontes anything less than a satrap.

To sum up: Orontes, satrap of Armenia, as a result of his slander against Tiribazos, satrap at Sparda, fell from royal favor. Shortly

after 380 he was removed from Armenia and sent westward to Mysia.

There he owned an estate and was subordinate in power and influence to his nemesis, Tiribazos. Diodorus 15.90.3 is right in placing Orontes in Mysia, but is wrong in calling him satrap, if by satrap he means the highest officer in a discrete administrative sector so recognized at Susa.

Section IV. Ariobarzanes' Appointment as Satrap at Dascylium⁵⁹

In Xenophon Hellenica 5.1.28 we learn that Pharnabazos had left the satrapy at Dascylium before 387, journeyed to court, and married a daughter of Artaxerxes. His successor as satrap is Ariobarzanes, who seems to have appeared earlier in 1.4.7 to undertake a mission for Pharnabazos. For Dascylium, then, Xenophon provides a satrap list of participants in the Satraps' Revolt, provides this description of Ariobarzanes: among the most noteworthy of the rebels was "Ariobarzanes the satrap of Phrygia, who, upon the death of Mithridates, gained control over his realm (basileia).\" Diodorus implies a satrap list for "Phrygia" of Mithridates, Ariobarzanes. To what degree is Diodorus accurate? Of what province is Ariobarzanes satrap? How did he receive his post a satrap?

A. Ariobarzanes' Satrapy

One issue may be dealt with rather easily. The assignation of Phrygia to Ariobarzanes in 15.90.3 is erroneous, or rather imprecise. Later in his work, Diodorus seems to be aware that Ariobarzanes held

sway in the far northwest of Anatolia, i.e. Dascylium (17.17.6-7), but calls the sector Phrygia.⁶⁰ This sort of confusion is not uncommon: Harpocration (sv. Ariobarzanes) refers to Ariobarzanes as satrap of Phrygia. Less satisfactory is Nepos Datames 2.5: praefecto Lydiae et Ioniae totiusque Phrygiae, for the earlier 370's. Nepos' mistake may be something of a reflection of Ariobarzanes' importance in the far west. Trogus. Prol. 10 labels him more accurately as praefectum Hellesponti.

The word basileia is also something of an imprecision. A satrapy can be regarded as a sphere of influence and operations, but not as a kingdom per se. It may be handed down from father to son, but such succession is ultimately at the discretion of the Shah. The final puzzling element, Nithridates as Ariobarzanes' predecessor, will emerge later as yet a further confusion on Diodorus' part.

B. Ariobarzanes' Appointment

On the basis of Xenophon's account it is possible to state that Ariobarzanes had become satrap no later than 387 but we are given no information as to why Ariobarzanes in particular was named satrap and whether Pharnabazos was called to court at that particular time for any purpose beyond marrying the princess Apame.⁶¹ It is possible to use the evidence to construct a scenario in which continuity in personnel, but discontinuity in policy can explain Artaxerxes' appointments in 388-387.

Two passages suggest Ariobarzanes had some experience in the handling of satrapial affairs. In 405 he was charged with the somewhat low level

task of escorting Athenian ambassadors which Pharnabazos had been holding, seemingly for three years (Xen. Hell. 1.4.7).⁶² Some time before 387 he had established a xenia with Antalcidas the Spartan (5.1.28, ek palaiou may signify quite a number of years before). When we examine Ariobarzanes' family history, these activities take on a greater significance.

Unfortunately, any attempt to discover Ariobarzanes' relations is prosopography by inference. The only extant personal history we have for Ariobarzanes is that he had three sons, one of whom was named Mithridates.⁶³ Noldeke seems to have been the first to propose that Ariobarzanes was closely related to Pharnabazos.⁶⁴ He noted that the name Ariobarzanes was held by a son of Artabazus, this Artabazus a son of Pharnabazos and satrap at Dascylium in the very late 360's. The name might be present in Pharnabazos' family before that point. Secondly, the satrapy at Dascylium had been in Pharnabazos' family since the 470's. It was reasonable that Ariobarzanes was a member of that same family and that the satrapy remained within the same family after Pharnabazos' departure. Ariobarzanes, in Beloch's view, was either a son or younger brother of Pharnabazos.⁶⁵

I can raise serious objections to neither scholar's views. Pharnabazos had at least one brother, Bagaïos, who assisted in maintaining order in the satrapy. Ariobarzanes' activities can be seen in light of the usual practice among Achaemenid noblemen to make use of their sons and relatives in civil and military capacities. Even youngsters were shown the ropes.⁶⁶ The continuity in personnel which results from placing Ariobarzanes among the "sons of Pharnakes"⁶⁷ is quite attractive.

As a matter of common sense I would prefer to regard Ariobarzanes as Pharnabazos' eldest (living) son. We know that Pharnabazos had other children before 387 (cf. Xen. Hell. 4.1.40, see below), and it would have been an insult to the competent satrap to refuse to permit him to hand down his post to his son, as he himself had received it from his own father. By 387, then, Dascylium is taken up by a close relative of the old satrap, someone already familiar with and to the satrapy, and with the foreign diplomat who is instrumental in causing a change in royal policy. To assume stability in governing is not rash speculation.

An additional piece of evidence from Xenophon may shed some more light on Ariobarzanes and the circumstances surrounding his appointment. This is the anecdote related in Hellenica 4.1.40, a brief digression which follows Xenophon's account (4.1.29-39) of a meeting between Pharnabazos and Agesilaus. When Pharnabazos was away from Dascylium (apodēmia), a brother⁶⁸ deprived the son of Parapita (a wife of Pharnabazos) of his archē and made him an exile. The son, who immediately before this passage had concluded a xenia with Agesilaus, flees to the Peloponnese and is well treated by his xenos, Agesilaus. This anecdote quite obviously displays the Spartan king, Xenophon's hero, in a very favorable light, and the Persians in a poor light. The bonds of friendship held firm after many years. Family ties mean little to the barbarians. But this passage is difficult to interpret because of the absence of proper names (who is the son? the brother?) and the placement of adelphos, which may refer to a brother of either Pharnabazos or the son of Parapita.

The most detailed analysis of the passage seems that of Beloch.⁶⁹ The apodemia of Pharnabazos is placed around 387, when he is anō (5.1.28), i.e. at court. This is most reasonable. Although Pharnabazos was away from Dascylium on campaign at different points between 394 and the time he left for court, the latter time seems the safest for someone to act against a satrap's son.

Beloch does not comment on the words aposterōn . . . tēn archēn. They are something of an exaggeration. Xenophon has just used the word archē in 4.1.37, where it means a satrapy, or rather the post of satrap, a source of jealous pride for Pharnabazos. The son of Parapita and Pharnabazos is a pais in 394, and seems rather youthful still by 387. It is extremely doubtful that Pharnabazos would leave the satrapy in the hands of so young a son at any point. A more reasonable interpretation of Xenophon's phrase is that family strife occurred--not uncommon in an empire where politics were highly personal--and the son of Parapita, a much younger man, was forced to flee Dascylium. He seeks out the friendship and protection of his much older guest-friend Agesilaus. The loss of an archē may mean that Parapita's son lost whatever estates were his partimony.

The real difficulty with the passage concerns the word adelphos (as it appears in the mss.). Who is he and to whom is he a brother? Beloch's identification of him as Ariobarzanes is almost certainly correct. He has been active in the affairs of Dascylium since 405, and would be powerful enough to deal summarily with rivals by 387, particularly those younger than him. But to whom is he a brother--to

Pharnabazos or to the son of Parapita (making Ariobarzanes a son of Pharnabazos)? Beloch was uncertain.⁷⁰ He believed that the xenia with Antalcidas had to have been made before 400, i.e. in peacetime (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28).⁷¹ This and Ariobarzanes' appearance in 405 did not rule out his being a son of Pharnabazos. But, later on, Beloch produced a stemma in which Ariobarzanes appears as Pharnabazos' brother.⁷² The evidence of 4.1.40 is very ambiguous.

There is really no evidence to prevent an identification of the brother as Ariobarzanes and a brother to Parapita's son. Evidence relating to the life of Agesilaus permits us to establish 443/2 as that king's birthdate.⁷³ Agesilaus was younger than Pharnabazos (Xen. Hell. 4.1.31), who was thus born around 445. Ariobarzanes, in order to be old enough to be entrusted with a mission in 405 would be about twenty.⁷⁴ He would be Pharnabazos' eldest known son, and certainly old enough to boot out his much younger brother by 387, and to have a grown son of his own in the 370's and 360's (when Mithridates was active). Needless to say, Pharnabazos was polygamous. The satrapy of Dascylium passed from father to eldest son.

There is one additional passage which may tilt the very ambiguous position of adelphos in favor of Ariobarzanes as son of Pharnabazos. Plutarch Ages. 13.3-4 reproduces the story in an abbreviated form, and seems to have been based on Xen. Hell. 4.1.40.⁷⁵ In his rendering Plutarch makes it clear that the son of Parapita was exiled by his brothers (hypo tōn adelphōn). Although Plutarch is inaccurate in making "brothers" plural, he understood the passage to refer to strife among Pharnabazos' sons, which include Ariobarzanes, if we accept Beloch's

suggestion.

This reconstruction which makes Ariobarzanes a son of Pharnabazos is a rather tenuous one. It is very regrettable--and perhaps surprising--that Xenophon is so circumspect when he narrates the incident in 4.1.40.⁷⁶ The major strength of the reconstruction lies in its presentation of orderly government in Dascylium: the satrapy remains within the same family--as it had for many generations--and passes to the eldest (living) son--who had previous experience in governmental affairs. There is continuity plus the rule of primogeniture.

The reason, it seems, for Ariobarzanes' appointment by 387, was that Pharnabazos was up country (5.1.28), and marrying the king's daughter. The old satrap seems to never have returned to Dascylium in that same capacity. He appears periodically until 374 as a special officer, an imperial commander who coordinated the campaigns against rebel Egypt (Isocrates 4.140, Diod. 15.29ff., Nepos Datames 3.5, Plut. Artax. 24.1). He can be regarded as the expert on far western affairs, familiar to all and personally familiar with most of those officers subordinate to him on the field. One might hazard to say that he is the karanos for Ebir-nari and Egypt. Was there any deeper reason for Pharnabazos' marriage and promotion? Evidence suggests that the marriage may have been planned since the mid-390's. It may be facetious to suggest that the bride was not old enough until 388.⁷⁹

A discontinuity in policy suggests an additional reason: It is in 387 that Artaxerxes has managed to apply what he hopes will be a definitive solution to the "Greek problem," the presence in Anatolia of potentially and actively hostile forces from mainland Greece which support

local Greek politicians inimical to Achaemenid control and other possibly recalcitrant elements. Pharnabazos had done much to help bring the problem under control by his able supervision of a mercenary fleet led by the Athenian Conon. For the time being the Athenians were the compliant elements of the native order, for they served as instruments for weakening Sparta. In the years immediately before 387 this view was shared by the satrap at Sparda, Struthas. But in 387 Tiribazos returned and spoke the King's Peace. With almost all foreign hostile troops removed from the Anatolian coast and its environs, the Great King now recognized Sparta as well as a compliant member of the native order (Xen. Hell. 4.8.16-17, 5.1.25-34). Might the old nobleman object? Might the most senior man in the Achaemenid far west eventually develop an animosity toward the younger Tiribazos, still an outsider and a newcomer? It was best not to find out.⁷⁸ Ariobarzanes would assure a continuity of personnel in Dascylium, but would not have the same personal stake in the old policy as Pharnabazos. All this is supposition, but perhaps after so many years of service in the far west Pharnabazos deserves a more honorable "retirement" as satrap in the far west than that given to his old rival, Tissaphernes.

C. Mithridates in Diodorus 15.90.3

The reconstruction so far has had Ariobarzanes succeeding Pharnabazos at Dascylium. Other than the exile of the son of Parapita, there seems to have been no difficulty in the transfer of power. But Diodorus seems to be at variance with this picture of stability: he inserts a Mithridates as Ariobarzanes' predecessor, but provides no details about

the supposed satrap. This Mithridates defies identification with any known figure. He cannot have been the very youthful--and unnamed--son of Parapita and Pharnabazos. The son was exiled; he did not die in Asia Minor before Ariobarzanes took power, as Diodorus states. One of Ariobarzanes' sons was named Mithridates: could Diodorus have reversed the names, thereby concealing the fact that in 362/1 Mithridates succeeded Ariobarzanes? At first glance this is an attractive theory: Mithridates is known to have betrayed his father sometime in the late 360's.⁷⁹ But in 15.90.3 no relationship is given between Mithridates and Ariobarzanes, and the transfer of power is due to one man's death; there is no hint of the treachery which Diodorus is not slow to narrate elsewhere in his account of that year's events.⁸⁰ Some scholars have taken refuge with the homonymous dynasts of Cius and argue that Diodorus has somehow confused or conflated the satraps at Dascylium with the local lords around Cius.⁸¹ It is difficult to understand why Diodorus would make such a mistake in this particular passage: in his discussions of the dynasts (16.90.2, 19.40.2, 20.111.4) he displays no confusion with the other figures, and provides information which permits the construction of a stemma without much difficulty. The most reasonable conclusion one can draw about Diodorus' account of Ariobarzanes' accession is that Diodorus is confused and erroneous, but that it is difficult to understand precisely what caused the confusion and error.

To conclude: By 387 Ariobarzanes had replaced Pharnabazos as satrap at Dascylium. Prosopography by inference permits the elaboration that Pharnabazos was succeeded by his eldest son, and that the satrapy remained within his own family. A change in royal policy may explain

the timing for Pharnabazos' "retirement" as satrap, but he left that post in honor.

Conclusion

As a result of the preceeding inquiries it is possible to establish the identities of the highest officers in Sparda and Dascylium. Tiribazos, an outsider, held the former briefly in 393, and was replaced by Struthas in 392. Struthas left by 387, replaced by Tiribazos, perhaps now wiser. He held the satrapy this time until a point after 374, when the successful noble of the southwest, Autophradates, took up the citadel and its sphere. We shall find him there into the 350's, so it seems. Among the array of lesser officers of these years were Orontes in Mysia and Droaphernes in the city Sparda. Struthas' son-in-law, Tigranes, seems to have still been around in the 360's. At Dascylium the picture is simple: eldest son, Ariobarzanes, succeeds father, Pharnabazos.

These lists of satraps illustrate a significant difference between the two centers of Achaemenid control on the west coast of Anatolia. In Dascylium, the less prominent satrapy, there is a clear display of continuity in personnel: control passes from one generation of administrators to the next. Both generations are valuable: Pharnabazos may have been removed to prevent tension over policy, but his removal took the form of a promotion--in political and social status--to a sector far more valuable than Anatolia. In Sparda, we find no continuity in personnel among the highest officers. Only among the lesser officers,

in the case of Tigranes, can a continuity be perceived. Tiribazos, Struthas, and Autophradates were not men long associated with Sparda; members of their families (save Tigranes) do not appear to remain prominent after these men ceased to be satraps.

The career paths of the officers in Sparda display both the positive and negative aspects of some of the characteristics of Achaemenid control set out in the previous chapter. Competent lesser officers could rise to higher status in adjoining sectors (Tiribazos, Autophradates). In the making of appointments the Shah recognized personnel and policy problems: Tiribazos was appointed to Sparda because he probably would not clash with Pharnabazos. Tiribazos and Struthas held the post of highest officer when they did because each man could be relied upon to carry through a particular line in policy. But there are negative aspects: officers could be removed or demoted; old friendships could turn to damaging hatreds; success and competence did not assure a continuity in personnel.

But all of this is still a skeleton stripped of its flesh. We are unable to speak in anything beyond generalizations or hypotheses about these men's personalities, their unities or disunities in outlook. One can point to two specters who will emerge periodically over the remainder of Artaxerxes' reign to exercise influence over his administrative decisions for Anatolia. Cyrus is one: Tiribazos and Orontes stood against Cyrus and were rewarded. But the fear of a new Cyrus would arise in the 360's (see chapter 6). The ghost of Tissaphernes is more problematic: a desire to avoid deleterious competition between Sparda

and Dascylium can be seen in the appointments made in Sparda. No satrap in that sector seems to have achieved the level of prominence reached by Tissaphernes in the earlier 390's.⁸² But deleterious competition remained.

Footnotes

¹Westlake CQ 29 (1979) 35 talks about the "sinister and enigmatic Tissaphernes." But the satrap seems quite optimistic in his expectation that he could exercise enough power over the Greeks to have each side destroy the other. Pharnabazos was "open and generous" (41), at least toward the Spartans, whom he could use to destroy those responsible for extorting protection money from his father.

²See Westlake Historia 30 (1981) 257-279.

³A thoroughgoing discussion of the evidence relating to Tiribazos is provided by Meloni Athenaeum 28 (1956) 292-339, who establishes that all the passages refer to one man in the different stages of his career. Discussions may be found in Krumbholz 63-64, 65-66; Judeich 83-84, 100, 105, 123-131 (becomes much involved in karanos v. satrap issue, see below; little attention paid to the mechanics of his career; career before 393 ignored); Schaefer RE 6A:2 1431-1437 (the most detailed account, but little analysis); Beloch² 3:2 121-136 (ignores early career); Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 524-525, cf. 518-519; Lewis Sparta and Persia 145-147 (perceptive notes).

⁴Diodorus' brief narration (14.27.7) mistakenly calls him satrap, a post held by Orontes (Xen. Anab. 3.5.17). Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 518-519.

⁵There is one slight possibility: transfer of ownership from an absentee landlord (possibly the King) to Tiribazos of estates already in existence. Note in Xen. Anab. 1.4.10 the estate of the satrap of Syria continues to exist although we do not know if the nobleman is still alive.

⁶Lewis 145 n.63 is uncertain whether his post as hyparch is a reward for service at Cunaxa.

⁷On philoi now see Wiesehofer Studia Iranica 9 (1980) 7-21.

⁸Here the titles given to Tiribazos by the sources create difficulties. Xen. Hell. 4.8.12: strategos; Diod. 14.85.4: the man leading infantry in Asia; Nepos Conon 5.3: in charge of Sardis. These are all job descriptions, not formal chancellory titles. From his actions it is obvious he is satrap at Sparda. As for a "military command" (so Lewis 145 n.63) or for his being karanos (a title attested only for Cyrus the younger): it is difficult to see how Tiribazos could outrank Pharnabazos, which is what moderns take karanos to mean.

Military realities may suggest a solution: Pharnabazos of Dascylium is absent from his province, and is operating in the Aegean and Europe. There are caretakers in Sparda. The obvious military function for Tiribazos, once he arrives, is to assure the internal stability of the Persian far west while operating out of Sparda. In this sense he may be a strategos, a general, and an important infantry commander. Pharnabazos' age, position, and length of time in office all insure he is the senior man.

⁹So Lewis 146 n.70.

¹⁰I believe there is a good chance the inscription should be assigned to the period after the removal of Spartan influence, i.e. after the campaigns against Thibron and Diphidas. The dispute concerning territory in the plain of the Maeander (1.5), the place in which Thibron campaigned (Xen. Hell. 4.8.17). The procedure which the Greeks follow in resolving this dispute, i.e. referring it to the king, suggest that it is being undertaken in a time of relative peace and nearly unquestioned Persian supremacy. The dispute itself may have been a result of wartime exigencies.

Tod II 113, pp. 36-39, assigns only a general date of 391-388, i.e. when Struthas was in the west.

¹¹In Harpocration and the Suda (in both sv. Struthas) Struthas is called satrapēs, but is not assigned to a particular sector.

¹²Before the publication of SIG³ 134a the resolution of this problem was simple. Theopompus was wrong; so Krumbholz 64-67. The inscription created the need for a *deus e machina*, the title karanos, to resolve the problem. Judeich 86, 307 proposes the solution given in my text. There the discussion stalled: Beloch² 3:2 135-138, Tod II p. 38, Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 524 n.50.

¹³Lewis 118-119 n.75 moved discussion off dead center by suggesting that only Struthas' "position as satrap of Ionia is relevant to this arbitration by the Ionian League, which is why it alone is mentioned; . . .". He goes on to express puzzlement over the rest of Struthas' position and to question the veracity of Theopompus. On the whole, Lewis pays far greater attention to titles, rather than actions, and hence he stymies himself.

Unfortunately, Lewis did not make use of the Xanthus decree, which he did in fact know about (citation on p. 83 n.4 to the CRAI 1974 publication). A full discussion appears in my chapter on the Hekatomnids.

¹⁴The "satrapy of Ionia" is a favorite problem in discussion of Satrapieneinteilung. Lewis 118-119, with notes, is a most lucid account of some of the evidence relating to the problem of whether a separate satrapy of Ionia ever did exist.

On the complexity of Ionia as a sector one may consult the following: Balcer in Arktouros (261-268). Balcer points to the existence of a political bipolarity within individual poleis, i.e. the asty may be pro-Athenian while the chora and its landlords are pro-Persian. Westlake CQ 29 (1979) 9-44 adds a much needed third dimension to the usual flat perception of pro-Athenian v. pro-Spartan forces by highlighting the difficulties every side faced in maintaining the military superiority upon which political control depended. He also emphasizes the unenviable position of the many small cities on the coast, whose policies were aimed simply at self-preservation. The role of the personality of the satraps is also examined.

When we add to complex Ionia the multitude of tyrants and dynasts in Caria and Lycia we are very close to driving any Persian administrator of this Herodotean nomos to despondency, let alone bankruptcy, as he tries to keep order and collect taxes.

Close attention to titles, at the expense of reality, has caused a satrapy of Ionia to surface occasionally in Achaemenid history. A standard account is given by Bengtson Philologus 92 (1937) 129ff (cf. Krumbholz 26-27, 32-33: wartime appointments are thought to reflect administrative reality; Murray Historia 15 [1966] 149), who begins with "big Ionia," the satrapy of Hdt. 3.90.1, which becomes whittled down (e.g. Karba in Old Persian inscriptions means Caria is a separate satrapy) until a "rump Ionia" is attached to the satrapy at Sparda. Beloch² 3:2 137-141 offers a brief survey of the evidence. Most recently there is Bosworth Arrian I 112, in which Ionia (or the coast) surfaces as a separate satrapy in the later 390's (thanks to SIG³ 134a) and in 362 in the guise of the satrapy of Mysia (thanks to Osborne GB 3 [1975] and Diod. 15.90.3). On the latter see discussion below, section III.

Since much is made of Herodotus' "Dareian constitution" in book three, it is worthwhile to note what Darius himself has to say. His Old Persian inscriptions are lists of peoples, not discrete provinces. So proven in Cameron JNES 32 (1973) 47-50. In Carius' letter to Gadatas, published as SIG³ 22 and more recently as ML 12, we have a verbal equivalent to gesticulations designed to indicate approximate direction. Gadatas has gotten himself into trouble over misuse of Apollo's gardeners near Magnesia on the Maeander. Darius talks about the region as ta katō tēs Asias merē, the lower portions of Asia.

¹⁵ Tod II p. 38 talks about an Ionian league consisting of 12 cities. I'm afraid that I am unable to find any evidence for such a league in the preserved sections of the inscription.

¹⁶ Nepos Datames 2.5, reminiscent of Hdt. 3.127.1, is wrong. Cf. Lewis 119 n.75.

¹⁷ Plut. Artax. 24 reports that Tiribazos and his son (not given a name) accompany the Shah in operations directed against the perennially recalcitrant Cadusians (Plut. Artax. 24). Section 24 reports two events: the first is the failure of the Egyptian campaign of Pharnabazos and Iphicrates (24.1), the second is the Cadusian campaign (24.2-11). The

two are contrasted (note the use of men . . . de); the first, marked by dissension in the high command, is a failure, the second, during which the king is in command, is a success--in fact capitalizing on dissension among the Cadusians themselves. One might argue that the two campaigns are juxtaposed solely for the sake of this contrast.

Exact chronology is always a difficulty in Plutarch's biographical sketches, but the date after 374 BC may be defended. The events in the Artaxerxes are in rough chronological order: Cunaxa, the fates of the participants, the King's Peace. Section 23 represents a digression on Tissaphernes' death and on the king's relations with his own family. The failure of the Egyptian campaign can be placed in 374, and occurred after the King's Peace (reported in Artax. 22). Following the conclusion of the Caducian campaign, Plutarch turns to narrate the final years of Artaxerxes' reign. It would seem reasonable that both the Egyptian and Caducian campaigns are placed in chronological order. Tiribazos is with the king after 374.

The Cadusians, located near Media (Xen. Hell. 2.1.13), like other tribal peoples, presented a constant problem to their more sedentary and urbanized neighbors. One should not, as Judeich 128-129, 129 n.1 does, attempt to identify one campaign against the Cadusians with another, especially if these campaigns are basically different in content. The identification of the campaign in Plut. Artax. 24 with that in Diod. 15.8, 10 is a false one: Diod. 15.8.5 makes explicit that Artaxerxes believes Tiribazos to be guilty and has placed him under guard, where he will remain until the king has time to arrange a trial (15.10.1). There is no reason to believe Artaxerxes would permit a suspected rebel--already under arrest--to operate freely in his presence and in the midst of a campaign (so Tiribazos and his son in Plut. Artax. 24.2-11).

One may sort out the following campaigns carried out against the Cadusians before the death of Artaxerxes II: one in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.1.13), one in the late 380's at the time of the final stages of the revolt of Euagoras (Diod. 15.8.5, 10.1), one after the failure of Pharnabazos' Egyptian campaign in 374 (Plut. Artax. 24, Trogus. Prol. 10).

One should note that Plutarch's account of Tiribazos' character in this campaign accords with the data he has given earlier. Tiribazos is often a paragon of nobility, but his lightness (kouphotēs) will lead him to less than moderate behavior, and trouble (Plut. Artax. 24.4). It is most reasonable to believe we are dealing with the same nobleman in Artaxerxes 5, 7, 10, 24.

¹⁸ A Tiribazos appears in the remainder of the Artaxerxes as an example of a noble whose loyalty to the crown is overcome by personal disappointment. Dareios, a son of Artaxerxes, has been cheated from a marriage to Aspasia, once the mistress of Cyrus the Younger, and is now quite disgruntled with his father (Artax. 26).

There are some difficulties in the story, which is set in the midst of intrigues surrounding an aged king (26.1-2). Darius is 50 (26.4), yet Plutarch later (28.1) calls him a neaniskos. The object of Darius'

desire, Aspasia, is by most conservative figures at least in her 50's: Plut. Artax. 26.5-6, 9 reports that she was Cyrus' mistress and was captured at Cunaxa, i.e. in 401. The other sources concerning her (Xen. Anab. 1.10.2, Plut. Per. 24.11ff, Ael. v.h. 12.1, Athen. 13.576d) suggest that she was not very much younger than 20 at the time of her capture (e.g. Xenophon calls attention to her wisdom and that she was not the youngest of Cyrus' courtesans). One might place her birth around 420. The story related by Plutarch here seems to take place in the 360's. Romanticism seems to overcome reality in the narration of these intrigues. One may suppose that Aspasia possessed influence at court--such is mentioned in the less romantic Plut. Per. 24 and implied in Ael. v.h. 12.1.

Dareios is found as an ally by a similarly disgruntled Tiribazos who has been disappointed twice: proposed marriages Amastris and then with Atossa, both Artaxerxes' daughters, had been thwarted by the Shah (Artax. 27.6-8), who had arranged them himself earlier. Conspiracy (28) against the crown (Artaxerxes II and Ochus, the heir apparent) follows, then the death of the conspirators (29): Tiribazos dies at court fighting the royal guards (29.7). Tiribazos' own son, Arpates (it is unknown if it was he on the Cadusian campaign), takes a role in court intrigue: unlike his father, he backs Ochus, and helps to kill Arsames in 359/8 (30.8).

¹⁹ Autophradates' career will be discussed in the course of the next chapters, on Euagoras, Datames, the Hekatomnids (including fourth century Lycia), and the Satraps' Revolt.

²⁰ The identity of these rebels remain a mystery. Judeich 190-191 synchronized Diod. 15.18 and Nepos Datames 2.1 and proposed that eos qui defeceant were Glos, son of Tamos, and Tachos, a subordinate of Glos, and that they were the object of operations in 383/2. Beloch² 3:2 136 accepted this.

There are difficulties with this identification. Diod. 15.18.1 makes it appear that Glos dies by treachery; no campaign against him is recorded. Tachos then musters the old forces of Glos and founds his own city to serve as a headquarters (15.18.1). Shortly thereafter he simply dies (15.18.2). Again no campaign or need for one. There is no reason to bring Nepos and Diodorus together. The events in Nepos take place after the end of the Cypriote campaign (which I place in 380, following Spyridakis). Nepos indicates that Datames succeeded his father Camisares after that man's death in a campaign against the Cadusians (Datames 2.1). This is the one waged in the late 380's and reported in Diod. 15.8.5, 10.1. Hence Datames has only just taken up Cilicia. A likely candidate would be the Lycians who are situated in between Cilicia and Autophradates' probable home sector. There is no reason to send Autophradates and Datames up to a region around Clazomenae and Cyme to deal with potential recalcitrants who virt-ally eliminate themselves.

²¹ CRAI 1975 306-330.

²²Eg. Lewis 53 n.23 cites it as a cultural document. It is unfortunate he did not consider the historical implications of Robert's analysis. One may find it cited, but only as a cultural document in Briant "Forces Productives" 38, 39, 44.

²³Robert CRAI 1975 310-313.

²⁴Some of the principal sources for Autophradates: Nepos Datames 7-8 (campaign against Datames); Xen. Ages. 2.26 plus Polyaeus 7.26 (operations against Ariobarzanes; for date see Judeich 199-202); Diod. 15.90.3 (rebel in 362/1); Dem. 23.154-156 (operations against Artabazos; cf. Judeich 207 n.1, Osborne Historia 22 [1973] 541, 541 n.127); TAM I 40, 61 (Lycian activities, called Persian satrap). I find no room to insert Droaphernes as satrap.

²⁵On statuary, etc. Robert CRAI 1975 314-317.

One must be careful here: Clement, citing Berossus FGrH 680 fr. 11, does not mention Artaxerxes II as Robert 316 top states. "Artaxerxes, son of Darius, son of Ochus" is identified with Artaxerxes II because during his reign inscriptions begin to contain the names of Mithra and Anahita, as indicated in the extract from Duchesne-Guillemin cited in Robert 316 n.31. Now see Burstein Berossus 29 n. 119. Berossus is speaking about Anahita alone. Practices for her may have followed practices already established for the more important Ahura-Mazda.

²⁶Thucydides' failure to discuss Persian affairs is treated by Andrenes Historia 10 (1961) 1-18. He is more polite to Thucydides than I have been here.

²⁷The revolt of Pissouthnes (chronology with a late date) is discussed in Lewis 80-81, and notes 192-200. I regret he did not discuss the Droaphernes decree in this context. Gomme HCT V:VIII 12 raises the possibility that Tissaphernes is at Sparda as early as 421.

²⁸It is uncertain how long Amorges' revolt lasted. Lewis 81 believes it to be on the short side. But Amorges may have waited a few years before making his move.

²⁹These documents include SIG³ 134a, 167, 170, SIG² 573, the trilingual Xanthus decree. Also see Schmitt "Satrap" 376-380.

³⁰Discussion may be found (with references) in Dandamayev ap. Walser 22, 24 and Frye ap. Walser 90.

³¹Gomme HCT V:VIII 357.

³² Lewis Sparta and Persia 80-81n.198 with p. 55, recognizing the uncertainty of the existence of precise satrapial boundaries, is to be preferred to the more mechanical solutions offered in Gomme HCT V:VIII 356 (change of supervisors for Arsakes, special high command for Tissaphernes. I believe Tissaphernes' title in Thucyd. 8.5.4 to be more descriptive than legally precise).

³³ I fail to understand the conclusion in Gomme HCT V:VIII 39 that if "the term [hyparch] has a local reference, Stages might be hyparch of Lydia." The best one can say is that Stages is a hyparch within the territory controlled by the satrap at Sparda.

³⁴ There are problems with Diod. 14.19.6. The other epineletai seem to control large sectors (Lydia, Phrygia), but Diodorus does not indicate how many were appointed for each sector. These same officers are then called satraps in Diod. 14.35.2-3. There is clarity only with Tamos it seems.

³⁵ He may also be Struthas' son-in-law (Xen. Hell. 4.8.21, so Judeich 271 n.1). Philiskos in Dem. 23.142 is Ariobarzanes' subordinate.

³⁶ Robert CRAI 1975 317 seems to believe so.

³⁷ Judeich 221-225, Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 515 n.1 for the identification of the various men named Orontes. The most recent discussion of Orontes' early career and parentage is in Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 517-522. The basic sources are as follows: satrap of Armenia, Xen. Anab. 3.5.17, 4.3.4; marriage to daughter of Artaxerxes, Xen. Anab. 2.4.8, 3.4.13, Plut. Artax. 27: his father, Plut. Artax. 12.1 identified with OGIS 264 and 391.

Trogus Prol. 10 erroneously calls Orontes praefectum Armeriae in referring to the 360's. See Osborne GB 3 (1975) 291-295, 297; Historia 22 (1973) 338; ABSA 66 (197.) 315.

³⁸ Most of the earlier perceptions are handled in Osborne GB 3 (1975). Judeich 130 n.2, 325 has Orontes appointed to Mysia after 383 (his date for Tiribazos' trial) as a hyparchos (Judeich 223 n.2). My presentation is a refinement in part of Judeich's view, with a detailed analysis (which he does not provide).

³⁹ M. J. Osborne "The Satrapy of Mysia" Grazer Beitrage 3 (1975) 291-309. Page and note references in the text are to this article.

⁴⁰ Bosworth Arrian I 112 accepts the view briefly given in ABSA 66 (1971) 310.

⁴¹ See note 39, above, end.

⁴² I fail to see how the examples cited by Osborne GB 3 (1975) 296 n.8 make up two distinct categories. Both are subordinate to the satraps.

⁴³ Osborne, it seems, has been led astray by the belief that Ariobarzanes' rebellion was triggered by Artaxerxes' decision to replace him with Artabazos. The references cited on p. 300 note 19 do not support this belief.

⁴⁴ Osborne GB 3 (1975) 309 final paragraph.

⁴⁵ Lewis 55-56 points out how the Mysian tribesmen lay between the sectors effectively controlled by the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium. His is a far more sophisticated perception than Osborne's, which simply makes an effort to establish precise boundaries for the region without considering the boundaries' implications.

⁴⁶ One may note the same cooption of tribesmen for nefarious purposes in the friendly relations which existed between Spithridates, a disgruntled nobleman of Dascylium, and Otys, a recalcitrant Paphlagonian chieftain. Xen. Hell. 4.1.2-16, 26-28 provides the fullest account.

⁴⁷ One should not be as sanguine as Xenophon about the nature of these settlements. Robert Et. Anat. 185-198 indicates that small villages were the rule among the native Mysians until about the second century AD. A brief summary may be found in F. Walbank Polybius I (Oxford, 1957) 605.

⁴⁸ It is uncertain whether he is the same man who operated at Colophon for Pissouthnes in 427/6 (Thucyd. 3.34.1).

⁴⁹ The relevant text indicates that Orontes, son of Artasyros, a Bactrian in extraction, revolted from Artaxerxes, conquered the Pergamenes, and then resettled them back on the hill in their old city. The word hill, kolonon, is a restoration (only the kappa and first omicron are extant). Cf. Dittenberger OGIS I p. 428 n. 7.

Accepting this restoration, I suggest this reconstruction of events: Lofty Pergamum, home of Asidates' enemies, is transferred to the plain (so Dittenberger) where future recalcitrance may be handled more summarily by local nobles. Orontes the rebel takes the inhabitants and places those loyal to him in the earlier and more strategic location, where pro-Orontes elements will be of greater tactical value. Orontes then "defects" and Pergamum goes "loyalist." Cf. Hansen Attalids of Pergamum² (Cornell, 1971) 10-11.

A parallel may be Miletus after the Ionian revolt (Hdt. 6.20), although I fail to see wisdom in entrusting ta hyperakria to the

Pedāsians (cf. Hdt. 1.175-176, 5.121).

⁵⁰ I note that Ephorus' teacher, Isocrates, uses satraps apparently as a collective term for Achaemenid officers in 5.104.

⁵¹ Surprisingly Osborne 306 cites Xen. Anab. 7.8.8 but then does not analyze the passage.

⁵² Leaving aside the questions of date and fragment disposition (they will be discussed later) I note that IG II² 207 mentions Orontes' sphere of control (archē) in line 3 and agricultural products to which Orontes has access (line 11; grown on his estate, his archē?)

⁵³ Local in the sense that he seems active in a particular district which is not as large as the sectors controlled by a satrap. Orontes was by extraction a Bactrian--but does this mean his ancestors were all born in Bactria or that somewhere in the past an ancestor of his, properly a Persian, was posted to Bactria where the family then remained? Also see note 37 above.

⁵⁴ Osborne misses Polyaeus 7.26 in this discussion.

⁵⁵ He is in the "wilderness"--so Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 538.

⁵⁶ Beloch² 3:2 140 did not rule out a date for appointment soon after the end of the Cypriote campaign, but provided no detailed analysis. For Judeich's view see note 38, above.

⁵⁷ Cf. Judeich 223: "er war wol ungefähr gleichaltig mit Autophrades and Tiribazos."

⁵⁸ Consult the chapters on Datames, the Hekatomnids, and the Satraps' Revolt.

⁵⁹ Not much attention has been paid to the early career of Ariobarzanes. The best and most intelligent treatment of the evidence can be found in Beloch² 3:2 146-147, 150-151. Judeich 205-206 does not discuss the early career or analyze rigorously Diodorus' material. His RE article, sv. Ariobarzanes cr. 1, is a sometimes erroneous recital of evidence. Lewis refers to Ariobarzanes in passing (118 n.75, 151 n.103). Olmstead 387-390, 394-395 presents the evidence, but no detailed discussion.

⁶⁰ It is uncertain whether the Arsames mentioned in Polyaeus 7.28.2 as satrap of Phrygia is to be placed in the period of destabilization in 360's. Cf. Beloch² 3:2 153.

⁶¹Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Xen. Ages. 3.3, Plut. Artax. 27; also see the beginning of the entry for Artabazos no. 152 in Berve.

⁶²The date of the mission is problematic and is dependent upon the acceptance of emiautoi tres (3 years). I shall not cloud the issue here with speculation as to whether the Ariobarzanes of 1.4.7 is not the future satrap, but some otherwise unattested lesser officer near Cius (homonymous men can be found here later in the fourth century). At this stage consult Beloch² 3:2 150-151.

⁶³Three sons: Dem. 23.141; Mithridates: Nepos Datames 4.5, 10.1; Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2, Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4. I will reserve judgment on the identities of the other two sons, but believe that if we knew their names from the ancient sources we would be in a better position to understand the tensions apparent in Dascylium during the council at Zeleia.

⁶⁴Nöldeke 295-296. Cf. Bosworth Arrian I 325 for a necessary corrective on the number of Ariobarzanes in Alexander's time. Berve nr. 115 is two men.

One may call the family of Pharnabazos the "sons of Pharnakes," after the expression found in Thucydides 8.58.1, tous Pharnakou paidas. Back in 1884 Nöldeke (296) wondered whether this term "nicht am Ende das ganze Haus bedeuten soll, statt bloss Pharnabazus und seine Brüder." He tried to make Pharnabazos a descendent of one of the Seven. Recent work based on the Persepolis tablets permits something of a vindication of this view: Hallock has identified the Parnaka of the tablets with Pharnakes, father of Artabazos (hero of the northwest in 479 and later satrap at Dascylium, Thucyd. 1.129.1). This Parnaka is a son of Arsames and cousin to Darius. Consult Lewis Sparta and Persia 8, 8 n.25. I would suggest that the sons of Pharnakes is indeed a way of referring to the entire family descended from Pharnakes (Parnaka), and that it is a local (in Dascylium) equivalent to the imperial appellation Achaemenid.

Other scholars differ: Lewis 52 n.17 suggests the phrase may refer to a "collective period," rule by the two known sons of the previous satrap, Pharnakes, Pharnabazos and Bagaios, Beloch² 3:2 147 believes the term to refer to Pharnakes' sons, but says nothing of a collective period of rule. Gomme HCT V:VIII 139 takes this view. Westlake CQ 29 (1979) 36 n.8 wonders whether the phrase keeps Pharnabazos deliberately in the background to Tissaphernes, who seems to be more powerful. I would argue the opposite, that this is Pharnabazos' way of flaunting his family's long tenure in the northwest (far more certain than Tissaphernes' family's, but see Lewis 83-84).

⁶⁵Beloch² 3:2 146-147.

⁶⁶In addition to Pharnabazos' young son by Parapita (discussed below), there is the pais Megabates, son of Spithridates: Xen. Hell. 4.1.28, Xen Ages. 5.4-5, Plut. Ages. 11.5-7, cf. Xen. Hell. 3.4.10.

⁶⁷See note 73, above.

⁶⁸Mss.: adelphos; Dinnorf: hadelphos.

⁶⁹Beloch² 3:2 146.

⁷⁰Beloch² 3:2 146-147.

⁷¹The making of xenia, even between "enemies," was possible in wartime as Xen. Hell. 4.1.39 proves. Cf. Lewis 150-151.

⁷²Beloch² 3:2 151.

⁷³Beloch² 3:2 146; Xen. Hell. 5.4.13; Plut. Ages. 40.

⁷⁴So Beloch² 3:2 147 with c. 425 as birthdate.

⁷⁵The anecdote serves the same purpose in Plutarch as in Xenophon.

⁷⁶Judeich's suggestion (72 n.1) that Xenophon was an eyewitness to the meeting of Pharnabazos and Agesilaus is interesting, and, if true, makes the absence of a proper name for Parapita's son (and his brother) even more puzzling. If Ariobarzanes was one of the participants, would Xenophon be concerned with Agesilaus, who is later on good terms with Ariobarzanes, would appear in a bad light?

⁷⁷Xen. Ages. 3.3 alone mentions the marriage (in the planning stage) as part of the cause for Spithridates' ill-feelings in 396. There is always the chance Xenophon uses hindsight to get in an attack on Pharnabazos' character.

⁷⁸Lewis 147 makes a suggestion along similar lines.

⁷⁹The sources are given in note 72, above.

⁸⁰Diodorus presents what is basically a pastiche of betrayals. Orontes: 15.91.1; Mithrobarzanes (not named, cf. Nepos Datames 6.3-7): 15.91.2-7; Rheomithres: 15.92.1; Tachos' generals: 15.92.3-5; Tachos himself: 15.93.

⁸¹Judeich RE II 832, sv. Ariobarzanes nr. 1, makes Ariobarzanes, on the basis of this passage, a son of Mithridates "des Fursten von Kios und Arrhina." His second piece of supporting evidence, Diod. 20.111.4, simply mentions two men named Kithridates who ruled by Cius later in the fourth century. Beloch² 3:2 150 simply suggests Diodorus had confused the satrap with the homonymous dynasts.

⁸²This prominence creates a prosopographical question which cannot be answered. Tissaphernes' tenure as satrap was not short; his influence extended into Caria (Xen. Hell. 3.2.12) and Lycia. He would have a sizeable following and extensive series of political friendships. He was married to a daughter of Artaxerxes II (Diod. 14.26.4). He had a brother who operated with him (Xen. Anab. 2.5.35). What happened to his family and friendships after his death? What events in Anatolia could be explained if one could answer that question?

On Tissaphernes and Lycia: TAM I 44; Silvia Hurter "Der Tissaphernes-Fund" in Morkholm and Waggoner Greek Numismatics and Archaeology: Essays in Honor of Margaret Thompson (Wetteren, 1979) 97-108.

CHAPTER III. 'Hot-Air' Hero: The Rebellions of Euagoras of Salamis
and Achaemenid Strategy in the Far West, 391-379

A very potent image was created in antiquity of Euagoras I of Salamis as a hero of Greek civilization, removing the baneful influence of the Achaemenid Empire on his island and, when the Great King seemed all powerful after 387, standing against him in the cause of liberty.¹ Although the speeches of Isocrates and expressions in the political documents of Athens are pleasant to phil-Hellenic ears, they are far removed from historical reality. Euagoras was only one among many political entities in Cyprus tolerated by the Shah so long as they remained compliant. But his rebellions during the 390's and 380's are significant for the understanding of Achaemenid administration in Anatolia: They are an illustration of the interpretative nature of rebellion and of the Achaemenid response to rebellion in a border region. Internal strife in Salamis between Euagoras' family and their opponents and external aggrandizement by Euagoras on Cyprus did not attract attention. But when complaints were made at Susa about that aggrandizement in the late 390's or Euagoras sought the support of those openly opposed to Achaemenid control (rebel Egypt of the 380's) then royal wrath was incurred. One can perceive in the operations also the effect of sea power on Achaemenid history. Finally, the rebellions demonstrate the need for Achaemenid authorities to set priorities when they operate with limited

resources. In the concluding section of this chapter the interrelations between these three characteristics will be set out in summary form.

Section I. Chronology

Before examining Euagoras' activities in the context of Achaemenid Cyprus, it is necessary to look very briefly at the chronology of Cypriote events during the fourth century B.C. Problems arise in dating the various incidents which occur in the context of operations against Salamis principally because the Cypriote difficulties took place over a long period, during which Achaemenid authorities were only tangentially involved.

A connected narrative is provided by Diodorus: His account introduces the type of problem which will be characteristic in establishing the chronology of events in fourth century Anatolia: the tendency to lump together under a single archon year the events of more than one campaigning season. Under the year 391/0 Diodorus 14.98 describes Euagoras' rise to power, the Cypriote reaction to his expansionism, and the decision of Artaxerxes to initiate operations against Salamis. Troubles apparently continued into 387/6 (Diod. 14.110). Under 386/5 and 385/4 are placed the preparations and operations of Tiribazos and Orontes against the rebel (Diod. 15.2ff, 15.8ff), the first elements appearing as a flashback. Diod. 15.9.2 (385/4) speaks about the Cypriote war as lasting ten years, with only the final two years marked by heavy fighting. In other words, active Achaemenid military involvement, from beginning to end, consumed ten years: theoretically, 394/3 - 385/4.

A ten year span of involvement is cited by Isocrates 9.64, and elsewhere he speaks about six years of hostilities (4.141, cf. 4.135) occurring after the time of the King's Peace (387). Within the same period falls a campaign against rebel Egypt (4.140). For Isocrates, the Cypriote War concluded c.380.

Beloch resolved the difficulties. The date of Isocrates 4 (which was composed for the 380 Olympia) provided a terminus antequem for the battle of Kitium which cracked Euagoras' navy and a date for the siege of Salamis (4.135, 141). The Egyptian king-list provided independent evidence that Nektanebos, who came to the throne before Euagoras made peace with Achaemenid forces, was king of Egypt in 380. Diodorus was right in assigning ten years, but was wrong in his placement of the major campaign, the second, against Euagoras.² That campaign did not belong under 386/5 and 385/4, but under 381/0 and 380/79 (i.e. the campaigning seasons 381 and 380). Hostilities ceased in the campaigning season of 380. This is the chronology I, as did most of my predecessors, will follow.³

Most recently, difficulties have been created by Reid in her study of Diodorus and Ephorus.⁴ She succeeds in emending Ephorus FGrH 70 fr. 76 to read Kitieis. She then goes on to place undue emphasis on the phrase antechontes eti tōi polemōi. The presence of eti in Ephorus, Diodorus' source (14.98.2 leaves the word out) is for Reid evidence that troubles occurred before 391/0, i.e. that conflict took place from c. 394/3 - 385/4. She accepted Diodorus' dates and worked back ten years. The eti signifies that when Diodorus first mentions hostilities under 391/0 he is actually reporting events which began in 394/3, ten years

before the war's putative conclusion. But her denial of the date of Isocrates' speech carries with it the position that the total length of any tensions and hostilities both with and without active Achaemenid involvement must be confined to a single decade. As shall be demonstrated, internal troubles in Cyprus took place over a number of decades, but not until 391/0 did Artaxerxes see cause to take a direct hand. Before 391/0 troubles were regarded as a purely internal Cypriote affair of little consequence. Once Achaemenid authorities intervene, Euagoras takes on his false importance in both Diodorus and Isocrates. That intervention, which attracted Greek attention and which was known as the Cypriote War, lasted the decade mentioned in the ancient sources. That decade is to run c. 390 - c. 380. Beloch's chronology should remain intact.

Section II. Cyprus and Euagoras Before the Achaemenid Intervention

In order to place events at Salamis into proper context it should be noted that on Cyprus there was no single Achaemenid highest officer, no satrap. Diodorus 16.42.4, referring to Cyprus in the mid-fourth century, provides a description of Achaemenid control which is true throughout the empire's history. There are a number of cities (nine are axiologoi), each ruled by its own politicians. The larger cities exercise hegemony over the smaller, surrounding settlements. It will be disputes over the intersections of these spheres of influence which will lead to destabilization, which may or may not threaten Achaemenid control in Cyprus and elsewhere. Minor internal difficulties should not prompt immediate response.

Diodorus' description is borne out by Strabo 14.684, who indicates that before the Ptolemaic period, Cyprus was ruled by "tyrants," i.e. each city had its own political leaders. Ptolemaic ascendancy in Egypt led to that dynasty's control over Cyprus. Here, too, is a point to note for the Achaemenid era: should anti-Achaemenid forces grow strong enough in Egypt, those forces may supplant the native Cypriote authorities friendly to Achaemenid control or lure them away from a compliant stance.

In general, Achaemenid control over Cyprus consisted of tolerance and support for compliant politicians. Compliance meant the payment of tribute on a more or less regular basis (cf. Hdt. 3.91), abstinence from disrupting other pro-Achaemenid entities, and, in times of large campaigns, the provision of men and ships. One may note, too, a direct relationship between Achaemenid naval power and the degree of control exercised over the island. In times of Achaemenid naval inferiority, native Cypriote authorities possessed a far greater freedom of action. Cyprus may be regarded, in administrative terms, as a mid-way point between the mainland Achaemenid satrapies and the Balkan Greeks. Iranian nobles controlled the former and exacted goods, services and bullion. The latter were almost always beyond direct Achaemenid control, but occasionally provided war material. The Cypriote cities provided tribute and forces, but were not controlled by Iranian nobles.

A brief survey of Achaemenid Cyprus should elucidate these points. It does not appear as if Achaemenid forces sailed to Cyprus to render it compliant in the later sixth century BC. Instead, Cypriote assistance in the Egyptian and Ionian campaigns of Cambyses (Hdt. 3.19) and Darius (Hdt. 6.6) are to be regarded as an index to Achaemenid supremacy on the

mainland and in the Aegean. In regard to the latter campaign, it is possible to note that the initial instabilities in Ionia had been exploited by recalcitrant elements on the island to damage the power of pro-Achaemenid leaders (Hdt. 5.104, 108, 113-116). Restabilization carried with it Achaemenid restoration of their friends (e.g. Gorgus of Salamis, Hdt. 5.115) and punishment (Hdt. 5.116) of their enemies, i.e. common Achaemenid policy.

Prominent families friendly with Achaemenid officials continued to remain prominent into the fifth century, e.g. Gorgus' at Salamis (Hdt. 7.98, 8.11): continuity in personnel. Continuity in policy may be noted: Cypriote cities contributed a total of 150 ships (Hdt. 7.90) for use against the western barbarians in 480 B.C. The fleet elements were commanded by local men under the general supervision of Achaemeni-Iranian commanders (Hdt. 7.96), at least one of whom was familiar with and to the far west.

Following the collapse of Achaemenid Europe and the failure of the Greek campaign of 480-79, Achaemenid control within and influence over Cyprus faltered. Persia's enemies had achieved a naval supremacy and instituted a forward policy directed against the far west of the empire. While an account of the Greek operations lies outside the scope of this presentation, two facets should be noted. First, Achaemenid control did not collapse upon first impact. The Greeks were intruders and were resisted on Cyprus (Thucyd. 1.94, 104.2, 112). Secondly, the presence, according to Diodorus (12.4.1, cf. 11.44.2; 12.4.4), of Iranian garrisons and satraps is not to be interpreted as a long-term feature of Achaemenid administration on the island. The stationing

of support personnel in a time of crisis such as a major foreign attack was a necessary measure; the terminology used to describe the garrison forces (barbarikais phulakais in 11.44.2, and Persikēs phrouras in 12.4.1) is precise enough to determine the forces are Achaemenid, but not to assign them a single nationality. The satrapai of 12.4.4 are at best Achaemenid officers, not highest officers normally stationed on the island.⁵ The degree to which Cyprus will act against Achaemenid rule elsewhere will now be dependent upon the relative strength of Achaemenid control on the far western coast of Anatolia and the strength of the fleets which Achaemenid authorities can raise.

A. Salamis

Although the city of Salamis fell to Athenian forces c.450, the foreign occupation according to Diodorus, was soon terminated at the death of Cimon, scion of a family which once served the Shahs, and by the illusory "Peace of Callias" c.449 (Diod. 12.4, cf. Thucyd. 1.112). Our reconstruction of events thereafter depends upon data presented in Isocrates' encomium (speech 9) to Euagoras and as background in Diodorus (principally 14.98). Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103 is of some assistance. Fortunately, the history of Salamis and Euagoras during the later fifth and early fourth centuries BC has been the subject of an excellent study by Costa, who does much to correct the pro-Hellenic bias of the ancient sources.⁶ He argues that the evidence does not bear our claims that Euagoras' early activities were anti-Persian. Such sentiments did not emerge until 391, when they were precipitated by the actions of Artaxerxes II. While these views are on the right track, they do require

some reformulation in the light of Achaemenid administrative practice.

One should note that during late fifth and early fourth centuries, the most pressing demand on Achaemenid administrators was the Greek problem: the widespread implantation on the Anatolian coast of recalcitrant elements from the further west. Such hostile forces regularly damaged the physical plant of the western satrapies, at the same time extorting funds normally forwarded to local Achaemenid officers and to Susa. Achaemenid forces, faced with limited naval resources in dealing with sea-based enemies, first tried to exploit the Spartans as a means of removing Athenian and pro-Athenian forces. Once the Spartans had become ensconced in the old Athenian bases, it became necessary to find a means by which to remove the present intruders without permitting the establishment of new ones. Coupled with the exigencies imposed by limited securely pro-Achaemenid naval forces by which to effect a solution to this problem were the deleterious effects of satrapial rivalry and disloyalty (Tissaphernes v. Pharnabazos, Tissaphernes v. Cyrus, Cyrus v. Artaxerxes' supporters).

A second chronic demand on Achaemenid attention was the somewhat less pressing Egyptian problem: Egypt remained fitfully stable in the mid- to later fifth century, but, when rebellious, threatened to destabilize adjoining sectors, including Eber-nari, the sole secure western source for an Achaemenid fleet. When stable, Egypt represented a major source of revenue for the Empire. It is understandable that Cyprus, particularly internal Cypriote events of limited impact, will not stand foremost in the minds of even local Achaemenid officers.⁷ It will take some severe discontinuity--or report thereof--to prompt decisive punitive

action. Cyprus, during this period, would continue to be a sector in which the degree of friendliness with Achaemenid officials could vary from city to city. Personnel changes among the Cypriote leadership would attract little or no attention and control. Regrettably events only in Salamis are documented with any thoroughness. What should become apparent is the overall lack of Achaemenid interference in the city's affairs. Salamis was not a perceived threat.

Within the city of Salamis were a number of families of political importance. Until c. 450 those known as the Teucridae had provided the city's "Kings"; after that time a number of families claiming a Phoinician pedigree held sway. Internal instabilities which ended with the expulsion from Cyprus of those Teucridae to whom Euagoras belonged attracted little Persian attention. The last of these "usurpers", one Abdemon, was regarded as pro-Achaemenid (Diod. 14.98.1).⁸ His fall, a result of armed action by Euagoras and forces he raised in Cilicia, and Euagoras' seizure of power incited no hostile response (c. 415) from the Shah and his representatives. Internal political disputes did not attract immediate attention normally. And the raising of a small number of mercenaries (Iso. 9.28-29) did not pose a threat to Achaemenid control. Achaemenid officers were content to accept the status quo so long as those politicians in power took no steps to damage Achaemenid control elsewhere. Cyprus--and Salamis in particular--was low on the list of priorities.⁹

Throughout his early career Euagoras was regarded as a cooperative local leader. Neither his external nor internal activities posed an active threat to Achaemenid Anatolia. He seems to have enjoyed not

unfavorable relations with Tissaphernes (IG I² 113).¹⁰ His capital improvements in Salamis (Iso. 9.47ff) were not interpreted as development directed against the Shah or his representatives. Rather, increased prosperity could lead to Salamis' becoming a more valued ally for Achaemenid forces. The conspicuous display of Hellenic culture did not carry with it the assumption of an anti-Achaemenid stance.¹¹

Artaxerxes had apparently weighed Euagoras' potential value as a supplier of ships for an Achaemenid fleet against the dynast's failure to meet consistently the guidelines set down for Achaemenid officials (maintenance of order, the payment of tribute). Hence, until the late 390's Euagoras was regarded as a political leader who could be used in a naval capacity against Sparta in the resolution of the Greek problem. Friendly relations between Euagoras and Athens (e.g. IG II² 113, Andocides 2.19-20) were not a cause for objection; Artaxerxes even chose to overlook a notable failure by Euagoras to maintain order and dispatch tribute. Shortly before 398 Euagoras had become involved in warfare with a neighboring dynast, one Anaxagoras, grandiosely styled in the epitome of Ktesias (FGrH 688 fr. 30) as "king of the Cypriotes." Salamis had apparently ceased forwarding money to Susa, perhaps as a result of the conflict. Both difficulties were resolved without Achaemenid military intervention. Thus, Salamis, like the other cities on Cyprus, contributed men and ships to the fleet commanded by Pharnabazos (Diod. 14.39, Hell. Oxy. 20, Justin 6.2.11-12). Artaxerxes had set his priorities.¹² Punishing Cypriotes was not high on the list--yet.

Euagoras seems to have played some role in arranging the retention of the services of the exile Konon as admiral subordinate to Pharnabazos.

The Athenian had fled to Salamis in 405 (Xen. Hell. 2.1.29), where he adumbrated his value to Achaemenid authorities by assisting Euagoras in building up his power base (Iso. 9.52-54).¹³ The reappearance of larger numbers of Greek and Cypriote ships in Achaemenid fleets of the 390's, and the presence of noted Athenian personnel in operations carried out against Spartan positions in Anatolia created the delusion that Athenian power was undergoing some sort of resurgence in the midst of a pan-Hellenic movement. There is something of a reflection of this delusion in IG II² 20, an Athenian inscription of 393 which honors Euagoras, and calls him a Hellene.¹⁴ But we are now at the eve of unchallengeable Achaemenid naval supremacy. Euagoras had wisely used the growth of that supremacy to expand his own sphere of influence on Cyprus while at the same time serving Achaemenid needs outside Cyprus--and meeting the guidelines expected of pro-Achaemenid political entities, by providing forces for the Achaemenid navy led by Pharnabazos.¹⁵

B. Euagoras as a Perceived Threat

In 393 Euagoras was a seemingly compliant native dynast. Two years later he was regarded as a dangerously strong and rebellious political entity to be dealt with by military force. We are dealing here with a change in perception at Susa created by the reception of new first hand local information. Although Costa is correct in downplaying the supposed cause and effect relationship between the downfall of Euagoras' former protege, Konon, and the development of Achaemenid hostility towards Salamis, he attributes too great an initiative to Artaxerxes without considering the nature of rebellion in the Achaemenid far west.¹⁶

Since the guidelines within which Achaemenid officers were expected to operate were elastic, the definition of a political entity as rebellious was not a rigid one. Internal difficulties within Salamis had attracted little attention. Extension of one's sphere of influence at the expense of one's neighbors need not create a hostile response from more powerful authorities. But the perception of events by more powerful authorities could be altered by data presented by local men who were believed worthy of trust. Euagoras thought he was preparing something for himself, but in fact was preparing it for his enemies.

The dynast had successfully taken advantage of Artaxerxes' need for naval support to build up his influence on Cyprus and his fame outside his sphere of influence. Theoretically he is to be congratulated for extending Achaemenid control. The particulars of his aggrandizement immediately before 391 are reported in Diodorus 14.98, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103, and Ephorus FGrH 70 fr. 76. His expansion had been resisted by a number of cities, in particular Amathos, Soli, and Kitium. One political leader, Agyris, also a cooperative local figure, had been killed. Euagoras had not been rebuked by Achaemenid authorities for his earlier activities, and could reasonably expect that the Shah would take greater note of the operations against the Greeks and of the re-emergence of a rebel Egypt. The key to the shift in Susa's perception was the presentation of new first-hand local information (Diod. 14.98.2) by envoys from the cities resisting Euagoras.

The data presented by these envoys must have been formulated in such a way so as to present Euagoras' activities as being directed ultimately against the crown itself rather than the mere extension of

Euagoras' own sphere. As far as we know the dynast's activities did not exercise any deleterious influence over Achaemenid control outside Cyprus. Artaxerxes was led to believe (Diod. 14.98.3) that unless military action was taken he would soon face a problem analogous to that development in the Greek problem with which he dealt upon his accession, i.e. use of the Spartans to remove the Athenians had resulted in the introduction of a Laconian cancer in Anatolia. Now it seemed that it would be replaced with a Cypriote version of the same disease. One may regard Artaxerxes as taking a proper course of action based on the information he received: he acted to reduce Euagoras' strength before the dynast could take concrete steps in extending his influence outside Cyprus. Decisive action would forestall the complication of the destabilization caused by rebellious Egypt while permitting a successful resolution of the final stages of the Greek problem in Anatolia.¹⁷

Section IV. The First Campaign

The first Achaemenid campaign against Euagoras does not appear to have been a major undertaking. However, imprecise and confused terminology in the sources and Euagoras' later significance have caused moderns to suggest that operations, if carried out at all, were unsuccessful.¹⁸ A reexamination of the evidence and demands on the Achaemenid officers of the far west should prove that by mid-390 a very swift punitive campaign was launched by rather minor political entities, while their more important counterparts dealt with more pressing problems, on the Anatolian mainland and nearby Egypt.

A. Mobilization, the Command Staff

The Cypriote envoys had been successful in effecting a policy change at Susa (Diod. 14.98.3; Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103: ho Basileus . . . sunepeisthē): Euagoras' expansionist activities on the island were no longer to be tolerated. Diodorus 14.98.3-4 records a rather complete version of the mobilization--but his terminology is problematic. Artaxerxes sends letters to coastal cities (epithalattious) and to tous aphēgoumenous tōn poleōn satrapas, commanding them to construct triremes and stockpile war material. Here is a rather imprecise use of the term satrapas, which in Diodorus is a rather elastic term. It is not possible to determine exactly to whom Diodorus refers in his use of satrapas. He may mean "highest officers," and these do control coastal cities as part of their sphere of influence. But Diodorus may mean "lesser officers" of the Achaemenid empire. In such a case, lesser officer controlling cities could include city-bosses and local nobles who exercised control over nearby city states in the same manner as Themistocles once had.

Although a variety of political entities would contribute to the campaign we should not conclude that the most important leaders of each entity (e.g. city boss, landed noble) left his home sector to fight personally in Cyprus. Most of these forces were probably drawn from southwest Anatolia, a region less affected by the Greek problem and over which the high commanders (see below) exercised control and influence. Local men would be leading local forces in their environs of their sectors.

While there is some question about the components of the force,

there is greater certainty about the chief commanders, Hekatomnos and Autophradates. The latter, as Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 103 indicates, was in charge of land forces. We have already examined the evidence relating to his political status and found that he was not yet satrap of Lycia, a post now held by Struthas. Hekatomnos of Caria, although called dynast by Diodorus (his usual term for the Hekatomnids), is actually a member of the satrapial family of Caria, non-Iranian political leaders from Mylasa which had risen to prominence during at least the past decade. He was in charge of the fleet. Both commanders are relative newcomers to Achaemenid administration at higher levels: Autophradates is a landed noble, probably living in the southwest of Anatolia. Hekatomnos may have already succeeded his father as satrap; the possibility exists that three generations of Hekatomnids were involved in the campaign in some respect. The cooperation of Autophradates and Hekatomnos in this operation bode well for the future of Achaemenid administration. The emergence of Caria as a third significant satrapy took place during Autophradates tenure as satrap at Sparda and was not resented. The structure of the high command is one which can be noted throughout the fourth century: one man in charge of the fleet, the other land forces; one man definitely local (Hekatomnos), the other, Autophradates, local or perhaps more closely tied to the central court.

The date of this campaign may be placed with only some degree of precision. Under the year 391/0, Diodorus 14.98 lists the dispatch of envoys to Susa (98.2), Artaxerxes' decision to launch a campaign (98.3), the mobilization (3-4), and Hekatomnos' crossing to Cyprus (4). A possible arrangement of these events, by campaigning season, may run

as follows. In 391, before the season, envoys would have been sent eastward. This permits at least part of the season in 391 to be used for mobilization. The length of time required for mobilization is rendered problematic by textual difficulties and imprecisions in Diodorus 14.98.4:¹⁹ someone tas en tais anō satrapeiais poleis epiporeuomenos and then crosses over to Cyprus with a large force. From the entire statement, the logical subject is Hekatomnos, who has just been named as the man commanded to make war. The mss. read autos, which grammatically refers back to the Great King (in 14.98.3). Diodorus' mss., then, have Artaxerxes raising forces in the "upper satrapies" and crossing to Cyprus. Dindorf emended the passage to houtos, which refers to Hekatomnos. This I accept. But, "upper satrapies" suggested a curiously lengthy and expensive way of gathering troops, since that term normally appears as the Greek characterization of territories east of the Tigris and Euphrates. Here again, Diodorus is confused and imprecise: I believe that the cities in the "upper satrapies" realistically should signify cities in the interior of Anatolia or, more precisely, Caria and the southwest, Hekatomnos' sphere of influence. If we confine Hekatomnos' mobilization activities to the southwest, we can perceive mobilization, the gathering of forces, as taking place in part of 391 and part of 390. By the campaigning season of 390 military operations could be carried out.

B. The Operations and Their Result

We know virtually nothing about the operations themselves, save that Diodorus describes the attack force (14.98.4) as megalais dunamesi.

Euagoras was able to take advantage of his fleet and the relatively strong position of Salamis (Iso. 9.47). He received some Athenian assistance (Xen. Hell. 4.8.24, cf. Lysias 19.21-23),²⁰ but it was ineffectual and was viewed by contemporaries as more a part of rivalry between Athens and Sparta than an expression of anti-Achaemenid feelings. Some fighting may have continued into the 380's. Chabrias was sent with ten ships and a small force (Xen. Hell. 5.1.10, cf. Nepos Chabrias 2.2, Dem. 20.76). This assistance, while usually cited as evidence for Hellenic strength,²¹ was viewed in the context of Spartan and Athenian rivalry, and seemingly attracted little Achaemenid attention. We should tone down the pro-Hellenic rhetoric and perceive this assistance in the context of internal Cypriote politics. Euagoras is undertaking the first steps to redress his new "reduced" status, a result of the punitive campaign.

We are in a position to assess better the results already alluded to of the campaign. Euagoras was left as king of Salamis (cf. Diod. 14.110.5). It would appear that his excessive strength was reduced and that he was then coopted. He would continue to hold Salamis if he did not disrupt the control of his neighbors or Achaemenid control elsewhere. This rather lackluster conclusion to the first campaign raises questions about Hekatomnos' loyalty and the activities of the more important Achaemenid officers. Charges were raised in Diod. 15.2.3 that the Carian satrap had displayed disloyalty towards Artaxerxes and was secretly assisting Euagoras in the 380's. Similar claims appear in Isocrates 4.162. Both passages receive detailed attention in the chapter on the Hekatomnids; it will be satisfactory to state here that such claims

are bound up with the fourth century Greek belief that the adoption of Hellenic culture (or elements thereof) carried with it the assumption of an anti-Achaemenid stance. This pro-Hellenic bias in our sources may explain why we hear almost nothing about Autophradates' role in the campaign. In later years Euagoras' ability to rebuilt himself into a threat was taken as evidence of Hekatomnos' failure. But that is in fact hindsight. A seemingly compliant Euagoras was left in place, and Achaemenid forces returned home.

The campaign had been entrusted to less significant officers. Their superiors in status and influence were attending to more pressing difficulties: the Greek and Egyptian problems. In western Anatolia Struthas and Pharnabazos were undertaking the final set of operations against Spartan power (Diod. 14.99, 110; Xen. Hell. 4.8.17-5.1.28). Later in the decade attention would be directed toward the preparation and execution of a punitive campaign carried out against Egypt (to be discussed below), one of the first fruits of the King's Peace. Full attention to Cyprus lay in the future.

C. Priorities in Strategy During the 380's

Consideration of the second set of operations, carried out in the late 380's, has been hampered by the frequent mention in the ancient sources of the lengthy preparations (Iso. 4.141, 9.64; Diod. 15.2.1, 9.2) and the apparently widespread turbulence set off by Euagoras' great power (Iso. 4.161-2, 9.62; Diod. 15.2.3-4). Both characteristics can be cited as evidence of overall Achaemenid weakness. But to do so ignores the demands on Achaemenid officers and the varied nature of Achaemenid control

in the far west.

The contexts of the passages do not create confidence in their value as evidence for Achaemenid weakness. Diod. 15.2.3-4 speaks about an open alliance with Akoris, the king of rebel Egypt, but goes on to characterize the other sources of Euagoras' support in somewhat grandiose and vague terms.²² Diodorus fails to connect the existence of a strong rebel Egypt with the weakness of Achaemenid control in Phoinicia and Arabia. Nor does he seem aware that the lengthy time for preparations was necessitated by the fact that Achaemenid forces had just been deployed--with too little success--against Egypt (Iso. 4.140). There also existed the need to assure the implementation of the King's Peace before partially denuding western Anatolia of forces for use elsewhere. Cyprus, as Diodorus was aware in 14.110.5, was of lesser importance for the moment.

Isocrates' passages are most unsatisfactory as evidence for weak Achaemenid control if cited out of context. Speech 9 seeks to praise Euagoras and is directed to his son, Nicocles. The dynast's activities will be displayed in an overly favorable light. The mocking description of lengthy Achaemenid preparations and the grandiose characterization of Euagoras' power in Phoinicia and Cilicia are in part patently false (see below on Iso. 9.62 and Cilicia), and, like Diodorus, ignore the demands of the Egyptian theater. Speech 4, the Panegyricus, is designed to convince the Greeks, and the Athenians in particular, to launch a pan-Hellenic crusade against the evil barbarians now lording over their Asiin brethren. It will be in Isocrates' interests to portray such an enterprise as a low risk venture which will yield great rewards. The

true nature of Achaemenid control is to be falsified. Hence, he must claim that Ionian forces commanded by Tiribazos in the late 380's would prefer to kill Persians (4.135) rather than subdue Euagoras (which they actually did). The lengthy preparations of 4.141 would overlap the time Achaemenid forces are deployed against Egypt (4.140): by refraining from putting both events into proper perspective and by assigning equal weight to both Isocrates is able to create an inaccurate picture of Achaemenid strength. His account of widespread turbulence (4.161-2) is in part false, but as a whole designed to reinforce the picture of Achaemenid weakness, and the high probability of Greek success. I shall discuss the individual points of destabilization presently and also refer the reader to the later chapter on the Hekatomnids wherein there is a discussion of these passages in regard to Hekatomnid loyalty to the Great King.

Following the initial operations of the 390's, Achaemenid interest in Euagoras and Salamis waned. The assistance afforded by Chabrias evoked no response and is to be viewed in the context of internal Cypriote affairs having limited impact on Achaemenid control elsewhere. Shortly thereafter Artaxerxes finally succeeded in applying a decisive solution to the Greek problem, the King's Peace. The Balkan Hellenes were commanded to stay out of Asia or face a resumption of Achaemenid operations directed against Europe (Xen. Hell. 5.1.30, Diod. 14.110). In the past Euagoras had depended upon forces which could be drawn from Greece. Now, by the elimination of sources from which recalcitrant dynasts might seek assistance, internal security in Cyprus was to a great degree, it would be hoped, assured. Future strife and future

outside assistance would have to be tempered with discretion.

The removal of foreign military forces from western Anatolia laid open the possibilities for deployment of military personnel drawn from those regions for use elsewhere in the far west. Immediate deployment would not have been a wise move: the renewed stability of the west coast would have to be assured. As set out in the last chapter, both Sparda and Dascylium had received new highest officers, Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes. Although neither man was unfamiliar to and with his own satrapy, it would be best to be certain that Achaemenid control in both spheres of influence could function on a "normal" basis before imposing special demands on the officers, higher and lesser, there stationed. But the resolution of the Greek problem meant that warfare on a large scale in western Anatolia would be replaced by smaller scale policing operations directed against pockets of instability still surviving. Regrettably such operations did not attract the attention of Greek historians of the fourth century B.C. Now Achaemenid forces could be deployed against rebel Egypt, which had emerged again as a threat. Unchecked, the rebellious stance of Egypt could have deleterious effects on Epirus and Cyprus.

During the early 380's the king of rebel Egypt was one Akoris.²³ He seems to have been without any serious rivals within Egypt initially and so was able to embark on a forward policy, which consisted of exercising influence in the regions adjoining Egypt, such as Libya (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103), and destabilizing Achaemenid control in its environs (cf. Iso. 4.140 and the eventual aid to Euagoras, Diod. 15.2.3,

4.3, 8.1). To assist him in this endeavor Akoris obtained the services of foreign generals, in particular Chabrias of Athens (Dem. 20.76, Polyaenus 3.7.11, Pliny n.h. 5.68, Strabo 16.760, 17.803).

The Greek difficulties had been set aside. The Egyptian problem, ignored in Diodorus 14.110.5, could be taken up. Regrettably there is only one passage which refers to the three year Achaemenid campaign against Akoris, Isocrates 4.140. Because Isocrates names the commanders of the forces we are able to gain insights into the probable sources of the war material and forces, and into the probable date of the campaign.

The nobles in charge were Abrocomas, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazos, a mixture of local men and outsiders. Abrocomas was the local man. He appears in the late fifth century in a position which must be satrap of Syria, a post carrying with it the supervision of Phoinicia (Xen. Anab. 1.3.20, 1.4.3, 1.4.5, 1.4.10, 1.7.12). It would be from his sector that the bulk of the forces used in the campaign were drawn.²⁴ Tithraustes, the chiliarch and liquidator of Tissaphernes (see previous chapter) should be the commander sent out from Susa. He had spent some time in the far west during the 390's and will not have been an unfamiliar figure to the more significant political entities. Pharnabazos is the former satrap at Dascylium, and is now married to Artaxerxes' daughter, Apame (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Plut. Artax. 27). His presence on this campaign represents both a sort of promotion and a skillful use by Artaxerxes of talented personnel. Pharnabazos had just displayed his skill in large scale imperial campaigns (use of sea and land forces extending beyond the confines of a single satrapy) in his military resolution of the Greek campaign. As a long-time significant officer in the far west he

have had some familiarity to and with his subordinates and colleagues on the Egyptian campaign. It is uncertain whether forces were drawn from the more northerly parts of Anatolia, although Ionian fleet elements were under Achaemenid control back in 388 and 387 (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28). Most would be probably kept north to insure the stability of the western coast of Anatolia. Pharnabazos' presence in the staff permits us to place the campaign after 387. The standard dates assigned by moderns, 385-383, are attractive because they allow time for preparations to be made after the King's Peace and for Pharnabazos to be present during at least part of the preparations.²⁵

Isocrates provides very vague data about the three year campaign. How many of these years were spent in actual fighting? One possible scenario, which takes into account the claims that Phoinicia was destabilized, would have pacification operations in Phoinicia followed by a strike against Egypt itself (this was the case in the 340's, see last chapter). Perhaps three seasons were spent attempting to crack Egyptian defenses, which could be quite formidable (cf. Diod. 15.42). The campaign itself did not end successfully: Egypt remained rebellious and adjoining sectors were still threatened by Akoris. During all this Cyprus had not come under Achaemenid attack, thereby facilitating claims of lengthy preparations for the attack on Euagoras.

Now that the major military campaigns and various demands on Achaemenid administrators have been elucidated, it is possible to determine the validity of claims that the Achaemenid far west was subject to massive and well-organized destabilization during the 380's. One should keep in mind a number of factors: Achaemenid control in Anatolia

was not monolithic, but diverse. There was much regional variety. Second, turbulence and disorder need not be aimed directly against the Shah or his subordinates, but rather could occur on a purely local level, one minor political entity damaging another. Thirdly, a destabilized Egypt could have deleterious effects on Achaemenid control and influence in Egypt's environs.

On the Anatolian west coast there were only two spheres of influence controlled by Iranian highest officers, the spheres centering on Dascylium and Sparda. The latter sphere had earlier encompassed Caria and Lycia, sectors supposedly disloyal to Artaxerxes. The former of these, Caria, was in a transitional stage of development: the Hekatomnid family had emerged as the satrapial house and was so recognized at Susa. The 380's were a time of consolidation and expansion for Hekatomnid control, and the family was not as influential as its Iranian counterparts in the north. The charges of disloyalty leveled against Hekatomnos are untrue, and are an expression of the wishful thinking that partially Hellenized administrators were supposed to be anti-Achaemenid. Secret assistance (Diod. 15.2) means no assistance. It would seem only that Hekatomnos did not campaign in person against Salamis. Diodorus interpreted his absence as secret support.

Lycia (Iso. 4.161, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103) shall be discussed in the chapter on the Hekatomnids. For our purposes here it is proper to state that the region was dominated by a number of minor dynasts who quarrelled with each other. Sometimes one dynast might achieve a temporary ascendancy (so Perikles). While such tensions generated no steady supply of revenue for Susa, they were not directed against the

crown or Achaemenid control. They were tolerated until they damaged more stable sectors.

Cilicia, too, is in a transitional stage. Earlier the region had been dominated by a native ruler, the Syennesis. The last attested of these seems to have displayed ambivalent feelings towards Achaemenid highest officers (Xen. Anab. 1.2.12-27) and may have faced opposition from within his own family. If one can believe Diodorus 14.19.3, political entities in Cilicia were causing difficulty at the close of the fifth century. Although Isocrates would have us believe that Cilicia was destabilized (Iso. 4.161, 9.62), it was used as a staging area against Euagoras before 380 (Diod. 15.2.2, 3.3, 4.2). Artaxerxes had taken the step of introducing into Cilicia, as an alternative to the old Syenneseis, loyal local men who held estates. One such noble was Camisares, originally of Caria (Nepos Dat. 1). He and others are to be viewed as those responsible for a Cilicia stable enough to serve as an Achaemenid naval base. Datames, Camisares' son, apparently later dominated the entire sector. He and his successors represent the type of Achaemenid control found until the empire's fall: satraps of Cilicia (see chapter on Datames and final chapter, below).

It was the continued rebellious stance of Egypt which created the problems for Achaemenid administrators elsewhere. One should note that Isocrates ended his account of the 385-383 campaign with the statement that Egypt now sought, as a result of the Achaemenid failure, to dominate neighboring regions. Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103 reports the surprising data that Akoris put together an alliance (summachia) with the Pisidians, a perennially recalcitrant group of tribally organized peoples never

thoroughly dominated by either the Achaemenids or their enemies (cf. Diod. 14.99.4-5 on Aspendos). Such a tie between two such distant regions was characteristic of rebel Egyptian forward policy in the fourth century. By helping to destabilize--or further destabilize (in this case)--a region, the Egyptian rebels hoped to tie up in Anatolia troops which might be otherwise deployed against Egypt.

Troubles in Ebir-nari and Arabia and the conclusion of a treaty with Barca are characteristic of the deleterious influence of a destabilized Egypt. The status of Barca (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103) is uncertain: While probably not under direct Achaemenid control during the fourth century, its politicians would have not taken an openly hostile stance towards Achaemenid authorities while Egypt remained under satrapial control. A rebel Egypt might draw upon Barca and Libya in general for military personnel and supplies. Arabia was never governed by an Achaemenid highest officer, but had sent periodic gifts to the Shah (Hdt. 3.91, 97) and had supplied military personnel for larger campaigns (Hdt. 7.69, under the command of an Achaemenid officer stationed in Egypt). These activities took place during a time of Achaemenid strength. In a time of Achaemenid weakness in and around Egypt, individual Arab chieftains might exploit that weakness by assisting those who could tie Achaemenid forces up elsewhere (paralleling Egyptian rebel practice). This was the case in the late 380's when one Arabian chieftain (imprecisely styled king in Diod. 15.2.4) supplied some military personnel to Euagoras, who at that time was allied with Akoris of Egypt.²⁶

Ebir-nari was the traditional region which Egyptian rebels sought to destabilize: here was the closest source to Egypt for an Achaemenid

fleet; Phoinicia was the land invasion route to Egypt. A stable Ebir-nari provided Achaemenid authorities with a place to mobilize, and in particular the navy with which to mobilize and transport personnel and supplies (e.g. as in Diod. 15.41, 16.41). A good deal of the difficulty in Ebir-nari is assigned to Euagoras' activities (Iso. 4.141, 9.62, Diod. 15.2.4), including occupation of Tyre. This is something of an exaggeration: the prime mover should be rebel Egypt. Akoris' forward policy encompassed both Cyprus and Phoinicia, assistance to the former (discussed below) a means of tying up Achaemenid forces, destabilization of the latter a means of preventing a quick punitive Achaemenid campaign. Tyre's disloyalty may be seen as a reaction by that city to the temporary superiority of Egyptian power. Lest it face destruction, the city, in its own self-interest, would take an anti-Achaemenid stance.²⁷

We should not characterize the Achaemenid far west in the mid to late 380's as marked by a massive and well-organized destabilization which destroyed a previously high degree of control. Troubles in Cilicia, Lycia, and Pisidia were, regrettably, the norm throughout the first decades of the fourth century, although the picture in Cilicia had grown considerably brighter by the end of the 380's. Rebel Egypt was the one center of new serious turbulence. The rebellious stance of Egypt created the impression in Euagoras' mind that activities which might ordinarily meet with Achaemenid disapproval would be overlooked while officers devoted attention to the more pressing troubles in Egypt and Ebir-nari, where the rebels' deleterious influence fed troubles. Before a new strike against Akoris could be launched, the environs of rebel Egypt were to be subdued. In this context we should place the second set of operations against Euagoras. If unchecked, rebel Cyprus might create additional

problems in the Aegean and Anatolia.

Section IV. Euagoras as a Perceived Threat, II²⁸

Diodorus explains Artaxerxes' decision to move against Euagoras (14.98.3) as a result of his appreciation of Cyprus' strategic value. The geographical position of the island and the naval capacity of a firm pro-Achaemenid Cyprus would provide a frontline defense for Achaemenid Anatolia and Ebir-nari while dealing with the Greek problem. It is the same appreciation of Cyprus' strategic value which motivated the second set of operations against Euagoras. If Euagoras achieved an unchallengeable supremacy on Cyprus, and possessed the ability to act independently of Achaemenid authorities and against their interests, Cyprus would represent a stepping stone for rebel Egyptian forward policy and offer the base from which and the material by which disgruntled Balkan Hellenes, in addition to Akoris, could carry out punitive actions against Anatolia and Ebir-nari. Diodorus' grandiose characterization of Euagoras' sources of support (15.2.3-4) do possess a grain of truth: rebel Cyprus would form a potential focal point for tous allotriōs echontas pros Persas and hoi en hupopsiais ontes tōi tōn Persōn basilei.

When did the second campaign take place and what is its chronological and tactical relationship with the Egyptian campaign of the mid-380's, i.e. were operations against Euagoras in the planning stage while forces were mobilized against Akoris? I have accepted and followed Beloch's chronology: the Egyptian campaign concluded, it appears, in the campaign season of 383, without any decisive success achieved. Diodorus 15.9.2

speaks about a ten year Cypriote war in which all but two years were spent in preparation for a major offensive. The two years of heavy warfare should refer to the campaigning seasons of 381 and 380, the bulk of fighting falling in the former season. This reconstruction would permit 382 to be set aside for gathering forces, assembling them at Phocaea and Cyme, and moving them to Cilicia (15.2.2). However, the presence of Orontes, satrap of Armenia, a man far distant from the scene of battle, on the command staff suggests a longer-range strategic planning, one which weighed the possible outcome of the Egyptian campaign against the outcome's possible ramifications on the increasingly stronger Euagoras (Diod. 15.2.1) and an already destabilized Epir-nari. As for the timing of Euagoras' moves, I would suggest that external expansion out from Salamis occurred in the mid-380's while Achaemenid forces were tied up in Egypt. If Egypt remained rebellious, Euagoras' now excessive power would have to be reduced and his compliant status assured. Given the failure of the Egyptian campaign, Achaemenid efforts would have to be expended in containing and policing Cyprus and Epir-nari as a prelude to a new strike on Egypt. Planning for the second set of operations against Euagoras would begin while the Egyptian campaign was in progress, and certainly when it became apparent that final victory would elude the officers operating in the southwest of the empire. Operations would be carried out by Anatolian personnel: the King's Peace had assured a period of stability in Anatolia (i.e. some years when it did not face incursions from the west) and as a result assured the renewed ability for the Great King to partially denude Anatolian sectors of loyal men for purposes of deploying them in extra-

Anatolian missions.

A. The Command Staff

An examination of the important commanders sent against Euagoras reveals Artaxerxes' desire to put together a staff of competent, experienced officers who had worked with each other in the past and who would be familiar with and to the personnel they would command and the areas in which they would operate. The high command displays the common division between a local man and an outsider, commander of land forces and commander of naval forces. Tiribazos, satrap at Sparda, was the local man and nauarch. Orontes, satrap of Armenia and Tiribazos' old superior, was in command of land forces. He was the outsider. Of the subordinate commanders we know only Glos by name: He represents continuity in personnel, for his family was long prominent in the western sectors of Sparda's sphere, and Glos himself was son-in-law to Tiribazos (Diodorus 15.9.3).

Tiribazos' early career ²⁹ has been discussed in the previous chapter and represents the promotion--with some temporary setbacks--of a competent and loyal lesser officer to a more important post. Although Diodorus confines his explanation of Tiribazos' appointment to the statement that the man enjoyed megalē apodochē among the Persians, Artaxerxes' choice provides an index of the stability of Achaemenid control in Anatolia: Tiribazos, the highest officer of the flagship satrapy, on the Anatolian west coast, is posted outside Anatolia and will be drawing personnel from his sector for use elsewhere. His colleague, Ariobarzanes at Dascylium, is left behind: he and other political entities such as Hekatomnos, while possibly providing forces for the campaign, will be able to act in a policing capacity should difficulties of a serious nature arise.

The strength of Achaemenid control and its renewed naval capabilities are evident from the make up of Tiribazos' fleet (Ionian ships and men: Iso. 4.135, cf. 4.153, Polyaeus 7.20) and their mustering points (Phocaea and Cyme Diod. 15.2.2). Tiribazos was a logical choice for nauarch since the bulk of the fleet would be drawn from sectors properly part of his sphere.

The selection of Orontes as commander of the land forces, i.e. forces which would carry out operations on Cypriote soil (infantry, cavalry), is more difficult to explain. No troops from Armenia seem to have been posted for use in Cyprus. That Orontes was son-in-law to Artaxerxes (Diod. 15.2.2, Plut. Mor. 174b, Plut. Artax. 27, Xen. Anab. 2.4.8, 3.4.13) offers only a partial explanation: Orontes' ultimate loyalty to the crown could be assured, but others were related to Artaxerxes (including Pharnabazos--certainly more prominent in and familiar to the far west).³⁰ Perhaps the best explanation is that Orontes once had been Tiribazos' superior. Artaxerxes hoped the two would continue to work together as they had before. In this he was seriously mistaken, as shall be demonstrated below.

The presence of Glos on the staff is representative of continuity in personnel and of the multi-ethnic nature of the Achaemenid nobility. Glos was the son of Tamos, an Egyptian of possibly royal ancestry (Diod. 14.35.4) from Memphis (Diod. 14.19.6). Tamos had long been in Persian service as a lesser officer in Ionia for Tissaphernes and later was admiral for the rebel Cyrus (Thucyd. 8.31.2, 87.1; Diod. 14.19.6; Xen. Anab. 1.2.21, 1.4.2), in addition to remaining a significant officer on the coast (Diod. 14.19.6, 14.35.3: terminology is imprecise in the latter passage). Glos, too, entered the service of Cyrus (Xen. Anab.

1.4.16, 1.5.7, 2.1.3). Following Artaxerxes' victory and the return of Tissaphernes to highest power, Tamos with his family and following fled Anatolia for Egypt (Diod. 14.35.5), hoping to receive the support of the then king of rebel Egypt, Psammetichos. Instead Tamos was executed: perhaps he was viewed as a perceived threat because of his ancestral ties to Memphite royalty. Glos did not eschew cooption, but returned to the west to take posts not unlike his father's. He was later to be son-in-law of Tiribazos (Diod. 15.9.3), thereby making the satrapial house of Sparda multi-ethnic. Glos, by his Egyptian ancestry and the present rebellious stance of Egypt, can be characterized in the late 380's as a compliant native leader. But his family's lengthy prominence in Ionia and the western portions of Sparda's sphere made him a local man. How, in the late 380's, he appears as a loyal local man leading troops drawn from his sector (Diod. 15.3.2, 15.9.3, Polyaeus 7.20). His post as a fleet commander is an exact parallel to his father's.

In theory, the staff put together by Artaxerxes was one which insured a high probability of success: everyone on the team had a proven track record.

B. Euagoras' Sources of Support; The Nature of Operations

Euagoras had succeeded in rebuilding his larger sphere of influence on the island of Cyprus at the same time as Akoris had succeeded in resisting Achaemenid incursions into his own. As discussed above, Akoris' strength facilitated the continued destabilization of Ebir-nari.

Instability may have taken a number of forms. Phoenician cities could have been occupied outright by Egyptian troops; anti-Achaemenid politicians could have seized control from pro-Achaemenid forces; normally pro-Achaemenid politicians, faced with Akoris' burgeoning power, could have assumed a temporarily neutral or pro-Akoris stance as a means of assuring their continued existence.

It was natural and reasonable that Euagoras and Akoris should cooperate, or exploit, each other. Egypt and the regions it destabilized could afford a source of supplies for Cypriote upheavals (i.e. Euagoras' expansion at the expense of the other Cypriote dynasts). From Akoris' viewpoint, assistance to Euagoras was an investment in his own future: if Cyprus continued to be in an uproar, Achaemenid troops which might normally have been posted to Ebir-nari for use against Egypt would have to be sent against Cyprus. Achaemenid fleet elements from Anatolia would be tied up in Anatolian waters. Thus we find Akoris as the major supporter of Euagoras, an ally (Diod. 15.2.3). Euagoras was provided with war material, including ships from Tyre (15.2.3-4). Such shipments continued throughout the course of operations (15.3.3-4). But we should not be at all sanguine about Euagoras' position as an equal to Akoris: We find that he has to journey to Egypt to request additional aid (15.4.3), and returns to the theater of war after achieving only limited success in his sales campaign (15.8.1). Euagoras was of value to Akoris only so long as the Cypriote dynast was on the offensive and could keep Achaemenid troops tied up while killing them off in battle.

A second factor which should be emphasized is that Euagoras drew no perceptible support from the Greeks, i.e. aid formally approved by

polis authorities. Isocrates 4.135 admits that Ionian forces were pro-Achaemenid and of great value to Tiribazos. The absence of any serious support from the Hellenes is a measure of the success the King's Peace had in removing destabilizing influences from Anatolia, while throwing Greece into an uproar over its implementation (cf. Xen. Hell. 5.1.32ff, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103.7-8, Diod. 15.5).

Although we are given only a few details about the nature of operations, it is easy to determine that the key to success lay in the ability to transport troops and supplies. The Achaemenid forces had no trouble mobilizing in Anatolia (Diod. 15.2.2) and Cilicia served as a secure base throughout the operations (15.3.3, 4.2).³¹ Supply transport was the more difficult matter: Achaemenid forces landed in large numbers and were later able to establish a base at Kitium (Diod. 15.3.4, 4.1), which had been anti-Euagoras in the last decade. But Euagoras raided Achaemenid transports, and was able to reduce the flow of supplies to the point where enemy forces became mutinous. The dynast enjoyed secure supply-lines; in addition to his own stores he could draw upon Akoris, whose transport ships, it seems, were not subject to serious Achaemenid harassment (Diod. 15.3.2-4). Achaemenid supply problems bought some time for Euagoras: Glos was compelled to redeploy his fleet for convoy protection (Diod. 15.3.2, cf. Polyaeus 7.20), thereby facilitating the arrival of enough supplies to launch full scale operations.

Achaemenid naval expertise and superiority seized victory (Diod. 15.3.4). Once Glos had achieved success against the rebel fleet near Kitium (Diod. 15.3.4-4.2), Euagoras lost heart and operations shifted to the beseiging of Salamis itself. Hostilities reached a stage where

some of the principals could leave the war theater. Tiribazos journeyed to Susa to report to the Shah (Diod. 15.4.2). Royal guidance would be sought on the best way to insure the future stability of Cyprus.³²

Euagoras was compelled to slip out of Salamis and beg for increased Egyptian support (Diod. 15.4.3). His eldest son, Phytagoras (Diod. 15.4.3, cf. Iso. 9.62), was left behind as commander. By the end of the campaigning season of 381 the war against Euagoras was virtually over; Achaemenid forces had acted swiftly, competently, and effectively.

C. The Letter of Orontes; The Final Settlement

The final stages of the campaign should have been carried out with great ease: Egypt was no longer willing to provide full support to Euagoras (Diod. 15.8.1), and Achaemenid forces had succeeded in tightening control over Cyprus and the environs of Salamis. Euagoras was deserted by his allies on Cyprus and was under siege. But he was to receive an unexpected reprieve in the form of rivalry among the highest commanders of the Achaemenid attack force, Orontes and Tiribazos.

The latter had returned from Susa and was prepared to bring the war to a finish. Euagoras was to be coopted if possible. When the dynast sued for peace, Tiribazos offered terms which no doubt fell within the guidelines set down by Artaxerxes in the consultation, terms which called for a return to the status quo ante bellum (15.8.2), or, more precisely, to the status as of the end of the first punitive campaign. In all they were not harsh. Euagoras' sphere was restricted to his home sector, Salamis. He had to pay tribute to Susa--a fixed amount each year. He was to carry out royal commands as a slave carries

out the commands of his master (poiēi to prostattomenon hōs doulos despotēi). These terms required Euagoras to become a loyal Achaemenid officer. He was to maintain order in his sphere without creating difficulties elsewhere. He was to forward tribute to Susa. In short, obedience and money. And Euagoras would lose neither life nor kingdom. The third component is the summation, in contemporary Achaemenid usage, of the position of any officer subordinate to the Shah.³³ In the House of the Great King, only the Shah was master; all the rest were slaves, Tiribazos and Orontes included.

It is at this point that resolution of operations becomes confusing. The sources emphasize a matter of semantics in an attempt to explain Euagoras' unwillingness to reach a negotiated peace and seek to endow him with an excessive leverage in exploiting tensions among the Achaemenid commanders. Euagoras is supposed to emerge as having secured better terms, as having scored a moral victory over the Great King. This attitude can be found in Iso. 9.63, but is to be expected in an encomium: Achaemenid kings (sic., read "forces") were so worn by war, that peace terms were rather favorable. The tyrannis of Euagoras was left undisturbed. This assessment is only partially borne out by reality. Achaemenid forces, after solving their provisioning problem, had scored a swift victory over Euagoras and forced him to go on defense. Cooption of a rebel was standard procedure; it was far more cost-effective than carrying out a lengthy siege. Isocrates speaks inaccurately of the Persian nomos of not making peace until they had achieved control over their enemies' bodies. In the case of Euagoras, Achaemenid forces had in fact done so. But the use of the word somatōn in Isocrates points to a more serious

difficulty in the historical narratives.

Both Diodorus (15.8.3) and Theopompus (FGrH 115 fr. 103) make reference to difficulties in negotiations, a result Diodorus says of Euagoras' refusal to be called a slave. It is only this third demand of Tiribazos which Euagoras refuses to accept. The refusal leads to further negotiations and a delay in ending operations, and so opened the way to recriminations among the commanders, and exploitation of their tensions by Euagoras. Some scholars have placed great emphasis on the terms "slave" and "king." Because Euagoras demands that he be required to obey the Shah as one king obeys another, scholars have argued that Euagoras in fact did enjoy a higher status than other Achaemenid functionaries.³⁴ Orontes' agreement that Euagoras could obey the Shah as a king obeys another king (Diod. 15.9.2) was recognition of that higher status. A reconsideration of the evidence suggests that this matter was a minor one. Tensions did exist within the Achaemenid high command, and delayed resolution of the operations, but Euagoras gained little. The change in terms from "slave" to "king," if it existed at all, are more a result of Orontes' desire to make peace before the morale of his troops deteriorated further.

One should recall that Artaxerxes probably had selected Orontes and Tiribazos as co-commanders because they had worked together before and that previous cooperation might lessen chances for deleterious rivalry. However, the opposite occurred. Diodorus 15.8.2-3 puts the rivalry in the context of military and political hierarchy. Tiribazos possessed leadership over the whole campaign; hence Orontes, the "other

general," was jealous of the doxē of his colleague. This perception is basically accurate. In theory the two commanders were equals: both were highest officers, satraps, and each commanded a branch of the military (Diod. 15.2.2). But realistically Tiribazos' position as a man from the ggeneral region of operations gave him an edge: subordinate commanders were likely to feel more comfortable with him than with an outsider and would look to him for guidance and even to countermand unpopular decisions by Orontes. Combined with the fact that Orontes was once superior to Tiribazos, this favorite-son status of Tiribazos was sure to lead to ill feelings. It is very probable that such ill feelings grew after the naval battle won by Glos. Achaemenid forces were besieging Euagoras on land, a tiresome task of perhaps indefinite duration in the viewpoint of lower military personnel. Tiribazos had gone to Susa and Orontes was then sole commander. He may have been believed by those used to Tiribazos to have abused his post. Eventually, the continued siege, ill feelings, and recriminations led to a worse situation. Orontes laid charges against Tiribazos before the Shah. The charges were believed. As a result, the unity of Achaemenid forces began to break down. Euagoras had not yet made peace. Artaxerxes thought his selection of commanders would benefit his realm, but in reality it led to serious troubles.

The letter itself, i.e. its contents and the king's reaction, is an important object to study, for it provides an excellent illustration of the interpretative nature of rebellion, here rebellion by a highest officer with a rather successful career.³⁵ Because highest officers in the far west operated within very general guidelines and possessed a

high degree of discretionary power, rebellion was difficult to define precisely. Royal and local approaches to administration could differ, but if the guidelines were not ignored policy vagaries by local officers could be overlooked. The Shah did not customarily play an active role in hunting down possibly rebellious officers. He did not initiate the destruction of his representatives. Rather he reacted to information presented to him, and that reaction was dependent upon the nature of the data and those presenting it. First-hand new local information presented by local men of a high and trusted status could effect policy directed against officers or political entities whose loyalty and competence were in question. Orontes, a man of high and trusted status, presented new data which were of such a nature as to effect activities hostile towards Tiribazos.

The charges are laid in Diodorus 15.8.4. Tiribazos could have taken Salamis, but did not. Behind the delay and negotiations--seemingly over the "slave" v. "king" issue--lay Tiribazos' desire for koinopragia with Euagoras. The satrap of Sparda had already concluded a private alliance (summachia idia) with Sparta, to whom he was a friend. An embassy was sent by Tiribazos to Delphi--to ask the oracle whether he should revolt. The most important charge of all was the last enumerated in the letter: Tiribazos was building up a personal following by his kindness to his subordinate commanders. In short, Orontes' letter was designed to convince the Shah that Tiribazos' activities in 381 and early 380 had been designed not to end the Cypriote campaign, but to exploit his access to large numbers of Achaemenid forces as a means to facilitate a revolt against the crown. The crown reacted to these data:

Artaxerxes ordered the arrest of Tiribazos (Diod. 15.8.5, cf. Polyaeus 7.14.1).

Orontes' status and the charges as a whole succeeded in effecting royal policy. But a closer examination of these charges reveals that they are a matter of hostile perception, a misrepresentation of Tiribazos' activities. Behind the first charge lay frequent diplomatic contact with a recalcitrant party under siege. Tiribazos seems to have been the chief Persian officer with whom Euagoras dealt. This is reasonable because Tiribazos had just returned from consultations at Susa over the means by which to bring hostilities to an end. Orontes--who had kept up the siege during Tiribazos' absence--will have felt shunted aside. Theopompus (FGrH 115 fr. 103) implies Euagoras exploited this feeling of ingratitude. As far as the second charge, Tiribazos was in fact a friend of the Spartans. Ten years earlier he had been willing to listen to Antalcidas, and had arrested the mercenary admiral Conon. He ran into trouble for his friendship (Xen. Hell. 4.8.16-17). His friendship and supposed alliance with Sparta at this point can be characterized as simply a move designed to utilize the resources of a now compliant city. One should recall that in the 390's Euagoras and Athens, while not acting against Achaemenid interests, had tried to formulate cooperative activities which would weaken Spartan power.³⁶ Sparta might now be willing to take vengeance--again doing so within the more general context of serving Achaemenid interests. Theopompus records that Euagoras did send out envoys to Sparta; these may have acted to counter-balance Tiribazos' activities and seek out new sources of foreign support (needed in view of Egypt's unwillingness to back Euagoras fully).

The final two charges come under the general heading of public relations. There is no other way to realistically characterize an embassy to Delphi; we may compare it in kind to the type of activities Pharnabazos had carried out earlier in the case of Athenian temples.³⁷ The "most serious" charge, that Tiribazos was building up his own power base by private good will displayed toward military leaders in the campaign by honors and gifts, is a misrepresentation of Tiribazos' efforts to insure the success of the campaign by preventing disaffection. At the very start of the campaign the troops had gone sour over the issue of provisioning (Polyaenus 7.20, Diod. 15.3.1-2). The demanding task of keeping large numbers of men stationary in the course of siege operations could lead to similar difficulties, difficulties Tiribazos was anxious to avoid. We might see also in this charge some allusion to Tiribazos' marriage connection with Glos (Diod. 15.9.3). Orontes' charges were a misrepresentation of limited local policy designed to achieve local goals in the interest of the crown.

While the charges formed grounds for arrest and detention, they were of insufficient strength for finding Tiribazos guilty. Diodorus provides an account of the trial which contains elements drawn from Herodotus (15.10.1, cf. Hdt. 5.25) and which illustrates the high value placed on service to the Great King (Diod. 15.10-11). Following Tiribazos' arrest, the King put off the trial (Diod. 15.8.5, 10.1) because it was necessary for him to undertake a quick punitive campaign against the Cadusians. It was during this same period of time that Orontes reached an accord with Euagoras.

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Tiribazos' defense, as presented by Diodorus, is surprisingly lame, a characteristic which may be due to Diodorus' summarizing a more detailed account. The defense against the charges of collusion with Euagoras is given as a simple comparison of the arrangements proposed by Tiribazos and those reached by Orontes. The "slave" v. "king" issue is the key difference, the implication being that Orontes gave Euagoras a lighter settlement. The consultation at Delphi is explained as well with a summary defense: Apollo, as a custom, gave no answers about death. Apparently, Orontes had couched Tiribazos' investigations in terms of inquiries about the health of Artaxerxes, e.g. would he die in battle. The friendship with Sparta is explained as having been made in the service of the crown. The remainder of Diodorus' account--and Tiribazos' defense--revolves around how and to what degree Tiribazos had laid up a store of good-will in the King's House. Did these recent misdeeds "bankrupt" Tiribazos? The royal judges (Diod. 15.11) deliberate and present opinions along these lines. Tiribazos was acquitted. But Orontes' false charges laid up such a store of ill-will

in the King's House so as to destroy in full his status as highest officer trusted at Susa (Diod. 15.11.2, Suda sv. Arbazakios, Plut. Mor. 174b).

A number of aspects of rebellion in the far west emerge from this incident. First, its interpretative nature. It was possible to view Tiribazos' activities dispassionately and see nothing threatening to Susa. But they could be misrepresented: Steps taken to insure the success and influence can be presented to an outside party as a threat to that party's own status and influence. Secondly, we note that the Shah does not initiate activity designed to destroy his officers. Rather, he responds to data presented to him. The nature of those data and the presenter determine the response. In this case, investigation and, ultimately, rejection of the data.

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To return to the war theater: Tiribazos had returned to Cyprus after consulting with the Shah close to the beginning of the campaigning season of 380. Some time during the season he was arrested and sent off to Susa. In Cyprus, the military demands remained the same: keep up the siege, while attempting to reach a negotiated settlement. If the latter could be achieved before the former, funds could be saved since the forces kept on Cyprus could be demobilized.

But the arrest of Tiribazos, the more popular commander, worsened the military situation. Achaemenid troops began to grow disaffected while Euagoras took heart (Diod. 15.9.1). Orontes moved to bring the war to a conclusion by imposing very much the same terms proposed by Tiribazos, but with a supposedly significant difference. Euagoras could obey the Shah as one king obeys another king. This "concession" is named only in Diodorus, not in Isocrates 9.63, which outlines the settlement in grandiose terms. Its absence in Isocrates may seem surprising: the speech is intended as an encomium and Diodorus would have us believe that Euagoras extended the war precisely to win the "concession." But Isocrates' account requires no concessions by Euagoras. I am very doubtful, moreover, that this "concession" meant anything or that Euagoras' desire to win it impeded bringing the war to a conclusion. Under Orontes' settlement Euagoras was reduced to compliant status; if letters later arrived which called Euagoras a "slave" (bandaka, cf. SIG³ 22), the dynast would be in no position to stand against his neighbors or the Shah. I would place the blame for impeding the war's conclusion on tension in the Achaemenid high command. Orontes, who had kept the siege going after the campaigning season of 381, may have desired full credit. The protracted negotiations probably reflect Euagoras' desire

to wear out the Achaemenid forces or gamble on beating back an assault by Persian troops weary of a siege. The siege of Salamis does not illustrate a moral victory for Euagoras, but is an illustration that in siege warfare both defender and attacker are under equal pressure and face equal danger. I shall turn to the final deleterious effect of the siege on Achaemenid forces presently.

It is perhaps fitting to summarize the realities of the second set of operations carried out against Euagoras. Military operations took place during two campaigning seasons. Euagoras enjoyed his sole success early in the first season: preventing the reprovisioning of Achaemenid forces. Once Glos broke the rebel fleet, Euagoras was forced into the defensive mode and Salamis was put under siege. The campaign was essentially over in 381--only Orontes' jealousy of Tiribazos combined with the difficulties of siege warfare extended it. Euagoras had enjoyed substantial support only from Akoris, and that support swiftly diminished once the Cypriote lost naval advantage. The campaign itself was only a sidelight in the overall Achaemenid effort to bring down rebel Egypt, an insurance policy designed to prevent further difficulties in Anatolia and Epirus. Euagoras was a "hot-air" hero, pumped up by contemporary oratory, but swiftly deflated by military reality.

Euagoras had miscalculated by repeatedly undertaking those types of activities which, although tolerated during the earlier part of his reign, met with immediate disapproval in the 380's. When Achaemenid forces did not possess naval supremacy and were pressed by the Greek problem (before 387), Cyprus received little attention. Internal strife in Salamis

which led to Euagoras' seizure of the throne attracted no adverse attention. Warfare between Euagoras and Anaxagoras and the cessation of tribute payments by the former were forgiven--Salamis' navy was of greater significance. Harsh action was not taken as a result of the 390 campaign. Euagoras thought he could expand his sphere of influence at the expense of neighboring Cypriote dynasts in the 380's. Achaemenid forces were concerned with Egypt and Akoris. But the Greek problem had been resolved; there were new Anatolian sources for a fleet. Cyprus could be dealt with summarily. Euagoras had gone beyond the limits of reason--his pleonexia was viewed as a direct threat to Achaemenid control, a threat confirmed by Akoris' willingness to assist him. This time a change from the status quo on Cyprus was not acceptable.

By the end of the season of 380, Euagoras had been rendered compliant and was confined to Salamis. But Orontes had created an additional difficulty which, fortunately, did not have serious repercussions. Glos, son-in-law of Tiribazos, believed the satrap's arrest would mean the end of his own career. Before the return of Tiribazos to the west, Glos imitated his father Tamos (Diod. 14.35), and, using his personal following as a power-base, decided to make a career outside the limits of Achaemenid control, in Egypt (Diod. 15.9.3-4). Diodorus describes the activity as directed against the Shah, but greater emphasis should be placed on a desire for self-preservation--and on mutual exploitation. Glos, highly popular among his own men (Diod. 15.9.3) sought out the assistance of disgruntled powers, who themselves could perceive Glos as a tool for their own ends. An alliance was made with Egypt (15.9.4);³⁹ Sparta was sounded out (15.9.5).³⁹ A summachia

with Glos seemed practicable and valuable. For both powers Glos and his forces could be a means by which to damage Achaemenid authority. But these plans came to naught. The admiral was killed hypo tinōn, perhaps by members of his own staff who opposed his policies (15.18.1). Another Egyptian, Tachos, a subordinate of Glos, assumed control over the commander's forces and established himself in Anatolia, at Leuke (18.1-2). He seems to have accomplished little and died under circumstances not recorded. Leuke became a region to be fought over by Glazomenae and Cymae. Neither Egypt nor Sparta had an opportunity to move against Achaemenid power. By the beginning of 379, Artaxerxes had achieved the short-term goals set down in the course of 382: he had stabilized Cyprus without endangering the recently restabilized Anatolia and without permitting the Egyptian rebels to initiate a serious forward policy. Full attention could now be devoted to regaining Egypt. We shall have occasion to note this effort in the next chapter, which traces the career of Datames.

Concluding Remarks

In actuality Euagoras had never posed a very serious threat to Achaemenid control: he was only one of many relatively minor political entities on the island of Cyprus. However, he represented a potential threat of great magnitude, a good deal of this potential a result of Cyprus' position and the fact that troubles existed in both the Egyptian and Greek theaters. Cyprus could provide a dangerous link between these theaters, a stepping stone for the expansion of destabilization. It

was against this potential that Achaemenid forces moved twice, efficiently and effectively. Recall that Achaemenid forces won--and could have lost--the second campaign within little more than a single campaigning season and after cracking the rebel navy in one battle.

The campaigns are more significant for their elucidation of Achaemenid strategy and its implementation in the far west. Three aspects were enumerated in the introduction: the influence of sea power, the nature of rebellion, and the setting of priorities. One may note their interaction. When Achaemenid forces possessed very limited sea power, i.e. when Epirus formed the sole secure source for western fleets, multiple theaters of destabilization existed. Since the Achaemenid fleet could deal effectively with only one at a time, priorities were set. Events in Cyprus were not the focus of attention. Internal Cypriote difficulties or expansionist policies of individual dynasts, which might otherwise be interpreted as rebellion, were left to run their course pending a decisive settlement of the more pressing Greek problem. Euagoras was tolerated for he represented an additional source of naval power.

Increased Achaemenid naval power led to alterations in priorities and policies. Pharnabazos' skillful use of Athenian fleet elements to begin to solve the Greek problem helped assure the ability of Achaemenid authorities to again raise fleets with some regularity from the west coast of Anatolia. Euagoras' relative value to Achaemenid officers fell, and with it their tolerance of his expansionist activities. Hence when new data were presented to Artaxerxes in 391 he interpreted them as signifying rebellion and deployed a fleet against Salamis. It

was a quick strike because the remainder of the Greek problem and the Egyptian problem continued to receive top priority.

Priorities shifted again once the King's Peace was imposed: full attention could be paid to Egypt. But the later reemergence of Euagoras as a perceived threat called for action against Cyprus and Salamis. The Peace created renewed naval strength permitting Egypt and Cyprus to be dealt with in tandem, with fleets drawn from different sectors. Although the Egypt campaign stalled, Euagoras was decisively beaten.

During the remainder of the fourth century the Greek problem did reemerge in serious form, while the development of Hekatomnid Caria's naval capacity gave new advantages to Achaemenid forces. Salamis and its dynasts knew their place. When they did step out of line they did so at a time of Achaemenid naval supremacy. The city was quickly rendered compliant (see final chapter).

Footnotes

¹The picture of Euagoras the Hellene is developed principally in Isocrates 9 (e.g. 9.47 ff). To it may be added the frivolous question of whether Euagoras would be regarded as a slave or king after his surrender (Diod. 18.8-9.2, 10.2). Euagoras is called a Hellene in IG II² 20, line 17. See Lewis and Stroud Hespieria 48 (1979) 190-1, and Robert and Robert REG 93 (1980) 390, no. 192. This image appears in Spyridakis 41-50 and Gjerstad 389ff. Rightly criticized in Costa Historia 23 (1974) 40-56.

²A discussion of the events and chronology may be found in Beloch² 3:2 226-9; for an earlier view see Judeich 117-131, cf. 137-143.

³Spyridakis 54-68, 122-3; Keinitz 81-89; Ryder CQ 13 (1963) 106; Osborne Historia 21 (1973) 523; Hofstetter nr. 105 (pp. 60-64).

⁴Reid Phoenix 28 (1974) 123-143; p. 138 n.38 for chronological outline.

⁵Something of an introduction may be obtained from Gjerstad 471-488; Gomme HCT I:I 271, 330ff; also consult Omstead's introduction.

⁶Eugene A. Costa, Jr., "Euagoras I and the Persians, ca. 411 to 391 BC," Historia 23 (1974) 40-56. His notes contain the necessary references to previous studies.

⁷It should be noted that the ancient sources were aware of the Achaemenid setting of priorities. Diod. 14.110.5 speaks about the inability to deal with Cyprus until the Greek problem was resolved.

⁸Costa Historia 23 (1974) 40-2. Phoinicians at court: Iso. 9.19. The first Phoinician usurper coopted the Teucridae (9.20-21, 26). The second usurper: Iso. 9.26, Diod. 14.98.1 (called Abdemon of Tyre), Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103 (Abdymon or Audymon of Kition).

⁹Iso. 9.27ff, Costa Historia 23 (1974) 42-3. I am not sure that the Shah would react as swiftly to instability inside Salamis as Costa believes.

¹⁰On early and relatively innocuous contacts with Athens see Costa Historia 23 (1974) 45-6.

¹¹Costa Historia 23 (1974) 43-4. That capital development and the adoption of Hellenic culture were not theoretically anti-Achaemenid should be kept in mind when the Hekatomnids are discussed. Capital development led to the emergence of Caria as the third significant satrapy on the Anatolia west coast, while Hellenic culture was used as a means of keeping the Hellenes in line.

¹²Costa Historia 23 (1974) 47-51. On Ktesias FGrH 688 fr. 30 now see Brown Historia 27 (1978) 13-16.

¹³Costa Historia 23 (1974) 46 rightly dismisses the view that the two colluded against the Great King.

¹⁴Now see Lewis and Stroud Hesperia 48 (1979) 180-193. Cf. Pausanias 1.3.2, Iso. 9.57, Dem. 20.70. Costa (51-2) places contact between Salamis and Sicily into proper context as an anti-Spartan move (Lysias 19.19-20).

¹⁵For a general survey of the period see Lewis Sparta and Persia 136-147.

¹⁶Costa Historia 23 (1974) 53-56.

¹⁷All this is stated in more polite form by Costa (55-6).

¹⁸Costa Historia 23 (1974) accepts Hekatomnos' disloyalty (54-56); Reid Phoenix 28 (1974) 138 n.38 implies there was no first campaign.

¹⁹Full discussion in Reid (136-7 n.37). She is too ready to toss out the evidence for the first campaign because of Diodorus' mistakes in terminology. The account of mobilization is confused, but that is not reason enough to deny the campaign's existence. Her unwillingness to accept its existence is probably a result of her belief that Cypriote difficulties existed only during the period of active Achaemenid involvement.

²⁰Cf. Costa Historia 23 (1974) 54.

²¹So too Reid 138-9.

²²Diod. 15.2.3: Euagoras' allies include those both openly and secretly at odds with Artaxerxes. Diod. 15.2.4: mercenaries are sent by certain others of whom the Shah was suspicious.

²³Kienitz 80-5, 166-170. For destabilization, Kienitz 76-80.

²⁴ Abrocomas first appears as an officer loyal to Artaxerxes (Xen. Anab. 1.3.20) during the revolt of Cyrus. Although not given a title, Abrocomas seems to have been satrap of Syria since before 402, and may have been the direct successor of the old satrap, Belesys (Xen. Anab. 1.4.10), whose palace was sacked by Cyrus (Berve I p. 258 places it at Chaleb). As satrap, Abrocomas was to defend the Cilician-Syrian gates and moved into the interior to join the Shah, but arrived too late for Cunaxa (Xen. Anab. 1.4.5, 1.4.18, 1.7.12).

²⁵ Spyridakis 62-3 (386/5-3/2), Kienitz 84-5, Beloch² 3:2 228-9 (385-3), Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 525-6; Judeich had tried to argue for an earlier date (389-7 BC).

²⁶ As for "King of the Arabs," the mss. of Diodorus read barbanōn, emended to Arabōn by Rhodoman. For an earlier example of Arabian cooperation with a rebel Egypt see Diod. 13.46.6, Gomme HCT V:VIII 290.

²⁷ Isocrates 9.62 makes these claims: Euagoras ravaged Phoinicia, seized Tyre by storming it, and caused Cilicia to become rebellious. The first two are certainly exaggerations, and would be assigned more reasonably to Akoris--using Euagoras' assistance. This last claim is false: Cilicia was used as an Achaemenid base throughout the war.

²⁸ Standard accounts of the second set of operations: Judeich 117-131, 137-143; Beloch² 3:2 226-230; Spyridakis 58-67; Olmstead 399-401; Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 522-537.

²⁹ Cf. Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 518-519; Meloni Athenaeum 28 (1950) 292-339.

³⁰ It is perhaps proper to ask why Pharnabazos was not chosen as commander. Perhaps he was still in Ebir-nari on policing activities; perhaps Artaxerxes II wished to avoid a possible clash of personalities between Pharnabazos and Tiribazos over their earlier differences in approach to the Greek problem.

³¹ As an index of stability in Cilicia, note that Camisares could be posted before 380 to fight in the Cadusian campaign Nepos Dat. 1.2, see chapter on Datames, below.

³² Tiribazos' travel over long distances should not create problems with the chronology. For rapid movements over longer distances by generals making reports cf. Lewis JHS 100 (1980) 194-5.

³³ SIG³ 22 (ML 12), Plut. Alex. 10. On the concepts of Bandaka (slave) and the King's House see Brandenstein 94-6, and Cousin and Deschamps BCH 13 (1889) 535-8.

³⁴So Costa Historia 23 (1974) 43 and Bosworth Arrian I 230. Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 526-534 offers a long discussion of the issue in the context of rivalry between commanders and suggests that Tiribazos might have been harsher because of past differences with Euagoras over Konon.

³⁵Osborne (534-6) believes that the effect of the letter was to conjure up the ghost of the traitor Cyrus.

³⁶Cf. Costa Historia 23 (1974) 51-2 on the anti-Spartan tilt of Euagoras before 390.

³⁷Lewis and Stroud Hesperia 48 (1979) 191 n. 16.

³⁸Diodorus may have given the wrong name to the king. Akoris' family had been supplanted by Nektanebos (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103). See Kienitz 88-9.

³⁹For the validity of Diodorus: Ryder CQ 13 (1963) 105-9.

CHAPTER IV. THE RISE OF DATAMES OF CILICIA: THE ROLE OF THE LOCAL
MAN IN THE FAR WEST

At the outset of this investigation I indicated that the building blocks for Achaemenid control were the estate and fortified strongpoint, and that the backbone in Achaemenid personnel was the local man, usually an estate owner, who in times of trouble mustered his resources and personal following for use in defense of his own property or in assisting his colleagues and/or superiors in the defense of the King's House. The career of Euagoras illustrated that an indigenous political figure, in his case a city boss and dynast, possessed a high level of discretionary power, so long as his activities did not pose a threat to his contemporaries in Achaemenid administration or could not be interpreted as doing so. That career contained an example of an important characteristic of Achaemenid administration: the interpretative nature of rebellion. The characteristics of control enumerated in the first chapter are illustrated in and elucidated by the activities of Datames, a non-Iranian, whose service led to ever-increasing status.

Datames should have been regarded as significant in the study of Achaemenid Anatolia. His career extended over a number of decades; he was a contemporary of both the older generation of administrators (Tiribazos, Pharmabazos) and the newer men of the mid-fourth century (Maussollos, Autophradates); he operated in a variety of regions within Anatolia. And, most significantly, his career is well documented enough for us to trace his family ties, his relations with other officers,

and his rise from local noble to highest officer. However, modern scholarship has confined Datames to a limited role as a precursor of the supposedly rebellious satraps of 362/1. His career is made into an illustration of Achaemenid weakness. All his deeds possess an undercurrent of disloyalty; his successes are the Shah's failures. In Judeich and those works generated from Judeich's Datames is handled summarily. He builds up a power base, uses it twice against the Shah and those loyal to him, and is finally killed.¹ It is the intention of this investigation to correct previous misconceptions about Datames' earlier career and rise to satrap and place them in a wider context as an illustration of the workings of Achaemenid administrative practices.

Section I. Sources for Datames

Datames is the only Achaemenid officer (with the exception of Artaxerxes II) for whom there is an ancient biography extant, the Datames in Cornelius Nepos, a Roman of the first century B.C. That Datames is the only Achaemenid officer included by Nepos in his biographies should serve as an index of his significance and visibility in the fourth century. Although Nepos provides a good deal of information on the noble's background and career, he acts as Datames' apologist. Datames is glorified and assigned a false importance in some campaigns at the expense of his Iranian contemporaries, who become foils against which the hero's superior qualities are highlighted. Datames is strong and vigorous, a better commander and tactician than his Iranian contemporaries. They possess serious character flaws and react to Datames' successes with treachery. Artaxerxes II is made the principal villain: he is a distant despot, prone to believe accusations made at Susa, at times indecisive or at

least forgetful of what he has commanded.²

Datames attracted the attention of a number of other authors who picked out incidents from his career, using them as anecdotes illustrating military and financial skill (principally Polyaeus 7.21, 29.1, Arist. Oec. 2.1350b, Frontinus Strat. 2.7.9). Unfortunately, these anecdotes are not given a precise chronological context and may differ in significant respects from the same data presented in the roughly chronological biography. Diodorus 15.91.2-7 has occasion to note Datames in his account of the "Great Satraps' Revolt" and provides what appears to be a fixed point in the chronology of the noble's career (362/1). However, in that account a complex series of events are telescoped, presented in a simplistic and confused fashion, and assigned to a single year.³

Thus in analyzing Datames' career a number of source problems will emerge: chronological imprecision, the lack of contemporary chancery documents and precise terminology, and seemingly contradictory data. Reconstruction of events will be hampered as well by the tendency in both ancient and modern accounts to attach the labels "loyalist" and "rebel" to political officers. We shall have to keep in mind the large amount of discretionary power which resided in provincial officers, and the importance self-interest played in determining an officer's course of action.

Section II. Datames' Family and Early Career

In the Achaemenid far west locally prominent families might have their origin when a loyal man, usually of some noble status, was installed by the Shah in hopes of stabilizing a disorderly sector. In

the case of Datames' family there is a transfer of competent personnel from their home sector to a new locale, one destabilized and in need of closer Achaemenid supervision. Datames' father was one Camisares, a Carian whose service to the Shah multis locis led to his being posted to that part of Cilicia close to Cappadocia (Nepos Dat. 1.1). Nepos calls Camisares' sphere a provincia, and this should best be interpreted as territorial sphere of governing. Camisares' service had led to increased status as a local noble; nationality played no hindering role. In fact, Datames' family affords an excellent example of the multi-ethnic nature of Achaemenid administrators.

Cilicia seems to have been in need of stabilization. Throughout the fifth century the region had been under the control of a native dynast, a king known as the Syennesis (cf. Hdt. 1.74, 5.118, 7.98), recognized at Susa as the highest Achaemenid officer for Cilicia. By the end of the fifth century the Syennesis' competence seems to have been questionable. Before Cyrus was proclaimed a rebel by Susa, the Syennesis, an apparently compliant member of the native order, was somewhat ambivalent in his behavior toward what should have been perceived as an army operating in the service of the crown (Xen. Anab. 1.2.12-27, cf. Diod. 14.19-20). Diodorus 14.19.3 has Cyrus use revolting tyrannoi in Cilicia as a prophasis for his own mobilization. Although Xenophon (Anab. 1.2.1, Hell. 3.1.1) is to be preferred (a campaign against the perennially recalcitrant Pisidians), behind Diodorus' version may lie the expectation that Cilicia was troublesome enough to warrant a show of force carried out by local Achaemenid officials outside the sector. We do not hear of a Syennesis thereafter (e.g. Iso. 4.161, 9.62). The implantation of competent men such as Camisares, with estates, would serve

to stabilize those regions in which they were located. The fact that Cilicia could serve as a staging area for Achaemenid troops in the late 380's (Diod. 15.2.2, 3.3, 4.2) should be regarded as an index of the success Achaemenid authorities, Camisares included, had in restabilizing Cilicia.

While still in Caria, Camisares had strengthened his own position by marrying into the nobility of the sometime disruptive Paphlagonians (Nepos Dat. 1.1 plus 2.2-3). While such a move probably increased Camisares' status in the eyes of his neighbors, there also accrued to him the advantage of having some potential leverage in regulating the activities of these tribally organized peoples (Xen. Anab. 5.6.8, Hell. 4.1.2-15, 26-28). Paphlagonia was a sector in which the basic political unit was the tribe. Tribes may or may not be unified at a given time, and Achaemenid personnel had the option of playing tribes against each other or exploiting intra-tribal rivalry as a means of directing disorder away from more settled regions. Paphlagonian warrior forces could either disrupt settled regions or be hired by such regions as mercenaries (cf. Xen. Anab. 1.8.5). One should expect both possibilities to co-exist. Recalcitrant tribal elements could also be sought out by rebellious Achaemenid personnel or other non-compliant elements (e.g. Spithridates' liaison with Otys: Xen. Hell. 4.1.1-28). There do not seem to have been any Iranian provincial officers in Paphlagonia as satraps (Diod. 14.11.3 is wrong in his terminology). By tying himself to Paphlagonian nobility, then, Camisares will have gained access to his kinsmen's military resources, and insured (so he hoped) that they would not initiate hostilities against his property or personnel. One should note that we now have an Achaemenid administrator, a Carian, married to a Paphlagonian, and

situated in Cilicia: a clear illustration of the multi-ethnic nature of Achaemenid control. Camisares is undergoing a transition from "imported" crown-appointee to an indigenous local noble.

Although a local noble, Camisares had responsibilities which extended beyond his immediate sector. We find his son, Datames, serving Artaxerxes as a palace guard (Nepos. Dat. 1.1). Although such a post is to be viewed as an honor for both father and son, to Artaxerxes accrued the advantage of having some insurance for the loyalty of the family. Camisares was also expected to assist the crown in larger campaigns which might be carried out beyond Cilicia. Late in the 380's both father and son fought against the Cadusians, a tribal people near Media. Camisares fell in battle (Nepos Dat. 1.2), and keeping with the Achaemenid practice of maintaining a continuity in personnel Datames, who had distinguished himself in the same war, was sent westward to take up his father's property and post, and, presumably, his circles of friends.⁴ While Camisares had tied the family to Paphlagonian nobility, Datames had married the daughter of Mithrobarzanes (Nepos Dat. 6.3), a man of Iranian extraction. Regrettably we do not know his home sector. The marriage may well have been between the families of nearby nobles.

While a local noble in Cilicia, Datames' responsibilities were much the same as his father's, and he is found cooperating with other Achaemenid officers in both minor policing actions and more significant large scale campaigns. Datames' first Anatolian campaign, soon after his return to Cilicia, saw him as subordinate to Autophradates (Nepos Dat. 2.1), later to be satrap at Sparda. The object of the campaign was unspecified rebels, but in view of the home sector of Datames and Autophradates' earlier career we should place these rebels somewhere in

the southwestern portion of Anatolia. The Lycians, controlled in the 370's by a number of warring dynasts, seem a likely candidate.⁵

Competence--and the ties of marriage--later caused Datames to be entrusted by the Shah with a campaign against the disruptive and semi-independent Paphlagonian chieftain, Thuys, Datames' own cousin. Here we have a local man undertaking a punitive expedition in a region with which he has some familiarity and against a rebel to whom he is related. Artaxerxes hoped Datames might render his cousin compliant by a traditional Achaemenid approach toward rebels: cooptation through diplomacy. When rebelliousness proved too strong for both diplomacy and marriage ties--a not infrequent occurrence in the empire--Datames defeated Thuys in battle and transported him to the king at Susa.⁶ One should note here that marriage alliances offer only the possibility for close relations; the individuals involved may elect to pursue policies hostile toward each other.

Nepos (Dat. 2.5) indicates that in this campaign Datames was supposed to receive assistance from Ariobarzanes, whom we know to have been satrap at Dascylium at this time (Nepos' grandiose description of Ariobarzanes' sphere is wrong, cf note 5). But the satrap abandoned his ally. Nepos is anxious to florify Datames and behind this "desertion" may lie an offer of assistance by Ariobarzanes, which Datames did not need to accept. That Ariobarzanes was even involved suggests that Datames is competent enough to be entrusted with a campaign somewhat north of his home sector and of interest to nearby highest officers. He seems to remain on good terms with both Ariobarzanes and his son Mithridates throughout his career. Hence, Datames, still a local noble, is coming into contact with men who already are (Ariobarzanes) or will

become (Autophradates) highest officers in the far west.

At this point I wish to skip ahead to the last campaign Datames undertakes as a lesser officer, a punitive campaign directed against Aspis of Cataonia, which took place before Pharnabazos' abortive invasion of Egypt in 374 BC. Aspis was a tribal chieftain who controlled a region between Cilicia and Cappadocia (Nepos Dat. 4.1-2). His power lay in the rough terrain of his sector, his fortified strongpoints, and his ability to reach an accommodation with the disruptive Pisidians (Nepos Dat. 4.1-4). Aspis was tolerated by the Achaemenid officers until he attracted royal attention and incurred royal wrath by disrupting one of the few aspects of provincial rule in which the Shah took any real interest: the collection and payment of tribute. The chieftain had raided the tribute caravan led by Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes, and was destabilizing adjoining regions (Nepos Dat. 4.2-3).⁷ At this point Datames was in Ebir-nari, a local lord about to lead troops from his sector against rebel Egypt (see below). It was probably this partial denuding of sectors close to Aspis' sphere which encouraged his disruptive activities. Datames (Nepos Dat. 4.3-5) was sent back north to carry out the punitive campaign, and he delivered defeated Aspis to Mithridates for transport to the Shah. Datames had acted to maintain the administrative guidelines: he restored order to his sphere's environs and insured, in this case, the delivery of revenues owed to the Shah. The campaigns against the unnamed rebels, Thuys, and Aspis display the frontline responsibility which lay in the hands of the local noble.

I indicated above that Datames was temporarily away from Cilicia when Aspis made his moves. Like his father Camisares, and other local

lords and dynasts, Datames was expected to assist in major imperial campaigns, especially if such campaigns were held in his general part of the empire. He would be expected to lead troops recruited from his sector or its environs into battle as a subordinate to an imperially-appointed superior. Such is the case in the campaign launched against the king of rebel Egypt, Nektanebis, in the mid-370's.⁸ Nepos' account, although unsatisfactory in some particulars, illustrates the importance of local nobles in large campaigns.

According to Nepos, five men are prominent in the preparation of the expedition at Ake in Phoinicia and its execution: Tithraustes, Pharnabazos, Iphicrates, Datames and Mandrokles of Magnesia.⁹ Datames, Tithraustes, and Pharnabazos shared the high command equally, but when Pharnabazos was called to Susa for consultation--standard practice in major campaigns--Datames was named sole high commander.¹⁰ Shortly thereafter, Datames is sent back to Anatolia to deal with the recalcitrant Aspis. Sinister forces are at work at Susa. Artaxerxes is turned against the able Datames, whom he has just tried to recall to Ake after dispatching him to Anatolia. When Datames returns to Ake after defeating Aspis, he learns of the Shah's secret hatred, names Mandrokles in his stead, apparently as high commander for the Egyptian campaign, and departs again for Anatolia, now as a secret rebel (Nepos Dat. 5.2-6).

This account is unsatisfactory: Artaxerxes is made a despot and fool. There is a constant and unnecessary shuffling in the Persian high command. Tithraustes simply disappears from view. Who is in command when Datames, now high commander, goes to fight Aspis? Nepos contradicts our other sources for the Egyptian campaign: Both Plutarch and Diodorus single out Pharnabazos as the high commander once the campaign moves

toward Egypt. He quarrels with the mercenary captain Iphicrates. Dissension and the fortifications constructed by Nektanebis stymie the Persian offensive, which is then seemingly abandoned.¹¹ Can sense be made out of Nepos' account? What of Datames?

It is reasonable to assume that Pharnabazos and Tithraustes remained high commanders throughout. Both are senior, experienced men, familiar to and with the Achaemenid far west. Tithraustes began his career as a high court official, set affairs in Sparda in order after executing its satrap, Tissaphernes, and in the 380's commanded a rather ineffective campaign against Egypt.¹² Pharnabazos was long the satrap at Dascylium. His family was a branch of the Achaemenid clan and he had married Artaxerxes' daughter, Apame.¹³ His son, Ariobarzanes, was the present satrap at Dascylium. Pharnabazos had shared command with Tithraustes in that earlier Egyptian campaign (Iso. 4.140). In the present campaign, I suggest, Tithraustes remained in command at Ake, first when Pharnabazos journeyed to Susa, and later when the military forces commanded by Pharnabazos began to move against Egypt.

Datames was a subordinate to both those Persian nobles. He was never high commander. Nepos is simply anxious to glorify him. He is one of those local nobles expected to serve as subordinates in large scale campaigns and lead local troops from their sectors. A parallel to Datames may be found in the career of the admiral Glos discussed in the previous chapter. The fifth man Nepos mentions, Mandrokles of Magnesia, is Datames' subordinate, whom Datames names in his stead as commander of local forces when he returns to Anatolia a second time. Why the return to Anatolia? Nepos' tales of despotism and intrigue

are hardly historical reality. Datames returns to Anatolia a second time because he has been promoted. His service led to higher status: he now became satrap, his sphere encompassing his old holdings and new ones in the interior, a sector in which he had just campaigned.

Section III. Datames as Satrap of Cappadocia

A. Appointment and Sphere

From Nepos' account (Dat. 5.6) it is apparent that Datames has left Ebir-nari before the troops moved against Egypt in the campaigning season of 374. While this provides us with an approximate date for his promotion, his formal title and sphere require some investigation. Neither Nepos (5.6) nor Polyaeus (7.21) assigns a title to Datames, although both sources have him operating with a high level of discretionary power in central Anatolia. Diodorus 15.91.2-7 calls him satrap of Cappadocia. In spite of the imprecision with which Diodorus uses satrapēs, the activities which Datames undertakes (discussed below) make it clear that he is a highest officer.

Trogus Prol. 10 reads: primum Datamen praefectum Paphlagoniae . Paphlagonon origo repetita. The context of the word praefectum indicates that Trogus uses that word as the equivalent for the Greek, satrapēs, i.e. highest officer. Orontes and Ariobarzanes both are assigned the same title, and there is no question that Ariobarzanes was satrap. Datames' sphere is more problematic, for the word Paphlagoniae does not appear in any text of Trogus. It is an emendation made in 1581 by Bongarsius, which has been accepted by the editors of the Teubner editions, the texts most commonly used today (Ruehl's in 1886, Seel's

in 1935 and 1972). The rationale for such an emendation was probably the desire to assign a sphere to Datames as he was the only officer listed who did not have one in the text. Since the word Paphlagonon follows praefectum it was reasonable to assume that Paphlagoniae originally stood after praefectum, but was skipped over by the copyists. But even if one accepts the emended text Trogus is still imprecise in restricting Datames' sphere to Paphlagonia, a region which did not normally have a satrap. Rather, I would suggest that when Datames was made satrap his sphere encompassed his Cilician holdings, Cappadocia, and regions held by tribally organized peoples, i.e. the Paphlagonians, the inhabitants of Cataonia, and at least some of the Pisidians. There is very little data on the administrative units in the interior of Anatolia, but flexibility in arrangement seems to have been the practice. Datames had proven himself in a number of campaigns directed against recalcitrants in these regions and was related to the Paphlagonians. It would be likely that Artaxerxes simply gave the whole area over the Datames, a man familiar to and with the region.

The timing of Datames' appointment is not unintelligible. The campaign against Egypt was a major undertaking, and no doubt many local nobles left their home sectors, taking troops drawn from those sectors with them. Hence, sectors will be partially denuded of forces which normally kept order. The disturbances caused by Aspis were only one result of this denuding. It would be in the royal interest to have a competent man such as Datames operating in Anatolia while other officers campaigned to the south. In addition, Datames was already familiar with the satraps to the west, Autophradates and Ariobarzanes. We do

not know who Datames' predecessor was and hence a more precise explanation for his appointment is not possible.

B. Datames' Campaigns as Satrap in the 370's

Investigation of the next stage of Datames' career is hampered by the chronological imprecision of our anecdotal sources, the tendency for different sources to retell the same anecdotes, each time in a slightly different form, and the romanticism of Nepos. Once we remove the secret friendships and hatreds which Nepos assigns to Datames after his final departure from the preparations for the Egyptian campaign, we can perceive him operating to consolidate and expand his control over his new sphere. One should keep in mind the large degree of freedom which local officials possessed so long as they acted within the very general administrative guidelines set down by the Shah. Datames' actions will threaten neither neighboring satraps nor the crown, but rather will serve to stabilize previously disruptive sectors.

Using Cilicia and Cappadocia (Nepos Dat. 5.6) as bases Datames embarked on a series of campaigns of stabilization and acted in concert with other Achaemenid officials. Paphlagonia was "pacified" and Datames installed his own men in fortified strongpoints as a means of controlling the tribes. Perhaps he was able to capitalize on his own Paphlagonian ancestry. Unfortunately Nepos assigns to Datames an ulterior motive: preparation of a personal powerbase for later use against the crown. As part of this preparation, Datames supposedly made a secret friendship with Ariobarzanes, satrap at Dascylium.

However, a consideration of evidence not given by Nepos indicates that there was no disloyalty to the crown, and that cooperation with

Dascylium was open, and in Achaemenid interests. Polyaeus reports that Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes, was also operating in Paphlagonia (7.29.2). The lack of a chronological context for the operation can permit its being synchronized with the earlier campaign against Thuys (Nepos Dat. 2.5) or Datames' later moves (5.6). The second campaign seems the more reasonable choice since Nepos implies that Dascylium took no active role in the first. In either context, though, the anecdote in Polyaeus can be regarded as evidence for the common interest on the part of two nearby Achaemenid officers to keep in check a people who could damage both their spheres. Joint action by two satraps against a common threat would be regarded with satisfaction by Susa, and would be a welcome change from the usual satrapial rivalry one found further west.

There is a series of anecdotes relating to Datames' activities around the Black Sea, and these may be placed in the same general context of operations carried out north of Cilicia (Polyaeus 7.21.1, cf. Aristotle Oec. 2.1350b; Polyaeus 7.21.2, 5; Aeneas Tacticus 40).¹⁴ Here too cooperation with Dascylium and loyalty to the Shah are implied. Datames' operations are placed at Amisus, Sinope, and Sestus, but few particulars are given. There exists the expectation that Amisus will be friendly toward Datames (Polyaeus 7.21.1, Arist. Oec. 2.1350b). Strabo 12.547 points to a long-standing relationship between that city and the administrators of Cappadocia, and I believe that it was in the interests of both city and satrap that nearby recalcitrants, including the Paphlagonians, be kept in order.¹⁵ Sinope is the object of attack on both land and sea, and was put under siege (Polyaeus 7.21.2, 5; Aeneas Tacticus 40). The causes of tension are not recorded. Although

Datames may have believed the city to be inimical to his interests, the Shah felt otherwise: when a message arrived commanding Datames to break off the siege, he obeyed (Polyaenus 7.21.5). The activities at Sinope are coupled with those directed against Sestus, on the European side of the Hellespont (Polyaenus 7.21.2). Sestus is some distance away from Datames' sphere, and an emendation to Polyaenus' text has been suggested as a means of encapsulating the incident in the north coast of Anatolia.¹⁶ Distance need not preclude Datames' operations: Sestus is the outward extension of Ariobarzanes' sphere, and this campaign can be regarded as an illustration of cooperation between the two satraps. Ariobarzanes (cf. chapter 6) was taking steps in the 370's to exercise control on both sides of the Hellespont, thereby giving Achaemenid forces a strategic advantage. Datames' cooperation in achieving that advantage in no way represents an activity inimical to the crown's interests. Nepos' claim of a secret friendship between Datames and Ariobarzanes is only an attempt to set the stage for later tension between satrap and Shah (cf. Nepos Dat. 5.6).

In addition to consolidating his position in Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, and their environs, Datames led a campaign against the often disruptive Pisidians (late 370's). The purpose of the operations was to regulate the Pisidians' movements by means of military force, the type of policing campaign normally undertaken by Achaemenid officials. In addition to the vague chronology (cf. Nepos Dat. 6.1), the campaign is problematic because within Nepos' account (6) occurs the stratagem for which Datames was most remembered--the destruction of defecting forces seemingly led by his father-in-law, Mithrobarzanes. So famous was this stratagem that it appears in nearly every source which discusses

Achaemenid Anatolia in the 370's and 360's. But each time it is told the time, place, enemy, and defector are somewhat different. Each version represents the view that Datames was a good and clever general, and that his rivals could stand up to him only by the use of treachery.

There are five different versions of the stratagem and they should be sorted out and analyzed before a consideration of the Pisidian operations can be attempted. The accounts are as follows:

1. Nepos Datames 6: In a campaign against the Pisidians in an unknown locale, Mithrobarzanes tries to defect. Campaign placed before Datames is regarded as open rebel (Dat. 7.1).

2. Diodorus 15.91.2-7: In a campaign against Artabazos in Cappadocia, Mithrobarzanes tries to defect. Campaign placed in events for year 362/1.

3. Frontinus Strat. 2.7.9: In a campaign in Cappadocia against Autophradates, an unnamed cavalry commander (Mithrobarzanes commanded cavalry in Nepos and Diodorus) tries to defect. No chronological context (cf. Nepos Dat. 7.1: Autophradates sent to Cappadocia).

4. Polyaeus 7.21.7: In a campaign against an unspecified enemy in an unknown locale, an unnamed hipparch tries to defect from Datames. No chronological context.

5. Polyaeus 7.28.2: Arsames, satrap of Greater Phrygia at an unspecified time, runs up against similar problems in a campaign against generals sent by the Shah when a hipparch defects.

Now for the analysis. I agree with Beloch's assessment¹⁷ that

Polyaenus 7.28.2 need not be emended to read Datames. There was no shortage of "defectors" or "rebels" in the Achaemenid empire. The fifth version may be removed from consideration.

Polyaenus 7.21.7, although assigned to Datames, simply has no specifics, and should be removed from consideration.

Nepos, Diodorus, and Frontinus are left. In the account of Frontinus there is no reason to question the existence of hostility between Datames and Autophradates or the playing out of that hostility in Cappadocia. Nepos Dat. 7 reports just such hostilities. One can easily assume a defection occurred, but not in quite the fashion Frontinus describes. The stories in Diodorus and Nepos are those which must be reconciled because both mention Mithrobarzanes as a defector.

When and to whom did Mithrobarzanes "defect"? There is no reason to question the existence of campaigns against the Pisidians or Artabazos as a way of resolving the problem. But if Mithrobarzanes died in the Pisidian campaign, he cannot reappear on the battlefield against Artabazos. If Mithrobarzanes acted against Datames, which opportunity offered the best chance for success and a reward for his treachery? Not a defection to the Pisidians. However, in the midst of a battle against a general and satrap--and grandson of the Great King--there may well be the desire to disassociate oneself from a commander thought of as a rebel by his opponent. When Mithrobarzanes defected he did so in the campaign against Artabazos. This display of self-interest and the desire for self-preservation would only parallel the more famous cases of Rheomithres and Orontes (Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4, Diod. 15.91.1, 92.1). Mithrobarzanes was unsuccessful, but the stratagem used by Datames became famous. The particulars became blurred.

In sum, Mithrobarzanes assisted Datames in a successful campaign against the Pisidians. Years later, the two stood together against Artabazos, but Mithrobarzanes gave way. Nepos remembered the man and the stratagem but placed it early on in Datames' career. And Nepos does not report the battle with Artabazos. Diodorus is to be accepted.

What should be stressed in the Pisidian campaign is continuity and cooperation. Datames trained his son Arsidaeus in the art of war and government (Dat. 6.1). Unfortunately Arsidaeus fell in the first stages of the campaign. Cooperation and the ties of family can be noted: the operations were carried out jointly by Datames and his father-in-law, Mithrobarzanes. Both men illustrate the frontline responsibility exercised by the satrap and lesser officers in policing disruptive elements.

In the late 370's, then, Datames undertook a series of campaigns against recalcitrant tribes and seemingly hostile city-states. In each case Achaemenid control is strengthened, while Datames' own prestige increases. Although the operations are not major undertakings, they display the value of the ties of friendship and marriage to the establishment and consolidation of Achaemenid control. Datames and the satrapial house of Dascylium work together in regions which abut both their spheres; Datames is able to use his own family. Replication is illustrated: Datames' activities as satrap are similar to those he undertook as a lesser officer, but they now occur over a larger geographical region. In spite of Nepos' claims of tension between Datames and Artaxerxes, none of the satrap's actions were directed in any fashion against the crown. Datames met the administrative guidelines.

C. The "Rebellion" of Datames

In the discussion of the revolt of Euagoras, I indicated how tensions between Orontes and Tiribazos led to the former presenting data to the crown which portrayed Tiribazos' otherwise acceptable activities as the creation of a personal power base for eventual use against the Shah and those loyal to him. The nature of the data presented and the status of the man making the charges caused Artaxerxes to accept the information as accurate, arrest Tiribazos, and hold him pending trial. Investigation proved that Tiribazos was not disloyal. The interpretative nature of rebellion should be kept in mind, for it was probably by a hostile perception of otherwise acceptable activities that Datames was called a rebel and made the object of a punitive campaign.

During his campaigns in the latter part of the 370's Datames is sure to have repeated the process Nepos notes (5.6) in connection with the Paphlagonian campaigns: building up forces, entrusting strongpoints to loyal men. While these moves strengthened Datames' own position, they also served to enhance Achaemenid control. Friendship with Ariobarzanes achieved the same ends. Misrepresentation of these activities would hold that Datames' actions were aimed solely at building up an unchallengeable position for himself in eastern Anatolia, a base from which he would set out to destroy those loyal to the Shah. Such a misrepresentation seems to have been detailed at Susa by Sysinas, Datames' eldest son (7.1), perhaps in hopes of gaining additional power. The reasons for Sysinas' ill-feeling towards his father, whom he might expect to succeed as satrap without recourse to deceit, are unknown, but intra-family rivalry was common in an empire in which politics were highly personal. Data

presented by a satrap's eldest son were believed accurate, and Artaxerxes ordered a punitive campaign against Datames (7.2).

Although few particulars about this campaign are preserved, the personnel involved and rough terrain on which it was fought permit some observations. The chronology is uncertain: the operations described in the previous section and the process of effecting new policy at Susa are certain to have taken up a number of campaigning seasons, and we may so place Sysinas' "defection" in 370. I would assign two seasons for military action against Datames and the negotiation of a peace (369, 368). The operations were entrusted to Autophradates (7.2), an expression of continuity in personnel. Not only was Autophradates highest officer in Sparda, directly to the west (hence ready access to large numbers of men), but he had some familiarity with Datames and his sphere. Unlike Ariobarzanes, Autophradates does not appear to have enjoyed a high degree of friendship with the "rebel". The force sent into Cappadocia was multi-ethnic (8.2), and may have contained elements from Datames' own sphere who were on bad terms with their satrap. On Datames' side lay the advantage of familiarity with the terrain on which the battles were to be fought and possession of strongpoints. Autophradates was unable to score decisive victories (Nepos Dat. 7.2-8.5, Frontinus Strat. 2.7.9. Polyaeus 7.21.6).

When war proved too costly, Autophradates turned to diplomacy (8.5-6). To co-opt a rebel and leave him in place was standard Achaemenid policy and inexpensive. Datames continued to hold his sphere, and there was no attempt to restrict his power. He had not initiated any acts designed to topple Achaemenid control. Rather, he reacted to

a new, hostile policy dictated from Susa, itself a result of local data. The fate of Sysinas is not known (cf. chapter 7).

The career of Datames from the 380's to the early 360's, the end of Autophradates' campaign, highlights a number of features of Achaemenid administration. Competence, not nationality, was the determining factor in advancements. Camisares' service led to his status as a lesser officer in Cilicia. Datames' led to promotion to satrap. His extended family was Carian, Paphlagonian and Iranian. Officers in the far west possessed a high level of discretionary power: none of Datames' activities, save for his attack on Sinope, met with royal disapproval before Sysinas' deceit. A solid base for Datames meant a solid base for Achaemenid control. Datames' sphere grew--in part because of promotion, but equally important because of the officer's competence. In Datames' earlier career the Shah remains in the background: Artaxerxes was content to leave his officers in the far west alone so long as they did not hinder the following of administrative guidelines. It was only local information presented to him which caused new policy to be effected. And that policy was abandoned when it proved too costly. It must be stressed that there is nothing singular about Datames' career; no part of it stands outside common administrative practice in the far west. It is exceptional only because it is well documented.¹⁸

Footnotes

¹Judeich 191-3; Olmstead 408-412 (with mistakes as to the time of Pharnabazos' death, Mithridates' parentage); Meloni RSI 63 (1951) 6-7.

²All references in this note are to Nepos. Datames. Despotism Artaxerxes: 5, 9; faulty Persian officials: 2.1 for incompetent Autophradates, 2.5 for deserter Ariobarzanes, 5.2 for jealous courtiers, 6.3-8 for defector Mithrobarzanes, 8.5-6 for Autophradates' military failures, 10-11 for treacherous Mithridates: virtues of Datames: 2.1 (saves royal troops), 3.5 (good soldier is advanced), 6.3-8 (tricks defector), 7.1 (forte ac strenuo), 8.3-6 (withstands superior forces), 9-11 (can be defeated by treachery only). Each time a Persian fault emerges, a virtue of Datames is illustrated.

³Diodorus 15.91.2-7: Datames, rebel satrap of Cappadocia, fights Artabazos, a loyalist general. Mithrobarzanes tries to defect, but is unsuccessful. Later Datames dies by subterfuge directed by Artaxerxes. The revolt itself, combined with an account of rebel Egypt, is narrated in Diodorus 15.90-93. The year 362/1 is perceived as the beginning of a massive destabilization of the entire Achaemenid west. But beyond a confused list of participants and a few stratagems, Diodorus provides no particulars. A full discussion will be given in chapter 6.

⁴The Cadusian campaigns are enumerated in chapter 2; we may identify this one with the operations carried out by Artaxerxes in Diod. 15.8.5, 10.1 while Tiribazos was under arrest. The campaign provides us with the only chronologically fixed point in Datames' early career. Based on this date, campaigning season 380, and data provided in Nepos I can offer some very tentative suggestions about Datames' family history; the date I offer below are minimalist and conservative, and may be revised upward without any damage to the evidence.

Beloch² 3:2 p. 154 suggests Datames is born no later than 410 B.C. and this may be refined. Judeich 191-3 offers no suggestions for Datames' family history beyond reciting Nepos. Dat. 1. I begin by presenting the evidence we do have; I believe the nouns and adjectives used by Nepos to describe members of Datames' family to be valid:

1.1: Camisares, natione Care, is Datames' father. His mother has the personal name Scythissa (cf. Datames 2.3-4).

1.2: Father and son participate in a war against the Cadusians; Camisares dies.

2.3: Thuys of Paphlagonia and Datames are cousins.

2.4: Scythissa is the paternal aunt (amita) of Thuys.

6.1: When Arsidaeus, son of Datames, dies fighting the Pisidians he is a young man (adulescens).

6.3-7 (cf. Diod. 15.91.2-3): Mithrobarzanes is father-in-law of Datames.

7.1: Sysinas is Datames' eldest son.

In analyzing the above data, I shall make two assumptions: that the Cadusian campaign took place in 380 BC (see chapter 3); that Sysinas and Arsidaeus are grandsons of Mithrobarzanes. Given the data and assumptions, I offer the following reconstruction:

a. Camisares dies in 380 BC (the date of the Cadusian war).

b. Arsidaeus does not die before 374 BC. The campaign against the Pisidians followed Datames' final departure from Ake (5.5-6.1). The Egyptian campaign, which is being organized at Ake, is carried out no earlier than spring 374 BC. For the date 374 BC as the start of the move against Egypt see Gray CQ 30 (1980) 314-5, 314 n. 45.

I would make Arsidaeus about 13 at the time of his death, a very conservative figure. His birth comes no later than 387/6 BC. Sysinas, his older brother, is born no later than 388/7 BC.

c. Since Datames must have a son by 388, I choose as the minimum age for his fathering one as 15 years. I would suggest that he was born before 403 BC.

d. As a result of number 3, the marriage between Camisares and Scythissa took place not later than 404 BC. Camisares received his estates from Artaxerxes II, whose reign began in spring 404 (Beloch² 3:2 p. 131). The marriage between the Carian and Paphlagonian took place before Camisares' being posted to Cilicia: he must have been of at least some minor importance in Caria to have married a foreign woman whose descendant is a chieftain.

e. The marriage between Datames and the daughter of Mithrobarzanes should come no later than 388 BC. Since Datames, immediately before taking up his father's estates, is a palace guard, we should place he and his family outside Cilicia during part of the 380's.

f. Camisares, by 388 BC, is significant enough to use his son in a political marriage. Camisares, then, is probably already in Cilicia by 388 BC. Since his post is a reward for loyal service to Artaxerxes II, this service fell between 404 BC and 388 BC. A logical possibility for the rendering of substantial service would be during the revolt of Cyrus. It is possible that Camisares was a loyalist, was rewarded, and sent to help stabilize a sector where more loyal men were required.

A summary of chronology:

before 404: Camisares marries Scythissa

before 403: Datames born

by 388: Camisares posted to Cilicia; Datames marries daughter of Mithrobarzanes

before 380: Datames a palace guard

no later than 388/387: Sysinas born

no later than 387/6: Arsidaeus born

campaign season 380: Camisares dies, Datames to Cilicia

not before 374: Arsidaeus dies

370: Sysinas "betrays" Datames

⁵ Nepos does not tell us Autophradates' title. However, Ariobarzanes

is given all Lydia, Ionia, and Phrygia as his sphere (2.5). I suggest that Nepos is confused. Shortly after 380 BC Ariobarzanes is the senior man in Achaemenid Anatolia and this may account for Nepos' confusion.

⁶For the campaign against Thuys see Nepos Dat. 2.2-5. Thuys should not be identified with Otys of the 390's. For such an identification see Bruce An Historical Commentary on the "Hellenica Oxyrhynchia" 143. Thuys was well-treated by Artaxerxes (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 179, Ael. v.h. 1.27).

⁷Nepos Dat. 4.1-5. That a tribute caravan was subject to attack is suggested by the wording of 4.3, quae regi portarentur abripiebat and by the fact that Mithridates is on his way to Susa when the attack occurs.

⁸For the campaign see Judeich 160-3, 19203; Kienitz 89-92.

⁹Nepos Dat. 3.5. Mandrokles: Hofstetter nr. 208; Iphicrates (cf. Diod. 15.41, Plut. Artax. 24.1): Hofstetter nr. 164.

¹⁰Datames as sole commander: Nepos Dat. 3.5. Consultations with the king at Susa in the course of major campaigns is neither uncommon nor a sign of royal disfavor. Hints of such consultations can be found in Hdt. 3.120.3, 7.19.2. Also see Lewis JHS 100 (1980) 194-5, Xen. Hell. 4.8.12-17, Diod. 15.4.2.

¹¹Diod. 15.41-43, Plut. Artax. 24.1. Shifting commands are accepted by all modern scholars I consulted: Kienitz 90, Beloch² 3:2 254-5, Judeich 160-161 n. 3, 161-162 n.1, Meloni RSI 63 (1951) 7.

¹²Iso. 4.140, Kienitz 85-6.

¹³Marriage with Apame: Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Plut. Artax. 27.7. See Lewis Sparta and Persia 8, 8 n. 25 on the sons of Pharnaces.

¹⁴Judeich 193, 193 n. 1, 194, 194-5 n.2 suggests they belong with Nepos Dat. 5.6-6.8. In none of these incidents do we have a chronologically fixed point. Extended discussion about the possible chronological placement of these anecdotes would not lead to any suggestion firmer than Judeich's.

¹⁵The Paphlagonians are also close enough to Sinope to be viewed as a threat or potential allies for the polis. Cf. Xen. Anab. 5.5.12.

¹⁶The archetype for Polyaeus, Cod. Florentinus (Laurentius Mediceus) LVI, 1 (13th A.D.), reads Seston, and was accepted by the Teubner editor Woelfflin in 1860, but not by Melber in 1970. Heringa in 1749 proposed the emendation Sesamon.

¹⁷Beloch² 3:2 p. 153.

¹⁸Datames' fall from power will be discussed in chapter 6.

CHAPTER V. THE HEKATOMNIDS OF CARIA

Throughout the fifth century there were two major centers of Persian power located in Anatolia on the far western frontier: The satrapies of Sparda and Dascylium. Their citadels were set inland, their governors were Persian noblemen who built estates, not cities. As the fourth century progressed a change could be noted on the far western frontier: a third major center of Achaemenid power was emerging, the satrapy of Caria, a region traditionally under the supervision of the satrap at Sparda. As at Dascylium, power resided in the hands of a single family whose members bore the title satrap. But they were not Persian nobles. They were political leaders, Carian in nationality, who had originally exercised power in a single city, inland Mylasa. They married within their own family, not with the heirs of powerful neighbors. Their satrapial citadel was not inland, it was on the coast. Greek, not Aramaic, or even native Carian, was the primary language of their documents, numismatic and epigraphic. They founded cities, and beautified them with Greek architecture and art. The Hekatomnids seemed an anomaly. But was that inimical to Sparda, Dascylium, to Susa?

Modern scholars have had serious difficulties in deciding how to characterize the Hekatomnids because they seem to be anomalous.¹ These Carians have consistently been pictured as dynasts who repeatedly shift--

even within the course of the career of a single politician--between stances which are friendly and which are inimical to the stability of Achaemenid control. Their political and economic successes are viewed as failures for Susa, their strengths as Susa's weaknesses.

But an examination of the Hekatomnids should go beyond that family's mere appearance of anomaly to a consideration of their activities as satraps. One should ask for them the same questions asked for those satraps who were Persian noblemen: What freedom of action did the Carians have? To what degree did the Shah interfere in their local affairs? Did the Hekatomnids act within the guidelines expected for satraps: to maintain order within their sphere and to pay tribute? Were the Hekatomnids ever viewed as hostile to Achaemenid control, either by neighboring satraps or Susa? After examining deeds and considering these questions, it is then possible and proper to ask how representative of Achaemenid control were the Hekatomnids. Were they anomalous or normal?

A few words on the nature and extent of this inquiry, and on terminology. Not all Hekatomnid activities will be extensively discussed within the confines of this chapter. Some, such as the campaigns against Cyprus or the deeds of Pixodaros, are considered here as a means of determining how one is to later perceive Hekatomnid action and policy in the larger context of the Achaemenid far west. Do we insert the Hekatomnid presence into a reconstruction as personalities and events displaying continuity or displaying discontinuity? Throughout this chapter I use both the titles "satrap" and "dynast" for the Hekatomnids. It is permissible here, for the Hekatomnids as a native family, indige-

nous to the sector they control--as Carians ruling Caria--are dynasts, native political leaders. They are similar to the earlier Syenneseis of Cilicia. In the eyes of Susa and in documents deriving from a chancellory source the Hekatomnids are satraps: they uphold the crown, they are the ones responsible for money and obedience.

Section I. Some Notes on Hekatomnid Family History

In the satrapy of Caria, as elsewhere in the Achaemenid empire, government was a family business. For most of the fourth century, indeed until the fall of the empire, Caria and its environs remained under the control of a single family, the Hekatomnids. In this initial section a fact must be established and emphasized about that family: the eventual absence of male heirs. Also, the misconception that Hekatomnid women enjoyed some special ancestral juridical position must be removed. Because Hekatomnid power was a personal power the fact and misconception are interrelated.

A series of passages from Strabo and Diodorus allowed earlier historians to construct the stemma for three generations of the family.² Inscriptions added a fourth.³ Their regnal years are established from evidence in Diodorus:⁴ Hyssaldomos was satrap before 390; his daughter was Aba, his son Hekatomnos (satrap until 377/6). Hekatomnos had five children: the eldest son, Maussollos (satrap: 377/6-353/2), married the older daughter, Artemisia (353/2-351/0); the middle son, Idrieus (351/0-344/3), married the younger daughter Ada (344/3-341/0). The youngest son, Pixodaros (341/0-335/4), married a Cappadocian woman, Aphneis. They had at least two daughters. The younger, Ada, married

Orontopates, an Iranian.

Of interest are the issues of the marriage between the children of Hekatomnos. There are no heirs from either the marriage of Maussollos to Artemisia or the marriage of Idrieus to Ada the elder.⁵ Only Pixodaros, who married outside his own family, seems to have fathered children, Ada the younger and at least one other child, a girl.⁶ Hellenistic claims and scholarly suggestions aside, there are, surprisingly, no attested Hekatomnid children other than those children of Pixodaros.⁷ The frequent contacts between the Hekatomnid family and poleis cult centers have made this family one of the frequently epigraphically attested ruling clans in Persian service. To date no inscriptions have emerged which contain what might be names of Hekatomnid children who predeceased their parents.

The lack of male, indeed of any, heirs from the marriages of four Hekatomnids necessitated something of a modification from the rules of primogeniture when satrapial power descended through the family members. Hyssaldomos, the first of the clan to be called satrap, handed power over to his only attested, and probably eldest, son, Hekatomnos. From Hekatomnos, the position of highest power fell to Maussollos, the eldest (Diod. 16.36.2), then to Idrieus, the next eldest (Diod. 16.42.6, 45.7), and finally to the youngest son of Hekatomnos, Pixodaros (Diod. 16.74.2). After the deaths of Maussollos and Idrieus, their widows, Artemisia and Ada (respectively), held highest power for brief periods (Str. 14.656-657; Diod. 16.36.2, 16.45.7, 16.74/2; Arr. Anab. 1.23.7-8).

Much has been made about the brief control of Caria and its environs by female members of the Hekatomnid clan, discussion fueled by the

brother-sister marriages and the erroneous statements by Arrian (Anab. 1.23.7) that such marriages were a nomos in Caria and that there existed in Asia a long-standing custom of women ruling men.⁸ Most recently, Bosworth⁹ has pointed out the inaccurate nature of the first generalization. Evidence seems to indicate that Hekatomnid women possessed no special juridical position. The largest body of government documents, Hekatomnid coinage, assigns no special position to the dynasts' Wives.¹⁰ All issues are struck with the names of the male dynasts only. The Hekatomnid mints seem to have continued to have produced coins of Maussollos and Idrieus following their deaths, while their widows ruled. Definitive proof of this awaits further numismatic study. In documents which derive from a chancellory source (SIG³ 167, SIG³ 170 for Maussollos; SIG² 573 for Idrieus; the trilingual Xanthos decree for Pixodaros) only the names of the male dynasts are used in the dating of the documents. The female Hekatomnids do not appear. Regrettably, there are no inscriptions extant from the periods when they ruled alone.

The prominence of the female Hekatomnids should be explained by political and personal reasons unique to the Hekatomnid family. The brother-sister marriages, whether or not in imitation of similar practices found in the Achaemenid ruling house at Susa, were almost certainly a result of Hekatomnos' own decision and were designed to solidify his family's control and ensure the continuation of that control. The occasional appearance of female Hekatomnids in inscriptions (e.g. Crampa Lambraunda II no. 40, SIG³ 168, Robert Sinuri no. 73)¹¹ may be explained by these women's positions as both wives of the dynasts and blood descendants of both Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos. In addition, the family seems to have been monogamous. The women's influence--and control--would

not be weakened or watered down by harem in-fighting.

The ability of both Artemisia and Ada to hold high power alone during the lifetimes of their younger brothers would be, then, the result of their own personal abilities, the popularity of their husbands, and a compliant attitude on the part of other family members.¹² Artemisia was the sole partner of the long-time satrap Maussollos (377/6-353/2). As I shall argue below, her policies represented a continuation of those begun by her husband. Her marriage to Maussollos and continuity in policy explain Artemisia's ability to obtain and hold sole authority. Her death, after two years of rule, followed too soon, it seems, for serious resentment to have built up among her brothers. Ada was less fortunate. Her husband, Idrieus, had ruled considerably less time than Maussollos and her brother Pixodaros grew tired of waiting for high power. He forced her from power into "retirement" (Str. 14.656-657, Diod. 16.74.2, Arr. Anab. 1.23.7). Regrettably, there is no evidence by which to judge Ada's activities as sole dynast for none are attested. But neither is royal hostility to rule by a woman.

Brother-sister marriages had the salutary effect of consolidating Hekatomnid control. However, the absence of living Hekatomnid children, particularly of males, would eventually have a most deleterious effect on Hekatomnid control. Control by blood descendants of Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos over Caria and its environs was assured only through the lifetime of the youngest son, Pixodaros. One may appreciate how the Hekatomnids were running out of time by attempting to work out something of the personal history of the dynasts.

It is possible to suggest an approximate birth year for Pixodaros. Suda sv. Dexippos reports an incident in which both Maussollos and

Pixodaros were involved in military action against Carian recalcitrants during the lifetime of their father, who died, it seems, in 377 (the date arrived at from Diod. 16.36.2).¹³ The latest possible date for this incident would be 377. I would not assume Pixodaros to have been younger than 10 at the time, for he is active in a military context. He would have been born, then, about 387, and would have been about 46 when he began to rule as sole dynast in 341/0. But this is an estimate using extremely conservative figures. A more reasonable, and perhaps the latest, chronologically, context for this incident would be after 390, in the aftermath of the campaign against Euagoras of Cyprus (see Section III, below). Again, taking 10 as an approximate minimum age for Pixodaros, we find that when he becomes satrap in 341/0 he is in his late fifties, if not already in his sixties. Again, one of the bases for this computation, the age 10, is still quite conservative. When Pixodaros holds sold power he is approaching old age. We should be very mindful of that fact when considering those steps he took to solidify his own power.

To sum up: The Hekatomnid family controlled Caria and its environs for most of the fourth century. Hekatomnos, it seems, attempted to solidify his family's control by causing his children to marry each other, although he may not have been the first to do so. Brother-sister marriages, monogamy, and blood descent kept highest power within Hekatomnid hands, whether male or female. Personal abilities, too, played their role: political competence preserved and nurtured power. Dynastic strife was a spectre which came only with the onset of old age.

Section II. Were the Hekatomnids Ever Inimical to Achaemenid Control?

It is standard in modern scholarship to speak about the "separatist ambitions" of the Hekatomnids,¹⁴ to interpret the dynasts' actions as somehow inimical to the crown, and to reconstruct tense and often openly hostile relations between Caria and the Shah. The foundation of such interpretations and reconstructions are a series of passages in the ancient sources which bring against the dynasts charges of secret and open rebellion. Before an examination of Hekatomnid activities is possible it is necessary to consider these passages, their context (if any exists), and their authors, and, if possible, to determine their accuracy. Some of these passages will require additional examination in later sections because they are the heart of elaborate speculations as to the true feelings of the heirs of Hyssaldomos.

A. Hekatomnos

The first dynast against whom charges of disloyalty are made is Hekatomnos. Isocrates 4.162 (the Panegyricus) claims that in truth (tēi men alētheiai) Hekatomnos has long been dissatisfied with Persian control (aphestēken: even, "in revolt"), and will openly side with Greek forces whenever they wish. Attention should be paid to the words tēi men alētheiai: they suggest immediately that if someone were to look at Hekatomnos' policies in 380, the approximate date of Isocrates' speech, he would be unable to find any visible signs of disloyalty. The future tense of homologēsei bears this out: Hekatomnos has not yet agreed to do anything.

The context of Isocrates' statement is equally telling: his assessment of Hekatomnos comes in the midst of a long passage (4.160-167) describing a supposedly massive destabilization of the Achaemenid west, a passage designed to convince Greeks to move in unison against the Great King while the time is ripe (4.160). Even the satrapies of Sparda and Phrygia (which one?) are seething with discontent (4.163). Isocrates, then, presents his assessment of Hekatomnos in the midst of special pleading, "l'exageration d'un propagandiste", in the words of Paul Bernard, one of the few moderns who rightfully dismisses the orator's claims.¹⁵ Such claims and catalogues are common for Isocrates¹⁶ and represent the converse to his claims of Persian supremacy when he seeks to berate the Greeks for falling from their more glorious past (4.133-137, 7.79-81).

Some scholars believe they have found proof for Isocrates' charges: Diod. 15.2.3 claims that Hekatomnos was secretly (lathrai) assisting the rebel Euagoras by sending him money for his war effort.¹⁷ They would trace the roots of this treachery back to the initial Persian operations against the recalcitrant, thereby accounting for Isocrates' words that Hekatomnos had been a secret rebel for a long time.¹⁸ However, a secret activity in an ancient source is often no activity at all. Diodorus has transformed suspected action into real action. Euagoras' continued presence in Salamis is not to be interpreted as the result of Hekatomnid disloyalty. As suggested earlier, the initial campaign against Euagoras, commanded by Autophradates and Hekatomnos, may have ended with the Achaemenid commanders "coopting" Euagoras, receiving assurances that Euagoras would remain a compliant member of the native order. At no time

do we hear of any royal response to supposed treachery on the part of Hekatomnos during any of the campaigns against the Cypriote rebel. We shall see later that Artaxerxes III, too, can rely on the Hekatomnids to put down renewed Cypriote difficulties (Diod. 16.42.6).

Secret hatreds and secret treachery are not enough to label Hekatomnos as a man whose existence and policies are inimical to Achaemenid control. The charges made by Isocrates and Diodorus are to be dismissed.

B. Maussollos

Hekatomnos' eldest son, Maussollos, is a frequent target in both modern and ancient sources for charges of disloyalty and rebellion. It is commonly held that Maussollos spent part of his career as an open rebel, acting to destabilize and disrupt royal control during the "Great Satraps' Revolt", and that in spite of his shifting between the stances of "loyalist" and "rebel", he was punished for his misdeeds.¹⁹ I shall treat Maussollos' career during the 360's in greater detail later in this chapter. My interest here is examining those sources which raise charges of hostility between Caria and Susa. Do they compel one to believe that Maussollos ever acted against royal interest?

Anyone seeking to perceive tensions between the crown and satrap must contend with epigraphical evidence. A Mylasan decree from 367/6 (SIG³ 167, lines 1-16; cf. Tod II no. 138) reports the attitude of Artaxerxes II toward Maussollos and those raising charges against him. When the Carian emissary Arlissis spoke ill of his satrap at Susa the Shah listened to the "information" presented by the local man, judged

him a criminal, and ordered his execution. Artaxerxes II, even when told otherwise, believed Maussollos to be a man not inimical to Achaemenid control.²⁰

The starting point for any reconstruction which portrays a rebel Maussollos is the statement in Diodorus 15.90.3 that Maussollos was among the most noteworthy of the participants in what is commonly termed the "Great Satraps' Revolt", an incident Diodorus places in the year 362/1. There are difficulties with Diodorus' characterization. Most notably, nowhere at all in Diodorus' account of the disturbance does Maussollos appear. He is missing in a second (and more accurate, see below, next chapter) catalogue of fourth century rebels, that in Trogus Prol. X.²¹ Epigraphical evidence (SIG³ 167 lines 17-18) indicates that by the next year, 361/0, the Mylasans were dating their documents in Artaxerxes' regnal years while calling Maussollos satrap, a return to "loyalist" normalcy.

There is reason to suspect the overall validity of Diodorus 15.90.3 and hence the accuracy of the charge raised against Maussollos. I have already pointed to the erroneous characterizations of Ariobarzanes and Orontes in the passage. Diodorus 15.90, as a whole, portrays a massive destabilization in the Achaemenid far west and lumps together a number of disparate sectors, concealing under the guise of anti-royal activity a complex of local rivalries which may be only tangentially related to each other.²² The passage, ultimately derived from Ephorus (and more than likely compressed by Diodorus), is suspiciously reminiscent of the catalogues and claims of Persian weakness found in Isocrates. Diodorus 15.90.3 is hardly evidence by which to judge Maussollos' political sentiments; it is merely a claim which Diodorus does not substantiate.

Those who have persisted in accepting Diodorus' characterization as valid have attempted to find evidence that Maussollos was punished for his rebellious stance. The evidence seemingly is provided by Isocrates in his Philippus (5.103). It appears that one reason why Idrieus desires the dissolution of the Achaemenid empire is because that archē was one aikisamenēn men ton adelphon. The brother is taken by scholars to be Maussollos, and the maltreatment--or torture--has been assigned to the reign of Artaxerxes II--or, in more recent scholarship, to the reign of Artaxerxes III.²³ The words by themselves are at best a vague charge without a secure chronological context (at least before 346). The context of Isocrates' words should create a high degree of suspicion about the passage's veracity. It occurs in the midst of a catalogue of Persian weakness, this time designed to convince Philip of Macedon to move against the Great King (5.99-104). It is a companion piece to Isocrates 4.160-167 and equally propagandistic. As worded, Isocrates' statement is insufficient evidence for any deep-seated ill feelings between crown and satrap. I shall return to this passage in considering ill-feelings alluded between Susa and Idrieus.

Anecdotes concerning Maussollos' monetary affairs have been regarded as evidence for royal displeasure and Carian disloyalty. Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 10-17 reports a stratagem used by Maussollos to obtain money. He claims to the people of Mylasa that the Shah is planning to move against the city because it is unwallled. After collecting money to build a wall Maussollos keeps the funds, claiming that the time is not propitious for building a wall. Those who have believed the anecdote to have some veracity have found as a context for royal displeasure the time of the satraps' revolt, although a precise setting is elusive.²⁴ It is important

to note that in the anecdote royal displeasure never materializes, but is merely a pretext allowing Maussollos to exact funds. Nor are any rebellious activities of Mausollos reported in the anecdote. It is the king who is portrayed as the aggressor. Maussollos invokes the king's name for his own profit and the Mylasans do not seem intelligent enough to realize they are being tricked. The anecdote is not satisfactory evidence for true royal hostility. However, it does serve as an illustration for Theopompus' statement (FGrH 115 fr. 299) that Maussollos would refrain from nothing in gathering funds. Perhaps Maussollos was thought not to be beyond claiming a measure of royal hostility. The Shah was far-off, but other seemingly loyal officers in the far west (e.g. Datames) faced royal displeasure.

A second stratagem exists in two variants. One might suggest they had a single original.²⁵ In the first version, found in Polyaeus 7.23.1, Maussollos is a greedy man, desires to exact money from his friends, but is reluctant to do so openly. Hence a stratagem: he claims the Shah is depriving him of his arche and shames his friends into contributing lavishly to a collection of gifts which will be sent to the king to assuage him. Maussollos apparently keeps the gifts (Polyaeus only implies this). Note that in this first variant royal hostility is only a pretext. The king is made an aggressor but no hostile acts of Maussollos are reported.

The second version, in Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 4-10, provides something of a more realistic context for the anecdote. Maussollos receives a letter from the Shah asking for the tribute--one might infer that failure to pay would have serious consequences. But Maussollos is short of funds and moves to collect monies from the richest men in his land. The wealthy declare aloud the amount they will each pay, but end up in a sort of

competition and donate more than initially promised. In this second variant there is no true royal hostility towards Maussollos, only a reminder of his obligation, as satrap, to pay tribute.

Neither variant has a chronological context, nor is it certain whether these stories are to precede or follow the events narrated in Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 10-17.²⁶ Scholars commonly place both versions in the time of the satraps' revolt, where they may be seen as evidence of Maussollos buying the king's favor.

It is possible to combine both versions into a single story.²⁷ Maussollos is advised to pay his tribute (the letter in Aristotle); failure to do so can have serious consequences (removal from power, deprivation of one's arche, as in Polyaeus). The dynast gathers together money and gifts, and exacts similar goods from the wealthy, most likely landed Carian nobility. The tribute is sent off. Perhaps there is something left over for Maussollos. In this suggested reconstruction, from which I have removed some of the more ludicrous elements, royal hostility is expressed as a condition: if the tribute is not paid, then Maussollos may suffer. One can only speculate why Maussollos was late--if he was--with his tribute.²⁸ Even then overt hostility on the part of the crown is not the initial reaction.

A final note is required about Maussollos' penurious character. Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 299 (Harpocration and Suda, sv. Maussollos) reported that the dynast, for the sake of money, would refrain from nothing. The anecdotes discussed above do support this characterization, although they cannot be assigned to Theopompus with any certainty. Maussollos may have stood alone among his contemporaries in his invoking illusory royal hostility as a means for self-enrichment--at least in the mind of

the source for these anecdotes. It will be necessary to consider them again, for they are more valuable as information concerning Maussollos' own internal administration of Caria.

To sum up: those passages alleging disloyalty on the part of Maussollos and hostility on the part of the crown are unsatisfactory evidence for either attitude. The passages are vague or unsubstantiated charges and frivolous anecdotes without certain context. They must be weighed against the realities of SIG³ 167 (open royal support for Maussollos) and the many decades of unbroken Hekatomnid control.

C. The Extension of Hekatomnid Influence

Charges that the extension of Hekatomnid influence westward beyond the borders of Caria took place in a context of tension between crown and satrap are raised by Demosthenes alone, and then only when his aim to convince Athens to lend support to Rhodian exiles who are anti-Hekatomnid in outlook. Demosthenes' claims are contradicted by the attitudes both of the crown and the satrap at Sparda. Both express tacit, if not open support for the growth of the Hekatomnid sphere.²⁹

One should begin by noting Demosthenes' attitude toward Maussollos in the mid-350's. The speech against Timocrates (Dem. 24) was delivered at a time when Maussollos had played some role in successfully removing Athenian influence from a number of islands, Rhodes included (scholia to Dem. 24)³⁰ Maussollos, now a force whose existence was inimical to Athens, is portrayed as a loyal minion of the Great King.

The tenor is different in Demosthenes 15, delivered after Artemisia, continuing her husband's policies, effected a number of changes in person-

nei on Rhodes.³¹ The exiled party, immediately labelled as democrats, need assistance. Demosthenes will argue for this assistance. In making his appeal, he is forced to argue that Artemisia will make no hostile response to Athenian military action. His reason (Dem. 15.11-12, plus scholia) is supposed ill-feeling between Artemisia and the crown at the time when Artaxerxes III is campaigning in Egypt. Unlike her husband in Dem. 24., Artemisia is so independent of the Shah that Hekatomnid control is not viewed as Achaemenid control. If Artaxerxes succeeds in Egypt, Artemisia, motivated by concern for her own position, will appease the Shah by giving him Rhodes. Should Artaxerxes fail, Artemisia will prefer Athenian influence in Rhodes over the influence of the hostile Shah.

All this special pleading misrepresents political reality. The expansion of Hekatomnid influence is the expansion of Achaemenid influence. When a single family is in charge of a large sector, benefits accrue to the crown. He can deal with one dynast on matters of tribute and obedience. Artaxerxes can even be seen to be at an advantage in his Egyptian campaign because Artemisia and the Hekatomnid fleet were available to attend to problems elsewhere. There was no tension between Artemisia and Artaxerxes III; power remained in loyal Hekatomnid hands. Demosthenes' later fame and forceful rhetoric are no guarantee of his veracity in this earlier speech.

D. Idrieus

The standard position expressed by modern scholars, occasionally in extreme terms, holds that Idrieus, the middle son of Hekatomnos, was guilty

of separatist tendencies and carried on activities which were inimical to Susa's interests. This is a position based on the unsatisfactory evidence provided in anecdotes without chronological context and by the special pleading of orators.³²

The most damaging charges are provided by Isocrates in his Philippus (5.103-104), a passage I have already noted. Idrieus is presented as a most prosperous dynast, and who, because of that prosperity, must burn with even greater hatred for the crown. Isocrates alleges that Idrieus should, if he is not quite perverse (schetliōtatos), desire the destruction of Persian control because that control mistreated--or tortured?--his brother, has waged war against him, and is constantly plotting against him in hopes of obtaining his body and money. It is out of fear that Idrieus now fosters and supports Persian control and pays his tribute--a sizeable amount--each year. But as soon as Philip's troops land in Asia and Philip speaks promises of "freedom", Idrieus and the other satraps--apparently they, too, burn with resentment while they quake with fear--will join the cause and destroy Susa's control over the Achaemenid far west. Impressive oratory--but false charges.

If someone were to examine Idrieus' activities at the time Isocrates composed this speech, what would he see? Isocrates' own words provide the answer. The satrap Idrieus is acting most successfully and well within the guidelines set by the crown: he acts to support Achaemenid control, and maintains more than a semblance of internal order in his sphere and its environs and sends more than a semblance of tribute to Artaxerxes. Both Idrieus and the Shah are reaping the benefits of the policies and capital improvements initiated by Maussollos. Among Idrieus' earliest activities as satrap was the successful coordination of efforts which

result in the restoration to power in Cyprus of compliant elements of the native order (Diod. 16.42, 16.46.1-3). It is Isocrates who is schetliōtatos in claiming that Idrieus is anything but a loyal and able satrap (Diod. 16.42.6).

The context of Isocrates' characterization of the dynast is equally telling. The assessment comes in the midst of a long passage (5.99-104) describing the supposedly moribund state of Achaemenid influence and control in the far west, a passage beginning with a mocking attack on Artaxerxes III. Isocrates' words are designed to convince Philip of Macedon to move against the Great King. Philip will find no opposition (5.105). The passage is essentially the same as the catalogue of Persian woes which appears in the Panegyricus (4.160-167). In both a loyal man is made a secret rebel (Hekatomnos: 4.162; Idrieus: 5.103-104), in both the time is ripe for military action (4.160, 5.101-102), in both the satraps and satrapies await impetus from the west for revolt (4.163, 5.104). Only the recipients of Isocrates' appeals differ. Decades later Isocrates is using the same arguments and they are still invalid.³³

Scholars have sought to support Isocrates statements, including the unsubstantiated charge that the crown fought Idrieus, with two anecdotes for which there are no chronological contexts. The first is Androtion FGrH 324 fr. 72 (Arist. Rhet. 3.1406b 26), who reports that Idrieus, when released from bonds, was threatening. Suggestions for a context have usually centered around the period of the satraps' revolt and have involved a belief in hostility between Susa and Caria. Badian has stated that "there is little point in guessing"³⁴ about a context, but I would like to raise two additional possibilities for a context in which Idrieus could have been captured or discomfitted. During the reign of Maussollos

Idrieus had acted as a military commander in operations against Heraclea at Latmus (Polyaenus 7.23.2). Earlier, Hekatomnos had used at least Maussollos and Pixodaros in military operations (Suda sv. Dexippos). A possible context for Androtion's statement might be military operations carried out by Idrieus against local entities opposed to Hekatomnid control. SIG³ 167, detailing attempts on Maussollos, offers another possibility: plots aimed against Idrieus. Susa need not be implicated when suggesting--or guessing about--a context.

A second anecdote is found in Plutarch Agesilaus 13 (cf. Mor. 191b, 209e, 807f) and has what might be called a moral, rather than a chronological, context, for it demonstrates that justice sometimes must take second place to friendship. Agesilaus writes to the Carian Hidrieus, requesting that he release Nicias, a friend of the Spartan. When Hidrieus is identified with the dynast Idrieus, the anecdote is often placed in the 360's when Agesilaus was in Anatolia (cf. Xen. Ages. 2.26-27).³⁵ That Agesilaus asks a favor of Hidrieus/Idrieus need indicate nothing about the future satrap's attitudes toward the crown, but does provide evidence of the Persians' ability to look beyond immediate political differences and deal politely with foreign nobility, part of the Achaemenid noble ethos of rule, and a personal counterpart to the more general coopting of recalcitrants. Agesilaus' own career elucidates this ethos: he can be treated with respect by Pharnabazos (Xen. Hell. 4.1.29-40, Ages. 3.5) and, following his withdrawal from Anatolia in the 390's, receives an offer of friendship from Artaxerxes II (Plut. Ages. 23, Xen. Ages. 8.3, Plut. Mor. 213 d-e, Aelian VH 10.20). In sum, Agesilaus might well expect (H)Idrieus the Carian to share in that ethos. But there is no evidence to substantiate claims that Idrieus and Artaxerxes II or III

enjoyed anything but favorable relations.

E. Ada the Elder, Pixodaros

There is only one passage which could be taken to imply a less than loyal stance on the part of Ada, widow of Idrieus. Strabo 14.657 reports that after deposing Ada, Pixodaros turned toward Persia (persisas). This might imply that Ada was less loyal than Pixodaros, but there is nothing which could substantiate this interpretation.³⁶

Although no source explicitly condemns Pixodaros as disloyal, and Strabo might imply the exact opposite, scholars, apparently without exception, have made the satrap a renegade.³⁷ This assessment is grounded in the interpretation of three pieces of evidence which are best discussed in the last section: the minting of gold coins, the date of the trilingual decree from Xanthos, and contact with Philip of Macedon in 337 BC.³⁸ If one places the decree in 358, the proposed marriage with the Argead house before the marriage of Ada the younger to Orontopates, and then accepts the unsubstantiated modern claim that locally struck gold coinage is a sign of rebellion, then one may argue that Pixodaros repeatedly turned against his own family and the crown over a twenty year period.³⁹ Later in this chapter I shall suggest alternative interpretations and rehabilitate the satrap.

To conclude: the evidence alleging stormy relations between the Hekatomnids and Susa is most unsatisfactory and, at times, openly deceptive. Any interpretation of the Hekatomnid dynasts which has as its theme separatist tendencies which materialize in frequent and repeated disloyalty relies on grandiose and unsubstantiated claims of Achaemenid weakness, on anecdotes without contexts, and on special pleading made by

sources to whom veracity is often a stranger.

Section III. How Did the Hekatomnids Rise to Prominence in Caria?

The Careers of Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos.

How did the Hekatomnids rise to such prominence in Caria, a sector traditionally the home of many lesser, local political entities and, when stable, under the influence of the powerful satrap at Sparda to the north?⁴⁰ In our literary sources Hekatomnid power emerges full grown, and seemingly unchallenged, in 391/0, at the outset of the first campaign against Euagoras. I shall try to make suggestions about those incidents and attitudes which may have contributed to the family's initial success. But for these suggestions to seem reasonable it is first necessary to examine the literary and epigraphic evidence for the careers of the first two Hekatomnid dynasts, or rather satraps, of Caria, Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos.

A. Hyssaldomos

Hyssaldomos' existence is attested only in inscriptions, and in most of these he is identified only as father of Hekatomnos.⁴¹ One inscription, however, does provide a minimum of information about his political career and the extent of his power. Unfortunately, that inscription is most problematic.⁴²

Louis Robert has presented and commented upon a now lost inscription found at Mylasa, the Hekatomnid hometown (Str. 14.659). The inscription is extant now only as a transcription made by Kondoleon. The first two lines provide fragments of what seem to be a dating sequence of the type familiar from SIG³ 167: Artax[erxes is king], [Hyss]aldomos is sat[rap]

(exaithr . . .). The precise date of the inscription is unknown. The fragment goes on to mention Carian ethnic groups, and a -ōmou of Aphrodite (?).

With this fragment Robert associated another fragmentary inscription, found at Tralles, which records envoys (presbeis) from different Carian ethnic groups. The fourth century letter forms of this inscription and its content caused Robert to believe it was another fragment of the decree published by Kondoleon.⁴³

What observations can be made about the title satrap in the first fragment? Very little is known about the application of the title satrap to officials of non-Persian extraction. Virtually all the evidence concerns the Hekatomnids themselves. The careers of Zenis and Mania (Xen. Hell. 3.1.10-12) suggest that a high officer of Persian nationality, an officer with whom one commonly associates the title satrap, could label an indigenous, non-Persian, lesser officer a satrap. Enough of the Mylasan fragment survives to suggest that the dating sequence should be grouped with other extant examples and that satrap is a title granted by Susa, i.e. that the crown, here Artaxerxes II, regards Hyssaldomos as responsible for internal security in his sector and for the forwarding of tribute drawn from that sector.⁴⁴

What, then, is Hyssaldomos' sector? At the very least it is Mylasa and its environs. If Robert's suggestion about the Tralles fragment is correct we may extend that sector to include the regions around the future Hellenistic city of Stratonicea and coastal sectors in the Rhodian Perea.⁴⁵ All this is quite tentative, and one should not at all be sanguine about the size of Hyssaldomos' sphere based on this evidence.

His power is to be regarded as definitely secondary to the power of his northern neighbor, the satrap at Sparda.

B. Hekatomnos

With Hekatomnos we are on firmer ground. He was satrap in Caria⁴⁶ by 391/0, when he and Autophradates were charged with restoring Euagoras to a compliant stance. The fact that Hyssaldomos had been a man of some power in Caria explains Artaxerxes' choice of personnel for the expedition. Hekatomnos is a loyal local man, and probably would have acquired some political and military expertise while his father was satrap. To Artaxerxes accrue the benefits of continuity in personnel in the far west.

Little of certainty is known about Hekatomnos' Cypriote adventures, although he should be exonerated of charges of incompetence and disloyalty. From Diodorus' somewhat confused account of preparations (Diod. 14.98.4) it appears that Hekatomnos could be depended upon to recruit forces from the interior.⁴⁷ Based on information provided by Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103, which describes operations at Cyprus, it seems that the dynast, in spite of his inland hometown, possessed influence on the coast to warrant his being named to command the naval elements of the Persian attack force. Such influence over the coast may have had its beginnings in Hyssaldomos' tenure as satrap (recall that the Tralles fragment gives the names of coastal peoples). The result of the campaign is a matter for speculation (see above).

Hekatomnos' position in relation to the Greeks would have improved after Tiribazos spoke the King's Peace. All the Greeks were commanded to be compliant members of the native order. It seems that Hekatomnos did face problems with recalcitrants among the Carians themselves. In the

Suda (sv. Dexippos) is a reference to a war waged by Hekatomnos against the Carians (Karas). Some have attempted to emend the passage to read the Coans⁴⁸ because Maussollos was known to have interfered in their affairs later. The emendation is not necessary. A context may be suggested for strife between the Carian dynast (and satrap) and his subjects. In my discussion of Datames I called attention to a danger inherent in the recruitment of Achaemenid armies and in the structure of Achaemenid campaigns. In these expeditions local political leaders leave their home sectors and take with them troops drawn from those sectors. Such troops are commanded by these local leaders and their loyal subordinates. Hence a given region from which troops are drawn is partially "denuded" of loyalists. The absence of Hekatomnos and his supporters during the Cypriote campaign may have given impetus to his family's rivals (or supporters, left behind, but whose self-interest proved greater than loyalty to an absent leader) to consolidate their power, thereby necessitating military moves by Hekatomnos upon his return. I would prefer to regard the enemy Kares as local lords (fifth century Caria is filled with them; Hdt. 5.118, 7.98-99) rather than as a political party centering around a koinon whose power was nearly eclipsed by the Hekatomnids.⁴⁹ The existence of such a koinon, as I shall argue below in section IV, is illusory. One should note that in the course of military operations both Maussollos and Pixodaros were wounded. The involvement of the third generation of Hekatomnids in affairs of state suggest that it is not unreasonable to assume that Hekatomnos took some role in administration whilst his father was satrap.

C. Suggestions About the Hekatomnid Rise

Having examined the evidence for the activities of Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos, and the suppositions which can be made on the basis of that evidence, I can begin to make some suggestions about the family's rise to prominence.

There are, unfortunately, few fixed points in early Hekatomnid history. Hekatomnos is known to have been in charge of Caria by 391/0. Hyssaldomos preceeded him, and was recognized as satrap of Caria, i.e. Susa did not see the need to send down to the coast someone of Persian extraction to hold the sector Hyssaldomos controlled. It is common to suggest that Hekatomnid control begins in 396/5, following the death of Tissaphernes and some sort of administrative reorganization carried out at that time which involved the creation of an independent satrapy of Caria.⁵⁰ Hyssaldomos appears as satrap, his power full grown.

I believe that a number of events had a bearing on the gradual rise of Hyssaldomos and his family: the destabilizing activities of the rebel Amorges, the revolt of Cyrus,⁵¹ the operations of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos against Dercylidas, and finally, the death of Tissaphernes. The fate of the Hekatomnid family may well have been closely tied to the stance they took in each event and to their relations with the long influential Tissaphernes. He owned land in Caria, although it is uncertain where his estates were and when he acquired them.⁵²

The headquarters of the rebel Amorges was at Iasus (Thucyd. 8.28, 29, 54.3), just southwest of Mylasa. Hyssaldomos may have made his first major appearance as a compliant member of the native order, assisting Tissaphernes in activities designed to destroy Amorges, and so earning Tissaphernes' favor.⁵³ Good relations may have continued

throughout the difficult period when Cyrus' baneful influence had eclipsed Tissaphernes' in Sparda, but apparently not Caria.⁵⁴ It would be reasonable for Hyssaldomos, and perhaps even Hekatomnos, to have participated in operations against Dercylidas (Xen. Hell. 3.2.14-15) within Caria.

I am suggesting--or, if one prefers, speculating--that Hyssaldomos' rise to power was not meteoric, but that over a period of time he gradually reached a position in which he was known as a loyal local lord and in which he was secure enough to ride out the effects of Tissaphernes' liquidation, regardless of his own juridical position at that time in the eyes of Susa. We do not know when Hyssaldomos began to be styled satrap. But Artaxerxes would have to have had a reason to look upon Hyssaldomos as a pre-eminent force within Caria during the 390's and a reason to allow his family to continue to be prominent, and to undertake important tasks in adjoining sectors. The choice of Hekatomnos as nauarch against Euagoras should be the legacy of Hyssaldomos' success.

Section IV. The Hekatomnid Administration of Caria

As representatives of the Persian crown, the Hekatomnids, although native born in the sphere which they controlled, were expected, as were those satraps of Persian extraction, to maintain order and forward tribute. In some modern reconstructions, the Hekatomnids undertake these tasks in a tense atmosphere in which the dynasts must jockey with a seemingly powerful and recalcitrant group representing Carian interests who do not approve of the Hekatomnid rise to power. In addition, the capital improvements which the Hekatomnids made in their sphere are perceived by moderns as the foundation for a future independent stance

by Caria and inimical to royal control. It was argued earlier that charges of disloyalty on the part of the Hekatomnids toward the crown were based on insufficient and unsatisfactory evidence. One source, Isocrates, virtually admits that Idrieus was a model satrap. A reexamination of Hekatomnid administration in Caria must focus on two sets of relationships: relations between dynast and subject, and between dynast and crown. What sorts of local groups were permitted political power under Hekatomnid control? Were they ever strong enough to rival Hekatomnid control? Were the various aspects of Hekatomnid administration (capital improvements, coinage, tribute collection) undertaken in such a way as to cause or reveal internal opposition to Hekatomnid control or to destabilize ultimate royal control over Caria and its satraps? In short, were the Hekatomnids unwilling or unable at any time to act within the guidelines established for satraps?

A. Local Groups with Political Power

Before examining the nature of internal opposition to the Hekatomnids in order to determine whether such opposition was prompted by personal hatreds or political programs, it is necessary to one to consider the nature(s) of the political organizations which existed in Caria during the fourth century. The evidence for such organizations is almost all epigraphic in nature.

Three local organizations are attested during the time of Maussollos. The Hekatomnid hometown, Mylasa, had a civic government, attested in a series of three decrees, SIG³ 167. The Mylasans date their decrees by the regnal years of their Shah and name their satrap. They have an ekklesia and three phylai (lines 3-4, 19-20, 38, 43-44). The existence

of these civic organs seems implied in Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 4-17, when Maussollos is described as exekklēsiasas the Mylasans on a matter of civil defense.⁵⁵

At Iasus we learn of a full complement of civic officials from SIG³ 169. The people of Iasus are organized into a demos, and possess a boule. There are numerous civic magistrates (e.g. archontes, stephanophoroi). These officials are active, in this particular decree, in exiling people, seizing their property and selling it off. The decree has a local date, Shah and satrap are not mentioned.⁵⁶

SIG³ 311 of Hellenistic date, but in it a group known as the Koaren-deis refer to a decision they made about granting ateleia along with Maussollos.⁵⁷ The date in the prescript is the Hellenistic equivalent of the date found in SIG³ 167, the Macedonian king and the Macedonian satrap are named.

During the time of Idrieus we learn of a civic government at Tralles. SIG² 573 reports that the Traldeis made a decision the right of asylum at a local temple. The date of the decree is given in the Shah's regnal years and mentions the satrap of Caria, Idrieus.⁵⁸ At the sanctuary of Sinuri near Nylasa inscriptions mentioning Idrieus reveal the existence of a governing body for the temple, a syngeneia which possesses an ekklesia (Robert Sinuri no. 73, line 3) and which can make grants of ateleia (Robert Sinuri nos. 73 and 75).⁵⁹

Finally, we learn from another decree of Hellenistic date, Crampa Labraunda II no. 42 (esp. line 9), that when Pixodaros was satrap a group known as the Plataseis granted honors and tax exemption--but only from "city taxes", not royal levies--to a Dion of Cos.⁶⁰

After this recital of what is actually a very scanty record (e.g. no information on Halicarnassus), it is possible to make some observations on the nature of these groups which possess some measure of political power. First, they are purely local and of great variety. There was seemingly no attempt by the Hekatomnids to impose any uniformity.⁶¹ The internal structure and personnel at Iasus seem quite different from the syngeneia for the sanctuary of Sinuri and from the smaller tribal organizations like the Koarendeis. Mylasa uses Greek terms for its civic organs--the appearance, but perhaps not the content of Greek polis structure.

Secondly, these different groups seem involved only with internal affairs. Mylasa and Iasus are concerned with seizing and selling property. Granting ateleia is a common concern. Internal administrative affairs are dealt with at the sanctuary of Sinuri and among the Traldeis. The honors granted to Maussollos at Mylasa are a recognition of the superior power of the Hekatomnid family. It is very difficult on the basis of this evidence to see how these local organs could rival successfully a competent satrap.

In allowing such a variety of local groups to exist the Hekatomnids are only following the tolerant lead of their superior, the Great King. There is no benefit in suppressing variety and effecting uniformity. Whatever recalcitrant elements may exist can be dealt with easily by effecting through cooptation, exile, or execution, changes in personnel, rather than changes in structure. Carian tribal leaders and Greek political bosses alike would be tolerated if compliant.

The realities of power suggest that tolerance was the result of secure Hekatomnid control.⁶² The earliest datable piece of evidence

among those cited above is in SIG³ 167, the first decree, dated 367/6, nearly thirty years after Hyssaldomos seems to have been invested with the title of satrap. The appearance of the Shah and/or satrap in the dating formula of decrees indicate that they sit above and can, if they wish, supervise local activities. Aristotle's anecdote seems to imply that Maussollos can set local government into action if he wishes. The Hekatomnids, when mentioned in local decrees, are in a position of strength; they must be assuaged. In matters of "foreign policy" it is they, not the local groups, who effect and carry out activities, as in the granting of proxeny to the Knossians (Crampa Labraunda II no. 40) and the oath imposed on the people of Phaselis (TAM 2:3 no. 1183). The Aramaic text of the Xanthos decree (discussed in section VII) reveals that it is the satrap who can exercise a high degree of control should he wish and punish any offenders. The same should be true in Caria.

B. Was There a Koinon of the Carians?

One of the more puzzling aspects of modern scholarship on the Hekatomnids has been the belief that there existed some form of koinon of the Carians which predated Hekatomnid control, was more broadly based, geographically, than the local tribal groups, and served as a focal point for Carian dissidents who sought to destabilize Hekatomnid control.⁶³ While it might be possible to make the supposition that a koinon of some form existed, it is impossible to endow that koinon with the strength to challenge the satrap.

Judeich⁶⁴ had believed there was some sort of Carian Bundesstaat. He inferred its existence from Herodotus 5.117-121 and Strabo 14.660.

The Herodotean evidence relates events during the Ionian revolt in the early fifth century. It does mention boulai allai te pollai, but these are wartime measures and need not reflect the political realities of peacetime. Note that the two Carian political figures who emerge as prominent are dynasts: Pixodaros of Cindya (Hdt. 5.118.3), important enough to have married the daughter of the Syennesis of Cilicia, and Heracleides of Mylasa (Hdt. 5.121, cf. 5.37), scion of the political boss Ibanollis. Herodotus 5.37, a list of those detained by the newly rebellious Aristagoras, is clear evidence that in Caria city bosses and minor dynasts were the norm. Herodotus' evidence is insufficient to allow the inference of the existence of a Bundesstaat in fourth century Caria.

Strabo, too, is insufficient: The passage Judeich cited in an account of the systema tōn Chrysaoreōn, an organization of Hellenistic date centering only around the temple of Zeus Chrysaoreus near the Hellenistic city of Stratonicea. There is no evidence for the systema's existence before Hellenistic times.⁶⁵ And it is not a common council of the Carians (cf Crampa Labraunda I no. 5, lines 15-16).

Robert was the next to grapple with the issue of a Carian koinon. He believed there to be one of Hekatomnid date which had its center near Mylasa. But his evidence seems to be confined to SIG³ 167, line 5, a statement that the envoy Arlissis was dispatched to the Shah hypo Karōn.⁶⁶ SIG³ 167 contains decrees made by the civic government of Mylasa. The inclusive term Carians seems to have no juridical value, but perhaps serves the purpose of making Arlissis seem a traitor to an entire people. The phrase hypo Karōn is not repeated in the other decrees of SIG³ 167 and I find it in no other inscriptions of Hekatomnid date. In

SIG³ 167 all activities undertaken to punish the enemies of Maussollos are undertaken by the civic government of Mylasa, not by a koinon. The organs of civic government mentioned in the decrees are those of the Mylasans.⁶⁷

Robert had associated with SIG³ 167 the two fragmentary inscriptions discussed in connection with Hyssaldomos. If one accepts Robert's hypothesis that these two fragmentary inscriptions are actually parts of one inscription then one has a decree mentioning a number of Carian ethnic groups, under the tutelage of their satrap, sending presbeis. One may at that point postulate that these groups are organized into some form of larger group, i.e. some form of koinon.⁶⁸ But it is impossible to see how such a group could rival the satrap in power.⁶⁹ The koinon of the Carians which appears in modern scholarship is an illusion. When we turn to discuss the nature of internal opposition to the Hekatomnids we should leave aside any speculations about a koinon serving as focal point for the opposition.

C. Internal Opposition to the Hekatomnids

Our survey of the evidence for indigenous Carian political organizations has revealed that such groups were purely local and not united, seemingly incapable of offering serious opposition to the satraps' power. How is one to account for those instances in which internal opposition against the Hekatomnids emerges? What and who lay behind such opposition? Because there was no powerful broad-based koinon, because there is no sufficient evidence to permit us to talk about royal hostility toward the Hekatomnids, these queries are more impressive than the replies.

The earliest recorded instance of Carian opposition, a failure, comes in Suda sv. Dexippos, discussed above. The instigators may have been potential rivals to Hekatomnos. The hands of the Shah or the satrap at Sparda are not to be seen.

The remaining documented cases of opposition to the Hekatomnids are plots directed against Maussollos. SIG³ 167 reports three such incidents. The first, in 367/6, concerns an envoy, Arlissis son of Oussollos, who violated his orders and plotted against Maussollos at Susa, i.e. he probably slandered Maussollos before Artaxerxes II. Artaxerxes executed the envoy. Arlissis was sent on his mission by the Carians. Most moderns have posited some form of koinon and made it the repository of dissidents. Evidence for such a koinon does not exist. It is not possible to offer a fully satisfactory identification of the "Carians" who sent Arlissis. The absence of a definite article before Karōn points away from any official group, but the term Karōn could include the Mylasans and Maussollos himself. How, then, does one explain Arlissis' actions?

Personal hatred or self interest (a desire to exploit distance from Caria and presence before the king for one's own benefit) seem the best motivation. It is difficult to believe that the Mylasans, or Maussollos himself, would arrange to send as envoy a noted dissident. Arlissis is not the leader of an opposition party or an envoy representing recalcitrants, but a traitor.⁷⁰ The inscription mentions no accomplices, a situation unlike the next two incidents in SIG³ 167 and the "plot" in SIG³ 169. One cannot pin down any specific political difference between Arlissis and Maussollos.

The second incident reported in the Mylasan inscription (lines 17-31),

in 361/0, regards a religious violation which touched Maussollos closely. Two sons of Peldemos, their names are not given, insulted a statue of Maussollos' father, Hekatomnos. As punishment the Mylasan civic government seized and sold the property of the guilty. The decree says nothing about the violators being executed or even exiled. One need not see serious political overtones in this incident and it should not be perceived as connected to Arlissis' treachery. The expression "sons of Peldemos" does not conceal an opposition party, but is probably a sign of the criminals' lack of notoriety.⁷¹ Personal hatred and unknown political rivalry seem likely motives for the vandalism. One can only speculate as to whether the criminals' father, Peldemos, had once run afoul of the now deceased Hekatomnos.

The third incident is the most serious for Maussollos himself (lines 32-50, 355/4): an assassination attempt at the festival of Zeus at Labraunda. The would-be killer, Manitas, was himself killed on the spot. An investigation followed. Thyssos, son of Syskos, was implicated. The criminals' property was seized, given to Maussollos, and sold off by the satrap. Surprisingly, we do not know whether Thyssos was executed or exiled. Specific motives for the act are not affected. But one might suggest, cynically, that Maussollos found this an opportune time to rid himself of Thyssos, or at least get his property.⁷²

SIG³ 167 is a remarkable inscription. It is not only testimony by the Mylasans of their love for their old satrap (the inscription as we now have it probably would have been set up as a memorial after his death), but is one of the few records we possess concerning "peacetime" internal opposition to dynasts and satraps. The threats directed against

Maussollos--slander, vandalism, attempted assassination--are by no means uncommon.⁷³ There were always disgruntled politicians. Only the epigraphical record is unique.

One final instance of internal opposition to Maussollos may be reported, but one less personal than the events just recounted. SIG³ 169, an inscription from Iasus,⁷⁴ describes the aftermath of plots against Maussollos and the polis of the Iaseis, i.e. a stasis between political groups. The winning group identifies itself with the interests of Maussollos and sells off the property of the losers, condemning them and their descendents to perpetual exile.⁷⁵ As a context for this stasis I suggest the late 360's when Mausollos' attention was drawn elsewhere, to the deleterious effects of troubles in Achaemenid far west (see section VI, below).

What conclusions may be drawn about opposition within Caria to the Hekatomnids? The opposition consists, with the exception of the incident in the Suda, of unsuccessful "plots" directed against Maussollos. All are of a purely local nature--no outside force is seen to foment them. When an outside force does appear, i.e. Artaxerxes II, that force operates on behalf of the satrap. When Carians are involved the motivations seem personal: political organizations, such as the illusory koinon, and detailed political programs do not enter the picture. In a Greek polis opposition emerges in the form of a stasis in which one group of politicians claims to be pro-Hekatomnid. There is little difference between the stasis at Iasus and those in cities elsewhere on the coast of Anatolia, during which one party would call for assistance from local Persian authorities. The unbroken succession of Hekatomnids indicates

the obvious: at no point was dissatisfaction with their control powerful enough to destabilize Caria and render the Hekatomnids unable to maintain order in their sphere and send tribute to Susa. Rather, Hekatomnid control was a time of growth and development for Caria.

D. Capital Development

This heading covers a number of topics: the synoikism of smaller settlements, the care and attention paid to temples, the minting of coins, and the dispatch of tribute. Although the evidence causes Mausso-llos again to appear preeminent, the activities enumerated above display continuity between the reigns of the Hekatomnids and represent a steady upward curve in Hekatomnid--and Achaemenid--power and prosperity.

Although the ancient sources never state it directly, moderns have often considered the capital improvements to the satrapy's cities and land as indicative of Hekatomnid rebelliousness and inimical to Achaemenid control. But improvements and loyalty need not be mutually exclusive. The development of the satrapy is not anti-Achaemenid, unless the activity of development and its results are directed against the crown or its representatives. From Hekatomnid activities benefits accrued to the crown: increased opportunities for trade in the far west, development of the Carian fleet, and the assurance of a steady, if not increasing, supply of tribute.

Achaemenid Persian beliefs held that it was the responsibility of political officials to ensure the peace and protection of one's land and people, and hence, to take necessary steps to guarantee the fertility and productive abilities of one's sphere. In the satrapies of Sparda

and Dascylium one may note the implantation of estates with paradeisoi, of garrisons and military colonies, even of Persian cults to achieve this aim.⁷⁶ The Hekatomnids undertook parallel activities in their own sphere.⁷⁷ They were the proponents of urban development, and the coast formed their focus of attention.

Under Maussollos, the satrapial capital was moved from inland Mylasa to Halicarnassus, now enlarged by synoikism with smaller settlements. Some nearby villages kept their old names but were rebuilt. New harbor facilities were added.⁷⁸ Maussollos' activity is a significant one for the Persian far west: the two principal satrapies which abutted on the Greek sphere had their capitals, Dascylium and Sparda, set inland.⁷⁹ By shifting the seat of his power to the coast Maussollos facilitated his ability to reach and strike out at potential recalcitrants sailing in from the further west. Halicarnassus served as both a valuable economic and military center (cf. Vitruvius 2.8.11, 13-14) which remained under direct satrapial control. Maussollos' development of Halicarnassus was complemented by the refoundation of Cos. Although a stasis seems to have accompanied or precipitated the transfer of the city, Bean and Cook seem on the mark in their assessment that the refoundation could not have been permitted if carried out by anti-Hekatomnid forces.⁸⁰

Concern for Carian religious centers formed part of Hekatomnid policy: the centers at Labraunda, Amyzon, and of Sinuri near Mylasa were the objects of Hekatomnid dedications and building programs. Most notable are the constructions carried out at Labraunda, which may be, in part, an expression of thanks by Maussollos for his escaping an attempt on his

life at the site. Zeus Labraundus himself was the most common reverse type on Hekatomnid coinage. The Hekatomnids were also able to make requests of temple authorities and authorize changes in temple procedure. It is difficult to speak about the precise political benefits which accrued to the Hekatomnids as a result of their concern for the sanctuaries. The dynasts would appear in a good light, at least, to the local inhabitants. They might also insure that the temple staff were their "friends."⁸¹ One should also note that the Hekatomnid concern for religious centers in their satrapy duplicates the concern displayed by the Shahs for religious centers throughout the entire empire.

Hekatomnid coinage is not a sign of satrapial rebelliousness, but of satrapial power. The coins themselves are syncretic political and economic documents with propagandistic value beyond the confines of Caria itself. The coinage is significant in the uniformity of its physical appearance and the regularity with which it appeared.⁸² The "satrapial coinages" one finds issued under the auspices of the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium and other western Achaemenid commanders are for the most part "campaign coinage," i.e. minted in connection with large scale military operations and used to pay troops. They are minted at irregular intervals, in mints within the sphere of military activity, and vary in obverse and reverse types. The obverse and reverse inscriptions can be either in Greek or Aramaic, and may bear the name of the satrap or military commander, or the word basileus, i.e. Shah. Hekatomnid coinage differs from these "campaign coinages" in many particulars.

The earliest issues of Hekatomnid coinage were minted under

Hekatomnos and should be taken as an index of the growth of Hekatomnid power. The obverse and reverse types are a combination of those which appear on the coinage of Greek mercantile cities (to assist circulation) and those of local significance (Zeus Labraundus).⁸³ The inscriptions are in Greek; this will be true of all Hekatomnid coinage.

Beginning with the reign of Maussollos the coinage was modified so that the most common of types on silver issues (there seem to be no satrapial bronzes) were "Apollo" on the obverse and Zeus Labraundus on the reverse.⁸⁴ The reverse inscription (always in Greek) bore the name of the satrap. Hekatomnid coinage maintained this appearance until the destruction of the satrapy by Alexander.

The choice of types displayed political and economic intelligence. The obverse was an adaptation from the Rhodian "Helios" and so assisted circulation. The reverse type, Zeus Labraundus, was a symbol unique to Caria, but also an equivalent of Ahura-Mazda and Zeus, the founts of kingship east and west. The uniformity in type and regularity of issue, combined with the satrap's name, guaranteed that the coinage would be a uniform and constant symbol of uniform and constant Hekatomnid power, political and economic. The rather Hellenized appearance of the coinage served a purpose beyond assisting in general circulation: Hellenization would be the means by which the satraps dominated the Hellenes.

The state of the work undertaken on Hekatomnid coinage allows me to make only a few observations on civic, i.e. non-satrapial, issues within the Hekatomnid sphere. In most cities of Caria there is a rather spotty record of minting. It is assumed by modern numismatists, in the arrangement of civic issues, that Hekatomnid control meant an end to civic

coinage.⁸⁵ As for those cities outside Caria proper, but within the Hekatomnid sphere (e.g. Rhodes, Cos), there seems to be no particular Hekatomnid influence. Local types continued to be struck, a parallel to the Hekatomnid tolerance of local, but compliant, institutions.⁸⁶

Economic prosperity in Hekatomnid Caria benefitted the crown, who received fruits of that prosperity in the form of tribute. Almost all our information concerning the payment of tribute is anecdotal, but it does suggest that the Hekatomnids possessed local freedom of action in raising tribute and that they sent it off with regularity. Theopompus' jibe (FGrH 115 fr. 299) that Maussollos would stop at nothing in raising money implies that he acquired quite a bit of it (cf. Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 4-10, and 1348a 18-34 for his like-minded subordinate, Kondalos). Another fragment of Theopompus (FGrH 115 fr. 113) which reports that phoros was assessed on the basis of city size lays open the possibility for reassessment and larger tribute payments in the wake of Carian prosperity.

Local initiative and royal flexibility seem built into tribute collection: Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 4-10 and Polyaeus 7.23.1 together suggest the satrap himself is responsible for collecting tribute, and that this tribute may consist of goods (expensive clothes, valuables) as well as bullion (gold, silver). Maussollos is seen here to pay some from his own pocket and assess the nobility for the rest.⁸⁷ Maussollos' subordinate Kondalos is able to display a similar flexibility in collecting what seem to be local taxes. Their existence are also indicated in Crampa Labraunda II no. 42, lines 15-17.⁸⁸

Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 28-34 is interesting because it suggests a "chain of command" and local freedom of action in the raising of money.

The anecdote concerns Kondalos, the Lycians, and what Kondalos claims to be a new royal decree designed to obtain hair for ornamental purposes. He is anxious to play a trick on the Lycians and so gain goods which he can sell for a profit. Kondalos claims that Maussollos, upon receiving word from Susa to send hair for prokomia, notified him to command the Lycians to cut off their elaborate hairstyles. But Kondalos decided to be flexible with the Lycians--they may pay this special impost to him with hair purchased from Greek settlements. That hair is what supposedly will be sent to Maussollos to forward to Susa in response to the royal command. Let us assume that the Lycians are not an extraordinarily dense group, and that Kondalos' trick works because it has the appearance of a real-life situation. If we assume this, then we may see an order coming down from Susa ("send hair for prokomia"), and interpretation of that order by the satrap which is sent down to his subordinate ("in this case, have the Lycians cut off their elaborate hairstyles"), and, finally, a further interpretation by the local official, made to carry out a cost-effective tax collection ("okay, you Lycians may 'pay' in hair purchased from Greek settlements").⁸⁹

It is reasonable to believe that the Hekatomnids paid their tribute on time: the incident in Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 4-10 implies that royal hostility for temporary nonpayment of tribute is off in the future. Maussollos does not seem an habitual offender. Isocrates indicates (5.104) regular yearly payment by the very prosperous Idrieus. There are no instances of any royal displeasure in reaction to non-payment. That argument from silence plus the evidence we do have would indicate that the Hekatomnids met their monetary obligations to the crown. It was the capital development of Caria and the absence of any serious internal

opposition which allowed them to do so.

A final note on tribute: one surprising aspect of the evidence is the total absence of any officials sent down from Susa or even labelled as royal officers whose duty is to attend to tribute collection and delivery. The local man (satrap or subordinate) seems in total control.

To sum up: At no time were the Hekatomnids unable or unwilling to act within the guidelines for satraps, i.e. maintaining a semblance of order and paying tribute. Their success in acting within these guidelines was due to generally amicable relations between satrap and subject, and satrap and Shah. The Hekatomnids permitted the continued existence of civic governments and local groups which exercised political powers. None of these were strong enough to pose a serious threat to Hekatomnid control. The existence of a Carian koinon, a group extending beyond a single community, is at best debatable. The Hekatomnids were the unifying force in Caria. Those recorded instances of opposition to the Hekatomnids--except for Hekatomnos' troubles--are limited in impact, and were the result of personal hatreds or stasis. All failed. None were ever serious enough to supplant the Hekatomnids. In none is it possible to discern the hands of any high authorities.

The generally amicable relations between satrap and subject allowed the Hekatomnids to develop their province, so enriching themselves and the crown. Tribute seems to have been paid regularly. No doubt increased prosperity meant some increase in tribute assessment. Money and obedience were required by the crown: Hekatomnid control supplied both.

Section V. Maussollos in the "Great Satraps' Revolt"

I have already alluded to the standard accounts of Maussollos' activities in the 360's: They assume tension between the satrap and the koinon of the Carians, regard capital developments as signs of rebelliousness. Maussollos is made to shift constantly between the stances of "loyalist" and "rebel" in order to reconcile SIG³ 167 (loyalist: 367/6, 361/0), Xenophon Agas. 2.26-27 (loyalist: 366-5), and Diodorus 15.90.3 (rebel: 362/1). The Xanthos decree has permitted further elaboration: Maussollos is removed from the post of satrap by 358, replaced by Pixodaros, and then reinstated. At the heart of modern interpretations are the beliefs that there existed a koinon, that capital developments signal rebellion, that Diodorus 15.90.3 and similar claims of hostility and tension between satrap and Susa are to be accepted. I have argued in previous sections that there existed no koinon (or any Carian group capable of supplanting the Hekatomnids), that capital development meant benefits to both satrap and crown, and that most passages alleging Hekatomnid disloyalty should be dismissed. The Xanthos decree will be discussed in section VII. It is to be noted here that the decree has nothing to do with the 360's or 350's.⁹⁰

Diodorus 15.90.3 has made the claim that Maussollos was among the most notable of the rebels. The claim is unsubstantiated in Diodorus' own account of hostilities. There is one source in which Maussollos' activities in the 360's are detailed: Xenophon Agasilaus 2.26-27, anecdotal information presented in an encomium for the Spartan king. A number of incidents are recorded: the presence of a Hekatomnid fleet

at Assus and Sestus, an earlier xenia between Maussollos and Agesilaus (accompanied with a dispatch of money to Sparta), and an opulent send-off for Agesilaus given by Maussollos. Only the first incident may be placed in a precise chronological context.

During the operations carried out by Autophradates of Sparda against the rebel Ariobarzanes of Dascylium in 366, Maussollos is present with a fleet of 100 ships. He is assisting Autophradates by directing the fleet against Assus in the Troad and Sestus in the Chersonnese, places seemingly within Ariobarzanes' sphere and under his control. Xenophon (Ages. 2.26) reports that Maussollos withdrew to Caria (oikade) after being convinced (peistheis) to do so by Agesilaus, who was acting as a diplomat. Comment is required on a number of items.

One should begin by noting that Maussollos here is not a rebel. He acts in concert with Autophradates against one is ostensibly destabilizing Persian control, Ariobarzanes. The tensions between Sparda and Dascylium which lead to this campaign will be discussed in the next chapter.⁹¹ The cooperation between Sparda and Caria is worthy of further attention here. This is not the first instance of cooperation between Autophradates and Carian dynasts. Before his appointment as satrap, Autophradates had worked with Hekatomnos, father of Maussollos, against Euagoras (Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103, with Autophradates erroneously called satrap). It is not unlikely that the future satraps met in the course of this campaign. Suda sv. Dexippos reports that Hekatomnos' sons Maussollos and Pixodaros were wounded in action against Carian recalcitrants. It is not unlikely that at least the eldest son, Maussollos, would have assisted his father in those earlier operations

against foreign rebels. Concert, not rivalry, will continue to mark relations between Maussollos and Autophradates after the operations against Ariobarzanes. For example, in Lycia the recalcitrant Pericles of Limyra was reduced both by men loyal to Autophradates and by Hekatomnid forces. Autophradates seems to have made no objection to the expansion of Hekatomnid influence at the expense of Pericles' influence-- and his own.⁹²

The Hekatomnid navy appears here as the instrument through which Maussollos can strike out at enemies of the Shah. The force operating in northern waters is supposedly 100 ships. Since it is unlikely that Maussollos would thoroughly denude his home sector in putting together this fleet, one should assume that the naval capacity of the satrap is larger than the number of Carian ships operating against Ariobarzanes.⁹³ Enough the coast should also have been in compliant hands for the fleet to move so far north, and this is likely because of Maussollos' friendship with Autophradates, through whose sphere the Hekatomnid fleet would have to move to reach the north.

The fleet seems to have been a military force of some significance as early as the 390's when Hekatomnos led the naval elements of the Persian forces while Autophradates was ostensibly in charge of land forces. We may be able to perceive a similar division in command in 366 BC: Maussollos is definitely in charge of the fleet (Xen. Ages. 2.26), while Autophradates commands the land forces. Xenophon claims Autophradates was afraid of Agesilaus while besieging Ariobarzanes in Assus and fled. Since Maussollos is operating against that site by sea, Autophradates would be on land. Hence there is a continuity in personnel and in the manner in which that personnel operate together.

In the previous section attention was called to modern perceptions that the transfer of the satrapial capital from Mylasa to Halicarnassus and the subsequent development of Halicarnassus were somehow inimical to Achaemenid control. In the operations against Ariobarzanes we see the first fruits for Susa from the transfer of the Carian satrapial seat to a coastal site and the development of harbor facilities there. Maussollos is able to command in Susa's interest a large fleet which possesses a safe home port. In the future, the Hekatomnid fleet will carry Hekatomnid and Persian influence into recalcitrant Miletus (Polyaenus 6.8), Rhodes (Vitruvius 8.2.14-15), and Lycia.

Why does Maussollos withdraw homeward after being convinced to so act by Agesilaus who is only an envoy? We should allow for a certain amount of misrepresentation on Xenophon's part when he writes about his hero, Agesilaus.⁹⁴ The withdrawal of both Maussollos and Autophradates from Assus should not be attributed to Agesilaus' persuasive tongue, past reputation, or supposed mercenaries in his service.⁹⁵ At this juncture Agesilaus is in the service of Ariobarzanes, as a coopted member of the compliant native order (compliant at least to Ariobarzanes). When he performs remarkable deeds as an envoy he performs them for Ariobarzanes: The withdrawal of Maussollos and Autophradates from Assus may have been part of a truce arranged while Agesilaus acted only as an intermediary.⁹⁶ As for Maussollos' withdrawal from Sestus, strategic considerations may provide a better explanation. Sestus is far from both Caria and Sparda and was under attack by the opportunist Kotys. That portion of the fleet operating around Sestus would not have been the main attack force. When Sestus was threatened by another force the

the Hekatomnid detachment might have taken that opportunity to withdraw to waters closer to friendly ports. Let someone else disrupt Ariobarzanes' interests.

To recapitulate my proposed reconstruction of events: A joint force under the command of Autophradates and Maussollos moves against the rebel Ariobarzanes. Autophradates operates on land, Maussollos on sea. Part of the fleet is detached and operates at Sestus,⁹⁷ but withdraws when Sestus comes under attack by Kotys. The particulars of the seigs of Assus are unknown. It seems to end with an agreement calling for the withdrawal of forces lead by Autophradates and Maussollos. In the negotiations Agesilaus acted as Ariobarzanes' emissary. This is the extent of Maussollos' attested military activities in the campaign against Ariobarzanes. In short, he fights the King's enemy.

Xenophon 2.27 reports a number of events which seem to take place at this time: Maussollos, because of previous friendship (xenia) with Agesilaus, contributed money to Sparta and gave Agesilaus an opulent send-off homeward (oikade). It is standard to interpret these activities as evidence for Maussollos' tendencies to act against the Shah as a rebel, and to use these activities to bridge the gap between Maussollos' "loyalist" stance in Xen. Ages. 2.26 and his rebel stance in Diodorus 15.90.3.⁹⁸ However, Diodorus is not proof enough of Maussollos' rebelliousness. Is there a possible alternative to Maussollos' activities, one which does not have him acting in a fashion inimical to Achaemenid control?

The earliest contact between Maussollos and Agesilaus was that leading to xenia, guest-friendship. What is the possible context for this contact? Does it imply disloyalty on Maussollos' part? Agesilaus had

campaigned in Anatolia during the 390's, but an opportunity for he and Maussollos to meet does not seem forthcoming from the evidence. Agesilaus never campaigned in Caria and we hear of no Carian troops, which could be lead by the future satrap, operating within the satrapy of Sparda in support of Tissaphernes and, later, Tithraustes.⁹⁹ Contact between Agesilaus and Hidrieus the Carian, an incident not recorded by Xenophon, is of no assistance in fixing a time for the xenia with Maussollos: this anecdote has only a moral context, and is itself placed by scholars in the 360's to facilitate an identification of Hidrieus with Idrieus, son of Hekatomnos. Xen. Ages. 2.26-27 is used as justification for that placement. One is left with assigning the xenia in general to the 360's because Agesilaus again appears in Asia in that decade. The contact between Hidrieus and Agesilaus does suggest, however, the way in which we regard the xenia; that, in turn, suggests a more precise context for the contact.

In my previous discussion of the Hidrieus incident I argued that ties of friendship between Idrieus and Agesilaus need not indicate any disloyalty to the crown on the future satrap's part. Rather, these ties highlight the ability and willingness of Persian nobility (or indigenous nobility in Persian service) to establish or attempt to establish relations of a polite nature with foreign nobility, even recalcitrant foreign nobility. A xenia between Agesilaus and Maussollos does not guarantee that Maussollos had rebellious tendencies. If we abandon the a priori assumption that contact with Agesilaus must mean disloyalty, another interpretation is possible, that Maussollos acts from a position of strength and in a way which is not inimical to Persian control.

After the imposition of the King's Peace all Greeks were theoretically cooperative and as such were not to undertake operations designed to weaken Persian control in Anatolia. The words of Artaxerxes did not preclude officials in Achaemenid service hiring Greeks along with their political leaders as mercenaries for operations intended to solidify Achaemenid control (e.g. operations against such perennial recalcitrants as the Pisidians or Mysians or against "rebels" such as Datames).¹⁰⁰ Local officers might hire out Greek mercenaries for their own purposes, as well, and hope that their activities would not be successfully represented to their superiors as inimical to ultimate royal interests. Maussollos' activities may be explained along similar lines. He is anxious to have Agesilaus--and Spartan troops--serve his interests, not Ariobarzanes'. The xenia could be perceived as a first step towards complete cooptation, which would greatly facilitate hiring Spartan troops. Agesilaus, too, would hope to show some gain. This is the sort of thinking which is behind the vague claim made by Archidamus in Isocrates 6.63 that dynasts in Asia were ready to lend support to Spartan interests. I would suggest that this attempt was made before Agesilaus crossed into Asia in the service of Ariobarzanes.¹⁰¹

What of the money given to Sparta and the opulent send-off for Agesilaus? These activities can be read in the same light, attempts to win over Agesilaus or, less politely, to bribe him--a friendly attempt at cooption. A context for these activities would elucidate Maussollos' aims. Unfortunately, Xenophon is not specific. Maussollos is mentioned alongside Tachos, the Egyptian rebel king,¹⁰² but the juxtaposition is misleading. The actions of both men are not to be regarded as contemporary.

Nor should any contact between Maussollos and Tachos be assumed. Both are mentioned together because Xenophon wishes to illustrate his statement that Agesilaus received money from both those he benefitted and those who fled him.

I suggest that a reasonable context for Maussollos' activities is the operations at Assus: Maussollos met Agesilaus, now in Ariobarzanes' service, and attempted to bribe him away from the rebel's hire. Agesilaus and Sparta were enriched. In Xenophon's account all these events are so portrayed as to put Agesilaus in the best possible light.¹⁰³ Hence, Maussollos is one who fled Agesilaus.

There is no evidence for the contention, based on Diodorus 15.90.3, that Maussollos acted to disrupt Persian control in the 360's. Rather he cooperated with his neighbor Autophradates and attempted, though unsuccessfully, to detach Ariobarzanes' ally, Agesilaus. All these events seem centered around 366-365. What did Maussollos do for the remainder of the decade? A reasonable suggestion was that he defended his home sector and began to extend his influence beyond Caria in a series of policing actions directed against anti-Persian elements, temporarily ascendent because of Autophradates' troubles in his own sector. Maussollos' success in extending his influence in his final decade of being satrap is most likely due to his not expending resources in futile attempts directed against his superior, the Shah.¹⁰⁴

Section VI. The Extension of Hekatomnid Influence

It is usually believed that efforts by the Carian satraps to expand

their sphere were inimical to the crown. This is a rather unfortunate interpretation, for the Hekatomnid ability to expand successfully and at the expense of forces unfriendly to Achaemenid control is proof that the Hekatomnid dynasts were most successful satraps. They exercised a virtually unchallenged control over their home sector, Caria, while forwarding tribute to the crown (thus acting within both guidelines), and were competent enough to extend that control and influence into neighboring sectors. In many instances expansion by one satrap of his sphere meant tension with the neighboring satrap, who perceived encroachment upon his own sphere. Hekatomnid expansion seems remarkable because deleterious effects on neighboring political entities are recorded only for those entities already inimical or potentially inimical to Achaemenid control in Anatolia.

In the operations carried out by Maussollos during the so-called "Great Satraps' Revolt" it is possible to identify a number of techniques used in his exercise of power: the use of the Hekatomnid navy, cooperation with the satrap at Sparda, and the attempt to coopt recalcitrant elements. These techniques are among those directly responsible for the success of Hekatomnid expansion.

Throughout the tenure of the Hekatomnid family as satraps of Caria there is no documented case of tension between the satraps of Caria and the satraps at Sparda. Hekatomnid influence is found to extend into regions which, in the past, were normally the scene of activities undertaken by the satrap of Sparda. The cooperation noted in 366-365 seems to have continued to the benefit of all.

Equally significant was the development of Hekatomnid naval power, and the use of the navy as an instrument for extending Hekatomnid and Persian influence in campaigns of both local and royal initiative. One should not underestimate the strategic significance of the Hekatomnid navy. Because it was a fighting force under direct satrapial control with safe home ports directly under satrapial control the Shah and his subordinates in the far west no longer were compelled to rely on the all too temporary compliance of Greek city-states to have access to an Aegean naval force. One may compare the Hekatomnid fleet in significance to the earlier development under Pharnabazos of an independent fleet which was used to remove those forces from mainland Greek cities which were esconced in Asia. In addition, the presence of a Hekatomnid fleet relieved some of the pressure on the crown when Ebir-nari faced destabilization as the result of Egyptian rebels. Loyal elements of the Phoenician fleets could be reserved for more southernly operations, while the Hekatomnid fleet operated in the waters off Anatolia.

In dealing with members of the native order, principally the Greek poleis, the Hekatomnids coopted compliant political leaders, supported them in power and permitted the maintenance of local forms of government. The Hekatomnid policy toward the Greeks must have resembled the policy followed and applied to the native Carians in the early days of Hekatomnid control.

Policing actions were undertaken against recalcitrants within or close to the Hekatomnid sphere. Such actions may be behind Isocrates' claim (5.102) that coastal sectors, sources for Achaemenid fleets, were in a state of uproar. In such policing actions the Hekatomnid navy was of value.

In discussing Hekatomnid expansion I have grouped together activities under headings which may seem somewhat arbitrary or artificial. All the techniques enumerated above are intertwined, and all may appear within the course of a single operation.

A. Cooperation with Sparda

Relations between neighboring satraps were often tense, poisoned by rivalry and jealousy. Such was not the case for the Hekatomnids and Sparda: relations appear to have been remarkably cordial throughout the fourth century. Some role in this state of affairs must be assigned to personality. Autophradates seems to have been able to work well with Maussollos, his near contemporary in age. Cooperation which began between Hekatomnos and Autophradates before the latter's appointment as satrap extended into the mid-360's under the former's son and seemingly to end of both Maussollos' and Autophradates' lives. Cooperation was beneficial to all concerned: Autophradates would be able to attend to his own province and to the effects of instability in neighboring Dascylium, his traditional rival, while Maussollos and the Hekatomnid navy dealt with the Aegean and Lycia. Later, the crown could make maximum use of forces from both provinces in dealing with troubles in Cyprus, Phoenicia, and Egypt. In the absence of one satrap from Anatolia, the other could defend Persian interests for both.¹⁰⁵ Fortunately, Carian cooperation with Sparda did not lead to hostility with Dascylium.

That the Hekatomnids exercised influence over regions which were viewed as part of Lydia is suggested by Lucian dial.mort. 24, a passage in which Maussollos outlines his sphere and includes "some Lydians" among

his subjects.¹⁰⁶ Epigraphical evidence and anecdotes preserved in Polyaeus indicate Maussollos and his successors operated in and exercised control over such regions.

A modicum of Hekatomnid influence may be perceived in Erythrae, a city in that part of Ionia certainly under Sparda's control. SIG³ 168 (Tod II no. 155), undated, records the honors granted to Maussollos and the plans to set up statues of the satrap and his wife. The content and tone of the document prefigures similar decrees of honors for Hellenistic monarchs. The background for the honors is a matter for speculation: it is safest to say that those in control of the city are not inimical to Achaemenid control.¹⁰⁷ A commonly suggested context for the decree is the mid-350's, the period of the Social War, when Maussollos is known to have had some hand in events in nearby Chius. With this context, a reasonable one, in mind, I suggest that the inscription be regarded as evidence for overall favorable relations between Maussollos and Sparda, seemingly still under Autophradates' control. Friendship with Maussollos on the part of Erythrae need not exclude loyalty ultimately to the satrap at Sparda.¹⁰⁸

In the case of Ephesus, there is evidence for operations by both Autophradates and Maussollos. The position of Ephesus on the coast is one which suggests that the satraps of both Sparda and Caria would have dealings with the civic government.¹⁰⁹ The activities of both satraps imply that it was in the interest of both men that the personnel in power at Ephesus be changed. Polyaeus 7.27.2 reports land operations against the city and a ruse leading to its capture by Autophradates. Maussollos expresses concern about the disruptive activities of Herophytus of

Herophytus of Ephesus while preparing a ruse against Heraclea at Latmus, reported in Polyaeus 7.23.2. Neither anecdote is given a precise context.¹¹⁰ I believe a reconstruction of events is possible in which Autophradates and Maussollos share a unity of outlook in events concerning Ephesus and which places the recalcitrant stance of the civic government in the late 360's. Recalcitrance would occur in the wake of the destabilization in Sparda set off by Orontes and the necessity for Autophradates to concentrate his efforts against him.

In both anecdotes Ephesus can be perceived as a city whose leaders are inimical to Achaemenid control as embodied in Autophradates and Maussollos. Autophradates is openly opposed by the city. Maussollos refers to the potential threat posed by Herophytus of Ephesus. This Herophytus may be identified with the infamous recalcitrant Herophytus, the object of adoration by anti-Persian forces during the Macedonian invasion of 336.¹¹¹ I suggest that Herophytus was one of the chief anti-Persian leaders in Ephesus in the late 360's and capitalized on troubles within Sparda to draw his city, through stasis, away from Autophradates' control. Maussollos' concern, uttered in the context of a proposed campaign against Pugela, on the coast south of Ephesus, is indicative of Herophytus' success in destabilizing the regions around Ephesus.

Ephesus and its environs would be the object of operations for both Autophradates and Maussollos. The city fell to Autophradates. The proposed campaign against Pugela occurred at approximately the same time as Autophradates' moves, but after Maussollos' seizure of Heraclea. The exact date of Ephesus' fall cannot be pin-pointed. The late 360's or the early 350's seem the most reasonable time.

Once reestablished, Persian control was not easily weakened. Arrian Anab. 1.17.10-12 provides information on the city during Alexander's invasion, and this data permits observations to be made about the personnel in power in the city.¹¹² By the time of Alexander's capture of the city the prominent politicians friendly with the Achaemenids were Syrphax, his son Pelagon, and the nephews of Syrphax (Arr. Anab. 1.17.12). Working backwards from 334 BC the following may be reconstructed. In 336, Syrphax and the others had been forced from Ephesus by a stasis set off by the appearance of Macedonian troops. The prominent anti-Persian, Herophytus (here called Heropythus, Arr. Anab. 1.17.11), was installed and later died.¹¹³ Immediately before 336, then, there were two generations of pro-Persian leaders active. Syrphax and his unnamed brothers represented the elder. Their political careers would extend back to at least the early 340's. The sons of Syrphax and his brothers represented the younger generation. I suggest that Syrphax and his brothers derived their influence from their father, who would represent the oldest generation of pro-Persians under consideration here. During the 360's, 350's, 340's, and 330's, these three generations were the men who dealt with Autophradates, Rhoesaces, and Spithridates of Sparda and with the neighboring Maussollos, Idrieus, Pixodaros, and Orontopates of Caria. These Ephesian politicians would be among those civic leaders responsible for forwarding the phoroi to Achaemenid officials (Arr. Anab. 1.17.10).

In sum, Autophradates and Maussollos seemed to have cooperated to reestablish control by compliant Ephesians. We also see the use of two of the techniques discussed above: cooperation with the satrap at Sparda and support for the compliant native order.

Miletus was another city traditionally under the supervision of the satrap at Sparda, but in which the Hekatomnids exercised influence as well. This "dual loyalty" of Miletus had no deleterious effects. Achaemenid control remained unchallenged until Alexander's invasion. In addition to friendliness with Sparda, Maussollos' activities here illustrate the use of the Hekatomnid navy and support for the compliant members of the native order. Polyaeus 6.8 reports that within the city of Miletus there existed a party in favor of Maussollos and one opposed. The Hekatomnid admiral Aegyptus moved to support the pro-Hekatomnid party and avoided an attempt made on him by the opposing party.

The anecdote is given no chronological context and the identity of the anti-Hekatomnid party is not defined. The anti-Hekatomnid party might be identified as those inimical to Achaemenic control.¹¹⁴ The context for a Milesian stasis would be similar to that for the stasis at Ephesus. Forces inimical to Persian control capitalize on troubles in Sparda and the attention paid to Egypt and Fbir-nari and weaken the position of politicians friendly to Persian control. The stasis should be placed in the late 360's to coincide with Orontes' activities and Tachos' forward policy.¹¹⁵

In spite of Aegyptus' setback it seems Miletus returned to a compliant stance. In Lucian dial.mort. 24 Maussollos states that he had moved up achri Miletou subduing the better part of Ionia. Evidence from the time of Alexander III allows us to work backward towards the 360's and 350's as was done in the case of Ephesus.¹¹⁶ The senior man in Milesian politics in 334 was Glaucippus (Arr. Anab. 1.19.1-2). His sons, Leucippus and Chrysippus, were old enough to be active in politics in the first half of the 330's.¹¹⁷ Glaucippus' career would have

extended back to 350 at least. Finally, good relations between the Milesians and the Hekatomnids are attested by SIG³ 225 (Tod II no. 161b), a dedication to Apollo at Delphi of bronze statues of Idrieus and Ada the elder.¹¹⁸ The dedication is made by the Milēsioi, i.e. the civic government, and should be placed in the early 340's, during Idrieus' lifetime. Favorable relations between the Hekatomnids and Miletus can thus be traced back to a period very close to the time of Maussollos' death. It is reasonable then that Miletus was pro-Persian from the time of Maussollos and Autophradates until wartime exigencies compelled Glaucippus to request Alexander to declare the polis an "open city". Glaucippus and the members of the political group to which he belonged would be the civic leaders with whom Achaemenid personnel had contact. In Miletus, then, Maussollos, without opposition from Sparda, intervened in a stasis to guarantee the emergence to power of compliant politicians. Once in power they maintained a loyal stance towards the satraps at Sparda and in Caria.

A more direct Hekatomnid control seems implied at Tralles. SIG² 573, an apparently imperfect Roman date reproduction of a Hekatomnid original,¹¹⁹ is dated by the regnal years of Artaxerxes and by the existence of Idrieus as satrap. Tralles, located inland from Ephesus, is another city one would expect to be normally under Sparda's control. But there is no evidence that the satrap at Sparda, perhaps Rhoesaces by now, took umbrage at the allegiance of the Traldeis to Idrieus. Persian control (and Hekatomnid influence?) seems to have lasted until 334, when the fall of Ephesus convinced Tralles to surrender to superior military might (Arr. Anab. 1.18.1).

A final instance of Hekatomnid influence within a region normally the concern of Sparda can be mentioned here briefly. Machinations of Maussollos and Artemisia were perceived in Chius by Demosthenes (speech 15) who, surprisingly, has nothing to say about the satrap at Sparda. The satrap may have felt it was easier for the Hekatomnid navy to operate against recalcitrants on the island.

B. Continuities in Policy

It is difficult to document cases in which the various Hekatomnid dynasts maintained continuities in their policies. The basic techniques remain the same, but the particulars are often a matter for conjecture. In the cases of Miletus and Ephesus it appears that once installed with Hekatomnid assistance the pro-Persian politicians remained friendly with all the Hekatomnids, but it is impossible to speculate on the exact personnel involved and exactly how favorable relations were maintained. To assume continued cooperation between Sparda and Halicarnassus after the deaths of Maussollos and Autophradates requires an argument from silence: there is no recorded tension. One might anticipate that Demosthenes, in order to bolster his case in speech 15, would have emphasized and misrepresented any tension which might have existed between the two satrapies. Yet he is silent, speaking only of Artemisia's supposedly poor relations with Artaxerxes III. In the case of Cyprus (discussed below) broad continuities are discernible. Both Artaxerxes II and III perceived the Hekatomnids as loyal men able to be trusted with campaigns outside their home sectors. The Hekatomnid navy is valuable in both campaigns. The Hekatomnids attempt, in both cases, to render recalcitrants compliant.

One may point to possible continuation of pro-Hekatomnid feelings in Chius and Cos,¹²⁰ islands favorably disposed toward Maussollos and who, during the time of Pixodaros, operate against Philip (Diod. 16.77.2), an activity nominally in Persian interests. Crampa Labraunda II no. 42 indicates that under Pixodaros friendly relations were possible between a member of the Coan polity and a local Carian group.

Information concerning the reigns of Maussollos and Artemisia permits some examination of policies begun by one dynast and continued by the next. But here, too, only generalities emerge. Heraclea at Latmus was the object of policing actions undertaken by both Maussollos and Artemisia against civic leaders whose loyalty to the satraps was in question. The city is northeast of Mylasa and fortified (Polyaenus 7.23.2). It was in the interest of the Hekatomnids to insure that Heraclea return to unquestioned loyalty, especially since Mylasa seems to have been without walls (cf. Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 11-17).

At least three different operations were carried out. In the first Idrieus served as general (Polyaenus 7.23.2) and took sureties (homera) from the city. These may have included hostages in order to keep the city docile. Relations seemed to have been strained, but not openly hostile, when Maussollos decided to win favor as a means to bring the city more in line. The sureties were returned and citizens from Heraclea were allowed to serve as his bodyguards (Polyaenus seems to exaggerate Maussollos' politeness somewhat). He finally incorporated soldiers from Heraclea into a force which would head toward Puzos¹²¹ to forestall moves by Herophytus of Ephesus. Military maneuvers distracted the populace of Heraclea and the city fell when ambushed by the Hekatomnid army.

The campaign against Pugela would have been carried out later.

Maussollos' decision to forego cooption through diplomacy for direct military action seems to have been only moderately successful. Polyaeus 8.53.4 records operations against the city by Artemisia.¹²² Her capture of the city is by ruse and involves ambushing the city while distracting the population with pomp and display. The outline of the ruse is similar to the one used by Maussollos (distraction and ambush), and may call into question the specifics provided by Polyaeus. One may assume that Maussollos after his action believed the city compliant, but that after Maussollos' death military action was again needed to establish compliant civic leaders in power. Both dynasts pursued broadly similar policy toward recalcitrants: the use of military action. The make-up of the civic government and the reasons for its recalcitrance are unknown.¹²³

Continuities in policy may be observed in Hekatomnid activities on Rhodes, which, like Chios and Cos, seems to have maintained a friendly stance toward Achaemenid officials until the collapse of Persian control. The extension of some Hekatomnid and Persian influence over these islands was possible in the early 350's because by then Maussollos (and Autophrades) had reduced the unfriendly elements in the port cities of Miletus and Ephesus. Unfortunately we are again hampered by the evidence which, although more detailed for Rhodes, provides many labels (oligarchs, democrats, etc.) but no specifics. The redating of certain Rhodian inscriptions suggests that Hekatomnid intervention resulted primarily in changes in personnel rather than thoroughgoing structural changes in the civic government.¹²⁴ Maintenance of a pro-Persian stance would depend upon support afforded by the Hekatomnids, and possibly other Achaemenid

officials, to friendly civic leaders, the compliant members of the native order.

During the time of Maussollos there seems to have been internal political difficulties in Rhodes: Arist. Pol. 5.1302b, 1304b speaks about the gnōrimoi moving against the dēmagōgoi and destroying the dēmos. The issue setting off the troubles seems to have been payment of debts to trierachs. That Maussollos supported one of these groups or that one of these groups sought out Maussollos' assistance may be suggested by Diodorus' statement (16.7.3-4)¹²⁵ that Rhodes, along with Chius, Cos, and Byzantium, acted together with Maussollos against Athens at Chius. It is possible that the politician Hegesilochus, who is abused by Theopompus and claimed by him to have headed the "oligarchs" (FGrH 115 fr. 121 = Athen. 10.444ef), was one of the Rhodians who had ties with Maussollos. Maussollos' influence, however it may have been exercised, was denounced by Demosthenes.¹²⁶

Hekatomnid influence does not seem to have been a matter of tight control exercised on Rhodes by outside officials imposed from above because by the time of Artemisia's accession those politicians who were most friendly with the satraps seem to have lost all power and the Rhodians launched an attack against Halicarnassus (Vitruvius 2.8.14). The Hekatomnid fleet routed the Rhodians, seized their ships, and executed the invasion force. The Rhodian ships were manned by Carian forces and moved against Rhodes. Artemisia took the city and executed the recalcitrant politicians. Some fled--they were the democrats,¹²⁷ those whom Demosthenes hoped the Athenians would support (Vitruvius 2.8.15, Dem. 15.11-12 plus scholia, using the terms dynatoi and dēmos). Again only the

broad outlines of policy are discernible: the use of diplomacy and military action to guarantee the permanence of a friendly, compliant civic government. Note, too, the significance of the Hekatomnid fleet and its facilities at Halicarnassus.¹²⁸

C. Imperial Missions

During the period of Hekatomnid control there are three cases of the Hekatomnids undertaking missions outside Caria and its environs upon command of the king. In all the Hekatomnid navy is significant. The first was the campaign against Euagoras in 390; the next, the campaign against Ariobarzanes.

The third campaign, beginning in the mid-340's,¹²⁹ was against the Cypriote rebel Pnytagoras of Salamis. A few characteristics of the operations can be noted here. The campaign is undertaken by Idrieus, who, like his father, was a loyal local man (Diod. 16.42.6). Idrieus was close to the scene of trouble and was familiar with and to the region from which troops would be drawn. As was common in other Achaemenid campaigns, Idrieus obtained mercenary support (Phocion) and worked with compliant members of the native order, including a man who could be reinstalled and who himself was familiar with and to the area in which operations were carried out, Euagoras, the deposed king of Salamis (Diod. 16.42.7). The Shah has something of a strategic advantage which his father, Artaxerxes II, lacked. The development of the Hekatomnid navy permitted simultaneous expeditions against Egypt and Cyprus. Earlier the demands of the Greek problem, Cyprus, and Egypt had to be juggled: simultaneous campaigns of great size in more than one region were not possible. Now,

however, while the satrap of Caria attended to one region, the satrap at Sparda could campaign in another.¹³⁰

D. Significance of the Navy

The value to the crown of the Hekatomnid navy has been stressed often in this section: the fleet was of importance in operations against Miletus, Rhodes and Cyprus. I wish to add here that the navy also permitted the opening of friendly ties with regions not often dealt with by Achaemenid officials. Crampa Labraunda II no. 40 is a decree issued by Maussollos and Artemisia granting honors and privileges to Knossos on Crete,¹³¹ because the Knossians were good men towards Maussollos and his affairs. The context for the decree might be the Social War. I am uncertain whether one should speak about the Hekatomnids supporting a compliant native order in this case.

There is nothing in this survey of Hekatomnid activities to suggest that the dynasts ever acted inimically to royal interests. Their home sector was defended, recalcitrants nearby were removed and Achaemenid influence was extended into the Aegean. The Hekatomnids were not caught up in deleterious tension with neighboring satraps.

While the broad outlines of Hekatomnid expansion may be traced, the particulars are difficult to illuminate. The satraps supported compliant members of the native order, i.e. compliant civic leaders in the poleis, but the day to day nature of that support is not elucidated in the sources. We hear only of "extreme" activities--the need for military force to establish or reestablish those friendly to Achaemenid officials. Reasonable speculation is possible about the identities of some of these

civic leaders, but one has to rely on evidence from the 330's as a starting point. The statement that Ephesus paid phoroi to the barbarians is the closest we come to seeing the nature of "peacetime" contact between the Hekatomnids and those regions they rendered compliant.

It is equally difficult to speak in specifics about the royal attitude and response to the extension of Hekatomnid influence. We can surmise it was favorable. The dynasts did nothing requiring a hostile royal response. Idrieus is regarded as dependable enough to take charge of the Cypriote campaign. There could have been little objection by Artaxerxes II or III in seeing the influence of mainland Greek city-states rolled back by the Hekatomnid navy. But it is impossible to determine how or whether Artaxerxes II and his successors differed in their own perceptions of the Carian dynasts.

The techniques used in expansion--naval power, cooperation with neighboring officials, support for the compliant native order--had not been invented by the Hekatomnids. They did use them adeptly and successfully. Each technique may be seen in operation in Lycia, a region which began as a battle ground for rival dynasts in the 370's and 360's and by 337 was securely under the control of the satrap at Halicarnassus, Pixodaros.

Section VII. The Hekatomnids and Lycia

Successful satraps were expected to be able to manage affairs not only within their own sector, also the affairs in neighboring and perhaps less stable regions. They were to act to solidify whatever Achaemenid

control already existed and supply, in general, a stabilizing influence which might lead to the extension of that control, whether by military conquest or the cooption of indigenous political figures of noteworthy influence. The Hekatomnids so acted in Lycia; the techniques found in their westernly activities are used adeptly against recalcitrant political figures in the southeast. Here, too, the Hekatomnid navy is of significance. There also seems to be cooperation with Autophradates, satrap at Sparda, who allows his own influence in Lycia to be complemented and then supplanted by his friends, the Carian dynasts. Above all, the Hekatomnids were a stabilizing force: the numerous small scale native Lycian dynasts gave way to a satrap at Lycia, or, more properly, to the satrap of Caria, who held Lycia as part of his own sphere, and held it--it seems--with royal approval.

A. Sources for the history of Fourth Century Lycia

The sources upon which a reconstruction of Lycian history must rely present serious difficulties; they allow only a relative chronology of events (a chronology itself uncertain in many particulars) and are imperfectly understood. In the Greek sources, i.e. historians or their fragments, there is only one passage which gives anything like a fixed point. Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 103 relates, in book 12, the successful attempt by Pericles, king of the Lycians, to conquer Telmessos in west Lycia. In Photius' summary of the book these events are narrated after the campaigns against Euagoras and various events elsewhere in southern Anatolia. The rise and expansion of Pericles can be placed roughly in 380's and 370's. Isocrates 4.161 (referring to events c.380) and Diodorus 15.90.3 (referring to events in 362/1), passages which question

the Achaemenid hold on Lycia, are better as evidence for internal strife in Lycia than for a province-wide anti-Achaemenid movement.¹³²

In the earlier decades of the fourth century BC. Lycia was a land of many dynasts--most of these minted coins, some dynasts minting in more than one city. The study of Lycian coins has focused on the groupings together and sorting out of the many issues and then suggesting relative chronologies. G.F.Hill's work of 1895 is still the standard arrangement.¹³³ Otto Morkholm studied the weights of fourth century Lycian issues and was able to divide Lycian into two numismatic regions: central Lycia, using a heavier standard, and west Lycia, using a lighter standard.¹³⁴ Observations of some exactitude on the location of the mints for the dynasts have been made. But when numismatists have tried to assign fourth century dynasts and their coins to particular decades their point of departure is Theopompus' information about Perikles.

Lycian inscriptions, mostly funerary in nature, would be of greater value if they could be read with a better understanding. Lycian is still known imperfectly in spite of recent progress deriving from work on the trilingual decree from Xanthus. Some attempts have been made to set the inscriptions in chronological order by relying on the style of the monuments with which they are associated, but style offers only a very approximate relative chronology. Often the funerary inscriptions will mention a variety of events: these events took place throughout the lifetime of the deceased, and one can suggest safely only termini ante quem for the inscriptions and the events they record.¹³⁵

In sum, there are no fixed points in Lycian history of the fourth century BC until 337, the date provided by Badian's dating of the

Xanthus decree (below). There can be only educated guesses about the relative order of events. In the reconstruction I offer below, I make a number of assumptions: the existence of tension between Lycian dynasts is not itself proof of anti-Achaemenid sentiments; influence of Autophradates over Lycia was strongest in the west; Hekatomnid influence will begin in the west and be extended eastward; Autophradates and Maussollos do not act against each other in Lycia, but operate--and cooperate?--against elements responsible for disruption in the entire region, particularly forces in the east responsible for disrupting the west, that part of Lycia closest to Caria and Sparda.

B. The Prelude to Hekatomnid Influence¹³⁶

Before evidence emerges for Hekatomnid influence and control in Lycia four major political figures can be perceived as active in the region. The first two are dynasts and combatants: Pericles, whose center of power was in central and east Lycia, and Artumpara, who was prominent in west Lycia. Pericles, the successful of the two, is eventually regarded as a force inimical to Achaemenid control, but in the early stages of combat there is no evidence to allow a judgment about either man's attitude toward royal control or their relations with their more powerful neighbors, Autophradates, Maussollos, and Datames of Cilicia and Cappadocia.¹³⁷ The second pair of figures, who may have entered the scene later, is Payava, a man of some influence at Xanthus, and Autophradates of Sparda. The two work together against those believed to be recalcitrants. One may place Pericles, given his westward expansion, among those recalcitrants. A survey of these figures will

illustrate the variety in Achaemenid control and the frontline responsibility for extending or strengthening control which resided in local men. Lycia had never been under firm Achaemenid control. While destabilization was the norm, it was regulated by the satrap at Sparda for whom Lycia was the very edge of his sphere. Compliant figures, such as the Hekatomnids and Payava, were the keys to keeping order.

Pericles is attested as a political leader in funerary inscriptions at Limyra, Arneai, Teimousa, and Kizilca (i.e. east and central Lycia). His mints were located in central Lycia, at Phellos and Limyra, the latter appearing at Phaselis (Polyaenus 5.42).¹³⁸ His success was not an anomaly: a competent political leader can extend his sphere by conquest and will clash with those threatened by his extended realm. Pericles may be regarded as a miniature of the Hekatomnids.

The chief object of his westward expansion seems to have been Artumpara. Tebursseli, a supporter (?) of Pericles at Limyra, portrays and records on his own tomb the defeat of Artumpara by Pericles (TAM I 104b). Telmessos fell to Pericles' army according to Theopompus.¹³⁹ At that point Pericles' power made it possible for him to be labeled as king by Theopompus, at the very least a recognition of his wide sphere and superior military power.

Artumpara, because of the imperfections in modern knowledge of Lycian, has been the subject of speculation as to his national origin. It is safe to say that like Pericles Artumpara was an indigenous Lycian.¹⁴⁰ His home sector was in west Lycia, although it is difficult to pin down his home or capital. His coins were minted in Kadyanda, Tlos, Pinara, and Telmessos--places later under Hekatomnid control. He appears as

ruler over Lycia in TAM I 11 is such that his sector seems to be all Lycia. We know little of Artumpara's battle(s) with Pericles. At one point Artumpara seems to have been able to draw support from Side, to the east in Pamphylia.¹⁴¹ As to his career after his defeat by Pericles there is only uncertainty. The owner of TAM I 29 refers to Idrieus (line 5), Artumpara (7), and Alexander (9), but the contexts are unknown.¹⁴² As to his career after his defeat by Pericles there is only uncertainty. The owner of TAM I 29 refers to Idrieus (line 5), Artumpara (7), and Alexander (9), but the contexts are unknown.¹⁴² One might say at best that the man commemorated in TAM I 29 lived during the careers of all three.

To sum up: Before the 360's two of the many dynasts attested in coinage clashed and one, Pericles, emerged superior. His new influence in the west might create concern among those in west Lycia and bordering Lycia. Those about whom we hear first are Payva of Xanthus and his ally, Autophradates. The destruction of a recalcitrant Pericles' power would be looked upon with favor by them.

Our only evidence about Payava and his ties with Autophradates comes from Payava's own tomb, which glorifies him in picture and word. We see the Xanthian in military activities and being received by Autophradates. The inscription, TAM I 40d, which accompanies the audience scene indicates that Autophradates, Wat[apr]data xssadrapa pa[rz]a, gave to Payava a religious object after one party defeated a second party, the second party seemingly a Lycian military leader. Pericles, the intruder into the West, seems a reasonable candidate. One should note that in Payava's perception only Autophradates was important enough to be placed on his tomb.

Payava's tomb offers no trace of Hekatomnid involvement,¹⁴³ just as Tebursseli's offered none for Sparda's involvement.

Autophradates' influence, involvement, interest, and even control in Lycia is confirmed by TAM I 61 from Phellos: the owner of that tomb set it up, and probably died, while Autophradates was in control of Lycia. Again, the expression used makes it appear as though Autophradates controls all Lycia. That Lycia should form part of the sphere of a successful satrap at Sparda is not surprising: TAM I 44, from Xanthus,¹⁴⁴ reports events and personalities of late fifth century Sparda. Autophradates' early career included a joint campaign with Datames of Cilicia, a man east of Lycia. One can only speculate whether Maussollos worked alongside Payava and Autophradates, or whether Pericles was defeated in sequential campaigns lead by Autophradates (with Payava) and then by Maussollos.¹⁴⁵

The best observations that one can make about Lycia before the Hekatomnid presence are that fourth century Lycia, as fifth century Lycia, was a land of many dynasts; Pericles gained temporary ascendancy; he was challenged by Artumpara, Autophradates, Payava, and finally, perhaps, by Maussollos. The general references to a destabilized Lycia are not indicative of revolts against the crown or the absence of Achaemenid control, but to the results of local tensions which eventually called for intervention by neighboring and more powerful authorities. The shift from supervision by Autophradates to Maussollos implies the agreement of Autophradates, who is then free to deal with northern difficulties.

C. Maussollos and Lycia

Four pieces of evidence allow us to begin to trace the presence and

extension of Hekatomnid influence in Lycia during the reign of Mausso-
llos.¹⁴⁶ The most suitable context for Maussollos' actions alone in
Lycia would be the late 360's and 350's following his moves against
Ariobarzanes. There is no evidence to permit a precise judgment about
the extent to which Maussollos' actions in the west against Greek poleis
overlapped his extension of influence eastward.

As indicated above, Pericles had used his navy to maintain his power
at Phaselis, which came under attack by Charimenes of Miletus (Polyaenus
5.42), who has been thought to have been in Maussollos' service.¹⁴⁷
Phaselis was eventually rendered compliant to Maussollos. TAM II:3 113,
an inscription whose right side only is preserved, contains the oaths
sworn by the Phaselitai and Maussollos. It is reasonable to assume that
the oaths signify, in fact, Phaselis' subordination to Maussollos. In
view of Phaselis' previous political disposition and its position on the
east coast of Lycia it seems reasonable that it was the Hekatomnid fleet
which acted as the means of extending Carian influence. Maussollos' fleet
must have been powerful enough to both commandeer "friendly" port facilities
and work against native Lycian naval power, i.e. Pericles' (his
fleet's home port would be near Limyra, which is on the way to Phaselis).

A most unsatisfactory reference in Steph. Byz. sv. Solymoi permits
speculation that Maussollos' land forces operated inland from the east
coast.¹⁴⁸

Finally, some form of direct political control was established over
part of Lycia: Maussollos' subordinate, Kondalos (Arist. Oec. 2.1348a
18-34), possessed the power to collect taxes, a power he abused to his own
financial benefit.¹⁴⁹

One may characterize Maussollos' activities in Lycia as follows: Maussollos, too, believed Pericles' power to be inimical to his interests. Naval and land operations were undertaken and seemed to follow up the earlier successes of Autophradates and Payava. Maussollos was powerful enough to take Phaselis and campaign inland from Phaselis among the Solymoi in east Lycia. Maussollos' influence in west Lycia was much stronger and he was able to set up government organs which functioned in peace time, such as those connected with tax collection. As for Lycia under Idrieus, it is possible to state that Idrieus' influence was felt at Tlos, and through west Lycia in general, this on the basis of TAM I 29.

D. Pixodaros and the Xanthus Decree¹⁵⁰

Two inscriptions attest to the stability of Hekatomnid control over west Lycia, and, by extrapolation, over east Lycia during the tenure of the last son of Hekatomnos, Pixodaros. Both inscriptions are from Xanthus. The first, TAM I 45, in Lycian and Greek, records Pixodaros' control over Xanthus, Tlos, Pinara, and Kandyanda (Kadyanda) as well as Caunus in south Caria (Greek text: lines 1-3, 8-10; Lycian text: lines 2-3). Although Pixodaros is not entitled satrap in the surviving portions of the inscription, he seems to be in full control of affairs, in this case making grants to the places named. Pixodaros is now heir to the influence and control once exercised by Artumpara, Autophradates, and Payava.¹⁵¹

Far better evidence for Hekatomnid control is provided by a decree from Xanthus only recently discovered. Three texts, Aramaic, Lycian, and Greek, are inscribed on a single stele, but do not represent direct translations of a single original. The Aramaic is the earliest and most

significant juridically. In it, Pixodaros, satrap of Caria and Lycia, approves certain actions proposed by the citizens and suburban land owners of Xanthus.¹⁵² The Lycian version is a decree by the Xanthians effecting the establishment of the cult of Basileus Kaunios and Arkazuma the King (Greek: Arkesimas, Aramaic: the companion of Basileus Kaunios). The Greek text seems an adaptation from the Lycian. In both the Lycian and Greek versions Pixodaros is called satrap of Lycia alone, reflecting the local significance of the actions the Xanthians have undertaken.¹⁵³

The principal difficulty in using the Xanthus decree is the issue of its date. The most exact date is given in the Aramaic text (lines 1-2): month of Siwan, year one of Artaxerxes, Pixodaros is satrap of Caria and Lycia. There are now two diametrically opposed interpretations of that date. In the first, proposed by the French excavators who discovered the stone,¹⁵⁴ principal value is assigned to year one of Artaxerxes, either Artaxerxes II or III. The name Pixodaros is of secondary value in determining the date. Because it is less reasonable to create a new Pixodaros for 404 BC, year one of Artaxerxes II, the French used the Hekatomnid Pixodaros and made him satrap of Caria and Lycia in year one of Artaxerxes III, 358 BC, June-July (Siwan). The position assigned to Pixodaros by this dating conflicts with the historical record known from Diodorus and inscriptions found before the Xanthus inscription. 358 should be a time when Maussollos is satrap in Caria. The French, then, constructed an elaborate hypothesis to explain this difficulty. Upon the accession of Artaxerxes III in 359/8, Maussollos, one-time rebel in the 360's was dismissed as satrap, and in his stead Pixodaros was named. The appointments of archontes and an epimeletes in the Greek and Lycian versions of

the decree are Pixodaros' attempts to solidify his power. Pixodaros, however, is dismissed later on because of personality flaws, and Maussollos restored to power in time to meddle in the Aegean and be recorded as satrap in SIG³ 167 lines 32-33 (year five of Artaxerxes III, 355/4 BC).¹⁵⁵

What the French dating signifies for Hekatomnid control over Lycia is that that control emerges full grown in the midst of tensions within Caria, and within Lycia, where Pixodaros is attempting to get his own "boys" into power.

A second interpretation of the date given by the Aramaic text has been proposed by Ernst Badian.¹⁵⁶ He assigns principal value to the name Pixodaros, satrap of Caria and Lycia, and to the regnal years hitherto known for Pixodaros, 341/0-335/4. The problem for Badian was to explain the appearance of a year one for an Artaxerxes during those regnal years of Pixodaros. Badian suggested that Siwan, year one of Artaxerxes, was 337, and that the Artaxerxes was Arses, who took the throne while Pixodaros is known to have been satrap of Caria. Arses, after ascending the throne rather disreputably (Diod. 17.5.3), had taken a Thronname.¹⁵⁷ To explain the absence of a Thronname in our rather meager sources for Arses Badian pointed to Diodorus 15.93.1, a garbled report of the practice of taking Thronnamen, and questioned whether Arses would be the one exception. In his discussion of duneiform evidence for the better attested Artaxerxes III Ochus, Badian noted that even after, and in spite of, the assumption of the name Artaxerxes, Ochus was habitually called Ochus in the sources. Hence, the absence in our sources of Arses' Thronname is not surprising.

By making this one assumption, that Arses took the name Artaxerxes, Badian was able to dispense with the French hypothesis about instability and rivalry within the Hekatomnid family. The French views were based on the rather erroneous perception that relations between satrap and Shah were tense and hostile, and that Maussollos acted to destroy royal control during the 360's. Badian's view, however, has much to be said for it: Hekatomnid influence does not emerge full grown in the midst of instability within Caria itself.¹⁵⁸ Rather, we may see a transition over a number of decades from warring Lycian dynasts to Carian satraps supervising native authorities who no longer had full discretionary powers. And Arses would have been wise to assume a Thronname, if only to capitalize on the memory of his predecessors. One should note that Bessus' rise to power, equally, if not more, disreputable, was accompanied by the assumption of the name Artaxerxes (Arr. Anab. 3.25.3, Curius 6.6.13) by the rebel.

The Xanthus decree represents our sole fixed point in Lycian history in the fourth century and is symbolic of the height of Hekatomnid power: the last son of Hekatomnos is satrap over both Caria and Lycia.

E. The Nature of Hekatomnid Control

It is difficult to speak in any great detail or with exactitude about the nature of Hekatomnid control over Lycia. It would seem that the Hekatomnids, as they did in Caria, allowed local self-government, but prevented the emergence of any force which might be inimical to their own power. This latter quality of Hekatomnid control is suggested by the numismatic record: the coinage of native Lycian dynasts ceased by the

latter half of the fourth century.

Local groups were permitted to maintain their own form of government. The oath sworn by the Phaselitai indicates that a compliant civic government would have been permitted under Maussollos and his successors. The places named in TAM I 45 also seem to have compliant local governments. The people of Xanthus are permitted, in the Xanthus decree, their own local political organization,¹⁵⁹ which can undertake activities of a local significance.

But the information on local government is skewed to some degree. The oath from Phaselis comes from a time of duress, and does not preclude Maussollos' having made structural, in addition to personnel, changes in the local government. The Xanthus decree, which comes from the final decade of Hekatomnid control, is revealing in the area of satrapial prerogative. In the Aramaic version it is obvious that while the Xanthian citizen body proposes (lines 6-18) it is the satrap who disposes (lines 19-27).¹⁶⁰ Unfortunately, it is not possible to judge whether satrapial approval was here a rubber-stamp, or a sign of tight control, or a necessity because the citadel at Xanthus served some special administrative function, i.e. as a satrapial capital for Lycia.¹⁶¹ Both the Lycian and Greek versions (Greek: lines 2-5, Lycian: lines 2-5) indicate that the satrap appoints local officers (two archontes, and epimeletes for Xanthus). The exact nature of these officers is uncertain;¹⁶² their appointment does not necessarily signify a tightening of control, but should serve as evidence for there being some form of normal provincial government under satrapial supervision. Satrapial supervision is also suggested by Kondalos' ability to collect taxes from the Lycians.

One should not underestimate Hekatomnid control. Each version of the Xanthus decree ends with a proclamation that Pixodaros is the ultimate arbitor of events (Aramaic: lines 19-27; Lycian: 36-41; Greek: 32-35).

The royal response to Hekatomnid control does not seem to have been unfavorable. Extension of Hekatomnid influence over Lycia meant an end to the numerous and potentially disorderly dynasts of earlier days. Native Lycian naval power (cf. Hdt. 7.92, 98; Polyaeus 5.42) would be in Hekatomnid hands and could be utilized in the interests of the empire. Internal order would lead to ease in collection of tribute. Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 18-34 implies that payment of specific taxes became something to which the Lycians were accustomed. That Pixodaros is called satrap of more than one region should not evoke royal displeasure.¹⁶³ In sume, the benefits which accrued to Susa as the result of the extension of Hekatomnid control into Lycia were the same as when the Hekatomnids solidified their control over Caria and its environs.

A few words may be said about the permanent of Hekatomnid control. The Xanthus decree takes Hekatomnid control down close to the end of the Achaemenid empire. Orontopates would have received Lycia with Caria upon the death of his father-in-law, Pixodaros. His administration collapsed, not because of internal disloyalty displayed by tyrannized Lycians, but because of the superior military might of Alexander (Arr. Anab. 1.24. 4-6).¹⁶⁴

Section VIII. Pixodaros and Orontopates

Pixodaros, the youngest son of Hekatomnos, has been the most maligned

of the Carian satraps. Against him have been raised charges of treachery towards his own family (by the French in their use of the Xanthus decree) and towards his king (by all scholars since before the 1880's). Just as moderns seem to regard the Hekatomnids as anomalies because they were not Persian in origin, so Pixodaros, because his son-in-law was Persian, and because he made contact with Macedonia, has become an anomaly among the Hekatomnids. A new interpretation of the evidence will be set forth here, one in which Pixodaros emerges as did the other Hekatomnids-- as a loyal and competent satrap.

It is perhaps best to summarize what has already been said about Pixodaros.¹⁶⁵ He was the youngest of three brothers. By the most conservative figures, ones I proposed and then rejected as too unlikely, he is in his late 40's when he takes power in 341/0. By less conservative, and more reasonable, figures he is in his late 50's, perhaps already in his 60's, when he takes up the satrapy. He has only one wife attested in the sources: Aphneis of Cappadocia. His only children are daughters. He took the satrapy, it seems, by force from his elder sister, Ada. When Pixodaros becomes satrap he has no sons, only a disgruntled relative sitting in a citadel within his own satrapy. These are realities with which he must deal if he is to hold his satrapy and guarantee that it remains in Hekatomnid hands.

A. Pixodaros and Macedon: The Standard Deal

It is now dogma that Pixodaros gave proof of his separatist--and disloyal--tendencies by attempting to arrange a marriage alliance between his eldest daughter and the eldest son of Philip II, the open enemy of

the Persian Shah. Before turning to the modern accounts of Pixodaros' activities, one should survey the ancient evidence.

The first piece of evidence comes from Strabo's account of the Hekatomnid family (14.656-657). He reports Pixodaros expelled his sister Ada, the daughter of Hekatomnos, from her position of power. He then turned to the Persians (persisas) and requested a "satrap" to share his rule. The "satrap" succeeded Pixodaros and held Halicarnassus. His wife was Ada, daughter of Pixodaros and Aphneis.

Arrian Anab. 1.23.8 provides a second account: Ada is expelled by Pixodaros, who now holds Halicarnassus and Caria. When he dies Orontopates his son-in-law takes over. He was dispatched to Caria before Pixodaros died (ek basileōs pemphtheis).

Diodorus 16.74.2 is quite brief: Pixodaros expels Ada from the dynasteia and holds it for himself.

Plutarch Alexander 10.1-4 provides the problematic evidence. Pixodaros hopes for an alliance with Philip and so proposes to marry his eldest daughter to Philip's son, Arrhidaeus. Alexander and Olympias take umbrage, and Alexander sends a counter-proposal to Pixodaros: Arrhidaeus is mentally defective, let Alexander become son-in-law. Pixodaros agrees, but Philip is unwilling to let his heir-apparent become son-in-law to a mere Carian, a slave to the King. The proposed marriage and alliance fall apart.

Plutarch is the only source to report contact between Macedon and Pixodaros. He discusses the contact in the context of tension within the Macedonian royal house (Alex. 10.1). The upshot of the affair is the arrest of Alexander's messenger and the exile of some of his companions.

Plutarch shows no interest in the Hekatomnid family per se. No background is given on Pixodaros. When Ada the elder is mentioned it is in a digression (Alex. 22.7). There is only the briefest mention of Alexander's conquest of Caria (Alex. 17.2).

The other sources on Pixodaros' rise to power and his son-in-law complement and supplement each other. This is particularly true of Strabo and Arrian. To Strabo's account one may add the name Orontobates (Orontopates), found in Arrian, and to Arrian one may add the name of Orontopates wife, which is supplied in Strabo. Arrian gives only a rough indication of when Orontopates arrived in Caria (before Pixodaros' death, time enough to effect the marriage with Ada), while Strabo is more precise. The arrival of Orontopates follows upon Pixodaros' seizure of power. It is seemingly the means by which Pixodaros strengthens his hold on Caria.

But how is one to deal with Plutarch's information? In what way is it to be inserted into a reconstruction of Pixodaros' activities? There has been only one solution proposed: Strabo's account is "cut" after the words "But Pixodaros, the remaining of Hekatomnos' children, drove her (Ada) out." (end of 14.656). Plutarch Alex. 10.1-4 is then "spliced" into the account. Then one resumes Strabo with 14.657, "persisas, etc.", to which is added evidence from Arrian. This description of a rather mechanical use of evidence is the reconstruction given in 1883 by Krumbholz, who seems to have drawn it from works appearing in the 1860's.¹⁶⁶

Krumbholz' reconstruction is that stated, in somewhat more eloquent terms, in all standard histories and in modern commentaries on the

Alexander historians.¹⁶⁷ Pixodaros seizes the satrapy, may be in trouble with Artaxerxes III for so doing, seeks an alliance with Persia's known enemy, this plan falls through, Pixodaros arranges for a marriage between Ada the younger and Orontopates.¹⁶⁸ OR: Pixodaros displays the separatist tendencies of his predecessors, offers an alliance to Philip, this action a sign of disloyalty prompted by Arsēs' accession; the project fails, Pixodaros has no choice but submission to the crown; Orontopates becomes son-in-law to Pixodaros.¹⁶⁹

In every modern account of Pixodaros' actions there are two underlying assumptions: the first holds that the marriage proposed with the Argæad house and the marriage with Orontopates are mutually exclusive, and sequential. Since the marriage with Arrhidaeus falls through, a marriage with Persian nobility takes place. Often it is assumed, and even stated, that Ada the younger was the bride-to-be in both marriages, although Plutarch does not name the bride and Strabo does not tell us whether Ada the younger was Pixodaros' eldest daughter. The second assumption is that the proposed marriage alliance with Philip must be interpreted as disloyalty to the Shah. But how reasonable are these assumptions and the standard modern reconstruction?

Keeping in mind those realities with which Pixodaros would have to deal, let us examine the modern reconstruction. First, the approximate date of the offer to Philip: Plutarch's discussion of the proposed marriage allows the event to be placed after 338, perhaps in 337, but before the Macedonian invasion of 336.¹⁷⁰ Plutarch seems to be treating Alexander's life before Philip's death in nearly chronological form. He talks about Alexander's education under Aristotle (Alex. 7; 8 is

something of a digression on Aristotle's influence), the campaign against Byzantium, during which Alexander is left in charge of Macedon (9.1), finally the battle of Chaeronea (9.2-4). Then the scene shifts to the Macedonian court, and we hear of these before Philip's death (9.5-14), events to be placed after Chaeronea. The Pixodaros incident and its aftermath is the last of these before Philip's death (10.5-7). Hence, modern reconstructions of events have Pixodaros doing nothing to assure the stability of his power and guarantee that Caria remains in his family's hands until 337.

A second issue to consider is the gain from such a marriage. The purpose of political marriages in general is to solidify one's power by gaining some political advantage. The Shah would promise his daughters to his satraps: they, the satraps, gained the increased honor of marrying into the ruling branch of the royal house, while the Shah hoped to bind these nobles closer to him with what Herodotus called anankaiē ischurē̄ (1.74.4). A marriage between the scions of families of nearly equal status might, at the very least, retard the development of tension or, at the very best, guarantee a unity in outlook, if not common policies. In the case of a match between Pixodaros' eldest daughter and Arrhidaeus, the couple as cited in Plutarch, moderns have assumed that the unity in outlook and common policies were to be for the detriment of Susa. But if the marriage had gone through, would there have been any political advantages, given the modern placement of the attempt. Does the marriage make political sense?

The proposed couple hardly evokes optimism. Plutarch reports that Pixodaros' eldest daughter is to marry Arrhidaeus. Arrhidaeus is slightly older than Alexander, who was born in 356, and so is probably in his

mid-twenties. But given what we know about Pixodaros (one wife, at least two daughters, his old age by 337), his eldest daughter may have been substantially older than Arrhidaeus. Even if we assume--and there is no reason to--that the bride-to-be is Pixodaros' eldest living daughter, i.e. children predeceased him, that woman could still be much older than Arrhidaeus. But this should not be an insuperable obstacle to the marriage in Macedon's view. Philip could still see gain. Mentally defective Arrhidaeus was expendable, and he seems to have been entrusted with no political responsibilities in Macedon. Philip could use him in a marriage alliance, gain a beachhead in Asia, and still have his heir-apparent in Macedon.

But, according to modern interpretations this marriage serves as Pixodaros' first attempt to obtain a male heir for his satrapy and represents a means of standing against the crown. As such the proposed marriage with Arrhidaeus holds no political advantages for Pixodaros. In order for Caria to be left eventually in secure Hekatomnid hands Pixodaros would have to hope that Arrhidaeus would come and live in Caria (familiarizing himself with the satrapy), and that his daughter would not have to go and live in Macedon. Pixodaros would have to hope that his daughter's political acumen would be such as to counterbalance Arrhidaeus' mental deficiency (a glance ahead at Adeia/Eurydike is not comforting). It is also surprising that Pixodaros seems unaware of Arrhidaeus' defects. One may perhaps understand why Pixodaros was so eager, according to Plutarch, to shift the proposed marriage from Arrhidaeus to Alexander. But could Pixodaros reasonably expect Philip to allow his heir-apparent--the son who held the seal of state in 340 and fought at Chaeronea--to leave Macedon and live in Caria to take up a Persian satrapy? Caria's

future seems quite uncertain.

Hence, the modern interpretation of Pixodaros' actions makes the Carian satrap politically naive or excessively optimistic. In 337 he is without sons. The steps he takes to insure his family will continue to hold Caria will lead either to a half-wit satrap or an absentee heir. If Pixodaros' contact with Macedon is a sign of disloyalty, why don't we hear of any moves by Orontopates and Darius III to make sure Caria becomes "politically correct"? Plutarch's account is problematic enough in itself. The standard modern reconstruction only creates additional difficulties.

B. The Marriage of Orontopates and Ada: A Reassessment

It is due time for Pixodaros and Orontopates to be rehabilitated, and for the proposed marriage to the Argaeid house to be placed in a better context. In reconstructing events here, one assumption is made, that unless the evidence so states or allows no other reasonable interpretation Pixodaros is not to be made politically inept. He waited since 377, the year of Maussollos' accession, to hold full power. I believe he would take no step to weaken his position as satrap once he attained it.

Pixodaros took up the satrapy under less than ideal conditions. Ada, the widow of Idrieus, had held sole power since 344/343. In 341/0 Pixodaros deposed, but did not kill, her: she was allowed to retire, to take refuge at Alinda, a well-fortified position (Arr. Anab. 1.23.8). One can only speculate about Pixodaros' earlier relations with his elder sister. One may suggest that her support was not overwhelming--we hear of no internal threats to Pixodaros' control or to Orontopates' control.¹⁷¹

Pixodaros is now satrap at Halicarnassus, he has no sons, indeed he is the last of male Hekatomnids. It is necessary for him to take steps to solidify his power as satrap and, more importantly, make sure he has a male heir to whom he may hand over the satrapy. What are the steps he takes?

Strabo's account, supplemented by Arrian, indicate those steps. Turning to Persia (persisas), he summons a satrapes (here simply a Persian nobleman) to share his arche. This nobleman, Orontopates, marries a daughter of Pixodaros, Ada, thus becoming a Hekatomnid, and takes up the satrap at Pixodaros' death in 335/4. The most reasonable context for the summoning of Orontopates is the context supplied by Strabo: Orontopates arrives in the course of 341/0 and marries Ada, probably shortly thereafter. Pixodaros now has a son-in-law, a male heir. He will be the next Hekatomnid satrap of Caria--and Lycia. There is time enough for Pixodaros to make him known in the satrapy.

One should refrain from pressing Strabo's account for dark implications of Pixodaros' actions. Persisas need not mean Ada pursued an anti-Achaemenid policy while Pixodaros submissively turned pro-Persian in fear of royal wrath at his activities. The word implies reliance on non-Carians, and although one thinks immediately of the Shah, the word may have been used by Strabo simply because Pixodaros stands out as one whose relations with his family were not perfect and who goes outside Caria for a son-in-law. It is rather doubtful that Pixodaros was ever in danger of incurring royal wrath. He was active in the satrapy since the time of Hekatomnos, and is likely to have been a candidate for military and diplomatic missions while his older siblings were satraps. He may have been no stranger at the court of Artaxerxes III. Pixodaros could

have easily exonerated himself of any guilt in deposing Ada--if there was really a need to. It is unfortunate that we know nothing about Orontopates' background. Both Strabo and Arrian describe him in such a way that it is difficult to assume he was a Persian already present in Caria.

To sum up: During the course of 341/0 the new satrap of Caria, Pixodaros, married his daughter Ada to Orontopates, a Persian. In 337, the year of contact with Macedon, Pixodaros was satrap of Caria and Lycia. His heir-apparent was his son-in-law, Orontopates, a Hekatomnid by marriage.

C. Caria and Macedon

If, by 337, Philip was an avowed enemy of the Persian crown, how does one explain Pixodaros' desire to arrange a marriage and so obtain a symmachia? There does not seem to be any history of ties between Caria and Macedon. Diodorus 16.75.1-2 reports that the Shah commanded tous epi thalattēi satrapas to lend aid against Philip. It is sometimes alleged that Pixodaros was among those who acted to halt Philip's advance at Perinthos and Byzantium. Byzantium (Diod. 16.77.2) did receive aid from Chios, Cos, and Rhodes, islands in which Hekatomnid influence was felt, but it was most likely Arsites, satrap at Dascylium, who was the chief Persian officer responsible for destabilizing Philip's hold on the European side of the Hellespont by coopting compliant members of the native order (Chares), funding mercenary forces (such as those lead by Aristomedes), and stirring up the Thracians. Arsites had reason to fear that Macedon's unchallenged hold on the European side of the straits might have destabilizing effects within his own sphere. Pixodaros'

role, if any, was tangential at best.¹⁷²

Pixodaros' contact with Philip should be viewed as an example of cooption, and mutual exploitation. By 337 Caria had joined Dascylium and Sparda as the third significant satrapy on the far western frontier. Macedon had emerged as the preeminent power in the Balkans. There were now far fewer sides for Persian officials to wear down in Europe. In 337 Pixodaros seems to have initiated the contact with Macedon in hopes of arranging a political marriage and thereby obtaining a symmachia. He is trying to render compliant a recalcitrant member of the native order. The proposed marriage is an attempt at cooptation. Pixodaros might stand a good chance of succeeding: unlike Arsites, his contact with Macedon had been minimal.

Now that Pixodaros had Orontopates as son-in-law, he could only gain by his activities. At the very least and in his own self-interest, Pixodaros would hope that a marriage would mean that Caria would remain untouched by Macedonian activities should Philip decide to move against Dascylium or Sparda. Caria was furthest from Macedon, and Philip was not a naval power: Pixodaros is not playing for high stakes. At best and in the interest of the Achaemenid far west in general, Pixodaros might hope that a marriage would mean that Philip would be coopted and forego moves against Achaemenid territory.

While Pixodaros is attempting to coopt--or exploit--Philip, Philip will try the same with Pixodaros. Philip can hope, at the very least, to buy a blind eye towards actions he might undertake against Sparda and Dascylium. Philip might have a future ally in Anatolia.

If we assume that contact between Pixodaros and Philip is undertaken

in an atmosphere of mutual cooption--or exploitation--elements of Plutarch's account become more intelligible. Earlier I indicated the rather unacceptable nature of the bride and groom if Pixodaros hoped to build a future for Caria on the marriage. If Pixodaros has already seen to the future of Caria, and if he and Philip are involved in mutual exploitation the selection of Pixodaros' eldest daughter and Arrhidaeus is somewhat more logical: both are expendable. They will represent a physical bond between Caria and Macedon, but will not be the ones responsible for making and effecting policy. Pixodaros' pleasure at receiving Alexander's counter-offer is more intelligible: He has the chance of effecting a bond using the Macedonian heir-apparent. Philip's anger is quite understandable: Alexander is not expendable. His destiny is to rule Macedon. Finally, there is the characterization of Pixodaros' position as a slave to the King. It is a ready slur--but far easier to make if hitherto Pixodaros had displayed no sign of acting against royal interests.

The failure to effect a marriage between members of the Hekatomnid and Argaeid houses need not have had any serious effects on Pixodaros. Perhaps he was even heartened by the display of vindictiveness within the Macedonian royal house. Philip might not be so formidable after all. In the following year, Pixodaros discovered he was mistaken. His friends at Ephesus, Syrophax and his family, were driven from the city and his older brother's nemesis, Herophytus, was honored as a "patriot."

Was Pixodaros guilty of disloyalty in his activities? Were they anti-Achaemenid? Not necessarily. Satraps were expected to take a hand in affairs outside their own sphere as a means of making sure their own

sphere remained stable. Disloyalty was a matter of perception, of how information from local men in the west was interpreted at Susa. If charges were raised, Pixodaros could always have claimed that he was acting to coopt a recalcitrant. In this case the attempt was unsuccessful. Given Arses' own troubles, it seems unlikely that Susa could have responded in any decisive manner to Pixodaros' activities in this one matter. At most, Pixodaros is guilty of acting in his own self-interest. The matter of contact with Macedon never seems to have been raised again.

D. The Administration of Caria Under Pixodaros and Orontopates

Other evidence for the reigns of Pixodaros and Orontopates is rather meager, but it is suggestive of continuity with the earlier Hekatomnids. The most visible form of political document, Hekatomnid silver coinage, remained unchanged. Both Pixodaros and Orontopates continued to mint coins with the traditional Hekatomnid types (see above). Pixodaros introduced gold coinage, and was the only one of the dynasty to mint in gold. But continuity may be seen here as well: The obverse type is slightly different, a profile Apollo, modeled on the coinage of Miletus, now under pro-Persian Glaucippus. The reverse bears Zeus Labraundus, although on the smaller coins there is room only for his double axe. The appearance of gold coinage is not a sign of disloyalty, but coincides with the introduction of widespread gold coinage elsewhere in the Mediterranean, the result of the new mines in Macedon.¹⁷³

Continuity may be perceived in internal administration. Local groups with limited political power continued to exist. Crampa Labraunda

II no. 42 records the Macedonian general Eupolemos' support for a decision made by the Plataseis during the reign of Pixodaros. The implication is that this group continued to exist throughout the reigns of Pixodaros and Orontopates. The Koarendeis of SIG³ 311 also seem to have existed from the time of Maussollos, at least, through into Hellenistic times, when Asander was satrap. There is no record of disruption at the sanctuary of Sinuri.

Nothing in the evidence concerning the extension of Hekatomnid influence over Greek poleis in the west to suggest discontinuity in the times of Pixodaros and Orontopates. The record is the same in Lycia.

In sum, there is no reason to suspect that Pixodaros or Orontopates ever failed to act within the guidelines expected of satraps. Pixodaros, upon his accession, stabilized his own position and made a secure future for Caria. He continued the policies of his predecessors. Orontopates, his son-in-law, became familiar with and to the satrapy. When Philip arose as a threat, Pixodaros tried to coopt him, but failed. Upon Pixodaros' death Orontopates took up the satrapy. He defended his capital and fought alongside his king. Neither satrap clothed himself with dishonor.

In drawing up conclusions for this lengthy inquiry, it is best to begin with two of the issues raised in the introduction: the freedom of action which the Hekatomnids possessed, and the perception of the Hekatomnids at Susa. Perhaps it seems a most remarkable characteristic of Hekatomnid control that there is no visible direct supervision exercised from Susa over Caria; no roving officials making inquiries into

the satraps' activities, no stationary officials observing, recording or countermanding satrapial action. The Hekatomnids seem to have full control over Caria and its environs, freedom of action unchecked by Susa. Why?

The explanation is bound up with the second issue, the royal perception of the satraps. They do not ever seem to have been perceived as inimical to royal control. Their activities maintained order and provided tribute. The need for tight royal supervision simply did not exist. The Shahs, Artaxerxes II and his successors, enjoyed for decades the stability afforded by continuity in personnel and policy.

But royal interest, observation, and contact is not to be denied. A list of contacts, attested and suggested, between Halicarnassus and Susa may be drawn up. In only one exchange is there a hint of hostility. Artaxerxes requests tribute from Maussollos. Otherwise the record is one of trust and confidence. Artaxerxes commanded Hekatomnos to attack Euagoras. So it was done. Artaxerxes supported Maussollos when the satrap was slandered at court. Artaxerxes III commanded Idrieus to attack Phytagoras. So it was done. When Pixodaros needed a male heir it seems that it was Artaxerxes III who arranged for Orontopates to become the last Hekatomnid satrap.

The implied contacts are no less suggestive of trust and confidence: recognition of Hyssaldomos, Hekatomnos, and all the children of Hekatomnos as satraps; the command for Maussollos to assist Autophradates against Ariobarzanes; recognition of the extension of Hekatomnid influence over Lycia.

The Hekatomnids supplied the Shah with money and obedience. Were the Hekatomnids an anomaly? Not for Susa, unless one took the cynical

view that the absence of family strife and tension with neighboring officials was cause for disappointment. The story of the Hekatomnids was not an uncommon one in the Achaemenid far west. Loyal local men grow prominent in their home sector, cooperate with other loyal local men, and extend their sphere of control at the expense of recalcitrants. But the political abilities and personalities of the Hekatomnids must have made a difference in how the particulars of the story were played out: the lack of tension with Sparda, the westward orientation of the satrapy with its coastal capital and great naval capacity. Caria under the Hekatomnids is an example of how the relative power of the various satrapies could fluctuate. Under competent leadership with continuity in personnel and policy Caria's power grew. This was a development Susa could welcome.

But the Hekatomnids were an anomaly--to the Greeks. The Carian satraps were not Persian in nationality. Not until the time of Pixodaros is there a marriage with Persian nobility. It must have been exceedingly distressing to some Greeks, such as Isocrates, to see those political leaders adopt so much Greek culture without coming to realize that they were also supposed to serve the interests of that culture's originators and so stand against the Shah. It must have been exasperating for some Greeks to see that bronze Milesian statue of Idrieus at Delphi atop its massive marble platform and realize that here was an Achaemenid satrap of whom the Great King would not hesitate to say "He bore tribute to me; what was said unto him by me, either by night or by day, that was done."

Footnotes:

¹The standard modern account of the Hekatomnid dynasty remains that given by Judeich (esp. 226-257), who seems to have been one of the first scholars to critically consider the dynasty in the context of Achaemenid history. The far more recent account of Bockisch is of value principally because her notes cite most of the more recent work on the Hekatomnids. Her refinements of Judeich are frequently counterbalanced by her failure to critically analyze newer source material unavailable in 1892. She is often cited by the most recent work which touches on the dynasty (e.g. works concerning the trilingual decree from Xanthus, discussed below in section VII). There is no truly satisfactory account of Caria under Achaemenid rule.

²The key passages are Strabo 14.2.17=14.656-7, Diodorus 16.36.2, 16.45.7 (with 16.42.6), 16.69.2, 16.74.2, and Arrian Anab. 1.23.7-8.

³The existence of Hyssaldomos, father of Hekatomnos, is attested only in epigraphical evidence: SEG 12.470-471 (from Caunus), Robert Et.Anat. 571-3 (from Mylasa, with the title satrap), and Robert Sinuri 98-102 (no. 76 plus commentary). Robert Sinuri 100 also discusses an inscription in Istanbul which reads Aba Hyssaldomou and suggests this may be a sister of Hekatomnos. This remains a possibility: the name (after a change in sound from b to d) is most similar to the name borne by two generations of Hekatomnid women.

It is hoped that the appearance of Hyssaldomos as the father of Hekatomnos will bring to an end the attempts to tie the Hekatomnids to the fifth century dynasts of Halicarnassus. Cf. Bockisch 124n.3, 136-137, 136n.7, 137.n.1-2; Crampa Laubrandia II p. 7 plus notes 7-8. Judeich 232 should have had the last word.

⁴The regnal years based on Diodorus have been successfully defended in Judeich 226-232, and Beloch² 3:2 143-144. Both men accept Diod. 16.74.2 for the beginning of Pixodaros' reign over the implications of Diod. 16.69.2 (Ada holds power until 340/339). I concur. Judeich 227 explains Diodorus' error as a failure to coordinate properly regnal years and Olympiads.

The only piece² of evidence at odds with Diodorus which requires further comment is SIG² 573 (cf. SIG³ 167-170, the beginning of the general entry). The inscription in question (also known as CIG 2919 and LeBas-Waddington 1651) is from Tralles, of Roman date (dated by letter forms), and concerns the right of asylum in the temple of Dionysos Bakchios. The date in the prescript is problematic: Idrieus is satrap in year seven, month seven of Artaxerxes' reign. The number of years are indicated by seven vertical strokes. The implication is that in 352, while Artemisia is still alive, Idrieus is called satrap (on Beloch's reaction see below, note 12), a direct contradiction to Diodorus 16.45.7 (cf. 16.42.5). The issue is further clouded by the fragmentary SIG³ 170, from Mylasa, according to which Maussollos is satrap in year seven of Artaxerxes' reign (353/2, the year of Maussollos' death).

The inscription was quite controversial when first published and was subject to much debate about its authenticity, and about the identities of the Idrieus and Artaxerxes mentioned. See Judeich 228-232 and Dittenberger note 1 to SIG² 573. The inscription was dropped from SIG³.

Those who attacked the stone's authenticity called attention to the problematic dating and to a passage in Tacitus Ann. 3.60-63, in which cities of Asia Minor, Tralles not included, appeal before the Senate for retention of their much abused right of asylum in temples. SIG² 573, then, was a similar fabrication, designed to bolster a practice's antiquity. But, it seems unlikely that a forgery of this type would bear the name of Idrieus. The names "dropped by the envoys in Tacitus' account are those of exceedingly well-known men (the Persians are Cyrus and Darius). One would expect a forged decree to bear similarly prominent names, e.g. that of Maussollos, who appears frequently in literature and whose Mausoleum was still extant in Roman times.

Dittenberger, in note 1 to SIG² 573, had expressed much satisfaction with the suggestion of O. Mueller, that the seven vertical strokes were an improper reproduction of ΠΙΙΙΙ which appeared on the original stone. I believe Mueller was heading in the right direction, and that the inscription is a faulty Roman date reproduction of a Hekatomnid date original in which the regnal years of Artaxerxes III were reproduced incorrectly. Another Roman date reproduction of an earlier decree was published by Robert CRAI 1975, the Drophernes decree from Sardis, which appears to be a translation of parts of an Aramaic original (esp. 309-311).

I shall use SIG² 573, not as evidence for Hekatomnid regnal years, but as evidence for the expansion of Hekatomnid influence. Cf. Bockisch 166.

⁵ Strabo 14.656 indicates Maussollos died childless (atechnos), a statement supported by the fact his wife and, later, younger brothers and sister succeeded him.

⁶ Strabo 14.657 refers by name to Ada, daughter of Pixodaros and Aphneis. Plutarch Alex. 10.1 talks about the eldest of Pixodaros' daughters.

⁷ In Strabo 14.657, Ada the elder refers to her πικείους, which certainly must mean Orontopates and Ada, her niece and son-in-law (it is not known whether the other daughters of Pixodaros married). In 193 BC Pixodaros, son of Krates, from Mylasa, claimed to be an apogonos of Maussollos or at least was so viewed by the Delphic Amphictyony. See SIG³ 603. This claim is best viewed as similar to Hellenistic era pedigrees of Iranian dynasts who claimed descent from one of the Achaemenid Seven, or the claim of Julia Berenice in the second century AD to have been descended from King Seleucus (OGIS 263). Famous men often have more children than they imagined.

Crampa Labraunda II no. 28 (pp. 28-29), a statue base, was restored to read Αριαραμείας Μαυσσολλού. Crampa, basing his decision on letter forms, suggested 300 BC as a very approximate date. Robert and Robert "Bulletin Epigraphique" REG 86 (1973) 155 no. 406: "sans doute

vers 300 BC." Now, Crampa suggested that Ariarames might be related to the famous Maussollos (citing SIG³ 603 as a parallel), but one must accept Strabo and the realities of what dynasts succeeded Maussollos. The letter forms--the basis for dating (and note the Roberts' certainty) would rule our Ariarames as a son who predeceased Maussollos, i.e. died before 353/2. Maussollos was not an uncommon Carian name, and Ariarames' father may well have been named after the famous dynast. For a non-Hekatomnid Hekatomnos see Robert *Et. Anat.* 568 (line 7 of the inscription there quoted; perhaps of the Hekatomnid period, cf. 573, last sentence).

⁸Recent scholarship has downplayed the validity of Arrian's generalizations: Crampa *Labraunda* II p. 6, Badian *Schachermeyer Studies* 4ln.1. Bockisch 173-174 is less satisfactory.

⁹Bosworth *Arrian* I 152.

¹⁰The most reasonable assumption (cf. Head *BMC Caria* lxxxiii) is that Artemisia and Ada continued to mint coins in their husband's names. Unfortunately, detailed die and die-engraver studies on Hekatomnid coinage are still lacking, and only assumptions about the duration and sequence of issues are possible.

¹¹Crampa *Labraunda* II no. 40 (p. 39-40) is a decree of both Maussollos and Artemisia granting honors to the Cnossians. The context may be the time of the Social War. Note that in line 4 the phrase "the affairs of Maussollos" should indicate the primacy of the male dynast. SIG³ 168 represents a desire by Erythrae to honor the dynast Maussollos and his wife. His honors are more opulent. For a similar honoring of both husband and wife there are the representations of Idrieus and Ada at Tegea (SIG³ 225 commentary, Tod II 161a) and Delphi (SIG³ 225, Tod II 161b). Robert *Sinuri* no. 73 line 6 reads *te n entolen ten Idrieos kai Ada s*. I am quite uncertain whether this is indicative of any special juridical position for Hekatomnid women (cf. Robert *Sinuri* 96-97: a sharing of power is so indicated). I do not cite TAM II:3 no. 1183 in my text for all references to Artemisia are modern restorations. Cf. Judeich 256.

¹²One may compare the position of these Hekatomnid widows to two other political figures: Artemisia of Xerxes' time, and Mania, wife of Zenis, the subordinate to Pharnabazos. Herodotus (7.99, 8.68, 102-103, 107) makes it clear that the former was a competent political and military official. Mania successfully appeals to Pharnabazos on the same grounds for the retention of her position (Xen. *Hell.* 3.1.11-12). Artaxerxes III should not have expressed displeasure if Ada and Artemisia held sole power, provided they were competent, maintaining order and sending in tribute. The issue which Beloch² 3:2 144-145 raised, whether a woman could be satrap, is, then, something of a false one. One may state only that the Great King never named a woman of Persian extraction as top officer in a province. Indigenous political leaders could be another matter. Figures such as Xerxes and Pharnabazos preferred the

the advantages which accrued by having continuity in personnel (and policies). Artaxerxes III seems to have felt the same way.

There is one substantial difference between the Hekatomnid widows and the two female figures mentioned above. Both Artemisia (Hdt. 7.99.1) and Mania (Xen. Hell. 3.1.14) had young sons, and so could be thought of as holding power in trust for these future leaders. I would suggest that in the cases of the Hekatomnid women a counterbalance to a lack of male heirs was their direct blood descent from Hyssaldomos and Hekatomnos. A male heir was ultimately of little benefit to Mania; she was killed in family strife (Xen. Hell. 3.1.14).

¹³ I shall consider supposed textual difficulties with the passage when I discuss the rise of the Hekatomnid family.

¹⁴ The term "separatist ambitions" is used by Bosworth Arrian I 153. In the notes to this section I cite Judeich and Bockisch as the chief representatives of the standard interpretations: the former produced the basic work on the Persian far west in the fourth century, the latter is the type of readily available account to which contemporaries, e.g. Badian and Crampa, have turned.

¹⁵ Bernard Syria 41 (1964) 209n.1 (208-212 is an exemplary account of Persian cultural influence on Lycia). As for the charges of weak Persian control in Sparda and "Phrygia" (Dascylium? or inner Phrygia?), they cannot be substantiated by the historical record. Perhaps Isocrates is interpreting the disruptive activities of perennial recalcitrants such as the Mysians, Pisidians, and Paphlagonians as evidence for a native desire to throw off Achaemenid control.

¹⁶ In addition to the passage discussed in the text I note the following instances in which Isocrates makes claims about Persian weakness, the bulk of which occur in the Panegyricus:

4.140: the failure of the Egyptian campaign of 385-383 leads to renewed rebel expansion.

4.149: a general insult to Persian military strength

4.150-157: Isocrates slurs the Persian noble ethos of rule and misrepresents the practice of coopting recalcitrants.

5.99-105: insult of Artaxerxes III; Persian far west destabilized (I discuss this charge in detail in considering charges leveled against Maussollos and Idrieus).

6.62-63: a vague passage implying a pro-Hellenic attitude on the part of Achaemenid officials (usually cited as evidence for Ariobarzanes' actions).

9.61-64: excessively sanguine view of Euagoras' activities.

12.59-62: survey of Persian weakness during Athenian ascendancy (Peace of Kallias mentioned).

¹⁷ The charges are accepted by Judeich 235, Bockisch 142-143, Spyridakis 59.

¹⁸As reported and suggested in Reid Phoenix 28 (1974) 136n.37, 138, 138n.38.

¹⁹Judeich 237-240, Bockisch 149-151.

²⁰In the section on Hekatomnid internal administration I shall discuss those reconstructions of events (e.g. Judeich 236, Bockisch 144) which use the inscription to create an opposition party to Maussollos.

²¹We have already seen that Trogus is accurate in his chronological placement of the campaigns directed against Cyprus, Egypt, the Cadusians, and Datames.

²²An obvious example is Egypt: its destabilization had begun long before the 360's. Trouble in the Levant (Ebir-nari) was due to the expansionist activities of Egyptian rebels. Later in this chapter I shall indicate that troubles in Lycia were of a local nature: warfare between two dynasts, neither of whom can be labelled anti-Achaemenid at the outset of their strife. A full discussion of the satraps' revolt is given in the next chapter.

²³Judeich 240n.1 suggests a dispute over tribute as the context for the passage (he does not discuss aikisamenen). Bockisch 150n.5 cites the passage without comment. Dupont-Sommer in his discussion of the trilingual Xanthus decree cites the passage as evidence for the removal of Maussollos from his post as satrap by Artaxerxes III: CRAI 1974 140-142 plus 140n.1 and Xanthos VI 167, 167n.2. For discussion now see Badian Schachermeyer Studies 42-43 plus 42n.3.

²⁴Judeich 240 and Bockisch 151 cite the anecdote in the context of the satraps' revolt and its aftermath. van Groningen 99 suggests before 361 as a more precise context, when Maussollos is openly hostile to the crown (but Maussollos' claim here is a stunt), but before his return to a "loyalist" stance.

²⁵Judeich 239, 239n.2 believes the two variants to reflect a single incident (on 207 he places it after Datames' death). Bockisch 131 summarizes both anecdotes in her text, and places them in the context of the satraps' revolt. She fails to comment on them, but I believe that her separate citation of both texts indicates she believes them to be two different incidents. van Groningen 97 (which Bockisch fails to cite) argues that the anecdotes refer to separate incidents, placing Aristotle's in 364 because it implies only a passive resistance towards Susa on Maussollos' part.

²⁶van Groningen argues (99) that the anecdotes reported by Aristotle (first the incident in Mylasa, then the request for tribute) must be in

chronological order because they seem to come from a common source. Aristotle's use of palin deetheis chrematon to introduce the second anecdote might be indicative of the chronological order, but van Groningen does not discuss this possibility.

A similar phrase is used by Aristotle to introduce anecdotes about Dionysius of Syracuse (2.1349a 14- 1350a 5) and Memnon (2.1351b 1-18), but there, too, it is an uncertain indication of chronological order. van Groningen (141-142, 175) again does not discuss the phrase in considering the chronology of the incidents. I would maintain that neither anecdote about Maussollos has any precise chronological context and that they need not have been reported in chronological order by Aristotle.

²⁷Cf. van Groningen 99.

²⁸Failure of tribute to arrive need not be the fault of the satrap: note Nepos Datames 4.2, 5 on the fate of Ariobarzanes' tribute caravan.

²⁹As for the crown: the growth of the Hekatomnid navy and its use as an instrument for Persian expansion was invaluable to Susa. Recall that solution of the Greek problem came only after the creation of an independent Persian-commanded fleet which could operate at will in the Aegean without depending on any one Greek state in particular. As for Sparda: as I shall argue below, Hekatomnid influence over Lycia and the islands of the Aegean met with no hostility from the satrap at Sparda.

³⁰On Maussollos in the Social War see Cargill 178-179, 183, 193-194. I would agree with Cargill that Maussollos did not foment trouble, but suggest instead that he made himself "available" to the most compliant members of the native order.

³¹Note that in Dem 15.3-4 Maussollos' relations with the crown are not an issue. Demosthenes is interested only in establishing Maussollos' guilt as the initiator of troubles for Athens.

³²In 1883 Krumbholz (82-83) even believed there was war between Idrieus and Artaxerxes III (rejected by Judeich 251 n.2). The passage is still used in 1980 as evidence for Hekatomnid separatism (Bosworth Arrian I 153).

³³Badian Schachermeyer Studies 42-43 expresses a similar attitude towards Isocrates.

³⁴The usual context is the satraps' revolt. Cf. Bockisch 150 and 150n.5, labelled by Badian Schachermeyer Studies 43n.5 as fantasy. Judeich 240n.1 seems to have suggested the same, but is not rebuked.

³⁵Judeich 203n.2 and 234n.2 rightfully rejects attempts to create a new dynast.

³⁶ This interpretation, although a possible one, was never suggested because scholars universally have split Strabo's account in two, causing persisas (14.657) to be preceeded by Plutarch Alex. 10.1-4, making the word imply a shift in Pixodaros' sentiments from anti- to pro-Achaemenid. But this is not what Strabo's account says. See below, section VIII on Pixodaros and Orontopates.

³⁷ Note the evidence Bosworth Arrian I 153 has to use when claiming that Pixodaros continues Hekatomnid separatism: Diod. 15.90.3 (Maussollos as a rebel in the satraps' revolt), Isocrates 5.103 (Idrieus as a secret rebel), Dem 15.11ff (special pleading about Artemisia).

³⁸ The evidence will be discussed below in the sections on Lycia and Pixodaros.

³⁹ A summary of the elaborate reconstruction is given in Mayrhofer 280-282. One should read his section 7.3 before 7.2. This reconstruction of Pixodaros' marriage alliances was dogma before 1883 (see Krumbholz 83).

⁴⁰ Bockisch 122-129 gathers the evidence for pre-Hekatomnid Caria. The key features to note in the sixth and fifth century are the presence of many small scale political leaders (some with a navy) and the absence of a single crown-appointed satrap of Persian extraction. A convenient and excellent summary of western Carian dynasts can be found in Bean and Cook ABSA 52 (1957) 143-146. Diod. 11.60.4 is good evidence for the diverse nature of the sector and the fragmented nature of Achaemenid control.

The Persian functionary who would have the greatest supervisory role in Caria would be the satrap at Sparda (cf. Hdt. 5.103: the effect of a weakened Sparda; note Tissaphernes' later influence, and Amorges' use of Caria as a base of operations). Dynasts neighboring Caria might also exercise some influence (cf. Hdt. 5.118).

⁴¹ Robert Sinuri no. 76 (pp. 980-102), SEG 12.470-471, Crampa Labraunda II no. 27.

⁴² Robert Et. Anat. 571-573 for the Kondoleon fragment. Discussion in Et. Anat. 567-573, Sinuri 100.

⁴³ Robert Et. Anat. 573.

⁴⁴ That Susa perceived Hyssaldomos, and his heirs, as satraps does not preclude local perception of the family as dynasts, tyrants, etc. Susa was far away. For the variety of titulature in the literary sources see Krumbholz 84-85, although extensive discussion about the Hekatomnid

juridical position is unnecessary (for such discussion see Krumbholz 84-85, Bockisch 171-173).

⁴⁵Robert Et.Anat. 56-570 suggested the following readings for the "Tralles fragment": line 7, Hygasseon (a people of the Rhodian Peraea); line 8, Naryandeon (inland, near Hellenistic Stratonicea); line 9, Koarrendeon (inland, near Hellenistic Stratonicea, cf. SIG³ 311).

⁴⁶He is entitled dynast (Diod. 14.98.3, 15.2.3) and epistathmos (Isocrates 4.162, avoiding Persian terminology; cf. Harpocration sv. epistathmos) in the literary sources.

⁴⁷The problems which center upon Diodorus' account of troop recruitment have been discussed in chapter 3.

⁴⁸Krumbholz 80, cf. Judeich 234n.1.

⁴⁹As claimed in Judeich 234, Bockisch 137-138. See below, note 50.

⁵⁰Krumbholz 79; Kahrstedt RE 7 col. 2988 (stressing the need for haste in a crisis situation). Judeich, of course, did not know the existence of Hyssaldomos, and argues that Hekatomnos received the post of satrap between 395-390, i.e. after the death of Tissaphernes. He suggests (233-234) that Hekatomnos was substantially stronger than other native dynasts and had eclipsed a Carian Budesstaat or Bundesgemeinde (whose existence he infers from Hdt. 5.117-121 and Strabo 14.660). This Carian group is the recalcitrants in Suda sv. Dexippos.

Although Bockisch had the evidence on Hyssaldomos available, her reconstruction does not make substantial advances over Judeich's. She, too, attempts to explain the Hekatomnid rise to power in terms of native dynast v. some form of Carian Bund (see section IV). Bockisch 136-137.

⁵¹There were royalist Carians at Cunaxa (Plutarch Artaxerxes 10.3, 14; cf. Ctesias FGrH 688 fr. 26). Unfortunately, we know nothing about their commanders.

⁵²For Tissaphernes' Carian estates see Xen. Hell. 3.2.12. Lewis Sparta and Persia 83 believes he held them before Pissothnes' revolt--they may have been also a reward for success. Tithraustes confiscated Tissaphernes' property (Hell. Oxy. 19).

⁵³On Amorges at Iasus now see Gomme HCT V: VIII 67-68 (no fort to be assigned there to Amorges). A less likely possibility for Hyssaldomos is that he was a coopted former supporter of Amorges.

⁵⁴It should be noted that the sources do not explicitly assign Cyrus power over Caria: Xen. Anab. 1.9.7, Xen. Hell. 1.4.1-7, Plutarch Artaxerxes 2.2, Diod. 14.19.2. In Diod. 14.19.6 Cyrus makes no appointments in Caria.

⁵⁵For Mylasa's government see Tod II pp. 113-114 (comm. ad. no. 138). Crampa Labraunda II no. 41, pp. 40-41 is too fragmentary to allow discussion beyond Crampa's observations. We are really dealing with Hellenistic code-words for governments in existence before Alexander's invasion.

⁵⁶On Iasus Tod II p. 116 and Dittenberger's notes to SIG³ 169 (pp. 229-231).

⁵⁷The Koarendeis seem to exist during the time of Hyssaldomos. See Robert Et. Anat. 569-570.

⁵⁸On the authenticity of the inscription see note 4, above.

⁵⁹Robert Sinuri pp. 25-31 (the syngeneia), 94-103 (the Hekatomnids).

⁶⁰Discussion in Crampa Labraunda II pp. 42-47. The dating formula (lines 8-9) names Pixodaros as satrap without recording Artaxerxes' regnal years or his name. This should not be taken as anything significant since the inscription is only a copy of an earlier decree. For additional remarks on the taxes and on the structure of the Plataseis see Robert and Robert "Bulletin Epigraphique," REG 86 (1973) 156-157, no. 408. Note that royal taxes take precedence.

⁶¹I am unable to say how much significance should be placed on the fact that some of the documents are dated with Shah and satrap (SIG³ 167 and 170, SIG² 573, Crampa Labraunda II no. 42--see above--and the original decision in SIG³ 311) and others with dates of local significance (Robert Sinuri no. 73, SIG³ 169). The appearance of Shah and satrap are a sign of their power, but not of their imposing a dating formula. Their appearance in Mylasa's decrees is understandable, for this was the Hekatomnid ancestral seat.

⁶²The occasional appearance of the ethnic Mylaseus in inscriptions is best described as polite in the case of Idrieus at Labraunda (Crampa Labraunda II nos. 17-18, the only examples in which it actually survives), or as an attempt to maintain some civic pride (in SIG³ 168 line 3, a decree of Erythrae; cf. Crampa Labraunda II p. 6n.4 for a view polite to the city, with which Robert Sinuri 100-102 concurs).

⁶³A full array of scholars' thoughts may be found in note 70, below.

⁶⁴Cf. note 50; the Bundesstaat is a fount for opposition: Judeich 233-234, 235-236, 236n.3.

⁶⁵Crampa Labraunda I pp. 33-35.

⁶⁶Robert Et.Anat. 571; the evidence cited in 571n.2 is Hellenistic in date.

⁶⁷Cf. note 55, above, on Mylasa's government.

⁶⁸As does Robert Et.Anat. 570.

⁶⁹Robert's suggestions were accepted in Tod II p. 115, which cites Et.Anat. 571. Bockisch (129-132), however, does not seem to mention the reference in her unsatisfactory discussion of the koinon. The koinon reappears in Crampa Labraunda I p. 35, now called to koinon tōn Karōn.

⁷⁰Scholars have been quite imaginative in discerning the background to Arlissis' treachery, and in emphasizing the role of the illusory koinon of the Carians. Dittenberger SIG³ p. 227n.6: The Carians wish to complain about Maussollos' harsh rule and so dispatch Arlissis. This suggestion is tied to the belief in note 5 that hypo Karōn implies a "commune concilium." Head BMC Caria lxxxii-lxxxiii also places much emphasis on the illusory koinon: it hates Maussollos. In general, Head is excessively sanguine about the autonomy of the koinon and Carian cities. SIG³ 167 is even regarded as a decree of the koinon. Judeich 236-239 combines the dissident feelings of the koinon with Maussollos' own recalcitrance towards the crown (as evidenced by his synoikism of Halicarnassus--certainly a move to lessen royal control). The koinon will further its own aims by weakening the satrap's position. Bockisch 143-144 echoes Judeich: koinon v. satrap, the former angered over Maussollos' consolidation of his power. Moysey 125 implies acceptance of Judeich's interpretation, but fails to discuss SIG³ 167 itself.

Note that in each explanation there is the assumption that the Hekatomnids eclipsed some wide-ranging form of native government and now represent an order imposed by outsiders.

I should like to add a hypothesis which is perhaps a bit more reasonable: In 370 another local man had claimed that a seemingly loyal man was actually a rebel. Sysinas spoke against his father Datames (Nepos Datames 7.1). A campaign was launched. It proved costly and unsuccessful. Datames the "rebel" was coopted (Nepos Datames 7-8). Perhaps Artaxerxes was in no mood for unsubstantiated charges. I would suggest further that by 367/6 two other events occurred: Negotiations between Datames' envoys and Susa (Nepos Datames 8.6); Orders had gone out to Augophradates and Maussollos to begin operations against the rebel Ariobarzanes. Arlissis made his move at the wrong time.

⁷¹Head BMC Caria lxxxiii claims they are "adherents of the old Carian party". Judeich 239 and Bockisch 150 see serious political overtones,

and connect the incident with Maussollos' stance in the satraps' revolt.

⁷²Judeich 245 suggests a possible tie between the attempt and Maussollos' death. Bockisch 146 involves the Carian koinon. Head BMC Caria lxxxii-lxxxiii preferred a nationalist party. Crampa Labraunda II p. 51 (commentary on 1.3-4 of no. 43) is very sanguine about the fate of Thyssos' family. He identifies a Syskes active in the mid-third century as Thyssos' grandson.

⁷³A few examples may be given here. Slandering and tattling: Sysirias against Datames (Nepos Datames 7.1), Aristagoras against Artaphernes (Hdt. 5.4); Vandalism: Diod. 16.41.5, a prelude to open rebellion; Assassination: the plots against Datames (Nepos Datames 9, supposedly inspired by Susa).

⁷⁴The date is local and cannot be translated into an absolute date. Judeich 226n3 places the decree in the context of the first plot against Maussollos. Bockisch 144 would place it earlier, assuming longer Hekatomnid influence.

⁷⁵One may compare to SIG³ 169, SIG³ 168, an undated inscription from Erythrae which granted considerable honors to Maussollos. It may be suggested that the inscription, an adumbration of the respect shown by Greek poleis to Hellenistic monarchs, may be one of the last in a series of events which began with a stasis. Judeich 264 suggests the Social War as a context for the decree. Bockisch 161 assumes the pro-Hekatomnids were oligarchs.

⁷⁶Briant "Forces Productives," esp. 24-37.

⁷⁷In some basic aspects of their administration the Hekatomnids seem to mimic the Shahs: Maussollos has a bodyguard (Polyaenus 7.23.2), there are "royal roads" in Caria (Arist. Oec. 2.1348a 24: most likely maintained by the satrap), Maussollos has garrisons (implied in Diod. 15.90.3: the erumata; Bean and Cook ABSA 50 (1955) 168 perceive garrisons designed to prevent reoccupation of old sites abandoned in the course of urban development. The hostility they assume is not in the evidence, e.g. Strabo 13.611).

⁷⁸Strabo 13.611, 14.656-657; Diod. 15.90.3, 17.23.4; Vitruvius 7.8. 11-14 are basic on Halicarnassus and its synoikism. The view that urban development was hostile to the crown is found in Judeich 237-239, who adds that the synoikism of Halicarnassus aroused hatred on Cos. Bean and Cook ABSA 50 (1955) 169 place the synoikism in 370-365; they suggest (p. 145) that Myndus and Synangela did continue to exist, but were rebuilt. For a good summary of Hekatomnid interest in urban development see Bean and Cook ABSA 52 (1957) 138-143.

⁷⁹ This seems to be true, too, for Syria (Xen Anab. 1.4.10) and Egypt (Memphis, e.g. Thucyd. 1.104). The Achaemenid Persians were not a sea-going people by nature.

⁸⁰ So Bean and Cook ABSA 52 (1957) 142 plus 142n.353. Diod. 15.76. 2 places the change in site in 366/5. Strabo 14.657 indicated that a stasis caused the move, but does not say anything about the stasis itself. A passage from Aristotle (Pol. 5.1304b) is taken to record that stasis: demagogues exercised a deleterious influence and they were supported by the gnōrimoi. The context of this passage is uncertain and Maussollos is not mentioned (he is absent in the Strabo and Diochorus passages, too). The role of the Second Athenian Sea League is problematic: The most recent treatment, by Cargill, holds (37) that Cos did appear on the decree of Aristoteles (IG II² 43; now see Cargill 15-27). One might suggest the gnōrimoi were pro-Hekatomnid and exploited the demagogues to effect their own rise to power. Unfortunately we have only the labels for politicians and not their actions.

⁸¹ In general on Hekatomnids and sanctuaries see L. Robert CRAI 1953 403-415 = Opera Minora Selecta III 1525-1537. On Labraunda, summary in Crampa Labraunda II pp. 6-8, 188.

Honoring temples: Crampa Labraunda II no. 27, mentioning Hekatomnos' dedication, shows early Hekatomnid interest at the site. Sizeable building activity later is carried out by Maussollos (nos. 13-14), and continued by Idrieus (nos. 15-19).

For Sinuri: Robert Sinuri no. 76 (Hekatomnos), nos. 73 and 75 (Idrieus).

Alteration in temple procedure is implied at Labraunda by Crampa Labraunda II nos. 53-54, cf. Robert and Robert "Bulletin Epigraphique" REG 86 (1973) 158 no. 412.

Requests of Temple Authorities: Robert Sinuri no. 73 (esp. 1. 6) and pp. 94-97; cf. no. 75 and p. 98.

Statuary for the Hekatomnids (exclusive of Maussolleum): SEG 12.470-471 at Caunus (Hekatomnos and Maussollos); SIG³ 225 commentary (cf. Tod II no. 161a) at Tegea (stele with Zeus, Idrieus, and Ada); SIG³ 225 (cf. Tod II no. 161b) at Delphi by the Milesians (statues of Idrieus and Ada dedicated to Apollo); the Hekatomnids were remembered fondly at Delphi, cf. SIG³ 603, from 193 BC.

⁸² Further study is required on Hekatomnid coinage: I am unable to cite numismatic evidence for the precise sequence of issues or for the location of Hekatomnid mints. Most of the standard studies of coinage from the Persian west simply group together examples based on physical appearance (i.e. similarities of types and inscription) and then make rudimentary observations. These observations need to be followed up with die studies, including examination of the "hands" of the die engravers. The observations on continuity or discontinuity in mint personnel, combined with observations on the number and quality of dies used, allow educated assumptions about internal stability in a sector because coinage reflects internal administration.

⁸³ There is no coinage which can be assigned to Hyssaldomos. In the coinage of Hekatomnos one notes the appearance of types drawn from Miletus; coins with those types are assigned to Hekatomnos on the basis of the obverse inscription EKA. See Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 139-144, nos. 82-87. Additional literature cited in Bockisch 138n.4. The "Milesian" types were puzzling to early numismatists (Judeich 24ln.2 for early views), and there is no evidence that Miletus was a Hekatomnid mint (as Bockisch 138 claims). Entities who begin minting coins will start by imitating widely circulating contemporary types.

⁸⁴ Continuity between the issues of Hekatomnos and Maussollos may be seen, e.g. Six NC (1890) 230-231 no. 23 (an early issue). For Hekatomnid coinage I give the following references: the works chosen are standard ones and represent those numismatists most responsible for setting the coinage in order:

Maussollos: Six NC (1890) pp. 230-231, nos. 23-26
 Head BMC Caria p. 181, nos. 1-15
 Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 145-150, nos. 88-99
 Additional references: Bockisch 144 n.9

Idrieus: Head BMC Caria p. 183, nos. 1-7
 Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 151-154, nos. 100-104
 Additional references: Bockisch 165n.6

Pixodaros (also, below, section VIII):
 Head BMC Caria pp. 184-188, nos. 1-15
 Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 153-158, nos. 105-114
 Additional references: Bockisch 166n.5

Orontopates: Six NC (1890) p. 244 (Salmacis a mint)
 Head BMC Caria pl. XLV, no. 4 (AR drachm)
 Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 157-160, nos. 114-116
 Additional references: Bockisch 169n.3

⁸⁵ Halicarnassus: civic coinage, influenced by Rhodian types, ceases once the satrapial capital is moved there. So Head BMC Caria liv-lv, 102-103; Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 1001-1004.

Iasus: a small series of "alliance coins" of Cnidus, Samus, Ephesus, Rhodes, and Iasus terminate supposedly with the onset of Hekatomnid influence. So Head BMC Caria lix-lx.

Mylasa: seemingly no civic coinage; coinage seems tied to the dynasts and Mylasa serves as mint until satrapial seat shifted. Coinage from a Mylasan mint resumes under the Macedonian general Eupolemus. So Head BMC Caria lxii-lxiv, esp. lxiii plus pl. xxvii no. 1 and page 110 n.1; also pl. xxi nos. 11-12 plus. p. 128 nos. 1-6 (only bronze).

⁸⁶ Rhodes: no visible Hekatomnid influence in coinage; in fact, Rhodian influence on Hekatomnid coinage is powerful. See Head BMC Caria pp. 231-234; Babelon Traite 2:2 p. 1014.

Cos: no Hekatomnid or Rhodian influence on types. See Head BMC Caria pp. 194-197 nos. 10-41; Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 1031-1042.

Cnidus: lion protome appears, but too infrequently to assume influence from Hekatomnos' issues. See Head BMC Caria pp. 88-90, nos. 28-39; Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 977-996.

Astyra: use of Rhodian types (Helios). See Head BMC Caria pp. 60-61 nos. 8-19 (obv. of nos. 8-10 resemble Hekatomnid issues); Babelon Traite 2:2 pp. 975-978 nos. 1616-1621.

⁸⁷To recap for clarity: Aristotle indicates the Shah requests tribute and Maussollos raises it by stratagem; Polyaeus indicates Maussollos alleges royal hostility if "gifts" are not sent, the nature of these gifts is listed.

⁸⁸Cf. note 60, above.

⁸⁹van Groningen 103-104 discusses Kondalos' position and decides that he is a finance officer. I believe it is best to interpret hyparchos in this instance as a position subordinate to the satrap rather than assigning a specific function to the title.

⁹⁰Earlier accounts of Maussollos' participation in the satraps' revolt all believe him to be a rebel after 366, but before 361/0: Krumbholz 80-81; Judeich 202-207, 239-241; Kahrstedt RE 14:2 cols. 2414-2416; Beloch² 3:2 256-257; Olmstead 413, 415, 425-429; Meloni 12-13, 26-27; Bockisch 149-151; Moysey 110 and 110n.37.

Judeich's is the standard account and works in the koinon and the belief that urban development is inimical to royal control. A more elaborate version of Maussollos' rocky career is now given in those accounts which hold the Xanthus decree is to be dated to 358. I cite as an example here Dupont-Sommer Xanthos VI 165-169. Full bibliographic references and discussion are offered in section VII, below.

⁹¹A word is necessary on the significance of the locations of Sestus and Assus, and on chronology. Assus, in the southern Troad, is representative of those regions located in the intersection of spheres of influence: it is possible for either the satrap at Dascylium or the satrap at Sparda to exercise control over the region. Tension between the satraps may result. Sestus is an example of a situation when a successful satrap exercises control over regions one might not normally associate with the usual limits of his sphere. Before the collapse of Persian Europe, Sestus, the Chersonese, and the Thraceward regions were under control of a commander independent from the satrap at Dascylium (Hdt. 9.116 implies the satrap at Sestus was the master for Persian Europe).

The chronology for events is established by Judeich 202-203 (with notes) and has won wide acceptance. The establishment of 366-365 as the date for operations depends on the chronology which can be established for operations at Samos. Judeich (202, 202n.1) believes that naval and land operations at Assus, Sestus, and Adramyttium (Polyaeus 7.26) were

part of a single coordinated campaign, and that Kotys and Maussollos were allies. I prefer to see the operations at Adramyttium as part of the same general campaign against Ariobarzanes, but not carried out simultaneously with the other troop movements. Kotys is better seen as an opportunist exploiting the destabilization in Ariobarzanes' sphere.

The events in Xen. Ages. 2.27 are assigned by Judeich (203-204, 203-204n.1) to 364-363 because he believes that the contact between Agesilaus and Maussollos and Agesilaus and Tachos must be contemporary. I argue against this position in the text, below.

⁹² All evidence relating to Lycia will be discussed in section VII, below.

⁹³ Xen. Ages. 2.26 simply reports Maussollos had a fleet of 100 ships. How many of these were Carian? Some within the fleet may have been drawn from Sparda but were under Maussollos' command. Note that Autophradates seems in command of both land and sea forces in Polyaeus 7.26.

⁹⁴ Xen. Ages. 2.27 itself offers an example: In 2.26 Maussollos is persuaded to leave--fear plays no role. But in 2.27 Maussollos is obviously the example illustrating those who fled Agesilaus but were among those giving him money. One may also note the jibes against Tissaphernes (1.17) and the exaggeration of the effects of his death (1.35). Xen. Hell. 4.1.1 conceals the setbacks of Agesilaus in his campaigns on the 390's (reported in Hell. Oxy. 21-22).

⁹⁵ Xen. Ages. 2.25 introduces the incidents by indicating that Agesilaus did the deeds of a great general while actually an envoy. The statement would seem to rule out Agesilaus' bringing with him a large military force--Spartan or mercenary. Cf. Judeich 202n.2.

⁹⁶ For the possibility of a truce during campaigns against rebel satraps see Nepos Datames 8.5-6. In this instance the campaign was going badly for Autophradates. Diplomacy can also be found, although as part of a ruse, in Polyaeus 7.26.

⁹⁷ Perhaps to prevent elements of Ariobarzanes' forces from moving through the straits to his support?

⁹⁸ The dates given by Judeich (203-204, 203-204n.1) help fill this gap. Repeated by Moysey 85-86.

⁹⁹ Moysey 85n.81 attempts to find a context: The Hekatomnids pay protection money to Sparta in the 390's so that Agesilaus won't invade. However, the sources for Agesilaus' campaigns seem to intimate (e.g. Xen. Hell. 3.4.12, 21) that moves or suspected moves towards Caria were a ruse designed to fool Tissaphernes.

Agesilaus' xenoi in Asia were perhaps quite numerous. Plutarch Mor. 212e refers to tous ep' Asias xenous. Also note the boast in Xen. Ages. 1.35. But both anecdotes are too general to be used to shed light on Agesilaus' relations with the Hekatomnids.

¹⁰⁰ Autophradates uses Greek mercenaries against Datames (Nepos Datames 8.2). Those states who sent their nationals into Asia as mercenaries had to display digression (cf. Dem. 15.9; SIG³ 182, cf. Tod II no. 145, a good illustration of Greek self-interest).

¹⁰¹ I would hesitate to see in this incident anything resembling the "bidding war" for the Spartan fleet carried on by Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes in the previous century.

¹⁰² There are textual difficulties: the mss. read tacheōs, corrected to tachōs, i.e. the rebel king. Cf. Judeich 203n.2.

¹⁰³ I am hesitant to take oikade literally. As for Assus as the context, I note that Olmstead 413 implies this, but presents no arguments.

¹⁰⁴ I should indicate here, although briefly, that the campaigns against Ariobarzanes resulted in the destabilization of Ariobarzanes' sphere. This, combined with the vigorous forward policy of Egyptian rebels and the self-aggrandizement of Orontes, created the need for numerous policing activities by officials in Persian service. So Autophradates' moves against Ephesus (Polyaenus 7.27.2) and the Pisidians (Polyaenus 7.27.1, Frontinus 1.4.5). Maussollos' activities which result in the extension of Hekatomnid influence may be seen in part in this light. Could this be a context for the stasis at Iassus?

¹⁰⁵ There are no dated references to Autophradates later than 362/1 (Diod. 15.90.3). It seems highly unlikely that he was replaced for reasons of incompetence and rebellion. His predecessor Tiribazos ended his career (and ultimately his life) at court; in Susa? Autophradates could have died in office or have been retired with honor. Since his first command is in 390--he would have been at the very least twenty, probably older, given his post's importance--Autophradates was approaching old age by the late 350's, probably a near contemporary in age with Maussollos. A death-date in the late 350's is not unlikely.

His successor, Rhoesaces, first appears in 343 (Diod. 16.47.1-2: there are chronological problems here), and is perhaps a scion of Spithridates, the one-time disgruntled officer of Pharnabazos who set off to Sparda in 395 (Xen. Hell. 4.1.27). See Bosworth Arrian I 111-112. If so, Rhoesaces' home sector, his place of origin, is properly Sparda, and we may further speculate that he was not inactive in political and military affairs under Autophradates. There is seemingly no tension between Rhoesaces and his Hekatomnid contemporaries: perhaps he had met them sometime before his appointment.

¹⁰⁶The passage is usually emended to read Lykiōn: Judeich 242n.3, Bockisch 152n.7, Metzger Xanthos VI 37n.30 in favor of the emendation; Krumbholz 81 against.

¹⁰⁷Cf. note 75, above. Judeich 244, 244n.1 discusses the context of the decree. Cf. Bockisch 161, 161n.4: Social War.

¹⁰⁸It is difficult to determine how compliant the civic leaders of Erythrae remained. Circa 350 BC (Tod's date) Erythrae was friendly with the political boss Hermeias (SIG³ 229, cf. Tod II no. 165, date on p. 188) who was later liquidated. Pro-Persian sentiments and the desire to erase memory of them seem indicated in Callisthenes FGrH 124 fr. 14a (Strabo 17.1.43) and Welles RC 15 (the reference to the grants of autonomy in the Hellenistic period usually means the removal of any remaining pro-Persian politicians).

¹⁰⁹Plutarch Lysander 3.3 reports that in the late fifth century Ephesus, surrounded by territories under Sparda's control, was used by local Persian officials as a sort of headquarters.

¹¹⁰Autophradates: Judeich 207n.1, placed during the satraps' revolt in a context with Dem. 23.154. Judeich 261 indicates Herophytus wins freedom for Ephesus in the mid-fourth century (the context he assigns for Polyaeus 7.23.2).

¹¹¹Roth (in Roos' Teubner edition) suggested that Heropythus in Arr. Anab. 1.17.11 be emended to Herophytus, based on Polyaeus 7.23.2. The two men have been identified, e.g. in Badian Ehrenberg Studies p. 62n. 18, cf. p. 40. Also Moysey 127.

¹¹²Eg. Bosworth Arrian I 131-133, Heisserer 58-60 discuss Arrian's evidence, but fail to work out the "pre-history" of the events.

¹¹³He may have already been dead and the taphos a monument. Otherwise he would have been in exile about 20 years.

¹¹⁴I do not perceive a situation analogous to Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-7 since we have no evidence for tension between Maussollos and Autophradates. It is unlikely that Maussollos would have acted to detach Miletus from Autophradates and so weaken Achaemenid control overall.

¹¹⁵361 is suggested as the date by Judeich 241; Bockisch 151-152 seems to place the incident in the context of the satraps' revolt.

¹¹⁶A Charimenes of Miletus operated against Perrcles of Lycia at Phaselis (Polyaeus 5.42), a city later in Maussollos' hands (TAM II:3

no. 1183). It may be possible that Charimenes' activities were in Maussollos' service and one of the benefits of a compliant Miletus. Borchhardt Bauskulptur 99 would place the passage before the satraps' revolts, and so remove the possibility of Maussollos' influence on Charimenes' actions.

¹¹⁷For Glaucippus: Berve no. 229; Bosworth Arrian I p. 138 adds evidence from Inscr. Milet. 122 ii 75, 78 on Glaucippus' sons.

¹¹⁸This extent of Glaucippus' career may help remove some of Tod's loss to explain SIG³ 225 (Tod II p. 181). Cf. Bockisch 165n.6.

¹¹⁹See the discussion in note 4, above.

¹²⁰Diod. 16.7.3-4, hypotheses to Dem. 24, Dem. 5.3-4, 25, 15.27.

¹²¹On Pugela: Strabo 14.120 (14.640); Harpocration sv. Pugela = Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 59.

¹²²For the identity of the Artemisia mentioned see Judeich 250n.1.

¹²³For discussion of the campaigns in general see Judeich 241, 249, 261 and Bockisch 151n.5.

¹²⁴The inscriptions and the re-dating are discussed in Bosworth Arrian I 243.

¹²⁵On the date see Beloch² 3:2 260-262.

¹²⁶Hypotheses to Dem. 24, Dem. 15.3-4 plus scholia, 5.25 (the scholia say it is Maussollos, but it may well be Idrieus).

¹²⁷Vitruvius reports that the Rhodians felt that control of Caria by Artemisia was improper and so acted to destroy her power. This motivation seems unlikely.

¹²⁸On Maussollos, Artemisia, and the islands in general see Bockisch 152-163, Judeich 243-245, 248. On Rhodes' continued pro-Achaemenid stance see Hauben Historia 26 (1977) 307-339.

¹²⁹The date has been debated. Judeich 133-136 places the campaign in 351 (the date implied by Diodorus' description of Idrieus) and believes Isocrates 5.102 to refer to Euagoras' dispute with Pnytagoras (as in Diod. 16.46.3). Beloch² 3:2 100, 287 set the campaign in 344 (Diodorus' description of Idrieus as one only recently in power is mistaken).

A full discussion of Cypriote events in the 340's may be found in chapter 7.

¹³⁰ There is no reason to believe, as does Moysey 173, that Mausso-lloc's untrustworthy nature was the reason he was not assigned to campaigns close to Dascylium.

¹³¹ Robert and Robert "Bulletin Epigraphique" REG 86 (1973) 155 no. 407.

¹³² Cf. Bernard's assessment, above, note 15.

¹³³ G. F. Hill "The Coinage of Lycia," NC 1895 1-44. One may also consult his BMC Lycia of two years hence.

¹³⁴ Mørkholm JNG 14 (1964) 65-76.

¹³⁵ Cf. the remarks by Demargne Xanthos V 113 on attempts to fix an exact date for the lengthy TAM I 44 by focusing on the name Milasandra (Melesandros).

¹³⁶ Standard accounts (with which I am in general agreement) may be found in: Borchhardt Bauskulptur 99-108, cf. AA 85 (1970) 386-387; Demargne Xanthos V 85-87, 137-139; Metzger CRAI 1974 87-88, Xanthos VI 34-36.

They supplement the nineteenth century accounts in Judeich 240-243 and Treuber 101-106.

Olmstead 391-392 is no longer satisfactory. See Demargne Xanthos V p. 86n.73.

Other dynasts minted coins in the first half of the fourth century, but it is difficult to suggest these figures' precise historical context or role.

¹³⁷ It is tempting to add recalcitrant Lycians to the list of possible identities for the unnamed rebels in Nepos Datames 2.1.

¹³⁸ The evidence of the funerary inscriptions is summarized in Borchhardt Bauskulptur 103-104. On his coins it is most convenient to consult Borchhardt AA 85 (1970) 388-389 and Bauskulptur 105-108. The Lycians are a people with a naval capacity as far back as the early fifth century (Hdt. 7.92, 98).

¹³⁹ On the fall of Telmessos Borchhardt Bauskulptur 100 opts for 372, the date proposed in Treuber 103n.1 (i.e. after the death of Euagoras of Cyprus).

¹⁴⁰ General discussion of Artumpara (and his coinage) may be found in Atlan Anatolia 3 (1958) 89-95, Mørkholm JNG 14 (1964) 73-74, Borchhardt

AA 85 (1970) 386-387, Bauskulptur 100-102.

As for his national origin: Among the words in TAM I 29, line 7, scholars often read medese, i.e. Mede. So Benveniste Titres et noms 101 and Borchhardt Bauskulptur 100-102. This word division is rejected by Metzger Xanthos VI 35n.24. To Bernard 209 Artumpara is a Lycian with an Iranian name.

Metzger Xanthos VI 35 also regards the Artumpara in TAM I 29 as different from the one in TAM I 11 and 104b because of the appearance of Alexander in the inscription. The owner of the tomb on which TAM I 29 is inscribed may simply have lived through the careers of both men.

¹⁴¹There is a coin minted (a tetrobol, Persian weight standard) with obverse and reverse types found on coins of Side which by relative chronology cannot be placed earlier than 380 BC. On the obverse appears a pomegranate, sign of Side, and on the reverse an inscription in Lycian characters, restored as Art umpara. This coin--SNG von Aulock no. 4184, ex. coll. Jameson no. 1593a--is published and discussed by Atlan and Morkholm (see note 140). The coin may precede Pericles' expansion.

¹⁴²Some progress has been made in translating the reference to Alexander in Carruba 280. LaRoche in Xanthos VI argues the inscription is after 334-30 (p. 55).

¹⁴³On the visual glorification of Payava see Demargne Xanthos V 68-85. For the tomb inscription (TAM I 40) see LaRoche in Demargne Xanthos V 137-139.

¹⁴⁴A brief discussion with bibliography may be found in ML no. 93 pp. 282-283: cf. Bosworth Arrian I 156.

¹⁴⁵The suggestion in Borchhardt IstMitt. 17 (1967) 166 that Pericles may have taken refuge with Strato of Sidon seems far-fetched.

¹⁴⁶On attempts to emend Lucian dial.mort. 24 to read Lycians see note 106.

¹⁴⁷I would prefer to see Charimenes in Maussollos' service and accept the context suggested in Judeich 242n.2 (cf. 256) and Metzger Xanthos VI 35n.27. Borchhardt Bauskulptur 99, however, places the incident much earlier.

¹⁴⁸The text reads "Solumoi, hoi nun Pisidai, Solumous kaloumenous parelthōn Mausōlou." See Trueber 105 and 107n.1.

¹⁴⁹There is no need to identify Kondalos with the who bear the Lycian equivalent of his name. van Groningen 99, cf. Treuber 106.

¹⁵⁰The bibliography is already unwieldy. The following are of value here:

Badian Schachermeyer Studies 40-50 (redated inscription).
Carruba Studie Micineî ed Ego-Anatolici 67 (1978) 273-278.

Dupont-Sommer CRAI 1974 132-149.

LaRoche CRAI 1974 115-125.

Mayrhofer Anzeiger der phil.-hist. Klasse der O.A.W. 112 (1975) 274-282.

Metzger CRAI 1974 82-93.

Metzger, Dupont-Sommer, LaRoche, Mayrhofer Xanthos VI 1979

Neumann Neufunde lykischer Inschriften seit 1901. 1979, with more bibliography.

SEG 27.942 with more bibliography.

Teixidor JNES 37 (1978) 181-186.

¹⁵¹See Judeich 252n2.

¹⁵²On the interpretation of the Aramaic see Teixidor 182.

¹⁵³Cf. Teixidor 181.

¹⁵⁴Proposed: Dupont-Sommer CRAI 1974 139-142, Xanthos VI 166-168.
Accepted: Demargne CRAI 1974 590; Dupont-Sommer CRAI 1976 651, 658;
Robert REG 87 (1974) 290-292 no. 553; Borchhardt Dorner Festschrift 183;
Mayrhofer 281-282; Teixidor 181.

¹⁵⁵Dupont-Sommer CRAI 1974 139-142, Xanthos VI 165-169. Mayrhofer 281-282.

¹⁵⁶Proposed: Badian Schachermeyer Studies 40-50. Accepted: Bosworth Arrian I 153; SEG 27.942; Robert REG 90 (1977) 413 no. 472.

Dupont-Sommer had access to Badian's article in preparing Xanthos VI. His reply to Badian (166n.1) addresses only the absence of evidence for Arses' Thronname but not the weaknesses of his own view in CRAI 1974, which he then goes on to present again.

¹⁵⁷Evidence relating to Achaemenid Thronnamen has been collected by Schmitt BzNF 12 (1977) 422-425. He misses Diod. 15.93.1, while Badian misses as a parallel. Bosworth Arrian I 355-356 catches both, but does not cite Schmitt's work, which appeared too late.

Note that the Arsacids used Thronnamen from the start (in imitation of Achaemenid practice?).

¹⁵⁸Badian's date renders more reasonable Borchhardt's views (Dorner Festschrift 183-191) about Carian cultural influence in Limyra.

¹⁵⁹Cf. Teixidor, cited in note 152; also: Metzger Xanthos VI 37-38, LaRoche Xanthos VI 62-63, Dupont-Sommer Xanthos VI 143-144, 148.

¹⁶⁰Dupont-Sommer Xanthos VI 144, CRAI 1974 132.

¹⁶¹Borchhardt Dorner Festschrift 183-184 suggested the two archontes were posted at Xanthus and Limyra. This is more reasonable if the inscription is dated to 337, long after Pericles' demise.

As for satrapial supervision of religious matters there seem to be no hard and fast rules. In sixth century Egypt Pherendates had to submit a list of priests to Darius for approval (Spiegelberg SBA 1928 605-611), no doubt because of the recent troubles and the general importance of the priesthood in Egypt.

¹⁶²Metzger Xanthos VI 37. He suggests the epimeletes was perhaps a civil governor for Xanthos. For the uncertainty over these posts see Badian Schachermeyer Studies 44-45.

¹⁶³Realistically, Arses was in no position to object himself. The Shah here is a chronological convenience.

¹⁶⁴For comment see Bosworth Arrian I 156-157. The point to note in Bosworth's account is that Lycia was separated from Caria and grouped with Pamphylia as a single sphere of operations (cf. Artumpara and note 141, above). Briant Antigone 75-76 suggests this grouping was a temporary measure after the Persian naval collapse, and that the sectors were later joined to Antigonos' Phrygian sphere.

¹⁶⁵Discussed in section I.

¹⁶⁶Krumbholz 83, cf. 79 and the citation of Pohla's work.

¹⁶⁷Berve no. 594 (Orontopates), 640 (Pixodaros); Badian Phoenix 17 (1963) 245; Hamilton Plutarch Alexander 25; Ellis Philip II 217-218; Hammond and Griffith History of Macedonia II 679-680; Bosworth Arrian I 153. These are the standard commentaries.

¹⁶⁸Badian's perception (see note 167).

¹⁶⁹Bosworth's perception (see note 167).

¹⁷⁰337 as a date: Badian Phoenix 17 (1963) 245, Ellis Philip II 217-218. Hamilton Plutarch Alexander 25: after 338.

¹⁷¹Popular support for Ada is indicated only by Diodorus 17.24.2-3. The Achaemenid defense of the satrapy belies this.

¹⁷²The warfare between Philip and Arsites will be discussed in the last chapter. Arsites' mercenaries: Pausanias 1.29.10, cf. Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 222 (Didymus 9.43-52); Thrace: Arr. Anab. 2.14.5, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 217-223, Polyaeus 4.4.1, Frontinus 1.4.13; Chares; Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 292, Philochorus FGrH 328 fr. 162 (Didymus 10.34-11.5).

Pixodaros' participation is alleged by Judeich 251-252, 301n.1 and Bockisch 168-169. Hence Pixodaros goes from pro- to anti- to pro-Achaemenid, all the time remaining separatist.

¹⁷³On Hekatomnid coinage see note 86, above. Head BMC Caria lxxxiv discusses gold coinage, which he also sees as a result of lax Persian control. That the right to strike gold was restricted to the Shah is a modern asseveration: J. deMorgan Manuel de Numismatique Oriental 35 so indicates.

Chapter VI. Sly Infidelities: Destabilizations in the Achaemenid
Far West, 368-359

Section I. Introductory

If any incident in the history of the Achaemenid far west during the fourth century can be held up by moderns as an example of the overall weakness and instability of Achaemenid control, it is the so-called "Great Satraps' Revolt." In reconstructions based on an almost unquestioned acceptance of data presented in Diodorus 15.90-93, onto which are tacked anecdotal notations from a variety of historians and orators plus abused epigraphical and numismatic evidence, modern historians have presented a massive destabilization of the Achaemenid far west, a well-organized and serious threat to Achaemenid control, a threat which, surprisingly, swiftly collapses in a paroxysm of treachery, leaving no lasting effects on the Persian empire. If the grandiose, yet simplistic, perception of Diodorus lies at the heart of such a reconstruction, it is best to begin with an examination of his account, in particular 15.90.

Diodorus assigns a series of events, revolts, to a single year, 362/1. He gives no reason as to why the satraps became disaffected, but rather emphasizes that the revolt encompassed all of the empire west of the Tigris and Euphrates, that the Greeks of the mainland, Egypt, the

Anatolia satraps, in short, the entire coast fronted by the Mediterranean, made common cause. The king is unprepared: he enjoys no support in the west and has lost half his tribute. Diodorus 15.91 continues the impression of a widespread and well-organized revolt by indicating that the rebels had a single commander, Orontes, who eventually betrayed them all.

All modern reconstructions have accepted the basic premises of Diodorus that the revolt was widespread and well-organized.¹ They have also fallen prey to some of Diodorus' faults: chronological imprecision, and the inability to account for destabilization (beyond the presentation of reasons which are similar to moralizing about Persian decline). They share Diodorus' perception of the Persian empire: strict satrapial boundaries, a precise administrative hierarchy, the ready ability to label an officer "loyalist" or "rebel" and for those labels to explain an officer's actions.

Diodorus 15.90-93 is chronologically imprecise: a complex series of events is compressed and placed under a single year. Within that year, particularly for events in Anatolia, there are only approximate indications of the order of events (the situation is somewhat better for the Egyptian theater, narrated in greater detail). Diod. 15.91-92 synchronizes in 15.91.2 Orontes' defection with a battle between Datames and Artabazos, and in 15.92.1 the aforementioned battle with Rheomithres' return from Egypt.

Diodorus' perception of the administrative structure of the empire is a shallow one. In order to depict a massive attack against the Shah, he labels all the Persians named in 15.90.3 as satraps and has the rebels

set up an "anti-Shah" in 15.91.1 with gradiose goals. He leaves no room for lesser officers or local nobles, failing to consider the response they might make to their superiors' treachery. Diodorus and his modern followers endow the satraps with the ability to shift the political direction of their province at will without any difficulty.

His account of individual events in the revolt is essentially a series of betrayals pasted together: Orontes' (15.91.1), Mithrobarzanes' (15.91.2-7), Rheomithres' (15.92.1), Tachos' subordinates' (15.92.2-5). In addition, Diodorus makes a series of claims only a few of which are substantiated by his narrative. Of those listed in 15.90.3 as rebels, he provides evidence for the Egyptian theater (long destabilized) and Orontes (no location is assigned his activities). Many particulars are confused or erroneous: Ariobarzanes' rebelliousness is not explained; the manner in which he received his province is wrong.² There is no evidence to prove Maussollos and Autophradates rebels.³ Orontes' title is imprecise.⁴ Purely local troubles are blown out of proportion and made into direct attacks on the Shah.⁵

The blame for these misconceptions is not Diodorus' alone. In book fifteen he is relying on and summarizing the work of Ephorus. His own account of the satraps' revolt may be perceived as a summary of a longer account in Ephorus' original work. The massive destabilization, the overall lack of morals among Persian officers (all prone to treachery), and the general unpreparedness of the Shah echo the words of Ephorus' teacher, Isocrates. Isocrates would like his audience to believe that Achaemenid control was marked by an ignoble ethos (4.150-157), that the empire, Lydia and Phrygia in particular, seethed with discontent (4.160-

167), and that the western sectors of the empire were prone to massive destabilization (4.160-167 for c. 380; 5.99-105, a passage very close to Diodorus' in tone, but applicable to the 350's). Isocrates' false perceptions were shared by Ephorus, and restated by Diodorus.

Diodorus' account is unique--and this should be a source of concern. He is the only one to perceive a high level of organization among the rebels. Trogus Prol. 10 lists the threats to Artaxerxes in chronological order, but does not indicate any interrelation among them: Euagoras (380's), Egypt (370's), the Cadusians (after 374); then follow the names of three leaders who were rebellious, Datames (early 360's), Ariobarzanes (mid-360's), Orontes (late 360's). Then Artaxerxes dies. None of these events were significant enough in Justin's view to warrant discussion in his summary of book 10. Plutarch's life of Artaxerxes says nothing about the far western troubles of the 360's: court intrigue posed the real danger to the Shah. Nepos provides a rather full account of Datames' career and discusses the activities of Greek generals in Asia: not once is there mentioned of a widespread and well-organized destabilization of the Achaemenid far west. Nor is there any in Xenophon's Agésilas or Hellenica. In our other historical and literary sources not once is an anecdote introduced with a context of a great satraps' revolt (e.g. "at the time when the king's generals were all in revolt...").

Rather than accepting Diodorus unquestioned and creating chaotic explanations for the political dispositions of Achaemenid military leaders and administrators (such as those for Mausollos), one should seek to explain the destabilizations in Anatolia in light of those characteristics already noted in its administration: the high degree of

satrapial independence; satrapial rivalry; control defined as a sphere of influence; the interpretative nature of rebellion (how local information is judged at Susa); continuity in personnel; the willingness to coopt rebels (closely tied to continuity in personnel); the simultaneous existence of many different types of political entities and administrative hierarchies; the desire not to run the Empire into the "red." We should also be cognizant that there are two theaters: Egypt, long-destabilized, and Anatolia, only recently in disorder.

One should also refrain from perceiving the destabilizations as pitting local authority directly against central authority. In Anatolia most of the military conflict is directed by one local officer against another, each relying on his own troops. It is only when Darius makes a decision as to which officer is inimical to royal control and proclaims a punitive campaign that one can speak about rebels opposed to the crown. But this is only a matter of interpretation, for the military conflicts remain basically the same. In the case of Egypt one may speak of rebels without these reservations, for indigenous politicians had openly declared themselves opposed to Achaemenid control--whether local or central.

Section II. Why Did Ariobarzanes "Rebel"?

An examination of the troubles in the far west should begin with an investigation of Ariobarzanes and his attitude towards the Shah. The few chronologically fixed points we have for the 360's permit us to place the operations against Ariobarzanes (366-365) as the first of the troubles in western Anatolia.⁶ The fact that Ariobarzanes is labeled as a "rebel"

in the primary sources has been significant for modern reconstructions of the satraps' revolt: those who fight Ariobarzanes are "loyalists;" those who come to stand with him or against his opponents are "rebels." The operations against Ariobarzanes are perceived as the prelude to widespread warfare, they are the spark igniting a general conflagration which threatens to bring down the entire Achaemenid west in 362/1. But the primary sources leave an important issue unresolved: why did Ariobarzanes rebel?⁷

To begin to answer this question, a closer examination of the campaign of 366-365 is in order. Because that campaign is a response to Ariobarzanes' actions, the nature of operations may facilitate an understanding of what activities of Ariobarzanes could be qualified as rebellious.

A. The Campaign of 366-365: Upon Royal Command?

The operations directed against Ariobarzanes have received some consideration in the discussion of Maussollos' "participation" in the satraps' revolt (chapter 5). There it was argued that the events recounted in Xen. Ag. 2.26-27 represented a campaign carried out jointly by Autophradates and Maussollos. Ariobarzanes held Assus and Sestus. While Autophradates placed him under attack at Assus by land, Maussollos deployed part of the fleet at Assus and part at Sestus. When Sestus came under attack by Cotys (anxious to exploit difficulties to his own advantage), Maussollos withdrew that part of the fleet southward. Assus is a well-fortified site and proverbial for its grain.⁸ Autophradates' siege is likely to have become costly before successful. Eventually,

Agesilaus, in Ariobarzanes' service, arranges a truce (Xen. Ages. 2.26).⁹

To this data may be added an additional passage, also anecdotal, Polyaeus 7.26. Here Autophradates acts alone against Ariobarzanes, who holds Atramyttium and Pteleous, a small offshore island. Autophradates has deployed land and sea forces to place Ariobarzanes under siege at the former site. Ariobarzanes, in order to replenish men and material, commands his phrourarch on the island to surrender, thereby causing Autophradates to divide his forces. The stratagem is successful, but we do not know the result of the siege.

Regrettably, this is the extent of our information concerning the fighting among Achaemenid forces. No certain order for operations is forthcoming.¹⁰ However, we may note that these operations display important similarities with earlier Achaemenid campaigns decreed by Susa: Command is held by two men, one supervising land forces (Autophradates), one sea forces (Maussollos); one may be described as a local man (Autophradates, whose contact and familiarity with Dascylium was far greater than the more distant Maussollos'), the other an outsider. Continuity in personnel may be noted: Autophradates and Hekatomnos, Maussollos' father, had cooperated, with a similar division of command, in the first campaign against Euagoras. The operations against Ariobarzanes bear the hallmarks of fourth century BC campaigns directed against rebels upon command of the king. Such a campaign, requiring cooperation between satraps and the deployment of land and naval forces from two satrapies--with the concomittent risks of partially denuding sectors of loyal men, is an activity whose scope and expense demand royal approval. In addition this is a campaign directed against a highest Achaemenid

officer, not a minor political entity. The operations of 366-365 were carried out, we may conclude, upon the command of the Shah,¹¹ and are of the type carried out against Euagoras, Egypt, and, most recently, Datames.

Susa believed Ariobarzanes a rebel. Why? In investigating this question it must be kept in mind that a campaign directed against a satrap is costly (loss of revenue from "rebel" territory, expenditure by the crown and "loyalists"), and may weaken Achaemenid control, even if successful (dangers of denuding sectors providing men for the campaign).

B. Past Explanations for Ariobarzanes' Rebellious Stance

Four different sources call Ariobarzanes a rebel: none explain why. Modern scholars have sought to fill this gap. Judeich¹² proposed that Ariobarzanes and Datames had reached a secret agreement to rebel; information about this agreement was divulged by Sysinas. This reconstruction is based on the data provided by Nepos Datames 5.6, which alleged a secret friendship. However, as argued in chapter 4, there is no need to assume the existence of a secret understanding. Cooperation between the two satraps was open and beneficial to Achaemenid control. There was neither the need to conceal cooperation nor to believe it directed against the Shah. If Artaxerxes had knowledge of a secret friendship directed against him, his deployment of "loyalist" forces seems unwise: Autophradates is made to move inland, thereby exposing Sparda to attack by Dascylium. Nor are any forces deployed against Ariobarzanes, the other "rebel". Judeich's proposal, in fact, skirts the issue of why either Datames or Ariobarzanes would seek to act against the crown.

His proposal is unsatisfactory.

During the past few decades it has become fashionable to perceive as the cause for Ariobarzanes' rebellion Artaxerxes' decision to replace him as satrap at Dascylium with Artabazos, the younger son of Pharnabazos.¹³ Moderns believe that Dascylium was Artabazos' ancestral satrapy, that Ariobarzanes was somehow holding the satrapy "in trust" and refused to surrender it. For all this there is not a shred of evidence. But, more importantly, a major long-term administrative blunder is assigned to Artaxerxes. The decision of Artaxerxes to send Artabazos westward is best perceived as the response to continued instability in Dascylium, not as its cause. Ariobarzanes, as has been demonstrated in chapter 2, received his satrapy above board: he was the eldest son of Pharnabazos, the previous satrap, and was long familiar with and to the satrapy at Dascylium. There is no evidence that he was holding this satrapy "in trust." Such would be unprecedented in Achaemenid history, and not a mark of administrative competence. By either assigning a satrapy in trust or announcing a preemptive replacement of an officer who has acted within his guidelines, Artaxerxes literally asks that officer to go into revolt. In 387 Artaxerxes had made major progress in solving the Greek problem; assigning a satrapy abutting the Greek sphere as a satrapy to be held in trust for a child as yet unborn would have been most unwise.

C. The Nature of Rebellion: The Role of Local Information

Before attempting to uncover the most reasonable causes for Ariobarzanes' disloyalty, one should first consider the nature of

rebellion in the Achaemenid far west and how it was determined at Susa that an officer or people were in fact acting in a fashion inimical to Achaemenid control.

Except in the most extreme cases, the line separating "loyalist" from "rebel" is thin and hazy, especially in considering the stance of Achaemenid officers (or political entities tolerated by Achaemenid control).¹⁴ The guidelines set down were general (maintain a semblance of order within one's sector, dispatch tribute on a regular basis), and not formulated in a stringent and precise fashion. Policy and guidelines--particularly in border regions--were not so stiff and formal that any vagary from an artificial ideal prompted a swift and harsh royal response. Rather, rebellion was a matter of perception, of how information borne by local men was perceived and interpreted at Susa. There was always the possibility of misrepresentation and misinterpretation.

The value of local information in effecting policy at Susa, particularly in matters calling for a judgment about loyalty and competence, emerges quite clearly upon consideration of the preludes to campaigns or actions directed against suspected rebels: Tissaphernes' ride from Sparda to Susa brought news of rebel Cyrus (Xen. Anab. 1.2.4-5); envoys from the Cypriote dynasts told of Euagoras' threat to the status quo (Diod. 14.98); Orontes' letter painted Tiribazos' competence as inimical to Susa's interests (Diod. 15.8, 10); Sysinas called his father a traitor (Nepos Datames 7.1); Arlissis slandered Maussollos (SIG³ 167). The royal response to such information will be dependent upon the nature of the data presented and the persons presenting the information. Someone of high enough status may be able to mislead the king and his advisors by

misrepresenting facts. The response to information--either accurate or inaccurate--may be disbelief (Arlissis was executed for his troubles), a desire to investigate (as with the charges laid against Tiribazos), or belief followed by military response (the campaigns against Cyrus, Euagoras, Datames).¹⁵ One should note that in all these cases the crown is somewhat passive--the Shah does not seem to actively seek out information by which he can discomfit or destroy his subordinates in the far west. Rather, he responds to first-hand data brought to him by those who are already in the far west.

We should try to fit into this pattern the decision to launch a campaign against Ariobarzanes. What activities could be presented to Susa--or misrepresented at Susa--as inimical to Achaemenid control? In whose interests would it be to present accusations? These two questions are interrelated; by answering the second we should be in a better position to address the first.

There are few reasonable candidates in the far west to be the one responsible for turning the Shah against a man who had displayed no overt signs of disloyalty for over twenty years. We should look for someone of high status, capable of misrepresenting the truth and being believed. Mithridates might be a candidate: Sysinas had betrayed his own father (see chapter 4); Mithridates is known to have betrayed Ariobarzanes (Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4, Arist. Pol. 5.1312a, see below). However, there are no overt signs of hostility between father and son; their falling out can be assigned to the period after 365. More importantly, it is very unlikely that Mithridates would have succeeded in convincing Artaxerxes to proclaim a campaign against Ariobarzanes:

Artaxerxes has just declared war on one of his satraps because that satrap's son, Sysinas, made out a case for his father's "rebelliousness." The campaign did not go well. Artaxerxes would be wise not to fall for the same trick twice.

It is equally unlikely that the recently "rebellious" Datames could effect a royal policy directed against his neighbor. In addition, Datames had enjoyed amicable relations with Ariobarzanes. The latter does not seem to have actively operated against Datames during the early 360's.

We may rule out Maussollos: he was far from Dascylium; Lycia and the Aegean were his sphere.

Only one officer remains who is of high enough status in the far west to gain ready access to the Shah's ear, who is familiar enough with the far west to present data and misrepresent it as damaging, who could benefit directly by discomfort to the sons of Pharnakes: Autophradates, satrap at Sparda, possessor of the flagship province on the Anatolian west coast, the man who had just failed to achieve anything decisive in his campaign against Datames (Nepos Dat. 7-8). What activities could Autophradates paint as rebellious? A list of charges must be prepared. They might seem trivial or even false to a distant and dispassionate observer--but in the years immediately before 366 Artaxerxes, Autophradates, and Ariobarzanes were not such observers. Also, one must keep foremost in mind that rebellion is a matter of perception, and that in the far west the satraps possessed a great deal of freedom of action. They might believe they were preparing something for themselves, while in fact they were preparing it for their enemies.

D. The Theoretical Background for Tension Between Sparda and Dascylium

There always existed the possibility for tense, even unfriendly, relations between the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium, administrative centers of the old Lydian kingdom. Sparda was by far the larger and more desirable province, the flagship of Achaemenid authority on the far western frontier. Dascylium, to the north, was a lesser province--it seems to have lost some of its glory with the collapse of Persian Europe. But since the 470's it was held by a single family, Achaemenid in origin, the sons of Pharnakes. The first of the family to hold Dascylium was Artabazos, son of Pharnakes and hero of the northwest in 479. The satrap at Dascylium could look upon himself as a more senior and noble man and would resent the possession of the flagship province, with its greater influence, going to men who were relative outsiders and seemingly not as well tied to the Achaemenid ruling house as he.

The theoretical basis for rivalry may be either exacerbated or toned down by considerations of personality. As far as we know Ariobarzanes and Tiribazos enjoyed amicable relations. Pharnabazos and Tissaphernes were bitter rivals--but they never faced each other in open battle.¹⁶ What of Ariobarzanes and Autophradates? By the time of Autophradates' appointment, sometime after 374 BC (but close to that date), Ariobarzanes was indisputably the senior man and the more noble of the two.¹⁷ He was of the sons of Pharnakes, had been active in the far west since at least 405 BC, had been highest officer for close to fifteen years (Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, chapter 2). Autophradates is first

heard of in 390 BC, was most likely younger than Ariobarzanes. He was a relative outsider, having served somewhere in southwestern Anatolia (chapters 2-3). Resentment may have grown between the two--the "senior post" went to a man lesser in age and status.

E. Charge I: Autophradates Believes Ariobarzanes Holds

Sectors Properly Sparda's

A cause for tension between the two satraps is likely to be the amount of territory over which they exercise control and exert influence. It is more realistic, as discussed earlier, to perceive satrapial control in terms of spheres of influence which may intersect. These areas of intersection, or liminal areas, may or may not be the object of tension and dispute among the highest officers, and, to some extent, lesser officers subordinate to the highest officers involved. As was seen in the case of Sparda and Caria, relations between Autophradates and Maussollos seemed amicable enough for each satrap to complement the other's activities, if not cooperate in joint operations.

One should begin by noting where the operations against Ariobarzanes takes place: Atramyttium (Polyaenus 7.26) and Assus (Xen. Ages. 2.26). In both places Ariobarzanes is in control and the object of seemingly ineffectual sieges. Before 366 he had been successful in extending his influence southward. Here, the particular cause for tension between Autophradates and Ariobarzanes was that the latter's sphere of influence encompassed the southern Troad, a liminal region which might well have been claimed by Autophradates as rightfully his. The liminal nature of the Troad is not difficult to establish. It

could be claimed either as a southward extension of Dascylium's sphere or as a northern extension of Sparda's.¹⁸ The ancient sources are in total disagreement over the region's boundaries.¹⁹ The city of Atramyttium was tied to the Lydian kings of Sardis in myth and tradition: The city was supposedly a Lydian foundation. Alyattes had appointed his son, Croesus, to rule the plain of Atramyttium and Thebe--a precedent for satrapial expectation.²⁰ Assus could be placed in the Troad or in Aeolis,²¹ the latter a sector once held by Pharnabazos (Xen. Hell. 3.1.10, 3.2.13).

The liminal nature of the southern Troad, its cities, and even personnel, is clear in the relatively well-documented late fifth century. Thucydides 5.1 and 8.108.4 narrate operations involving Pharnakes, Tissaphernes, and Arsakes, a local noble, who is active at Antandrus and Atramyttium.²² Pharnakes of Dascylium introduced exiled Delians into Atramyttium in 422, but Arsakes felt no need to display a similar friendship. In 411, Arsakes was subordinate to the more influential Tissaphernes and acted in accordance with his wishes at Antandrus. Within a few years it is Pharnabazos who seems preeminent at Antandrus and in the Troad (Xen. Hell. 1.1.24-25).

In the 350's this region is again subject to operations carried out by personnel from both Sparda and Dascylium (cf. chapter 7). Assus, and the more distant Atarneus, were held by the tyrant Eubolus, who passed these holdings on to his subordinate, Hermeias. The two were objects of campaigns by Autophradates and, later, Mentor.²³

One should not dismiss the southern Troad as an area of no account, unworthy to be claimed by two satraps. Atramyttium and Assus were both

axiologoi. Assus, in particular, was well-fortified, difficult to attack by land or sea. It was also proverbial for its grain.²⁴ Either city would be a valuable addition to a satrapy's physical plant.

Ariobarzanes had enjoyed success in extending his influence westward across the straits and was in possession of Sestus. That both sides of the straits should be subject to a single officer is not surprising. Strabo 13.591 reports just such a situation as existing before the first century A.D. In his discussion of Abydus, on the Asian side of the Hellespont, Strabo indicates that Sestus, because of its proximity, was often placed with the former site under a single hegemon, since boundaries were not yet set by continental limits. Such a governorship could be a survival of the geopolitical reality of Achaemenid times. Data from Theopompus (FGrH 115 fr. 390) preserved in that same passage of Strabo indicate that in the fourth century Sestus was well-fortified, a double wall joining city to harbor. The physical layout of the city and its position in regard to the currents made it kurian . . . tōn paradōn. With both Sestus and Abydus in his hands Ariobarzanes was in good strategic position. There were opportunities to act as arbitor of more far westerly affairs.²⁵

The mere extension of Ariobarzanes' influence, while grounds for displeasure on the part of Autophradates, would be insufficient grounds to regard the satrap as a rebel. Rather, an expanded sphere of influence, which may be attributed to Ariobarzanes' long tenure in the far west, could be regarded at Susa as a mark of success, that the guidelines set down for satraps were being followed. The issue of whether

possession of Sestus represented a violation of the King's Peace and was thus a poor reflection on Ariobarzanes is a false one: "autonomy" is defined by the power with superior force. Persian influence and control on both sides of the straits was not something for Susa to surrender in order to uphold a legalistic fantasy existing in the minds of some contemporary Greek politicians.

Ariobarzanes' holding of the southern Troad could be at best misrepresented and presented only as a lesser charge. To find the most serious and the major charge we must remain cognizant of the great independence the far western satraps had in formulating and carrying out policy in the environs of their province.

F. Charge II (Major Charge): Ariobarzanes is Building Power-Base
For Use Against Susa's Interests

A reexamination of Ariobarzanes' activities in Greece in the years immediately preceding 366 suggests that Autophradates would have ample opportunity to misrepresent his rival's policies as inimical to Susa and those loyal to the crown. Sentiments similar to the vague claims of pro-Spartan feeling in Asia uttered in Isocrates 6.63 could be turned easily against Ariobarzanes in the presence of far-off Artaxerxes.

A starting point and parallel is provided by the letter which Orontes sent to Artaxerxes II in the last years of the 380's. In it, Orontes, jealous of his co-commander, Tiribazos, satrap of Sparda, lays charges against his loyalty. Two of the charges may come under the general heading of creating a power-base to use against Artaxerxes and those loyal to him. Orontes claimed that Tiribazos had arrived at a private

alliance with Sparta, since he was their friend. This last clause was in fact somewhat accurate: Ten years earlier Tiribazos had been willing to listen to Antalcidas, and he had arrested the mercenary admiral Conon. But he also recognized the limits of his authority and journeyed to Susa to explain his position (Xen. Hell. 4.8.16-17). He was replaced by Struthas (whose own perception of the Greek problem matched that of Pharnabazos and Susa). When Artaxerxes decided to shift imperial policy, to recognize Sparta as a friendly state, Tiribazos again took up the post as satrap of Sparda. Tiribazos' reply to this present charge of Orontes makes clear that the charge was a matter of a hostile perception of open activity. Tiribazos had sought out Spartan compliance in dealing with Euagoras, not for any private gain, but in the service of the crown (Diod. 15.10.2). Local policy designed to achieve some immediate and limited goal had been misrepresented at Susa.

The second charge was far weaker: Orontes claimed (Diod. 15.8.4)--and this was to be the most serious charge--that Tiribazos was building up his own power base by private goodwill displayed toward military leaders in the campaign, by honors and gifts. We might see in this charge some allusion to Tiribazos' marriage connection with Glos, a subordinate official in Ionia and noted naval commander (Diod. 15.9.3). Surprisingly we have no reply to this charge in Diodorus' account of Tiribazos' defense, but the charge is not a difficult one to which to respond. Again, a matter of perception and misrepresentation. Tiribazos was anxious to prevent any disaffection among his commanders, local men drawn from their home sectors in Sparda's sphere. He sought to make himself popular among his troops as a means of insuring the

success of the campaign. To a dispassionate observer this is a display of good leadership; to a disgruntled rival, the creation of a personal power-base of which that rival is jealous. Orontes presented new local information to Susa--the misrepresentation of local policy. The crown investigated and found Tiribazos innocent. Orontes believed he had been preparing something for himself, but had instead prepared it for the man he had made his enemy.

Perception and misrepresentation are the keys to the charge which would be most damaging to Ariobarzanes: creation of a personal power base by pursuing a policy inimical to Susa. At the heart of this change is the mission of Philiskos of Abydus in 368 BC.

Diodorus 15.70.2 and Xenophon Hellenica 7.1.27ff report a series of activities in 368: Philiskos of Abydus was sent to Greece on a diplomatic mission. When diplomacy failed, military action remained. Philiskos left for Sparta's use a group of mercenaries hired with Achaemenid funds. In the following year--and these are details reported by Xenophon and not Diodorus--embassies arrived in Susa from Sparta, Athens and Artaxerxes heard the envoys and again shifted imperial policy: Thebes was now preeminent among the compliant members of the native order among the European Greeks. A number of principal issues must be resolved: Who sent Philiskos? What was his mission? Why was there a shift in policy in respect to European Greece? Finally, why was Philiskos sent to Europe in 368 and not some other year? The accounts of his mission and its aftermath must be examined in greater detail.

Diodorus 15.70.2 is the shorter account: Philiskos was an envoy

sent by Artaxerxes II. His mission was to summon the Greeks to end their wars and make a common peace. The site of this conference is not given. The conference failed because Thebes was not accepted into the peace; it had gathered Boiotia into one group. Philiskos' response was to leave a picked force of 2000 mercenaries for the Lacedaemonians' use.

Xen. Hell. 7.1.27ff indicates the Philiskos was sent by Ariobarzanes, and with an ample supply of cash. The mission is not given a stated general purpose, but it seems as though the prime aim was to arrange a peace. A meeting was held at Delphi: Sparta, Thebes, and Theban allies were in attendance. The success of the conference seems to have been dependent upon Messene again being under Spartan, not Theban, influence. When Thebes refused to relinquish ascendancy, talks fell apart. Philiskos turned to a more decisive type of action: he gathered mercenaries and left them for Sparta's use. Philiskos seems to have returned to Asia thereafter.

It is common among modern scholars to combine these accounts:²⁶ Diodorus provides a general framework, while Xenophon the particulars. Ariobarzanes is subordinate to Artaxerxes and so sent Philiskos upon royal command. Ariobarzanes is perceived as simply carrying out Susa's policy at Susa's command. But the reconciliation of Diodorus and Xenophon is not a matter of simply addition. The former's account is decidedly inferior, and ignores the significant aftermath of Philiskos' activities, the shift in frontier policy the following year.

Diodorus' narrative, in wording and reasoning, is derivative from his descriptions of earlier abortive attempts by unnamed Persian envoys

to reach a common peace.²⁷ The account deals with generalities alone. Philiskos is sent by the King; everyone meets at an unspecified site to reach a common peace; the conference breaks up for the usual reason--Thebes' new ascendancy (cf. Diod. 15.38.3, 15.50.4). The only specifics in the account are telling: the name of the envoy and the fact that he leaves an Achaemenid-funded mercenary force in Greece. These elements occur in none of Diodorus' accounts of other attempts to reach a "common peace."

Xenophon's account is superior. It provides far more specifics and endows Philiskos with a limited and intelligible goal. Philiskos is sent with money by Ariobarzanes, a satrap familiar with and to Greek affairs. A meeting is held at Delphi; in attendance are the Spartans and Thebans, those who had enjoyed a certain superiority because of the King's Peace and those who are now successfully challenging that superiority. Philiskos' chief aim is to restore some measure of Spartan security, if not superiority, i.e. the restoration of what was long perceived as a "normal" situation. At the present time Sparta is threatened on two sides--Thebes is preeminent in central Greece and in Messene. When monetary diplomacy (i.e. bribery) fails to remove Theban influence from Messene, thereby ending Theban encirclement of Sparta and her allies, Philiskos turns to military force, or the threat of it. He supplements the Spartan army. Xenophon's account may be summarized thus: In 368 there was direct intervention in Greece by a local authority carrying out policy without reference to the court at Susa. Ariobarzanes is responsible for maintaining stability within his sphere and in its environs. He is meeting that responsibility. When we accept

Xenophon's information as superior and more accurate we can begin to address the questions raised earlier about Philiskos' mission and its aftermath.

The first issue which requires consideration is the dispatch of Philiskos himself. In whose service was he operating? An examination of his career suggests that he was sent by Ariobarzanes and that is carrying out Ariobarzanes' directives. Demosthenes 23.142 describes him as a "hyparch," an officer subordinate to Ariobarzanes. He may have been active at Abydos as early as 375 BC. A possible reconstruction of his career runs as follows: Philiskos of Abydos was a local politician recognized as compliant and loyal by Ariobarzanes once the satrap extended his own influence over that city. Philiskos would be then invested with some sort of position in the Achaemenid hierarchy not dissimilar to that held by Zenis and Mania earlier in the century. Philiskos was competent enough to make his influence felt elsewhere in the Hellespont (Perinthus, Dem. 23.142). He would be a most reasonable choice for a diplomat to be sent into Greece. He had already had contact at least with Athenian military personnel.²⁸ I might suggest that he was accompanied by two other Greek "front-men" drawn from Dascylium's sphere: Agauos, and Diomedon of Cyzicus.²⁹

There is no administrative policy in the Achaemenid far west which would have interdicted this type of move by Ariobarzanes. Tiribazos, whose difficulties have been treated above, apparently dispatched envoys to coopt compliant members of the native order. Maussollos seems to have made some effort to render Agesilaus more pliable: a xenia between the two men was the result (Xen. Ages. 2.27). Pharnabazos,

in the course of his Egyptian campaign during the 370's, had occasion to send his own envoys into Greece on precise and particular missions. He compelled Athens to recall Chabrias from Egypt and grant him Iphicrates as a mercenary leader (Diod. 15.29). He tried later, though unsuccessfully, to cause Athens to punish Iphicrates after the failure of the campaign (Diod. 15.43.6). Hence Ariobarzanes' dispatch of one or more envoys, by his own decision, to effect some particular action is not without precedent. Admittedly, the examples cited of earlier embassies sent by satraps are somewhat inconclusive in that none of the envoys went on a mission to reconcile warring powers within Greece. Nevertheless Xenophon is no doubt correct in making Philiskos Ariobarzanes' emissary. Diodorus has, in producing too brief a narrative, readily assigned the actions of a local officer (here a satrap) to that officer's superior (here the Shah).

What was Philiskos' mission? The dispatch of Greeks drawn from Dascylium's sphere is not at all unreasonable if we do not magnify their objective into the widespread and general mission assigned to Philiskos by Diodorus. Philiskos' mission was a quite specific one: The ascendancy of Thebes had placed Sparta in an uncomfortable position--to the north was Thebes, which controlled all Boiotia, to the south and west was Messene, now under Theban domination as well. Philiskos was to try to restore the previous status quo to some extent by placing Messene under Spartan supervision. Both Sparta and Thebes would be more evenly matched--there would be further opportunities for both sides to continue to wear each other out in Greece, damaging that land, not Achaemenid territory. One should recall as well that Ariobarzanes had

long been accustomed to work with Spartan personnel. Their leaders were more familiar. Thebes was an unknown quantity. Philiskos' mission was the manifestation of a policy with a pro-Spartan tilt.

However, a year later a new policy was made at Susa. Such is clear from Xenophon. In Hellenica 7.1.27 we find a policy friendly toward Sparta pursued in the far west. Then, in 7.1.34-37, a new more pro-Theban policy is proclaimed at Susa. Theoretically the shift may be explained by circumstances involving the reception of new local information upon the basis of which Artaxerxes formulates a reply and/or policy. In this specific case, local information was presented about the far west by men from the far west, Greek envoys. Some of the first-hand information was undeniably pleasing to Artaxerxes II: it was the data presented by the Theban envoy Pelopidas. Throughout his life Artaxerxes had been accustomed to dealing with the Greek problem in two possible manifestations: unfriendly elements in Anatolia supported by Athens, unfriendly elements in Anatolia supported by Sparta. Each had sent troops and fleets against Achaemenid territory, held it, and had done damage. Pelopidas, however, could point to the historical record (7.1.33-35) which exonerated Thebes. The city always had been friendly with Persia, and now was an enemy of Sparta, having achieved a measure of ascendancy on mainland Greece. Theban ascendancy--or hegemony--posed no threat to Achaemenid territory. No Theban force had ever damaged the Achaemenid west.

The presence of Greek envoys at Susa in 367 was the result of local Greek perception--or misinterpretation--of local Achaemenid policy. Xen. Hell. 7.1.33 says nothing about the Shah summoning representatives.

The decisions of Sparta to dispatch Euthycles seems to have set off a reaction in Thebes. The Thebans and their allies dispatched their own emissaries, Pelopidas, Antiochus of Aracadia, and Archidamos of Elis. The impression these three would make by their presence at Susa was that Spartan influence in the Peloponnese was seriously weakened. Sparta and its sometime ally, Athens, were surrounded. Athens, too, had sent envoys: Timagoras and Leon, men unable to present a unified front.³⁰ The "discovery" in Greece of a Spartan emissary to arrive in Susa had set in motion a capillary action.

The Spartan decision to send an emissary is not difficult to discern. In 368 they had seen the pro-Spartan policy of Ariobarzanes attempt, but fail, to effect anything decisive, either diplomatically or militarily. Perhaps assistance from his superior, the Shah, would be more effective. Sparta mistakenly believed that the policy pursued locally would be that pursued at Susa, that the Shah would support the Satrap. They discovered instead that new first-hand information could effect new policy at the court. Ariobarzanes' perception need not equal Artaxerxes'.³¹

The "new" policy set down by Artaxerxes in no fashion compromised Achaemenid military and political superiority, but was flexible and designed to keep Sparta and Athens on the defensive: Messene was to remain out of Spartan hands, thereby keeping Sparta and powers favorably disposed to her on mainland Greece encircled by Thebes and those powers favorably disposed to her. Athens, Xenophon indicates (7.1.36), was to "draw up her ships"---a broad demand which did not specify how it was to be carried out. Artaxerxes' response to Leon's objections was not the

utterance of foreknowledge of Ariobarzanes' disloyalty, but an indication of the imperial willingness to be flexible.³² But there still remained the threat of direct Achaemenid military intervention in Greece:

Artaxerxes continued to be the arbitor of future events. In sum, Artaxerxes reexamined the Greek frontier on the basis of new local information which probably included reports by Achaemenid officers. His actions and policies were the result of his perception of the situation, in particular how he could turn that situation to his own benefit by tinkering with the internal politics of lands beyond his own realms. Hence a shift in frontier policy.

In Xenophon's account of the 368 Delphi meeting the Athenians are not mentioned, but they did send envoys in 367. Were Athenian diplomats in attendance in 368? Although some have posited an Athenian presence because of Diodorus' generalities,³³ an examination of the purpose of the conference as given in Xenophon suggests there was no cause for Athenian envoys to be present: the issue was Messene, not a general peace; the upshot of the conference was military assistance to Sparta. Although ties of alliance had existed between that state and the Athenians (Xen. Hell. 7.1.1-14), the conference could have been conducted easily without them.

A crucial set of questions remains to be answered: Why did Ariobarzanes send Philiskos to Greece, i.e. what did Ariobarzanes hope to gain? Secondly, why was Philiskos sent in 368--was this a year of particular significance? Both queries are bound up with each other. When moderns argued that Philiskos was an emissary of Artaxerxes, the answers were

that 368 allowed for a reasonable time-lag after Leuctra, time enough for the full impact of the Spartan decline to be known and that Philiskos was supposed to put together a common peace. Perhaps, too, the Shah wanted peace so that he could hire mercenaries from among demobilized Greeks. However, if Ariobarzanes is the prime mover, more precise reasons for the events of 368 may be discerned. Ariobarzanes is exercising his influence over Greek affairs. In addition, he is taking advantage of his senior status, his familiarity with and to Greek politicians, to increase that influence by attempting to become the arbitor among the Achaemenid officers of the far west for Greek affairs. Had Philiskos succeeded in restoring Messene to Sparta by diplomacy and in restricting the new Theban power, Ariobarzanes would have pulled a coup which would have more than made up for the fact that he did not hold the flagship satrapy. The career of his father, Pharnabazos, could give him reason to be hopeful: Pharnabazos, while satrap, had outshone every successor to Tissaphernes at Sparda.

Ariobarzanes' dispatch of Philiskos to assist the Spartans--a group of long familiar to and with Ariobarzanes--was not an act of rebellion. The policy displayed here may be accurately characterized as "pro-Ariobarzanes". His actions are best perceived in terms of Ariobarzanes' own self-interest, if one is a dispassionate observer. Yet Ariobarzanes ran a risk: The King might decide that Ariobarzanes had overstepped the limits of his authority. Susa did not always perceive events as did Dascylium or Sparda--so Tiribazos learned. The King could investigate the situation on the frontier and decide that local policy had been inimical to royal interests, if something prompted that investigation.

The arrival of Greek envoys in the wake of Euthycles' dispatch caused the presentation of new data and prompted a different policy. This in itself should not have been fatal to Ariobarzanes' career, in spite of his activities. The internal situation in Greece had not changed significantly. Here a shift in policy does not necessarily entail the instantaneous replacement of the highest officers.³⁴

The year 368 was a year of significance: Ariobarzanes could not only feel safe in exercising and extending his influence, but also be quite sanguine about the benefits which might accrue to him even if Philiskos did not meet with great success. Autophradates was not at Sparda during the campaign season of 368, but was fighting Datames. His chief concerns would be the war and the means by which to reach an accommodation with the "rebel" Datames, and not the balance of power on the Greek mainland. He could neither play a role in Greek affairs nor share the credit; Ariobarzanes could act as if he held the satrapy or Sparda--and redress the status variance which existed between himself and Autophradates. The chronology of the war with Datames is uncertain (see above), but one may safely allow for two campaigning seasons, with the peace initiative coming sometime during the second. In 368 Autophradates was either in the midst of a first, and relatively lackluster campaigning season, or had already realized, in the midst of a second, that he could not achieve decisive victory against his opponent. Ariobarzanes could win greater fame in what was also part of Sparda's sphere, while its satrap was not distinguishing himself in any part of his own sphere.

To summarize the result of my inquiries into Philiskos' mission: The dispatch of Philiskos was the manifestation of Ariobarzanes' policy. In his self-interest he sought to build up his own influence in Greece, the environs of his satrapy. In particular, he hoped to restore Sparta, the Greek power with which he was most accustomed, to a more unchallenged position by removing Theban influence from the Peloponnese. Ariobarzanes selected 368 because his rival in Anatolia, the satrap at Sparda, could not devote full attention to the west and was in the process of experiencing setbacks. Although Ariobarzanes' activities in no way were inimical to royal interests, the confluence of new local information presented at Susa, a shift in imperial policy, and a defensive attitude on the part of Autophradates would facilitate a misrepresentation and misinterpretation of those activities.³⁵

During the course of 367 Artaxerxes altered policy at Susa in favor of Thebes. The policy pursued by Ariobarzanes was no longer Susa's preferred. Autophradates by this time was attempting to reach an accommodation with Datames, and probably needed to present some defense of his own activities. Although Nepos Datames 8.6 seem to rule out a personal appearance at Susa by Autophradates, it does not preclude the dispatch of messengers from Sparda. The variance of local (Ariobarzanes') with imperial policy toward the Greeks would give Autophradates' envoys ample opportunity to misrepresent that variance as inimical to royal interests. Ariobarzanes would be accused of creating, while loyal Autophradates was away, a power-base for use against the crown and those loyal to it.

G. Charge III?: Ariobarzanes in Collusion with Datames?

Throughout this section I have criticized Judeich and those who have agreed with him for accepting as evidence for Ariobarzanes' disloyalty a secret understanding between him and Datames. There is no need in modern scholarship to rely on such an agreement to explain the absence of tension between the two satraps and their open cooperation. However, cooperation and friendship previous to the "rebellion" of Datames might at some later point form the basis for an accusation against Ariobarzanes made after the "rebellion" of Datames. It is possible that Judeich's view, when placed in the mouth of Autophradates, might serve Autophradates--but not very well at all.

Autophradates could misrepresent the earlier friendship, presenting to the Shah a "plan" by which Datames' moves and Ariobarzanes' attempt to build up his own position were part of a single effort directed against Achaemenid officers loyal to the crown, i.e. Autophradates himself. Such an accusation could serve as a partial defense for his own poor showing in the recent campaign. Ariobarzanes failed to provide "expected" assistance, hence he was in league with Datames. But a charge of collusion would not be a very strong one--Ariobarzanes does not seem to have been expected by Susa to play a role in the campaign and there is no evidence for cooperation between Dascylium and Datames in 369-367. In fact, Ariobarzanes had turned his attentions westward. This charge could only be one subsidiary to the foundation of Autophradates' complaints, Ariobarzanes' supposed meddling in territories "properly" controlled from Sparda or under its influence.

H. The Mechanics of Declaring Ariobarzanes a Rebel

For campaigning to have begun in 366, the declaration of Ariobarzanes as a rebel must have taken place sometime during the year 367, so as to allow time for mobilization (by both sides). Unfortunately, one can only speculate about the chronology of events and the precise fashion in which Autophradates made his charges stick. He must have had men at court in time to take advantage of the reexamination of policy towards mainland Greece and must have convinced the Shah of Ariobarzanes' disloyalty in time to permit both declaration and mobilization by 366.

The chronology of the campaign against Datames will suggest circumstances under which envoys from Sparda, from Autophradates, would be at Susa. If the campaign against Datames was proclaimed in 370, 369 and 368 would serve as the seasons in which military operations were conducted. Peace negotiations in which representatives from the general sent against the rebel, i.e. Autophradates, would have to be present, could have begun in 368. It is possible that such representatives remained at Susa into 367, and witnessed the arrival of Euthycles. If the campaign against Datames was declared in 369, envoys from Autophradates would certainly have been at Susa in 367. Neither possibility is a certainty, but in favor of the former (a declaration in 370), it can be stated that Autophradates might stand a better chance of damaging his rival's reputation if the peace arrangements with Datames had been brought to a conclusion or close to one.³⁶

The chronology of the Greek embassies which reached Susa in 367

is a matter for speculation, too. Crucial is the time when Pelopidas arrived--and this is dependent upon speculative chronology concerning affairs in Greece.³⁷ In the case of Autophradates' men, we may give a communications advantage to Autophradates, who as satrap could assure his envoys relatively rapid means of transportation. We should also posit knowledge on Autophradates' part of events in the west: his presence in the interior while fighting Datames and his inability to conduct policy in person on the western edges of his sphere of influence does not preclude his being kept abreast of Ariobarzanes' activities. A communications advantage for Autophradates would permit him to have envoys at Susa able to present the sort of arguments which would turn the Shah against Ariobarzanes.

We may perceive Autophradates' machinations as taking place in stages. Initially his envoys could have been dispatched only to raise general complaints against Ariobarzanes, i.e. that Ariobarzanes, by his actions in the Troad and on mainland Greece, was meddling in sectors most properly the responsibility of the officer holding the flagship province, Sparda. His envoys may have been skillful enough to operate at Susa without maintaining constant contact with Sparda and immediately begin to exploit and misrepresent differences between Ariobarzanes' policy (as manifested in 368) and Artaxerxes' reconsideration (as manifested at Susa in Pelopidas' presence) and to the disadvantage of Ariobarzanes. In any case, Autophradates stood the greatest chance of success in turning Artaxerxes against Ariobarzanes once a difference in their policies could be pointed to.³⁸

The particulars of the presentation of Autophradates' case are unknown. Buckler is on the right track in recognizing the damage which could be done by drawing parallels between the activities of Cyrus the younger and those of Ariobarzanes.³⁹ The extension of Ariobarzanes' influence into the southern Troad would become the desire to hold forward positions for use against Sparda. The mission of Philiskos would be placed also under the general heading of creating an independent power-base. Ariobarzanes sought to restore Sparta to unchallengeable supremacy in Greece so as to make use of their forces for his own purposes. Ariobarzanes ignored the fact that Theban hegemony signified that at last the one power which never disrupted Anatolia could now hold in check the two powers, Athens and Sparta, most responsible for a century's worth of difficulties, including support for the rebel Cyrus. Ariobarzanes should have examined Sparta's past record and then either assisted Thebes or worn down all the sides. The western orientation of Ariobarzanes' policies in the years of the campaigns against Datames was evidence at least of the desire to create a power-base as a prelude to rebellion, by exploiting the setbacks experienced by the other highest officer. Autophradates successfully misrepresented Ariobarzanes' activities in the same way Orontes had Tiribazos'. A campaign against the "rebel" Ariobarzanes was decreed on the basis of this new local information. We should not jump to the conclusion that the campaign's initial purpose was the destruction of Ariobarzanes. Rather it should be punitive in nature: reduce the excessive strength of the rebel and offer him a chance to be coopted. Its aim would be the restoration of the status quo, but as perceived by Autophradates.

Sparda would be preeminent in Anatolia, and its influence preeminent beyond the western limits of direct Achaemenid control.

Would Ariobarzanes have had an opportunity to answer the charges? He may have, but unsuccessfully. Unlike Tiribazos, Ariobarzanes had pursued a policy which was no longer to be in favor at Susa. This may have made the difference--just as it had in Autophradates' favor.

I. Concluding Remarks and Criticisms

At the outset of this investigation, the question was posed: why did Ariobarzanes rebel? This perhaps is the wrong question to ask. Instead, the question to be answered is as follows: What policies and activities of Ariobarzanes gave cause for others to regard him as inimical to royal control, to regard him a rebel? In 368 Ariobarzanes, displaying a continuity with his policy of working with the familiar politicians of Sparta, attempted to increase his own influence in the west, while his rival Autophradates was away. He attempted to extricate Sparta from a poor strategic position, but failed to achieve anything decisive either by diplomacy or by funding mercenaries. Sparta perceived the policy displayed locally by Ariobarzanes as a manifestation of policy held by Susa, and in 367 dispatched envoys to Artaxerxes' court, hoping to prompt more effective assistance. When Euthycles was joined by envoys from other Greek states Artaxerxes heard much new local information. We do not know whether he had received similar reports from his own officers in the far west, or what in particular caused him to tilt policy after hearing Greek envoys. But a decision was made. Policy at Dascylium no longer equaled policy at Susa.

At this same time Autophradates found himself ill at ease with his own position: he had achieved little of decisive nature in the campaign against Datames. Ariobarzanes possessed the southern Troad, which Sparda's satraps had held in the past. Ariobarzanes had exploited his (Autophradates') absence in an attempt to become the arbitor of affairs in Greece. The shift in Susa's policy towards the Greeks presented Autophradates with the opportunity to transform general complaints into specific charges which would turn the Shah against the satrap at Dascylium. Local information was (misre)presented at Susa by Autophradates' envoys. The occupation of the southern Troad, the mission of Philiskos were all evidence that Ariobarzanes sought to create an independent power-base as a prelude to rebellion. His activities were inimical to Achaemenid control, and were to be stopped before a new Cyrus arose. By the end of 367 a punitive campaign had been declared against Ariobarzanes; Autophradates and Maussollos were to carry out operations by land and sea beginning in 366. Artaxerxes has mis-perceived his own officer's activities in the far west.

Admittedly there are difficulties of a serious nature with this lengthy reconstruction. In order to create a list of charges, I have placed in the mouth of Autophradates words close to previous modern reconstructions which I have not accepted; e.g. that the mission of Philiskos was undertaken by an Ariobarzanes already determined to act against the crown. The basic cause for tension between these satraps of Sparda and Dascylium is the inability of one officer to look without jealousy at another's power. But most serious of all is that there

exists not a shred of evidence for Autophradates' machinations. We are presented only with the fait accompli of operations against the rebel Ariobarzanes. A defense is possible: The reconstruction advanced does fit the pattern which can be noted throughout the reign of Artaxerxes, and which is intelligible. The court is dependent upon first hand local information in making policy decisions. It is possible for an officer or political entity of high enough status to feed false information to Susa and so effect a policy which benefits him personally. Ariobarzanes evidently could not defend himself persuasively. It now remains to examine the use Autophradates made of his deception.

Section III. The Operations of 366 and 365 and the Collapse of Internal Order in Dascylium

A. The Campaigning Seasons

There are few chronological indices for the duration of the campaigns directed against Ariobarzanes or the order of events.⁴⁰ We can posit two campaigning seasons: Timotheus' seige of Samos lasted through the winter of 366/5 and into spring 365. During these operations he faced no Persian opposition.⁴¹ The lack of Achaemenid forces at Samos would be indicative that the north, Dascylium's sphere, was the area in which forces were deployed by Autophradates and Maussollos during this period. The anecdotal information concerning punitive operations directed against Ariobarzanes is also suggestive of two campaigning seasons.

Two reconstructions of the order of events are possible.⁴² The first assumes that Ariobarzanes had deployed his forces at the southern limits of his sphere to meet Autophradates' attack and that Hekatomnid

forces were slow to mobilize. Hence, the operations at Atramyttium (Polyaenus 7.26), in which Autophradates appears without Maussollos, but with a joint land and sea force, are assigned to 366. To 365 may be assigned operations by Autophradates and Maussollos (Xen. Ages. 2.26-27), the deployment of forces at Assus and Sestus. The unsuccessful siege of Assus along with Agesilaus' resolution of it by diplomatic means would come close to the end of that campaigning season. By then the deleterious effects of the partial denuding of Sparda and Caria for men to send into the north would begin to be felt, e.g. stepped up activities by tribally organized recalcitrants and the weakening of pro-Achaemenid forces within Greek poleis. The second possible reconstruction assumes a rapid deployment of allied forces during 366 for operations at Assus and Sestus, and the redeployment, after a first, rather lackluster season, of Hekatomnid forces to the south in 365. The operations of Autophradates alone at Atramyttium would occur in the second season. The redeployment of Maussollos' forces may have been prompted by concern over the type of operations conducted at Samos by Timotheus--intervention close to the Anatolian mainland by Greek forces from outside Asia. However, we hear of no Achaemenid response to these operations (see below), during which the native Samians appear to be the chief sufferers.

Of these two reconstructions, the first is preferable because the declaration of a punitive campaign against Ariobarzanes must have occurred late in 367. Only Autophradates could have a full complement of troops ready for deployment sometime in 366. The more complex naval operations of 365 would seem to demand almost a full campaigning season,

time enough for deployment off the Troad, deployment of a squadron north to Sestus, a siege at Sestus, a siege at Assus. It also seems clear that as a punitive campaign, the operations directed against Ariobarzanes were not very effective. The loss of Sestus damaged only the overall Achaemenid strategic advantage. Assus and Atramyttium seem to have remained in Ariobarzanes' hands by the end of 365. We do not know how the campaign was resolved. Was Ariobarzanes offered in 365 a chance to become "compliant," to be coopted? Given the circumstances of the attack on him, would he accept such an offer?

B. The Greek Exploitation of Disorder

Among the more dangerous effects of the campaign involving the highest officers of the satrapies abutting the Greek frontier was the opportunity afforded to Greek states of the mainland to exploit for their own benefit the disorders in Achaemenid territory. In general, one may note the following characteristics of such activities. Discretion was displayed: Greek states sought to avoid open hostility with Susa by refraining from the types of activities undertaken, for example, by Agesilaus, i.e. open attacks directed against satrapial capitals, widespread installation of their own military forces in the cities and strongpoints of Achaemenid territory. There was lip-service to the King's Peace, although it was obvious that in times of satrapial warfare, Achaemenid forces (and Susa) would be slow to respond to transgressions of a more limited nature. In short, the Greeks displayed self-interest, they attempted to gain whatever advantages were possible without incurring danger and/or wrath for their homestates.⁴³

The activities of Timotheus, dispatched by Athens supposedly to aid Ariobarzanes without violating the King's Peace (so Dem. 15.9), display the confluence of discretion and self-interest as Timotheus ignores the satrap, while exploiting Achaemenid troubles. The orders with which Timotheus was sent off in 366 raise some questions. It is reasonable that he would be chosen as one to work on Ariobarzanes' behalf since both men's fathers had worked together (so a display of continuity in personnel), but it is difficult to perceive under what conditions Timotheus could remain within his guidelines and assist another labeled a rebel. By the start of 366 (winter 367/6) it must have been known that a punitive campaign was to be directed against Ariobarzanes precisely because he was a "rebel." To assist Ariobarzanes would certainly constitute in Artaxerxes' eyes a violation of the King's Peace, in the sense that Timotheus would be striking directly against Achaemenid control in Anatolia. To remain within his order, I imagine that Timotheus would have to refrain from overt opposition to Ariobarzanes' enemies, perhaps not appear on the field of battle as an aggressor. In short, the orders which Dem. 15.9 assigns to Timotheus are more unworkable than those once given to the Athenians at Corcyra.

While the "theory" is puzzling, the "reality" is clear. At no point in the first campaigning season does Timotheus offer assistance to Ariobarzanes. Instead, Athenian ships are sent to seize Samos. Our other sources, Isocrates 15.111-112 and Nepos Tim. 1.1-3, ignore Timotheus' precise sailing orders; they are concerned with displaying him as a decisive military man.⁴⁴

I find it difficult to explain what the Athenians actually intended

by the orders given Timotheus, as reported in Dem. 15.9. It is possible that they initially misinterpreted the punitive campaign as satrapial rivalry of the type which had existed between Cyrus and Tissaphernes (Xen. Anab. 1.1.6-9)--military operations, but no officer declared a "rebel." The point Demosthenes seems to want to make in the passage is that it is safe to interfere in territory close to the Achaemenid Empire, i.e. off-shore islands.⁴⁵ In particular he is attempting to force Athens into assisting Rhodians who have been exiled under the influence exercised by Artemisia of Caria. Timotheus at Samos is supposed to represent a successful precedent, and hence his exploits are included. The orders may serve as Demosthenes' proof that Athenian policy could at once be circumspect and decisive: Timotheus faced off Achaemenid forces without any ill effects. As they stand in Dem. 15.9, Timotheus' orders display discretion and self-interest, but it still remains puzzling as to how they were to be actually carried out. Timotheus simply ignored them. Athenian policy in 366 seems a mixture of discretion and self-interest, to which may be added Timotheus' own desire to win glory. But it is difficult to see how Athens followed a policy which could be characterized in reality as not inimical to Achaemenid control.⁴⁶

Timotheus' activities at Samos also raise questions.⁴⁷ He has moved to oppose an internal order which appears friendly to Achaemenid interests. What had been the internal situation at Samos? Was there a Persian response to the siege? Why is no fear displayed about Timotheus incurring the Shah's wrath? We know only the final stage of events which took place on Samos before 366: Kyprothemis, probably a

Greek,⁴⁸ has garrison forces of unknown composition on the island. His paymaster is Tigranes, a lesser officer subordinate to Autophradates.⁴⁹ Achaemenid interest in Samos (its strategic value aside) at this particular point might be explained by political instability on the island: one party seeks out the aid of the Persians who use this opportunity to expand their influence (a policy not dissimilar to that noted among the Hekatomnids towards off-shore islands). Tigranes may be the prime movers in 366, taking matters into his own hands, trying, while his superior is away, to build up his own image in the eyes of his superior. It is extremely doubtful that either the Samians or the Persians felt themselves constrained by "autonomy."

Timotheus' operations do not seem to have spurred passions among either the Persians or the Athenians of the time, in spite of later Greek praise--given once he was successful. There are suggestions of some opposition to his "free-booting:" Isocrates boasts that he enjoyed no state financial support.⁵⁰ There is no attested Persian response to the siege of a people seemingly friendly to Achaemenid control. The setbacks for Timotheus seem confined to supply shortages.⁵¹ The next time we hear of Persians in connection with Samos is in Arrian Anab. 1.19.8 when Achaemenid ships use the island as a base.⁵² The complete absence of any information concerning attempts by Achaemenid officers or, more importantly, Achaemenid-funded Samian exiles to take the island back seems surprising. Had Tigranes overstepped the bounds of his authority and was his "pet-project" abandoned by Autophradates? Did the Athenian cleruchs pose any threat? Achaemenid officers could always hold over the island the threat of the restoration of the exiles.

Perhaps the growing strength of the Hekatomnid fleet acted as a deterrent to cleruch adventuresomeness. The answer may well be that if the Athenian cleruchs presented no threat to Achaemenid territory, then there was no need for an Achaemenid response. Samos had not been under direct Achaemenid authority for any lengthy time in the earlier fourth century and would not count as "lost" territory.

One may conclude that Timotheus cleverly exploited the disruption in the Achaemenid far west to his own and Athens' advantage. He was praised because he was successful. Ariobarzanes had been "abandoned" or, more properly, ignored. On the basis of the information available, operations in Samos do not seem to have been particularly tied to operations in the Troad save for a Greek exploitation of Persian woes.⁵³

In 365, after the successful conclusion of the siege of Samos, Timotheus appears in the northwest of Ariobarzanes' sphere. Aid to the satrap seem to have been a concern secondary in Timotheus' mind to self-interest, his own and Athens'. By the end of the campaigning season Sestus and Crithote were in Athenian hands: to Isocrates, the result of decisive action by a skilled general (15.112); to Nepos (Tim. 1.3), a gift from Ariobarzanes, a reward for Timotheus' assistance. Isocrates' perception is more realistic than the illusory good-will found in Nepos. If Ariobarzanes had expected to make use of Athenian forces to forward his cause, he found himself exploited by those he sought to exploit himself. Sestus, the more significant of the two cities, represented an outward extension of Ariobarzanes' sphere. It had come under attack by Maussollos, and then Cotys (a far more unstable political entity). Ariobarzanes decided it was best to acquiesce to Athenian occupation of

the city and its environs, to leave it in the hands of a power which had not, at least recently, disrupted Dascylium. Timotheus had successfully picked up the pieces of Ariobarzanes' crumbling sphere in the northwest.⁵⁴

Sparta, too, benefitted from the disturbances of 366-365. We may certainly posit the involvement of Spartan self-interest, but since most of our information is vague (Iso. 6.63) or overly complimentary (Xen. Ages. 2.26-27) many issues concerning the activities of Agesilaus cannot be resolved definitively. What was the relationship between Sparta and Ariobarzanes? The reply depends upon the juridical value of symmachia in Xen. Ages. 2.26.⁵⁵ What types of troops, if any, did Agesilaus have with him while in Ariobarzanes' service? We hear of no particulars in the sources: AGesilaus seems to act alone in a diplomatic capacity, a reason to doubt a wide-ranging political and military agreement between Sparta and Dascylium.⁵⁶ How long did he remain in the satrap's service?⁵⁷ When we reject the synchronization in Xen. Ages. 2.27, apparently only for 366 and 365. What can be stressed is that the Spartan's service to the satrap would be a sort of repayment for the latter's efforts in 368. In view of the continuing Theban threat it is highly unlikely that Sparta could deploy a very sizeable force to assist Ariobarzanes, himself under attack and hence unable to lend assistance to the Spartans at home.

C. Growing Instability in Dascylium: The Collapse of Philiskos;
Greek Intervention within Dascylium's Sphere.

Dem. 23.141-142 (cf. 202) reports that the following activities were

undertaken by Ariobarzanes' subordinate, Philiskos: He used the satrap's forces to extend his influence (read: Ariobarzanes' influence) over Greek cities, which he then proceeded to maltreat (read: in which he punished recalcitrant anti-Achaemenid elements). Thersagoras and Exekestios, tyrant-haters from Lampsacus, killed Philiskos. Before his death, the hyparch had paid for mercenaries at Perinthus, held the whole Hellespont, and was the greatest of the hyparchs. No dates are provided for these events.⁵⁸

A possible reconstruction is as follows: The expansion of Philiskos' power, including a role at Perinthus, can be assigned to the period before 367, with the hyparch achieving a great renown by the time of Ariobarzanes' move south to defend himself against Autophradates. It is probable that Philiskos, a man familiar with and to the Greek powers with an interest in Hellespontine affairs, was left in the north. We may place at this juncture some of the abuses directed against political enemies, i.e. those who sought to exploit Ariobarzanes' difficulties by moving their cities away from more direct Achaemenid supervision. The collapse of Philiskos may come sometime in 365 or later: at these times Ariobarzanes was still under attack in the Troad, and would come to face a more deleterious effect of satrapial warfare, the disloyalty of his eldest son, Mithridates (below). Most certainly disruption within the house of Ariobarzanes would have given the Lampsacenes the courage to act.

Although the chronology of events is imprecise, the significance of Philiskos in the administration of the northwest sectors of Dascylium's sphere are clear: He represents the Achaemenid use of cooperative natives

and may be perceived as forerunner of Artabazos' Mentor and Memnon. As a Greek in Achaemenid service, he would be valuable--and perhaps more acceptable to other Greeks--in a diplomatic capacity, and could serve as Ariobarzanes' expert on more far westernly affairs. His nationality might ameliorate Greek reaction to Ariobarzanes' grip on the straits: Philiskos was a civilized "front-man." His death, if it occurred in 365, may be tentatively added as a cause for Ariobarzanes' acquiescence in Timotheus' control over Sestus. More importantly, his death, when added to Athenian control over part of the European side of the straits, opened a power vacuum which could be filled--or at least exploited--by forces inimical to orderly Achaemenid control.

Operations carried out by Greek military officers deep within Dascylium's sphere can be noted beginning in 364/3. Diodorus 15.81.6 (cf. Nepos Tim. 1.3) reports that Timotheus relieved a siege suffered by Cyzicus. Unfortunately we do not know who the beseigers were. It is significant that an Achaemenid officer is not the arbitor of affairs in this region. The same may be noted at Heraclaea, further east: In the midst of stasis, the citizens looked first to Timotheus, then to Epamonidas. Neither intervened (Justin 16.4.3-4). Finally, Mithridates, now in flight in the interior, lent a hand (see below).⁵⁹ Discretion among the Greeks receded along with the dissolution of Ariobarzanes' influence.

D. The Fall of the House of Ariobarzanes

The most serious, and seemingly inexplicable, result of the punitive campaign of 366-365 was the internecine struggle between Ariobarzanes and

his eldest son, Mithridates. The setbacks which Ariobarzanes faced in the northwest portions of his sphere of influence, the straits, are understandable: he was meeting attacks directed against his southern border. But none of the operations attested seems to have seriously damaged Ariobarzanes' power. One should expect there to have been some problems within Dascylium's sphere as a result of deployment of forces southward, but strife between the satrap and a man who could be characterized as his heir-apparent should not have been among those difficulties.

Four sources report internal strife. The most general account is given by Harpocration (sv. Ariobarzanes): Susa dispatches men to arrest Ariobarzanes, who is eventually crucified. Xenophon Cyrop. 8.8.4, in a discussion of the decline of contemporary Persian morals, argues that great honor is assigned to men like Mithridates, who betray (prodous) their fathers, like Ariobarzanes. Aristotle Pol. 5.1312a is seemingly more dispassionate: Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes because he despised him and desired gain (kerdos). The most serious account is in Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2: Mithridates cum ipso patre bellum de dominatione gessit. The accounts can be reconciled. A bellum de dominatione, allowing for some measure of exaggeration, implies family strife, not in contradiction to the data provided by Xenophon and Aristotle. We may insert this strife into the general notations provided by Harpocration. But the chief difficulty with each of the sources is the concern with an event, betrayal, and not its particular cause. Why did Mithridates despise his father, what gain did he hope for by betrayal? It is possible that Mithridates hoped betrayal would meet with the approval of

Autophradates and Artaxerxes, who perceived Ariobarzanes as inimical to their interests. If this was his expectation, however, it was a hazardous one: the assassination could easily create additional disruption and divided loyalties. The initial cause of the difference of opinion between father and son remains inexplicable--the historical record is simply too lacunose.⁶⁰

It appears that Mithridates' desire to challenge his "rebel" father had not been viewed at Susa as a solution to the instability at Dascylium. The decision to send out Artabazos, Pharnabazos' son by Apame, to take up the satrapy is indicative of Susa's perception that the situation in Dascylium was out of control.⁶¹ In-fighting existed among the highest officers of the satrapy, Greeks were again beginning to operate within sectors in which Achaemenid officers were supposed to act as arbiters of events. The activities of Timotheus and Agesilaus did not bode well. As we shall see in section 5, below, the existence of Artabazos permitted Artaxerxes to dispense with the elder house descended from Pharnabazos. It was this decision to dispatch Artabazos westward which we may assign as the cause for Mithridates' decision to betray his father and for his own flight eastward from Dascylium into Datames' sphere.

Internal strife in Dascylium, the decision of Mithridates to betray his father, the decision at Susa to replace Ariobarzanes with Artabazos, the actual betrayal and arrest of Ariobarzanes, the flight of Mithridates: these are events only partially attested in the historical record, but whose precise interconnections are difficult to perceive. Diodorus' account compresses events and, as indicated above, roughly synchronizes with each other Orontes' defection, a battle

between Datames and Artabazos, and Rheomithres' return from Egypt, all under 362/1 (15:91-92). Xenophon Cyrop. 8.8.4 lists the betrayal of Ariobarzanes before the return of Rheomithres from Egypt. If we assume this order has some chronological value we may argue that Ariobarzanes was out of the picture before the events synchronized in Diodorus. No operations pitting Autophradates and Ariobarzanes against each other may be assigned to the campaigning season 364, but in the year 364/3 Timotheus operates unthreatened close to Dascylium (Diod. 15.81.6). We may place the internal strife between father and son in the year 364. Already there has been too much supposition, but the sources do not permit anything more substantive. At this point I offer the following relative chronology of events for 364-362, one which assumes that both Susa and Dascylium are affected by the reception of new information (in various decrees of accuracy). Regrettably, this reconstitution, too, is supposition. Following the end of operations in 365, relations between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates began to sour for reasons I am unable to specify. In-fighting of a somewhat serious nature began. At Susa, Artaxerxes reached a decision, perhaps effected in part by news of increased disorders and in part by the continued loss of revenue and destruction of Dascylium's physical plant, to send Artabazos westward as satrap. If Mithridates knew of this policy decision his resolve to betray his father would have been strengthened. Perhaps this action might forestall his own fall from power. The progress of Artabazos towards Dascylium must have exacerbated tensions throughout the upper echelons of the satrapy. Perhaps too melodramatically, the entry of Artabazos into territory extremely close to the satrapial capital pre-

cipitated what we can label the betrayal-proper. Mithridates arrested Ariobarzanes and arranged to hand him over to Artabazos. When it became obvious that Artabazos had arrived to supplant the house of Ariobarzanes, Mithridates fled east, eventually entering the presence of Datames, a family friend who had not been involved in the earlier troubles but had mobilized in his own defense at the approach of Artabazos. I shall return to the events in section 5, a consideration of Artabazos' and Datames' activities in the 360's.

E. Minor Instabilities in Sparda and Caria After 365

Dascylium was not alone in suffering difficulties created by the deployment of troops for warfare. In Sparda and Caria it is possible to note the effects of denuding sectors of loyal men for use in battle. Warfare between satraps presented opportunities for lesser powers to take a more independent stance. Although exact chronology is uncertain, a number of smaller operations may be placed in the years after 365 BC; some of these military campaigns appear to have been characterized by cooperation between Autophradates and Maussollos.⁶²

In at least two poleis on the Anatolian coast political leaders were perceived as inimical to stable Achaemenid control. Operations were carried out against Ephesus, seemingly under the control of Herophytus until its capture by Autophradates. Miletus was the scene of intrigue involving politicians favorable to Maussollos.⁶³ Perennial recalcitrants such as the Pisidians were not slow to exploit the relative absence of Achaemenid forces. It is perhaps here that we should place the punitive campaign undertaken by Autophradates against the Pisidians

(Polyaenus 7.27.1, Front. Str. 1.4.5, cf. Diod. 15.90.3).⁶⁴ Here, as in the campaign against Datames (cf. Nepos Datames 7.2) Autophradates ran afoul of opponents to whom accrued the advantages of familiarity with terrain and possession of narrow passes and high points. It is also in the context of the later 350's that we may place a continuation of troubles in Lycia (Diod. 15.90.3), though it must be stressed that in disputes between small scale political entities it is not possible to determine whether any side even thought in terms of acting against the Shah.⁶⁵

Warfare between satraps also served as a cause for a far more dangerous problem: Achaemenid lesser officers might use their superiors' disputes as a cloak behind which to begin to pursue their own goals in their own self-interest. It is in this context that we should examine the most serious manifestation of this problem, the activities of Orontes, a lesser officer in Mysia.

Concluding Remarks:

In the foregoing examinations there has been, unfortunately, too much supposition and speculation. What has emerged is a perception in which the chief losers of the years following 366 are the satraps involved in warfare. Autophradates seems to have scored no substantial victories, but instead he and Maussollos must contend with minor forces who have exploited the absence of satraps and armies. Ariobarzanes defended himself against Achaemenid foes, but fell victim to internecine strife. Although Achaemenid control was damaged by external and internal recalcitrants seeking to capitalize on difficulties for their own benefit, Susa was only an indirect loser: none of the activities detailed

above threatened the security of the crown. Susa lost revenue and some strategic advantages. No figure emerged who would challenge Artaxerxes' right to the throne. The impact was limited and local.

Section III. Orontes in the Satraps' Revolt

Among the most misunderstood episodes in the destabilizations of the 360's has been the activities of Orontes, a subordinate of Autophrades. The grandiose account of Diodorus, after being questioned in only a few particulars, has passed virtually unchallenged into modern reconstructions. Judeich,⁶⁶ while holding that Orontes was not a highest officer in 362, believed him to head a highly organized and massive revolt. He turned rebel again in the 350's. Most recently, Osborne has offered a perception substantially different in its particulars from Judeich's.⁶⁷ Orontes was posted westward in 364-363 to become the highest officer of a newly created province, Mysia. The satrap of Mysia led a highly organized and massive revolt in the 360's. However, there was no second revolt: Orontes died shortly after his "surrender" to loyalist forces at the end of the decade. Abuse of numismatic evidence permitted Osborne to argue that Orontes intended to supplant Artaxerxes as Shah.

I shall take exception with Diodorus and his modern interpreters. Orontes, as argued earlier, was sent westward shortly after 380. He became a lesser officer, a local noble in the sector of Mysia, subordinate to the satrap at Sparda. His position was not enviable: under the watchful eyes of Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes, he would have to contend with native Mysians, Greeks, and perhaps the ill-feelings of

other local nobility. A lesser officer could rise to great power in times of great discontinuity--but to how great a power? A reexamination of the evidence will suggest that Orontes achieved great power only within sections of the spheres controlled by Sparda and Dascylium. He used Autophradates' mobilization as a cloak of concealment; he picked up the pieces of Ariobarzanes' shattered power, and held parts of those regions over which the satraps had recently disputed. Orontes had no intention of supplanting Artaxerxes, but only hoped to be a highest officer, at least in the far west. He wished to attain his old level of status.

A. Orontes' Coinage

If Orontes' activities are the most misunderstood, the numismatic record is the most abused body of evidence for his career. Standard reconstructions have all too often misused numismatic evidence, pressing it far beyond the limits of reason. Neither die studies nor find spots figure in discussions, only overly grandiose perceptions and unwarranted assumptions. The two most recent studies of Orontes seem oblivious to the fact that the evidence upon which Orontes' royal pretensions are based no longer exists.⁶⁸ Any reexamination of "satrapial" coinage should seek to establish a number of items: the mint(s) at which the coinage was struck (find spots should be recorded), and the minting authority. The coinage should be placed into a relative sequence of issues: die study (combined with an examination of engravers' hands) will facilitate a more precise internal arrangement. After all this, one may begin to make observations about the size of the coinage (i.e. the number of issues), its distribution (geographical), and any special circumstances

(e.g. did the minting authority control temporarily civic mints? was distressed coinage sent into circulation?). One should also keep foremost in mind that Achaemenid officers in the far west minted coins primarily as a means to pay mercenary troops and commonly used mint personnel from Hellenic poleis to produce these "campaign coinages."⁶⁹ Regrettably, an ideal numismatic study of Orontes' coinage is not possible here: many of the examples of his coinage do not have an archaeological context recorded for them, and the number of examples of issues assigned to Orontes is quite small. However, these circumstances do not preclude a careful and circumspect consideration of the available evidence.

One should begin with the single coin which has been, and continues to be, so misinterpreted. It is a silver tetradrachm. On the obverse is a Persian head, right, wearing a low tiara whose flaps are drawn around and under the cheeks. The reverse depicts a lyre with seven strings and bears the inscription BASIL. The mint and minting authority are uncertain: the reverse inscription could indicate that the coin is ultimately a symbol of royal authority. The fabric and workmanship allow it to be placed among the Greek coinages of the late fifth and early fourth century. A most reasonable initial statement is that this coin is an example of a campaign coinage.

A more precise assignation can be hazarded. The use of portraiture as a means of identifying the man depicted on the obverse is a difficult matter. Quite often Greek mint personnel will mark out a Persian primarily as a non-Greek type, with attention paid to "Persian" characteristics: Iranian garb (cap), facial features (nose), and arrangement of

facial hair. The reverse type can offer some certainty: a similar reverse type can be found on the civic coinage of Colophon. That city may be a possible mint.

There is no evidence to permit the assignation of the coinage to Orontes. Babelon had argued for such an assignation on the basis of portraiture alone and believed the reverse inscription to signify royal aspirations. The coin is singularly ineffective as rebel propaganda. The rebel is not named and the Persian portrayed wears the low tiara, not the high tiara of royalty. In physical appearance the coin is no different from other types of campaign coinages. In 1948 Robinson summarized and decisively supplanted all previous scholarly considerations of the tetradrachm: the coin is to be assigned to Colophon or Iasus, minted for Tissaphernes, c. 400-395. The coin is not to be included in a corpus of Orontes' coinage. No conclusions at all may be drawn from it, either about Orontes' power or about his aims.⁷⁰

A second group of coins to meet with misinterpretation comes from Lampsacus: occasionally it is held, without any basis in fact, that gold Lampsacene staters which seem to illustrate Orontes are evidence of his desire to become Shah. One should begin by noting that civic coinage was minted by the Lampsacenes in gold, silver, and bronze. Orontes seems to have controlled the civic mint long enough to have the mint personnel strike coinage for him in all three metals.

Silver drachms may be assigned to Orontes with little difficulty. A number of drachms have an obverse which depicts a female head, helmeted, facing left. The reverse depicts the protome of a winged horse, right. The reverse inscription: ORONTA.

The reverse inscription permits assignation of the coinage to an Orontes, who is almost certainly the famous rebel. Assignation to a mint depends upon the similarity of reverse types: the winged horse is commonly found on Lampsacene drachms. The most reasonable conclusion to draw about these coins is that Orontes had the Lampsacenes mint then as a campaign coinage.⁷¹

There are two types of bronze coinage which may be assigned to Orontes and the Lampsacene mint. Type I has an obverse depicting a Persian male's head, right; the reverse depicts the protome of a winged horse, right, with the reverse inscription ORONTA. Type II has an obverse depicting a bearded male head (sometimes called Zeus), and a reverse which in type and inscription is the same as Type I. The reverse inscription permits identification of Orontes as the mint authority, and, as on the drachms, the similarity of reverse types between Lampsacene issues and Orontes' issues permit the attribution to Lampsacus as the mint. Some have suggested the Persian head on the obverses of Type I is Orontes. We may add these bronze issues to Orontes' campaign coinage.⁷²

The most problematic are his gold staters, of which three are extant.⁷³ On the obverse they depict a Persian head, left; on the reverse, the protome of a flying horse, right. There is no inscription on either obverse or reverse. The staters may be assigned to Lampsacus on the basis of fabric, workmanship, and the similarities of reverse type. The attribution to Orontes is dependent upon two observations: Bronze issues with his name depicted a Persian on the obverse; silver and bronze coinages may be assigned to him at Lampsacus. Since the gold staters

depict a Persian and are from Lampsacus, the staters must have been struck for Orontes.⁷⁴ In sum, Orontes controlled the mint at Lampsacus which normally struck gold, silver, and bronze coinages. It did the same on Orontes' behalf.

There is absolutely no reason for perceiving grandiose political implications in Orontes' Lampsacene gold. The mistaken belief that only the Shah could mint gold is based on no evidence. Rather, the striking of gold depends upon a supply of the metal.⁷⁵ A careful examination of the extant Orontes staters indicates that there is nothing outstanding about them: they may be placed without difficulty among the rest of the fourth century Lampsacene gold staters.⁷⁶ In appearance, the staters are politically mundane, providing the observer with no reason to believe they are documents supporting a rebellious pretender to the throne. The staters are anepigraphic; the Persian portrayed wears a low tiara. A comparison of these coins with those of the Hellenistic rebels Molon and Diodotus should emphasize the relatively tame nature of Orontes' gold.

Another series of silver coinage can be assigned to Orontes', although the mint remains somewhat uncertain. The obverse depicts a kneeling hoplite, left; the reverse, a winged boar, right. The inscription on the reverse, ORONTA, permits the attribution to Orontes. Clazomenae is usually cited as the mint, perhaps the reverse type can be found as an obverse type on the city's Hellenistic issues.⁷⁷ One may reasonably conclude that these silver drachms are a further example of Orontes' campaign coinage, the obverse depicting the coins' recipients.⁷⁸

A series of bronze coins minted at Cisthene have been attributed to Orontes. The obverse depicts a Persian head, right; the reverse, a galloping horseman, right, with the reverse inscription KISTHA. While the reverse inscription permits identification of the mint, attribution to Orontes relies only on the fact a Persian is represented on the obverse. Babelon had suggested this Persian might be some unknown local dynast.⁷⁹ If the coinage is Orontes', it too may be added to his campaign coinage.

Equally uncertain has been the assignation of electrum coinage struck at Phocaea to Orontes. The obverse depicts a Persian head, left; on the reverse is a four part incuse square. There is no inscription. Electrum issues with the incuse square on the reverse are common to Phocaea; and the coins in question are of the same fabric. But an assignation to Orontes depends solely upon the fact a Persian appears on the obverse. The metal need create no excitement: Phocaea's civic coinage consisted of electrum; Orontes simply used the civi mint for his own purposes. If the coinage is Orontes', it, too, may be added to his campaign coinage.⁸⁰

We may now draw conclusions about Orontes' coinage as a whole. Two sets of issues may be assigned to Orontes with a high degree of certainty. The first is the gold, silver, and bronze coinage of Lampsacus: Orontes' name appears on the silver and bronze; the reverse types of all permit assignation to Lampsacus. The second, the silver coinage which bears Orontes' name and which, on the basis of reverse type, may be assigned to Clazomenae. The Cisthene bronze and Phocaea electrum, while secure in mint, are most insecure in minting authority: Orontes has received these coinages because a Persian appears on the obverse.

Unfortunately, no precise date can be assigned to Orontes' coins. They may be placed in the later 360's when we know Orontes to have carried out military operations. What of the political significance of the coinage? One should note the reliance on local mint personnel and on local types. There is a great deal of variety in Orontes' putative coinage, hardly evidence for a well-organized propaganda campaign one might expect of a rebel who is thought to have challenged Artaxerxes for the throne at Susa. One should leave aside grandiose illusions: Orontes controlled a number of civic mints for a time, during which they struck coins for him. These coins differed from regular civic issues by having Orontes' name on the reverse, or an unusual obverse type (at times a Persian head).

Most of the coinages minted for Achaemenid officers in the far west were struck for particular military campaigns by mints close to the scene of operations or at the mustering points for soldiers. With this in mind, we should anticipate the mints Orontes controlled to give some indication of his sphere of operations. Clisthene may be placed within the bounds of Mysia. Clazomenae and Phocae suggest operations to be carried out within the sphere controlled from the citadel at Sparda. Lampsacus suggests operations carried out deep within the sphere controlled from Dascylium. Even the two most certain coinages alone (Clazomenae and Lampsacus) suggest that Orontes had expanded his sphere outwards from his liminal position in Mysia to encompass further sectors of both Sparda and Dascylium. And it is in these sectors that the literary evidence places Orontes--with Greek hoplites, the potential recipients of a Hellenic-looking campaign coinage.⁸¹

B. Orontes' Military Operations

There exists only limited attestation in the historical record for specific military operations undertaken by Orontes. Polyaeus 7.14.2-4 reports three such incidents, which may be placed in the later 360's.⁸² In Polyaeus 7.14.2, Orontes, a rebel, is fighting unspecified generals of the king. Operations center around Sardis and Mt. Tmolus and meet with a modicum of success. A reasonable conclusion is that these operations are directed against Autophradates, satrap at Sparda. In 7.14.3, Autophradates is the object of Orontes' aggressions. Operations take place around Cyme: Orontes' Greek hoplites give him a tactical edge; Autophradates and his cavalry will not make a frontal attack. In 7.14.4, we find that Orontes has lost many allies, probably hoplites, as the result of a surprise attack launched by Autophradates. Orontes' stratagem is to convince Autophradates that new mercenaries, which the satrap at Sparda had expected to join up with the rebel, have in fact arrived. One can make these general observations about these incidents: Autophradates is Orontes' enemy. The key feature in Orontes' tactical advantage is a replenishable supply of Greek hoplite mercenaries. Operations, when given a definite geographical location, take place within the sphere controlled out of Sparda.⁸³ They are to be placed most reasonably in the time after the conclusion of the campaigning season of 364 (see below).

OGIS 264 (lines 5-10) reports an operation of a military and political nature. While a rebel, Orontes settled "pro-Orontes" Greek personnel on the old strategic site of Pergamum. This development too should be assigned to the later 360's,⁸⁴ some time before Orontes

surrendered, and some time after, recalcitrant elements had been transferred to the plain where they might be dealt with more summarily by local Achaemenid personnel (see above, chapter 2).

A synthesis of the data concerning the campaign of 366-365 against Ariobarzanes, the numismatic evidence concerning Orontes, and the data just presented may now be made. In the mobilization against Ariobarzanes, Autophradates, the officer superior to lesser officer Orontes, would have commanded him to mobilize a portion of his following. If tension existed between the two, Autophradates would want to place part of Orontes' men, if not Orontes himself, under his own general supervision, while Orontes would take advantage of this opportunity to place himself openly on a war-footing. Perhaps the Cisthene coinage, if it is Orontes', may be placed in this context: it would have been used to pay whatever mercenary forces Orontes hired during the mobilization, though the more reasonable context for this coinage would really be the later preparations made for a campaign by Orontes against Autophradates. If the coinage is not Orontes', then I am tempted to assign it to the period of Autophradates' mobilization against Ariobarzanes.

The settlement of pro-Orontes elements at the old site of Pergamum represents the building up of Orontes' own power base. A most logical context for this move would come during Orontes' own preparations for a thrust into Sparda. Securing the old lofty site of Pergamum would be an intelligent step in securing the Caicus valley in general and in constructing a more solid political base from which to operate.

It is not possible to set in definite chronological order Orontes' operations against Autophradates. I would suggest that operations

began at Cyme and, after success there, moved southwards toward the citadel at Sparda. Orontes' coinage from Clazomenae (and Phocaea) can be seen as issues designed to pay the hoplites which Polyaeus reports were with him. I call attention again to the obverse type of the Clazomenae issues: a kneeling hoplite.

The Lampsacene coinage, indicative of Orontes' control of the city and its mint, can be placed in the context of the aftermath of Philiskos' death. Orontes could move--probably through subordinates (and/or allies, such as Rheomithres)--to exploit troubles in Dascylium's sphere and to fill the power vacuum resulting from the dissolution of order in the house of Ariobarzanes. Orontes may have won some support in and around Lampsacus during the years 366-365 while operating under Autophradates, but this is only supposition. Nor do we know the length of time Orontes was able to exercise influence over Lampsacus.

The following is a suggested relative chronology for my reconstruction of Orontes' operations, beginning in 366: Orontes mobilized as part of Autophradates' forces; in the punitive campaign he may have begun to build up influence in Dascylium's sphere. Following the campaign of 365 Orontes secured Pergamum and made plans to exploit difficulties for his own benefit. Such exploitation would take the form of thrusts into Dascylium and Sparda. Events in Dascylium in the respect are unknown, save for Orontes' ability to hold Lampsacus (indicated by coinage). Autophradates mobilized to meet the threat of Orontes, now openly rebellious (363 the earliest?). At Cyme (so Polyaeus 7.14.3) Orontes possessed the advantage and pushed southward: fighting occurred around the citadel of Sparda. Orontes' probable bases were coastal

cities, where he minted coins and awaited the return of Rheomithres from Egypt. Operations ultimately collapsed: the key to the surrender of Rheomithres and Orontes, as I shall argue below, was the successful pacification of the satrapial capital of Dascylium and its environs by Artabazos, who then moved southwards through the Troad. What is significant here is that in spite of Trogue Prol. 10 neither the numismatic evidence nor attested specific operations place Orontes any further south than the satrapial capital at Sparda. It is important to take note that Orontes "rebels" against his superior Autophradates-- Artaxerxes does not even enter the picture.

C. The Diplomatic Front I: Orontes and SIG³ 182

It is a common belief, in reconstructions of the satraps' revolt, that the fragmentary SIG³ 182, the "reply to the satraps' envoy," is evidence that in 362/1 the rebel satraps of Diod. 15.90.3, under the direction of Orontes, dispatched an envoy to the Greeks to obtain their assistance in activities designed to topple the crown.⁸⁵ SIG³ 182 represents the reply given: a refusal to assist rebels or the Shah, a desire to remain neutral. I believe that a closer look at this lacunose document will prove it too fragmentary to permit the assignation of a precise date to the reply or the making of any precise statements about the nature of the "satraps" who sent the envoy. The document serves best as an example of Greek diplomatic language, self-interest, and exploitation of Persian difficulties as the Hellenes place themselves in a morally superior position. If the document is to be placed in the later 360's it provides an excellent display of the wide gulf between diplomatic niceties and political-military realities.

The inscription, once seen at Argos, is now lost: two copies are extant from the hands of modern scholars. The fragmentary nature of the surviving text combined with the uncertainty whether the original was inscribed stoichedon make restorations most difficult. More significantly, the surviving text--or copies thereof--contain two distinct and seemingly unrelated documents: the first is the "reply to the satraps", the second concerns the settlement of territorial disputes by arbitration. Perhaps we have a dossier of documents designed to display ability among the Greeks to settle political difficulties through diplomacy; an epigraphic refutation of the statement made that Greece was filled with monuments to the Greek ability to destroy his fellow-Greek.

The first document, the "reply," is too fragmentary to allow a determination of what legal body was responsible for the text. The term "Hellenes" is used, and the natural interpretation given this is that the Hellenes are the Greeks of the mainland. No precise group is specified, and in spite of conclusions drawn from the Attic dialect of the reply it is quite easy for a limited organization to speak broadly and with diplomatic niceties.

The Achaemenid envoy appears in line 3: tōi para t]ōn satrapōn hēkonti. This single envoy is given neither a specific identity nor specific mission. It is deduced from the restoration of the reply that the envoy's mission was a request by the "rebels" for military assistance. Yet the reply is directed to the Shah. The "satraps" are unidentified: in view of the vague tone of the document, "satraps" could simply mean Achaemenid officers, regardless of status or political disposition. Regrettably, the document is too vague to permit an

identification of these Achaemenid officers or their reason for seeking out the "Hellenes" for assistance. It is as if the particulars are suppressed in order to place the "Hellenes" in a better light.

The tenor of the Greek reply is diplomatically self-serving. It portrays the status quo as one in which affairs in Greece are self-contained: troubles among the Greeks are solved peacefully by the Greeks themselves.⁸⁶ There is no hostility between the Greeks and the Shah. Hence, there exists neither the opportunity nor the need for Achaemenid involvement in Greek affairs. This depiction of Greek affairs is to apply to all Achaemenid officers regardless of their political disposition. Any shift in the status quo will be due to the Shah: the Greeks proclaim they will actively maintain their neutrality and enter into no hostilities with Achamaemenid officers.⁸⁷ As far as the Greeks are concerned the status quo will continue (lines 8-12), affairs will present neither opportunity nor need for Achaemenid interference. The blame for the opening of any hostilities in the future will be laid directly upon the Shah, and the definition of hostile actions is for the Greeks alone to define. Two possible types of hostility are recognized by the Greeks: overt (polemēi, 1.12) and covert (pr/ag]mata; lines 12-13). Such acts may be committed by the Shah or his subordinates; the latter group is very loosely defined (line 15): ē allos tis tōn ek tēs ekenou chōr[as. The shadowy nature of the subordinates is another reason to think of the term satrap as one having no real juridical value in this document. The type of response the Greeks will make to such aggression is left for the Greeks themselves to decide.⁸⁸

This document is a display of diplomatic fantasy: the Greeks have

taken the opportunity to issue a "reverse" King's Peace. They attempt to erase on stone the realities of missions such as Pharnabazos' about Chabrias (Diod. 15.29) and Iphicrates (Diod. 15.43.5-6) or Philiskos' (in which Achaemenid officers were the arbitors of Greek affairs, or at least tried to be) and they do so by throwing the King's Peace into the Shah's face. The Shah is told to stay out of Europe or face the consequences. If the document is a product of the later 360's, the fantasy is more apparent: the "Hellenes" are exploiting disturbances in Achaemenid territory to their own advantage; in the temporary state of Persian disorder the "Hellenes" have issued a doctrine which, in normal circumstances, they would not have the power to enforce. SIG³ 182 tells us nothing about Orontes, his aims, the scope of his activities, or the organization of those officers whom moderns label as rebels against the crown.

D. The Diplomatic Front: Orontes and IG II² 207

Until the present decade IG II² 207, an inscription consisting of four possibly related fragments, was held to be evidence of Orontes' activities in 349/8, in particular his close commercial and military ties with Athens.⁸⁹ Although fragment a of the inscription is missing and the data (on line 11) required for dating, the Athenian archon's name, appear differently in each modern copy of that fragment's text, scholars have believed the archon's name in fragment a and the Athenian generals mentioned in fragments b+c+d (which can be joined together physically) represent definitive evidence for a date in 349/8. In 1971⁹⁰ Osborne challenged the modern perception of IG II² 207 and

in so doing successfully placed all of Orontes' rebellious activities in the later 360's. I concur with Osborne's presentation of the decree, and will attempt to modify his conclusions. The inscription presents better evidence about the freedom of action a lesser officer might enjoy and evidence about the Athenian and Achaemenid desire to exploit each other for temporary gain than about the activities of the well-organized rebels which figure in Diodorus' and moderns' accounts of the satraps' revolt.

Osborne held that fragments b+c+d were part of a single decree involving Athenian agreements with Orontes. No internal evidence exists in these fragments which permits the assignation of a precise date to them. The now-lost fragment a is probably not part of the same decree. As for its date, the archon's name was copied as Nikomachou by Pittakys, the scholar who actually saw the stone. Osborne suggests this may be a blunder on Pittakys' part for Nikophēmou, for no Nikomachos appears as archon until 341, when Orontes would have been in his nineties. 361/0 is the possible date for fragment a, the year Nikophemos was eponymous archon. While fragment a seems to be a decree general in content, fragments b+c+d contain very specific provisions, and can follow up fragment a, and be of a slightly later date. The following questions about Orontes should be put to these fragments: What do they tell us about Orontes' politics, do their contents represent theoretical proof of a stance inimical to Achaemenid control? What might be the relative order of a and b+c+d, is there an alternative to Osborne's perception? Why would Athens and Orontes seek to enter into agreements?

Fragment a speaks in general terms of Orontes as being of service

to Athens (lines 5-6), he is seen as one who will cooperate with the Athenians and their allies (lines 12ff) in commercial agreements. His sphere of influence is defined by the rather colorless term arche (line 14). Orontes is honored with a 1000 drachma gold crown, and perhaps--if restorations are to be trusted--Athenian citizenship. Theoretically none of this is out of order: Orontes could claim without difficulty that Athens is a compliant member of the native order, and that as he extends his own influence, he extends Achaemenid influence. The other fragments report agreements of a more specific nature, the sale and transport of grain for Athenian forces under the generals Chares, Charidemus, and Phocion (lines 12, 14, 21). Grain is ready in Mysia at the beginning of the campaigning season. Again, theoretically, nothing precluded local nobles and/or lesser officers from disposing of agricultural products as they see fit unless a). these goods are sold to those acting openly against Achaemenid interests or b). superior officers are being cheated in such financial transactions, i.e. the requisite tribute remains unpaid because funds and good are diverted elsewhere. None of the agreements reported are in themselves "rebellious."⁹¹ Instead, the question we should ask is: under what conditions would such agreements have been mutually beneficial?

The relative order of the fragments is most uncertain: We should first suspend from memory the letters assigned to the different pieces of stone and the resulting implication of a particular order. Of the four fragments, three may be joined together physically to create a single object; the fourth fragment no longer exists. The two resulting objects, of which only one is extant, both contain indications of on-going

relations between Athens and Orontes. The now-lost fragment records the honor of a crown: another example of such an honor can be dated to 369/8 and follows the rendering to Athens of substantial service on the part of the man honored.⁹² Could the lost fragment, now called a, have followed chronologically the services which are to be rendered under the terms of the surviving decree, b+c+d?

A most reasonable time for Athens and Orontes to have entered into commercial agreements and when on-going relations would be mutually beneficial is the later 360's. The key is grain and the grain-route from the Black Sea. Beginning in 366 the straits are a war-zone; grain from Mysia affords a supply which could be transported bypassing the war-zone and the later destabilized Dascylium (fragment c, line 13, suggests direct shipment to Lesbos). At some point in the 360's Orontes is able to exercise control over Lampsacus--perhaps he can be perceived as an officer with power enough to assure safe shipment of foodstuffs. Orontes is presented by the Athenian desire for grain with a further opportunity to build up his influence and power base. In the wake of commercial ties might follow the ability to hire, without state opposition, Athenian mercenaries. Athenian policy in fragments b+c+d is another display of Greek self-interest in a time of disorder in the Achaemenid far west.⁹³ Athens exploits Persian troubles, making agreements with one inimical to orderly Achaemenid control. Athens and Orontes exploit each other in the hopes of future, substantial gains--yet neither seems to have been able to provide the other with substantial and lasting aid. IC II² 207 does not serve as evidence for grandiose aims on the part of Orontes, but rather fits nicely into a context of activities

limited in scope and carried out in Dascylium and Sparda as Orontes extends his influence outward from his Mysian base and seeks the military personnel which will facilitate his exploitation of Ariobarzanes' weakening and his own attacks deep within Autophradates' sphere. The direct losers in Orontes' activities were the highest officers in Sparda and Dascylium, not the crown.

E. Orontes and the Egyptian Theater

Crucial to the reconstruction of the satraps' revolt as a massive destabilization of the Achaemenid far west has been the assumption that there existed at least the plans for widespread cooperation (if not a joint invasion of sectors east of the Syrian desert) between the rebel satraps of Anatolia, led by Orontes, and the king of rebel Egypt, Tachos.⁹⁴ However, the thrust of my reconstruction so far has been that neither Autophradates nor Maussollos were disloyal, and that Orontes' activities seem confined to an outward extension of his base in Mysia, i.e. a mid-fourth century version of the later Attalid kingdom. He tries to exploit fighting among the highest officers in Sparda and Dascylium and fighting within the house of Ariobarzanes as a means to enhance his own power. His diplomatic efforts are aimed westward, toward possible sources of mercenaries. The souther limit of his numismatic evidence is Phocaea; of his military operations, the environs of the city of Sardis. To what extent, then, were events in Ebir-nari and Egypt tied to the destabilization in Anatolia?

There are only two incidents which provide evidence of possible cooperation between the Egyptian sphere and Anatolia, i.e. Orontes.

The first is the diplomatic and military activities of Rheomithres, seemingly a subordinate of Orontes. Xenophon Cyrop. 8.8.4, in a discussion of the decline of contemporary Persian morals, indicates that Rheomithres left his wife and children behind in Egypt while he journeyed northwards and then "defected" to the Shah in hopes of great reward.⁹⁵ Diod. 15.92.1 reports that Rheomithres was sent hypo tōn apostatōn (a rather vague and general term) to Tachos and received 500 talents of silver and 50 ships. He sailed to Asia; established a base at Leucæ and later surrendered these to loyalist forces.⁹⁶ One may perceive that Rheomithres seemed cognizant of his own self-interest throughout: he left his family in Egypt, a place which would not be subject to ready Persian attack; he used Egyptian war material to establish himself in a base; he then surrendered to superior force before a killing blow was delivered. Prosopography suggests that Rheomithres was not executed, but continued to live in the far northwest, most likely in Dascylium's sphere, where he withstood Alexander at the Granicus, and later at Issus.⁹⁷ Just as Orontes acted to increase his own power, Rheomithres perceived working on Orontes' side as a means of increasing his (Rheomithres') power. Opposition to Artaxerxes does not enter into consideration, for both men's aims were confined to attaining stronger positions in the far west at the expense of highest officers. Rheomithres must be working for Orontes in the 360's for he established base in the region where both coinage and the historical record place Orontes' activities.

The second incident, one which may be explained after a more full examination of the Egyptian theater, is reported in Trogus Prol. 10:

deinde in Syria praefectum Armeniae Orontem.⁹⁸ Orontes is in Syria.

He has been active in the far northwest, and hence this reference is puzzling: How did Orontes get to Syria? Is this a joint operation with Egypt? When was Orontes in Syria?

In order to put these contacts into perspective one should first examine Orontes' and Rheomithres' activities in Anatolia from the vantage point of Egypt and in the context of Egyptian activities. By 363 Tachos had become king of rebel Egypt. He is at a strategic advantage in maintaining his independence from Persian domination: Anatolia, the potential source of Achaemenid land and naval forces which might be massed in Ebir-nari (as in the 370's) is marked by troubles in the satrapial family of Dascylium and by the expansionist activities of Orontes, one of the most serious effects of the partial denuding of Sparda and Caria for the earlier punitive campaign. Tachos may embark upon a forward policy designed to disrupt the Achaemenid-held environs of his kingdom: he has no visible internal enemies, and may deploy forces outside Egypt, while at the same time identifying and supporting (diplomatically and militarily) compliant (i.e. anti-Achaemenid) elements of the native order, utilizing them to disrupt Achaemenid control and replace it with his own (so Diod. 15.90.2-3).

His search for allies began in 363. Members of the native order discomfited by the King's Peace responded to Tachos' requests. Agesilaus (with a support contingent) arrived from Sparta later in 362.⁹⁹ One may note here a continuity in personnel: Agesilaus was experienced in warfare against Achaemenid personnel. Chabrias,¹⁰⁰ who had served Egyptian rebels in the 370's, also took up service and participated in

an "Achaemenid" division of command: Agesilaus commanded on land, Chabrias on sea.¹⁰¹ The latter had arrived to act alone; Athens honored Tachos' diplomatic mission but apparently sent no official assistance.¹⁰² Tachos' resources were not unlimited: anecdotes from Aristotle indicate financial difficulties in putting Egypt on a war-footing.¹⁰³ Assistance to Rheomithres' may have been a somewhat unwise overextension of material Tachos himself needed. Tensions over strategy seem to call his leadership qualities into question as well.¹⁰⁴

A forward policy, if carried out successfully, affords to Egyptian rebels the possibility of destabilizing at least two sectors under Achaemenid control: Phoinicia and Syria. Phoinicia was the scene of an Egyptian invasion, and initial success permitted the stationing of Egyptian and mercenary forces (Plut. Ages. 37, Diod. 15.92.3). It was the plan that these bases would serve as staging areas for forces to invade and besiege cities in Syria (so it seems from Diod. 15.92.4). But before the plan could be effected, the commander, Hektanebos, revolted against Tachos (Plut. Ages. 37). It is in the context of this invasion in which we should perceive the assistance granted to Rheomithres: Tachos hopes that he has invested in the successful distraction of Achaemenid forces who will have to be deployed against a stronger Orontes. Rheomithres was quite fortunate in being able to carry out his mission: we do not learn whether he suffered losses as he journeyed northward. The fact he left his family in Egypt may point to his expectation that his forces would be an object of attack as they journeyed back to Anatolia.

The exact chronology of all these events is most uncertain, especially as regards time for preparation and mobilization.¹⁰⁵ One should allow for two campaigning seasons. Preparations would have begun in 362, been finished by the earlier part of the campaigning season of 361. This season would see the invasion of Phoinicia and the assistance afforded to Orontes through Rheomithres. By the season of 360 Persian forces under Ochus would have been mobilized, while Egyptian unity began to crumble.

The degree to which Phoinicia and Syria were destabilized is also uncertain. It would appear that Phoinicia was the worse off: Egyptian troops were actually stationed there. It is also possible, and even probable, that the presence of superior anti-Achaemenid forces may have compelled previously pro-Achaemenid figures to modify their policies as a means of self-preservation. Only in the case of King Strato of Sidon do we have specific information, and even his stance may not be determined with any great certainty.¹⁰⁶

Wartime expenditure and the deployment of large forces outside Egypt took their toll on Tachos. He faced a revolt led by his commander in Egypt and that man's son, Nektanebos, now in Phoinicia. Mercentary ranks split: Chabrias remained loyal to Tachos, Agesilaus backed the disloyal rebels. Nektanebos in turn faced a rebel whose power-base lay in Mendes.¹⁰⁷ Tachos had learned the dangers of denuding his home sectors and of entrusting large forces to men who proved only marginally loyal. With the collapse of the unity among Egyptian rebels, Achaemenid forces were in a position to exploit Egyptian troubles. Tachos, now available as a cooptable member of the native order through

whom Artaxerxes II could hope to exercise hegemony over Egypt, journeyed to Susa.¹⁰⁸ Persian forces, led by Ochus, had been mobilized by 360, and were joined by the fugitive Tachos. It is uncertain how far west these forces moved: the campaign seems to have been called to a halt by Ochus after Tachos' death and when Ochus grew concerned over events in Susa.¹⁰⁹

The continuities in Persian policy are interesting to note: The cooptation of the rebel king Tachos, who had done such damage to Achaemenid territory, is a reflection of the policy enunciated in Herodotus 3.15 in connection with Egypt. The fact that Ochus moved toward Egypt, and not Anatolia, again points to its great significance to the Achaemenid empire. Local men could well handle Anatolia. Rebel Egypt itself followed policies not unlike the Achaemenids in its attempted support of cooperative locals and experienced the political dangers of a large scale campaign. Both the Anatolian and Egyptian theaters seem to have exploited each other--and benefits were very short term.

How are we to deal with Trogus' claim that Orontes invaded Syria, a sector seemingly only threatened by Egyptian forces in Phoenicia? We should first ask a rather obvious question: how did Orontes get there?¹¹⁰ In the fourth century there were two methods of deploying large numbers of troops: by land or by sea. One should hold in mind that deployment of large forces by sea will require constant landings for reprovisioning (at least for fresh water). Regardless of the method by which Orontes reached Syria we must assume either a great deal of support for Orontes in Anatolia--for which we have no evidence--or an

ability on Orontes' part to cut his way through Achaemenid territory from Mysia. On land Sparda and Caria were not supporters of Orontes' aggrandizement: the experiences of Autophradates against the Pisidians and Datames suggests that one should not be optimistic at all about moving through southern Anatolia, assuming there had been success in moving through Sparda and Caria. Movement by sea would require a sizeable fleet--large enough to oppose the navies which would be launched from Sparda and Caria, powerful enough to force landings for supplies, even in hostile territory, and flexible enough to ward off constant forays by privateers operating in the comfort of a disorderly situation in Anatolia. Orontes might have had access to the core of such a fleet, had not Rheomithres surrendered the ships provided by Tachos--however many made it safely to Anatolia. The numismatic and historical record--save for Trogus--places Orontes no further south than Sparda. He must move through an immense amount of territory. I do not see how he could do it.¹¹¹ Trogus Prol. 10 is erroneous: Orontes' title is wrong; the reference to Syria may be a confusion with some aspect of the Egyptian theater, perhaps even Ochos' westward moves.

To answer the question posed at the beginning of this section: Ties between the Egyptian and Anatolian theatres were minimal and transitory. The relations between Orontes and Tachos were such that each man was at once the exploiter and the exploited. To Tachos, Orontes and his emissary Rheomithres were compliant members of the native order. Once supplied they could tie up Achaemenid forces which might otherwise be deployed southward against Tachos. To Orontes, Tachos was a source of material. The troubles in Ebir-nari were Tachos'

doing--until his position collapsed. There was no joint campaign.

F. Orontes: Commander of All the Rebels?

Diodorus 15.91.1 presents a number of details which require comment. Orontes is assigned the title of epi ten ton holon dioikesin. . . strategon: what does this mean? He is chosen to hold this office by hoi d' aphestēkotes tou Baseileōs: who are they? He uses funds for recruiting mercenaries: where do these funds come from? He hopes to gain the office tēs parathalassiou pásēs . . . tēn satrapeian: what is this office? Finally who and what does Orontes surrender to and why?

Bu having examined the attested activities of Orontes we are in a better position to analyze Diodorus' information concerning Orontes' position and determine the veracity of that information. Orontes' documented activities, i.e. where he minted coins, where he led troops, with whom he seems to have established diplomatic contact, indicate that his activities are based in Sparda and Dascylium, that the thrust of his diplomacy is to obtain assistance from ancestral enemies of Achaemenid control. But the tenor of Diod. 15.91.1 is quite grandiose; the historian assumes an unsubstantiated high level of political, military and diplomatic organization among the rebels he catalogued in 15.90.3. However, this tenor does complement Diodorus' perception of western troubles in which everyone strikes out directly against the Shah. The broadly defined rebels "democratically" choose a general, an "anti-Shah", who eventually comes to hope that the "true Shah" will offer him a position of highest authority in the west, a position which seems to pre-figure the offers Darius III will make later to a victorious Alexander.

Orontes' title is actually a job description, not a formal chancellory title. In addition, nothing in Diodorus' account substantiates the claim that Orontes held wide-ranging command. The activities of Rheomithres, who seems to act under Orontes' orders, are confined to that portion of Anatolia already known from the numismatic and historical records to have been under Orontes' influence and control, i.e. the part of the coast of Anatolia west of Sparda's sphere.

We may begin to tone down the grandiose quality of the description of Orontes by asking precisely who his supporters were. Since Orontes had been a lesser officer in the far west we may assume he drew his principal support from among other lesser officers dissatisfied with the state of affairs in Dascylium and Sparda, officers who would seek to exploit for their own benefit difficulties experienced by their superiors. But these disruptive activities were directed against the highest officers, not the Shah. In winning such support Orontes' age and royal background would be of value, particularly in causing him to emerge as a leader and in convincing lesser officers previously loyal to their satraps to change their political stance. Another possible source of support would be those politicians in Greek cities who saw support of Orontes as a means of increasing their own power at the expense of political rivals who had worked with Achaemenid personnel. The increase in Orontes' power during this time may have also compelled smaller cities, out of a simple desire for self-preservation, to back the man with a temporarily superior military force. We may perceive a wide base of support for Orontes--but one existing only in sections of Sparda and Dascylium, only among lesser officers and more minor political entities, and only in a time when severe discontinuity permitted Orontes to

temporarily emerge as one possessing superior force. Hegemonia (a term Diodorus uses) of a temporary nature is perhaps the most apt description for Orontes' position in the late 360's.

Diodorus claims that Orontes had control over funds large enough to pay for 20,000 mercenaries. Let us leave aside impressive figures and ask what possible sources of funds were available to Orontes. Most obvious would be funds normally designated for what would become tribute forwarded to the satraps and to Susa. To this may be added booty from military operations, special imposts (i.e. extortion), the personal wealth of the rebels, and proceeds from the sale of agricultural goods (i.e. such as those sold to Athens). In short, Orontes and his supporters would be the recipients of bullion and goods which in peacetime would be distributed to lawful representatives of Achaemenid control.

The office which Orontes hoped for when he surrendered to his opponents is a difficult one to ascertain. One might expect satrapeia to be the position of satrap. The geographical designation parathalassion is general and vague, applicable in 15.90.3, it seems, to the entire western portion of the Achaemenid empire.¹¹² Comparison with other passages in Diodorus indicates that a title which combines satrapeia or a related word) with parathalassios has no single definition.¹¹³ An examination of Orontes' power-base offers a possible resolution of the question of what type of office he hoped for upon his surrender.¹¹⁴ Orontes holds portions of the coastal sectors controlled from Sparda and Dascylium, and some of the sections of the interior (e.g. at least part of the Caicus valley). Orontes might well expect to be permitted to hold onto his conquests--or part of them--upon being coopted.

The surrender of Orontes and Rheomithres encompasses two topics: the mechanics of surrender, and the reason for surrender. Diodorus, in his account of Orontes' betrayal, emphasizes the role of the Shah, but does recognize that both local and central operatives are present. Money is sent to Artaxerxes as a gift, or less politely, as a bribe. The men transporting money to Orontes are arrested and sent to the Shah: these men would include Rheomithres' men, Greeks in alliance with Orontes, and men who disagreed with Orontes' move and still believed they could hold out against "loyalist" forces (the opposite type of the men responsible for Glos' death in Diod. 15.18.1). Military forces once used to attack Achaemenid control were surrendered to "those sent by the Shah." These are probably local personnel operating against Orontes. We should not assume that a new special force was sent from Susa for the sole purpose of effecting Orontes' collapse. Fighting should be perceived as local warfare between Orontes (and his supporters) and forces opposed to Orontes' expansionism. As for the cities surrendered, we assume that Orontes allowed forces to enter strongholds (e.g. Pergamum, OGIS 264), after having arranged to hand over those politicians who refused to go along with his own "treachery."

In describing Rheomithres' surrender, Diodorus 15.92.1 places a greater emphasis on the Shah, with the effect of having the ex-rebel buy the Shah's favor. The pollous tōn aphestēkotōn hēgemonas should signify lesser personnel, not the satraps listed in 15.90.3. We should not rule out their being surrendered to local officers, i.e. those who did not join Orontes' disruption.

A few words may be said here about the situation which would have precipitated Orontes' surrender. His aggrandizement had been made possible

by the warfare between Sparda and Dascylium, and the continued disorder in the latter after 365. Once this situation changed, Orontes faced the possibility that the satraps of both provinces would launch a joint attack on the territory he had seized from them. If he surrendered before the killing blow he might be permitted to hold on to his life and some of his property. In the next section I will argue that Artabazos' arrival as the new satrap for Dascylium altered the picture for Orontes-- Artabazos would seek to reclaim territory lost by Dascylium to Orontes. It seems that Orontes' surrender precipitated Rheomithres', at least in Diodorus' account, although the reverse is also a possibility. Orontes' death followed close upon his surrender.¹¹⁵

G. Concluding Remarks

Orontes in the 360's is a creature of the far west who exploited troubles resulting from continued instability after 365. His activities are to be confined to the far west, to Sparda and Dascylium. His coins were minted at Lampsacus and Clazomenae; perhaps at Cisthene and Phocaea, too. His power was great enough to control their civic mints from which were issued campaign coinages to pay mercenaries. His military activities can be placed no further south than the city of Sardis. He built up his power-base, including Pergamum, and conducted operations on the Anatolian west coast.

Orontes' diplomatic ties with Athens and Egypt were marked by mutual exploitation without lasting benefits for either side. The self-righteous SIG³ 182 tells us nothing about his activities.

Orontes was an important commander: but his supporters were only

lesser officers and malcontents from Hellenic poleis drawn to him as a man of high birth.

But if Orontes had been in the far west since the 370's, as I argued, why did he wait until the later 360's to expand his power? There are only a series of partial answers. Orontes arrived as a lesser officer, a disgraced outsider, under the scrutiny of loyal Tiribazos and Ariobarzanes. The former, his old nemesis and present superior, left Sparda c. 374. Orontes, until then, would have had to have been cautious in building up any personal following. Until 370 we hear of no major disturbance in the far west: Autophradates, Ariobarzanes, and Datames all seem to co-exist peacefully. There seems to have been little chance for Orontes to exploit difficulties at the top. We should also count on the continued distrust of his fellow lesser officers and local nobles who had enjoyed amicable relations with the long-time satrap Tiribazos. Beginning in 370-369 warfare does exist in which one Achaemenid highest officer moves against another. Perhaps Orontes scored limited gains in Autophradates' absence.

It appears that the campaign of 366-365 offered Orontes the chance to place himself on a wartime footing without arousing undue suspicion. With the collapse of order in Dascylium Orontes could draw off lesser officers, especially if Autophradates was busy elsewhere in Sparda. The years 364-361 saw Orontes try to gain as much as possible, but his plans were foiled by the collapse of Tachos as a sure source of money and material, and, more importantly, the restabilization of Dascylium.

Orontes is best compared, not to Cyrus the younger, but to Spithridates, the disgruntled subordinate of Pharnabazos, who exploited

(and was exploited by) recalcitrant Paphlagonians and the invaders Agesilaus to strike blows against his superior before moving off to Sparda in hopes of being coopted by an ex-rebel, Ariaaios, himself recently named a caretaker at the citadel of Sparda. Orontes was not a rebel against Artaxerxes in the sense that he challenged the crown. His enemies were the highest officers of Sparda and Dascylium, and it was at their expense and that of their supporters that Orontes tried to expand his holdings and attain higher status. The crown is involved only indirectly, in that Orontes' disruptive activities prevented the meeting of administrative guidelines. Orontes was motivated by his own self-interest, now perhaps heightened by the realization that he would not have another chance to regain high status. He gained that status, but after death: the kings of Iranian Commagene placed him in their gallery of ancestors (OGIS 391-393).

Section V. Artabazos, Mithridates, and Datames

The later 360's were a time of disorder in the satrapy of Dascylium, a period even more problematic because of the scanty data and lack of chronologically fixed points. In 366 and 365 operations were carried out by Autophradates and Maussollos against the satrap Ariobarzanes, who had been declared a rebel at Susa. Although Autophradates and Maussollos do not seem to have scored any decisive victories against Dascylium, we later find the satrapy in disorder. Foreign Greek forces exploited the fighting for their own benefit, and by 364/3 the Athenian Timotheus was able to operate close to Dascylium, at Cyzicus (Diod. 15.8.16,

Nepos Tim. 1.3). Ariobarzanes lost parts of the western and southern portions of his sphere of influence: Philiskos of Abydos had been murdered in the later 360's (Dem. 23.141-142); the lesser officer Orontes took advantage of fighting to extend his own sphere of influence northwards into the Troad, at least as far as Lampsacus. The satrapial house was in an uproar: There was fighting between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates, his eldest son (e.g. Val. Max. 9.11 ext. 2), which ended in son betraying father (Xen. Cyrop. 8.8.4), who was apparently shipped westward for execution (Harpocration sv. Ariobarzanes). Adding to this confusion is the appearance in the west of Artabazos, youngest son of Pharnabazos and younger brother of Ariobarzanes. He would later fight Datames in Cappadocia (Diod. 15.91.2-6), and by the end of the 360's would be in control of Dascylium (cf. Dem. 23.154ff). Datames, although he survived warfare with Artabazos, was later murdered by Mithridates, who fled into the interior (Nepos Dat. 9-11).

Elucidation of these events is required, but there will be only partial success. It will appear that Artabazos' arrival in the west can account for the precipitous actions of Mithridates and Datames. What can be stressed is the predominantly local nature of these events: While they disrupt Achaemenid control in the far west, they pose no serious long-term threat to Anatolia or Artaxerxes. Events in Dascylium are a worst possible case of rivalry between officers. It is this rivalry and disorder which Artaxerxes hoped to resolve by dispatching Artabazos westward.

A. Artabazos' Background

An examination of Artabazos' parentage and relations suggests the

explanation for Artaxerxes' decision to abandon the house of Ariobarzanes, and turn instead to a cadet branch of the sons of Pharmaces to provide the new satrap at Dascylium. In determining Artabazos' background we are on firmer ground than the prosopography by inference which marked the investigation of Ariobarzanes. Credit must be given to Nöldeke for being the first to suggest that Artabazos was the son of Pharnabazos by his marriage to Apame.¹¹⁶ IG II² 356 provided the necessary documentation which rendered Nöldeke's suggestions a virtual certainty: although the inscription is damaged, it is clear that the progonoi of the young Memnon honored in the Athenian inscription included Pharnabazos, Artabazos, and Mentor, so tying them all as relations.¹¹⁷ Based on the data provided in Xen. Hell. 5.1.28, Artabazos' birth may be placed after 388-387.

The second piece of Artabazos' background which is of significance for the 360's and beyond is that he is the brother-in-law of the Rhodians Memnon and Mentor, whose sister Artabazos married (Diod. 16.52.4). The marriage had taken place by the time Charidemus entered Artabazos' service (Dem. 23.15.4).¹¹⁸ In relative terms we may place the marriage after the Rhodian brothers began working for Artabazos. The parallel may be drawn to the ties of family between Glos and Tiribazos (Diod. 15.9.3), the former marrying the latter's daughter while in his employ. A more precise dating of the marriage is difficult. Working backwards from Diod. 16.42.4 (assigned to 342/1, see below), the approximate twenty years of marriage required for 11 sons and 10 daughters suggests a date c. 362.¹¹⁹ We cannot work backwards from the date of Charidemus' arrival since that date is itself somewhat uncertain.¹²⁰

The following may be said about Artabazos' background: He was born after 388; as a son of Pharnabazos (satrap of Dascylium), and Apame, daughter of Artaxerxes, he is the union of the sons of Pharnaces and the Achaemenid ruling house. He has ancestral ties to both Susa and Dascylium. Soon after his arrival in Dascylium Artabazos contracts his own marriage ties with compliant members of the native order; he marries into the family of Memnon and Mentor. I am tempted to see these two Rhodians as men of some importance beyond mere mercenaries: could they be the exiled scions of a noble Rhodian family forced from political ascendancy? With this marriage the sons of Pharnaces become multinational.

The decision by Artaxerxes to dispatch Artabazos westward as satrap of Dascylium may be explained as the desire to install a man who at once provides continuity in personnel and represents royal interests. Artabazos is at once an insider and outsider. The continuing disorder within Dascylium, and the internecine fighting which eventually broke out between Ariobarzanes and at least his eldest son, Mithridates, during the year 364 motivated Artaxerxes to turn to Artabazos as the man who could take up the province while bypassing internecine strife. As a son of Pharnabazos and member of the sons of Pharnaces he could take up ancestral estates and the old ties and networks of friendships and alliances. But he was an outsider: he had spent his early life, we may almost certainly assume, with his father, at court or on campaign in Ebir-nari and Egypt. It is uncertain whether he had ever been in Dascylium.¹²¹ As a grandson of Artaxerxes, Artabazos would certainly be of high enough status to win the respect and/or fear of far western

personnel and neutralize, at least in part, the influence of the equally royal, but older, Orontes. Artabazos could be expected to not act in a fashion at variance with what should have been obvious as Susa's interests, as had Ariobarzanes in 368-367.

The exact date and circumstances of Artabazos' dispatch and his arrival in Dascylium are not certain. Diodorus assigns to 362/1 Artabazos' battle with Datames, synchronizing it roughly with Orontes' and Rheomithres' surrender (Diod. 15.91.1-92). On the basis of this information and the probable date of his marriage, Artabazos would have to be in the far west in 362. One may suggest that the decision to dispatch Artabazos was made in the course of 364. He would have been sent westward early on in 363 with some form of escort forces, and with the authority by which he could supplement those forces. As he proceeded west he would have to pass through the interior of Anatolia: in this context we may place his clash with Datames (see below). He would arrive at Dascylium sometime in 363 BC: there would be time enough for hiring Memnon and Mentor, and for marrying their sister by 362 BC.¹²²

B. Datames v. Artabazos

In approximately 363 BC Artabazos and an escort force was moving westward. At this time a good part of the Anatolian interior was under the control of Datames, who had begun his career as a lesser officer in Cilicia and had been promoted to satrap of Cappadocia before 374 BC (see chapter 4). His activities had included cooperation and friendly relations with Ariobarzanes, a man now out of favor at Susa. The sources report ill feelings in general between Datames

and the crown. For Nepos (Dat. 9.1-5) and Polyaeus (7.21.4) Datames was the object of sinister and royally-inspired plots inside and outside his sphere. Nepos (9.1) speaks of Artaxerxes' implacabile odium. Diodorus 15.91.7 reports a similar desire of Artaxerxes to destroy Datames, whose generalship somehow posed a threat to Susa. The specifics of conflict between Datames and other Achaemenid officers are puzzling: Polyaeus 7.21.3 reports a potential clash with the Shah. Datames crossed the Euphrates, moved towards the Great King and swiftly withdrew. The chronological and precise geographical context of this anecdote is unknown. Diodorus 15.91.2-6 reports conflict between Datames and Artabazos (called only a stratēgos of the king). Save for the death of Mithrobarzanes, Datames' father-in-law, the fighting, which took place in Cappadocia, was inconclusive. Two issues should be investigated: To what extent was Datames involved in the disorders in Dascylium? To what extent was he on bad terms with Artaxerxes in the 360's?

The first query can be answered only with an argument from silence. In the earlier part of the decade Sysinas (Nepos Dat. 7.1) had convinced Artaxerxes that his father was acting in a fashion inimical to royal control. Artaxerxes then entrusted to Autophradates a punitive campaign against Datames, one which ended with an agreement by which there was a return to the status quo ante bellum. Participation by Datames on either side of the later punitive campaign against Ariobarzanes appears unlikely. The satrapy of Dascylium was attacked from the west and south, and no role for Datames in the punitive campaign is attested. It would have been most unwise for Datames, himself only recently regarded as a rebel, to come to the assistance of Ariobarzanes,

now openly declared a rebel by the crown. If Datames offered assistance, Artaxerxes would have cause to order his destruction. But if one assumes that Datames stood away from the troubles in Dascylium, how does one explain the tension and conflict reported in the sources?

Moderns have tended to accept the sources at face value. Datames was a rebel in the late 360's and a participant in the "Great Satraps' Revolt" (based on Nepos Dat. 9.1-5 and Diod. 15.91.2-7). His operations near the Euphrates (Polyaenus 7.21.3) were part of a master plan carried out with Orontes for an invasion of the empire east and south of Anatolia.¹²² But such a view assigns a false importance to Diodorus' unsubstantiated claims of a well organized and massive revolt and to Nepos' desire to glorify Datames at the expense of rival Achaemenid officers, including the Shah. Datames' military activities in the late 360's can be explained by self-interest and the desire for self-preservation.

The Euphrates maneuver and the battle with Artabazos can be viewed as a single set of operations in Datames' sphere and its environs. One should recall that the Euphrates river extends northwest into lands under Datames' control (cf. Strabo 12.1.2). Artabazos was moving westward to take up Dascylium, and Datames' temporary crossing of the Euphrates can be viewed as a mobilization against what he believed (mistakenly) to be an enemy force. Polyaenus' labeling of Datames' foe as the Great King (who does not seem to move from Susa) is a mistake--a parallel to Nepos' desire to glorify Datames by pitting him against the evil Shah. Later, in Cappadocia, Datames did clash with this

force led by Artabazos (Diod. 15.91.2-6). In the fighting Mithrobarzanes attempted, out of his own self-interest, to defect, but was killed by Datames (cf. chapter 4). Diodorus does not assign any explicit cause for the inconclusive fighting. Perhaps Datames believed that his past association with Ariobarzanes had marked him out as an additional target for Artabazos. Regrettably, the sources do not permit greater precision. I would only stress that the conflict here is limited in duration and seems to have no lasting impact on Achaemenid control. One should perceive temporary local instability, not a direct attack on the crown or territories outside Anatolia.

C. The Pacification of Dascylium

Artabazos entered into a province in which top level authority appears to have been in near collapse. First among his concerns would be securing the satrapial seat and attempting to resolve internal disputes. With news or rumors of Artabazos' approach, Mithridates must have come to the decision to betray his father in hopes of saving himself. The actual betrayal would come some time in 363, by winter 363/2 the latest. The situation among the house of Ariobarzanes, his sons, and the supporters of each is most uncertain: within the context of disorder we can insert Orontes' self-aggrandizement at Dascylium's expense, and the chance for the mercenaries Memnon and Mentor to enter Artabazos' service. We should assume that Artabazos would have to spend some time establishing himself in control of the satrapial seat in the course of 363 and the early part of 362. The marriage with the Rhodian woman would take place before the end of 362. As for Artabazos' earliest activities at the satrapial seat:

Upon his establishment in Dascylium, Artabazos would have seen to the arrest of Ariobarzanes and his shipment eastward. But Mithridates, who had fought against his father before Artabazos' arrival, seems to have been unable to reach an accommodation with Artabazos, for we find Mithridates next in the interior of Anatolia, east of Dascylium. Perhaps Artabazos was able to coopt the two remaining sons of Ariobarzanes, so as to provide some continuity with the previous administration.

Difficulties remained outside the satrapial capital. If the decree in honor of Athenodorus may be placed in the 360's, we can see him operating on Artabazos' behalf at Cius to restore order.¹²⁴ Orontes is perhaps still in control at Lampsacus and is in possession of the Troad. Pseudo-Demosthenes 50.4 reports trouble near Cyzicus into 362/1. There may have been a stasis in the city.¹²⁵ By far the most dangerous of these disorders was Orontes' sphere of influence which extended into territories previously under Dascylium's control. Artabazos would have moved southwards from Dascylium (Lampsacus passing from Orontes' hands) and have eventually reached the Troad. We may place the beginnings of this campaign in 362, with its culmination in 361. I suggest that by mid-361 Orontes decided it was best to attempt to be coopted--the aid from Tachos would not be enough to insure military success against the new satrap. Sometime later in 361 came the actual surrender, and then death of Orontes.¹²⁶ Unfortunately, all of the above is supposition. But, when the historical record resumes for Artabazos he has made hostile contact with Autophradates--this presupposes the disappearance of Orontes' sphere, which included the liminal regions once the object of dispute between Ariobarzanes and Autophradates.

With the death of Orontes, something of a vacuum was created. In addition, Mithridates, who had fled east, was now operating in the interior of Anatolia (see below). Artabazos had two options tactically: to continue southwards, i.e. to fill Orontes' old sphere with his own power, or return to the satrapial capital and prepare for a thrust into the eastern portions of Dascylium's sphere and western portions of Datames'. It appears that Artabazos chose the first. It is necessary now to explain the following situation depicted by Demosthenes 23.154ff: the crossing of Charidemus into Anatolia, the arrest of Artabazos, Charidemus' seizure of cities. These events raise questions about their background: how much of the Troad was in Artabazos' hands; where is Artabazos when hostile contact with Autophradates occurs? Why does hostile contact occur? And, finally, what is the effect of these events on Mithridates and Datames?

Dem. 23.154 implies that when Charidemus crossed into Asia the cities of Scepsis, Cebren, and Ilium were under Artabazos' control, i.e. Artabazos' sphere of influence (like Pharnabazos' forty years before) encompassed the northern and middle Troad. Before Charidemus' arrival, operations were carried out close to and in the northern extension of Orontes' sphere. We may place such operations during 362-1. Charidemus' crossing would come early in 360: before that point Orontes had collapsed and Autophradates had placed Artabazos under arrest.

When Charidemus enters into Memnon's and Mentor's hire, Artabazos is under arrest. The places Charidemus seizes are aphylactoi. Allowing for some exaggeration on Demosthenes' part, it seems that there was not a concentration of Artabazos' forces in that sector. Nor does there

seem to have been any great stockpile of supplies: Charidemus will not have enough supplies to remain under a state of seige (so Dem. 23.155). One can conclude that troops and their provisions are focused elsewhere; that Charidemus has been hired to help guard the Troad in Artabazos' absence. One can further conclude that Artabazos, immediately before his arrest by Autophradates, was close to Autophradates' sphere, i.e. Artabazos was in the southern Troad. We may now suggest the reason for tension, an old one. Artabazos sought to reclaim the southern extension of Ariobarzanes' old sphere and clashed with Autophradates: a replay of old tensions. By 360, the same question existed: who was to hold the liminal regions, the areas of intersection of the spheres controlled from Sparda and from Dascylium? It was this old dispute which led to Artabazos' arrest.

How much of the Orontes' and Ariobarzanes' old sphere was held by Artabazos? Sestus and Abydus do not seem to be under firm Achaemenid control at all. Dem. 23.158 reports the Sestus was held by Cotys. Abydus at least does not seem openly inimical to Artabazos. Dem. 23.155 implies that after his release, Artabazos was able to draw supplies from inner Phrygia, Lydia, and Paphlagonia: ek tēs anōthen Phrygias kai Paphlagonias oikeias ousēs. Lydia is understandable in this context if Artabazos and Autophradates had reached some sort of agreement about supplies, but inner Phrygia and Paphlagonia--for the 360's--is an exaggeration, perhaps made to blacken Charidemus. Overall, we may conclude that after securing his satrapial seat, Artabazos moved against Orontes, carrying on operations in the Troad. Here occurs Autophradates' sole attested action directed against orderly Achaemenid control: the

arrest of Artabazos. That action may be explained as misjudgment, the flaring up of old tensions concerning the south Troad, which Autophradates believed was his rightfully. Artabazos, a grandson of the King, would expect that he should hold all of Ariobarzanes' old sphere. He was loyal to the crown.

The temporary difficulties between Autophradates and Artabazos had some deleterious effects on the recently stabilized Dascylium, effects similar in kind, but not as serious as those experienced in the far west during the immediately preceding years. Charidemus exploited the absence of Artabazos' forces in the north and mid-Troad to seize Cebren, Ilium, and Scepsis (Dem. 231.54). From the sketchy details concerning Ilium it appears that the populace and the mercenary commander Athenodorus, working in Artabazos' service, attempted to resist Charidemus.¹²⁷ It was Charidemus' success which convinced Autophradates to release Artabazos. Charidemus, if left to operate unchecked, might eventually pose a threat to Autophradates' sphere. If Artabazos was released--and the old tensions over the Troad put aside--the new satrap at Dascylium could return to his own sphere and fight Charidemus. No losses would accrue to Autophradates or Sparda. Charidemus was put under attack by the released Artabazos. Memnon and Mentor recognized that a cost-effective solution was the best: they moved to get the mercenary out of Asia, and spare their sphere more damage.¹²⁸ By the end of the campaigning season in 360 the difficulties between Autophradates and Artabazos were over. Artabazos could solidify control in the north and central Troad, and then turn to the final outstanding problem he faced: Mithridates, son of Ariobarzanes, now operating in the interior of Anatolia.

D. Mithridates and Datames

We can trace some of Mithridates' activities in the regions east of Dascylium after his flight in 363. We find him, with a group of companions, exercising a political role at Heraclea on the Black Sea (Justin 16.4.3-9, Suda sv. Klearchos). He assisted Clearchos, or rather both men attempted to exploit the other for political gain. Clearchos was the more successful.¹²⁹ He moved to present himself as a compliant member of the native order: frequent embassies were dispatched to Artaxerxes II and III (Memnon FGrH 434 fr. 1.4).¹³⁰ The dynasteia he founded outlasted the Achaemenid overlords who approved of his existence.

At some point after (?--there are no chronologically fixed points) Mithridates' contact with Clearchus, we find him in the company of Datames, an old friend of his father. The sources now relate a tale of intrigue designed to display Datames' bravery as a contrast to the Persian predilection for treachery and cowardice as solutions to administrative problems (Nepos Dat. 10-11, Polyaeus 7.29.1). Mithridates was supposedly in league with the Shah, who commanded that Datames be killed or be shipped alive to court. In order to gain Datames' confidence, Mithridates pretended to be a "rebel," for Datames was now one, too. Immense damage was done by the two to royal property until Mithridates killed Datames with a singularly simple-minded strategem--use of a concealed weapon. The Shah, meanwhile, suffered monetary and property losses in an ineffective handling of rebellion.

Here, too, the sources have placed events into a rather simplistic mold of "rebel" v. "loyalist" in order to glorify a single officer (Datames in Nepos, Mithridates in Polyaeus). Disruptive activities are

quickly perceived as being aimed directly against the far-off Artaxerxes. Self-interest, not subterfuge, may help explain events. These were local disorders--Artaxerxes was off in the background. Both Datames and Mithridates acted out of self-interest. Self-interest, not subterfuge, may help explain events. These were local disorders--Artaxerxes was off in the background. Both Datames and Mithridates acted out of self-interest. Artabazos was in the process of solidifying his control over Dascylium and could be expected to turn eastward to deal with two outstanding problems: Datames, who had fought him as he approached Dascylium and who was a friend of Ariobarzanes, and Mithridates, son of the former satrap and possible rival for the post of satrap. We cannot expect that all of Ariobarzanes' support in Dascylium had disappeared. Datames, now aided by Mithridates, was taking steps to build up his own position--his operations directed against "royal" property and revenue (Nepos Dat. 10.2, Polyaeus 7.29.1) are basically the same steps he took in the 370's to solidify control over his new satrapy (Nepos Dat. 5.6). His activities were aimed against a potential threat from the west, not from Susa. Mithridates' "treachery" can be explained by self-interest: Mithridates may have hoped that by killing Datames and invoking Artaxerxes' name he might garner some reward.

Again, I would refrain from viewing these troubles in the interior (c. 362-360) as being directed against Artaxerxes. Datames seems motivated by concern over possible threats from the west, Mithridates by a desire for self-preservation. While Cappadocia was damaged, central authority remained untouched.

E. Concluding Remarks

One may now present an account of the "restabilization" of Dascylium: In 363, it seems, Artabazos, son of Pharnabazos, arrived in Dascylium to replace his elder brother as satrap. His first order of business was to set in order the satrapial capital: Ariobarzanes was arrested and sent east; Mithridates fled; Ariobarzanes' remaining sons may have been coopted. Did Artabazos have any personal feelings about the actions he undertook? The only member of his family in Dascylium whom we know he might have had the opportunity to meet was Mithridates (Nepos Datames 4.5 reports him on the way to the Shah).

The pacification of Dascylium, the capital and its environs, lasted into 362. Artabazos' staff was multi-national: the Athenian Athenodorus, and the Rhodians Memnon and Mentor. The satrap married the sister of his Rhodian companions.

Beginning in 362 Artabazos moved to clear out Orontes' supporters from his satrapy. He moved into the Troad and by mid-361 held the north and mid-Troad. He forced Orontes into surrender.

Orontes' sphere, a vacuum after his death, had encompassed regions of both Sparda and Dascylium, including areas once the object of dispute between their satraps. Into the vacuum entered old tensions, but now, fortunately, less severe and more temporary. By early 360, Autophradates had "arrested" Artabazos in the south Troad. The exploitation of these tensions by Charidemus ended inter-satrapial hostility. By 359 Artabazos was in an unchallengeable position in Dascylium. But his sphere of influence seems not have to been as large as his elder brother's. And to the east, Cappadocia was in disorder after the death of its satrap (361 or 360).

Section VI. Conclusion

It is now possible to place the destabilizations of the 360's into perspective and provide a summary of the difficulties which threatened Achaemenid control in Anatolia. The "Great Satraps' Revolt" has been minimalized: it is no longer a massive destabilization, but the effects of the destabilization of a few border provinces combined with attempts by Greek, Egyptian and Achaemenid personnel to exploit those difficulties for their own personal gain. The eastern sections of the empire are not threatened. Contemporary with these relatively recent difficulties are problems which were perennial in nature to the Achaemenid far west such as tribally organized recalcitrants (e.g. Pisidians) and minor in-fighting among native dynasts (e.g. Lycia); but all were exacerbated by the need for troops in the far northwest and in actions against an expansionist rebel Egypt.

The first stage of the problems in the far west came before 366. The keys to understanding are the rivalry among satraps and the great independence which they possessed in making and effecting policy. A basic object of dispute in this instance was the size and extent of Ariobarzanes' sphere of influence and power. He had expanded his sphere to include liminal regions which Autophradates, possessor of the flagship satrapy, believed his own. Ariobarzanes had also made policy in an attempt to benefit those whom he believed to be in mainland Greece the most compliant members of the native order, but did so at a time when his rival, Autophradates, was under pressure in the midst of not very successful operations against Datames, a satrap known

to have been friendly with Ariobarzanes.

Autophradates reacted harshly to Ariobarzanes' displays of his influence and power. The satrap at Sparda perceived them as a threat to his own influence, for success on Ariobarzanes' part, coupled with his own lackluster showing against Datames, might assure Ariobarzanes' emergence as the preeminent Achaemenid highest officer on the Anatolian west coast. Autophradates capitalized on the fact that local and imperial perceptions of affairs distant from Susa might differ. His chance came when Artaxerxes perceived Greek affairs differently from Ariobarzanes, and shifted Achaemenid favor from Sparta to Thebes, a city unblemished by hostile acts directed against Achaemenid territory. Autophradates misrepresented this policy variance as one in which Ariobarzanes' policy was inimical to royal interests. The decision that Ariobarzanes was a rebel displayed continuity with other such decisions: new local information was received, on its basis a decision was made.

The operations of 366-365, the second stage, display the hallmarks of past Achaemenid campaigns: two commanders, one on land, one on sea, one a local man, one an outsider. The campaign offers an illustration of the dangers of mobilization and the deleterious effects of pulling large numbers of loyal men from one sector for military duty in another: a chance is provided for disgruntled lesser officers like Orontes to mobilize without incurring suspicion. The partial denuding of sectors offers opportunities to perennial recalcitrants (such as the Pisidians) to disrupt a normally peaceful state of affairs. The Greek poleis of Anatolia might see the emergence of policy or politicians less friendly to Achaemenid supervision (e.g. Herophytus of Ephesus).

The third stage, the situation in Dascylium following the end of operations in 365, is puzzling and uncertain. Was an offer of cooption extended to Ariobarzanes? Was this the cause of tension between Ariobarzanes and Mithridates? There then followed the fall of the house of Ariobarzanes. This top-level disruption was complicated by Orontes' self-interest and aggrandizement (operations had allowed him to be on a war-footing) in regions disputed by Sparda and Dascylium. The disaffection of lesser officers and Greek operations deep within Achaemenid spheres may be added to the difficulties. The inability to resolve the instability at Dascylium prompted Artaxerxes to replace Pharnabazos' older son with his younger son, Artabazos. Artabazos would assure a continuity in personnel, but might be more attuned to the wishes of Artaxerxes, since he had been raised outside Dascylium, at court and on imperial campaigns. By 363 Artabazos arrived to take up the province.

The fourth stage placed many demands on Artabazos: he must pacify the satrapial family and its holdings, deal with disaffected nobles, and, no doubt, attend to perennial recalcitrants. By his decision to move against Orontes after holding the satrapial seat, Artabazos would eventually come into short conflict with Autophradates over those same liminal regions which had precipitated difficulties earlier. It was in the mutual interest of both satraps to leave the issue aside, lest in their fighting others exploit tensions to the discomfiture of Achaemenid control. The regions east of Sparda and Dascylium which lay under Datames' control seem to have remained outside the western conflicts until Artabazos moved westward through Cappadocia to take up Dascylium. Mithridates fled into the interior and operated in his own self-interest.

This led to cooperation and then a falling out with Datames anxious to protect his own position. When Artabazos seemed ready to turn eastward (the westward sectors of his sphere securely held by his Rhodian relatives) his supremacy elsewhere in Dascylium precipitated the "betrayal" and execution of Datames, and the desire of Clearchus to be recognized as a compliant member of the native order. Dascylium was now stabilized, Cappadocia was in disorder.

Dascylium and its environs had been the most destabilized sector of Anatolia, a situation which in part may be attributed to the collapse of unity within the satrapial family. This lack of unity was exploited by Orontes who, although a lesser officer, possessed an extraordinarily noble background, thereby granting him a high probability of success. Orontes had built himself a power-base which centered in Mysia (we know he held Pergamum) and the liminal areas of Sparda and Dascylium. He opened relations with the Egyptian rebels and forces in Greece which might support his cause: all sides exploited each other politically without anyone achieving lasting benefits. The key to understanding Orontes' activities is provided by the circumspect examination of coinage which may be attributed to him. No grandiose aims are documented, only a series of campaigns which damaged Sparda and Dascylium. Orontes' actions were only a sidelight in the larger issue of conflict between Sparda and Dascylium. When tensions lessened, Orontes' chance of scoring long-term success disappeared. His temporarily stronger position had been facilitated only by dispute among the highest officers who were his immediate neighbors.

Orontes is unique in a respect other than his royal background:

his activities are documented by definitive numismatic, literary, and epigraphical evidence (although not always of the highest quality). He is, however, one among many lesser officers in the Achaemenid far west. We have only the scantiest documentation for a few others during the period of destabilizations: Tigranes (in Sparda), Rheomithres (in Dascylium?), Droaphernes? (if he is to be placed in the fourth century at all). One should recall that the coinage of Cisthene which bore a Persian head may well be the coinage of an officer unattested in our literary sources. The question of lesser officers in Dascylium should be a very complex one: the sons of Pharnakes had led the satrapy for generations. What was the effect of the friendships and alliances on the events of the 360's?

We are also totally uninformed about the role played by garrison forces which might be nominally under Susa's control. What of troops such as the Assyrians and Hyrcanians who appear in texts for the 390's (Xen. Anab. 7.8.15). Such forces and troops no doubt continued to exist; I see no reason why they should have been removed. Most reasonably they would slow any anti-Achaemenid movements, if they themselves remained loyal. They also call into question the ability assumed by modern scholars for satraps like Autophradates and Maussollos to exercise repeated political about-faces.

Egypt and Ebir-nari are very much a theatre apart from Anatolia: Egypt was long-destabilized, and the temporary unity among its rebels permitted a forward policy which destabilized adjoining sectors and which attempted, by financial and military aid to Anatolian rebels, to distract Achaemenid forces before they could be deployed.

An issue which has not received a great deal of attention in the past has been the attitude of the government at Susa. The manner in which the king and court utilized local and first-hand information raises the question of how the central government is convinced of the veracity of that information. When Artaxerxes decreed campaigns against distant officials who, to dispassionate observers, may not seem rebellious, what does this tell us about Artaxerxes' administrative skill and about his perception of Anatolia in general? We may discern a number of factors which affect Artaxerxes' determination of information's veracity: royal interest and understanding of the information's context and background; the personage bringing the information, or more precisely, to account for messengers, the ultimate source; the timeliness of information, if designed to effect a policy change.

In the case of the declaration of Datames as a rebel, information was presented by the satrap's eldest son, and was thus more believable. A local man was sent to fight Datames; cooption followed a too expensive and lackluster campaign. A possible royal perception of the entire matter was that Datames, unfortunately, was wayward and punitive action was required to bring him or his sphere back into line.

In the case of Arlissis' slander of Maussollos, noted in SIG³ 167, we have an envoy, not of the satrapial family, presenting information which was false: Artaxerxes may have already decided that Maussollos would assist Autophradates against Ariobarzanes.

The shift in policy towards the Greeks in 367 highlights the significance of historical considerations: it was impossible to deny that the now ascendant Thebans had never disrupted Achaemenid control in Anatolia and its environs.

In the case of Ariobarzanes' being declared a rebel we see a misunderstanding far more serious than the arrest of Tiribazos. Autophrades would have to have been a master of diplomacy for Artaxerxes to declare a campaign which would place two border provinces at odds and run the risk of additional internal disorder throughout the west. Did the king believe that the Thebans would be strong enough to dominate Greece in Susa's interest? Did Artaxerxes expect that the punitive campaign would be swift and decisive--that the mere threat of one would bring Ariobarzanes into a compliant stance? Did Artabazos play any role in the intrigues? Perhaps Artaxerxes actually believed Ariobarzanes was on his way to being a second Cyrus and was to be stopped as soon as possible. The campaign against Ariobarzanes turned out to be a serious mistake.

As for the general place of Anatolia in Artaxerxes' overall conception of what parts of his empire were the most valuable, I can only note that Ochos mobilizes toward Egypt and not Anatolia.

As for the role of the Greeks, greater emphasis must be placed on the reality of action than on the mouthing of diplomatic niceties. The Greeks exploited Achaemenid difficulties for their own benefit: Athens moved into the Chersonnese and the straits, seized off-shore islands; Spartans served rebel masters for needed pay. The Greeks, to those who sought out their services, were at once a tactical advantage and disadvantage. Hoplites were good fighters; it was the expectation that if you possessed Greek mercenaries you possessed a good fighting force (cf. Polyaeus 7.14.2-5). The disadvantage may be perceived in the activities of Charidemus: the prophasis for his presence in Anatolia

was to assist Achaemenid forces, but it developed that the real reason--for Charidemus himself--was to increase his own power and influence.

By 359 Dascylium, the key trouble spot in Anatolia, was again stable. A number of issues did remain unresolved: How would Susa deal with the Egyptian problem? Its continued existence presented a drain on Achaemenid manpower from Anatolia. What effect would the death of Datames have on the interior sections of Anatolia? What would be the effect of the continued emergence of Caria as the third significant satrapy of the Anatolia west coast? Finally, what steps, if any, would Artabazos take to rebuild the power and influence of his own satrapy, which seemingly reached an apogee in the early 360's under his predecessor?

Footnotes

¹Judeich 146-169, 193-223 remains the standard modern reconstruction, modified but not yet supplanted. He collected the sources and arranged them so as to justify Diodorus' list of rebels in 15.90 and his claims of unity of action. Judeich did not investigate the nature of Persian control in Anatolia.

Other treatments: Beloch² 3:2 pp. 254-7, Olmstead 408-422, Meloni RSI 63 (1951) 5-27. The French contribution, based on their misdating of the Xanthus decree, has been discussed in the chapter on the Hekatomnids.

Moysey (esp. 30-164) represents the inadequacy of an approach like Judeich's, which fails to question Diodorus' data or chronology. He seems particularly liable to restate factual errors found in Olmstead: the placement of Pharnabazos' death before his Egyptian campaign in 374, the early dispatch of Artabazos to Dascylium (see below, section five), the misuse of the Colophon tetradrachm (below, section four). Moysey (111 ff.) has difficulty in plotting the individual and collective aims of the satraps, and ends up (as on 89-90) falling back onto moralistic perceptions of Achaemenid weakness and oppression.

A serious attempt has been made in the past decade to question the basic interpretation of the satraps' revolt by Osborne ABSA 66 (1971) 297-321, Historia 22 (1973) 515-551, and Grazer Beiträge 3 (1975) 291-309. These works are marred, however, by a persistent perception of fixed satrapial boundaries, stiff administrative hierarchies, and the over-reliance on the terms "rebel" and "loyalist." This is particularly true of the last article cited.

The inability of historians of the Achaemenid far west to go beyond Judeich has marred recent works which still must rely on him: so with the otherwise exemplary work by Buckler, Theban Hegemony.

²Consult the chapter on the governors of Sparda and Dascylium, chapter 2.

³Consult the chapter on the Hekatomnids. The sole rebellious act of Autophradates, reported in Demosthenes 23.154, is nothing more than temporary tension with Artabazos over the souther Troad (see section five, below).

⁴See note 2, above.

⁵This is particularly true of the list of peoples which begins with the phrase "of the Ionians," under which rubric are included many non-Ionian peoples.

On Lycia and Pamphylia see the discussion in the Hekatomnid chapter. Atlan Anatolia 3 (1958) 89-95 attempts to perceive definitive anti-Shah activities on the part of Pericles, the Lycian dynast, but the most reasonable explanation remains self-aggrandizement at the expense of neighboring dynasts.

Cilicia may have been destabilized as a result of similar local tensions. These would be prone to occur when Datames was drawn northwards.

The Pisidians are always destabilized; now they are presented with new opportunities for self-aggrandizement. As objects of a campaign by Autophradates: Polyaeus 7.27.1, Frontinus Stratagems 1.4.5.

The Syrians and Phoinicians are listed simply as ethnics without any consideration of Achaemenid personnel in those regions: Syria and Phoinicia are better seen as environs destabilized as the result of the rebel Egyptian forward policy. See section four, below.

⁶The determination of the date is given on Judeich 202-203; Beloch² 3:2 pp. 255, 257. Both assign two campaigning seasons to the warfare between Sparda and Dascylium.

⁷Sources: Diodorus 15.90.3 (Ariobarzanes fails to appear in the subsequent narrative), Dem. 15.9, Trogus Prol. 10, Harpocration sv. Ariobarzanes.

⁸Assus and Atramyttium as axiologoi: Str. 13.614; Assus well-fortified: Str. 13.610; Assus' grain: Str. 15.735.

⁹Xenophon's account of the operations in the Agesilaus is misleading in that he has broken apart the events in order to use each to highlight some favorable aspect of Agesilaus' character. The same may be seen in Xenophon's treatment of Agesilaus' campaigns in Asia in the 390's. While the Hellenica narrates events in their proper order (with setbacks concealed; see Bruce 131-149), the Agesilaus discussed events out of order, at times depriving them of their historical context.

In general outline, we find the following activities in Agesilaus' campaign in this order: the battle at Sardis, the execution of Tissaphernes, the truce with Tithraustes, Agesilaus' move into Mysia, his operations with Spithridates, his meeting Pharnabazos. Xenophon's narrative of the campaign is brought to a halt in the Agesilaus at the death of Tissaphernes at the hands of Tithraustes (1.35). There follows a discourse on barbarian despondency at this event and a general praise for Agesilaus. Contact with Tithraustes is not mentioned until 4.6, but there is no word about a truce or contemporary military events. We have only an anecdote without context in which a Persian tries to bribe a Greek, and the latter issues a noble reply (cf. Plut. Ages. 10.4-5). Agesilaus' activities in Dascylium are narrated out of context as anecdotes used to illustrate various facets of Agesilaus' arete (3.3-5: contact with Spithridates and Otys; 5.4-5: the story of Megabates).

¹⁰ Olmstead 413 implies that Assus was the scene of an agreement. He would also assign Polyaeus 2.1.16 and 2.1.36 to the 360's (413n.38), however, a context in the 390's is far more reasonable: see Judeich 58 (on 2.1.16) and 70 (2.1.26).

¹¹ Meloni 9 argues the case for a campaign at the king's behest, its objective to install Artabazos as satrap at Dascylium. On this, see below.

Harpocraton implies a campaign in which men are sent out against Ariobarzanes, but his text is vague, and the mss. read Xerxou for the king's name.

¹² Judeich 194, 197, 198-199.

¹³ Olmstead 413, Meloni 9, Osborne Grazer Beiträge 300, Moysey 65-66 and n.48 (Moysey seems to recognize the weakness of this explanation but does nothing about it). Beloch Janus 9 assigns to Ariobarzanes the fear that he would be replaced by Artabazos, and that fear caused rebellion. But why should Artaxerxes have replaced a veteran with a relatively untested novice who seems to have never been in Dascylium?

¹⁴ Rebellious activities, i.e. activities which if directed against the king or his representatives constitute rebellion, are detailed in Polyaeus 7.29.1 (cf. Nepos Datames 10.2). These are moves against the symbols of Achaemenid control: pulling down phrouria (focal points of power), burning komai (the king's wealth, which becomes booty, leia, the robber's tribute. For a discussion of these passages consult Briant Index 53-54.

¹⁵ I note this case in which new local information may have caused the Shah to overrule the activities of his officers: Datames departs from Sinope after receiving a letter from the Shah commanding him to do so (Polyaeus 7.21.5). The inhabitants may have dispatched messages to Susa assuring the crown of their loyalty.

¹⁶ Open warfare between the satraps of Sparda and Dascylium at a time when both were judged as acting according to their guidelines seems never to have occurred. Xen. Hell. 3.2.13 reports Pharnabazos' jealousy and resentment--and cooperation with Tissaphernes. One should exonerate Tithraustes of a willful desire to disrupt the province of Dascylium (so claimed in Lewis Sparta and Persia 142-143 n. 51) by encouraging Agesilaus to march off to Pharnabazos' territory. This encouragement is assigned to Tithraustes only by Xen. Hell. 3.4.25-29 and has the effect of making Agesilaus look better than the Persians. Tithraustes also speaks ill of Tissaphernes: the Persians are made to seem morally inferior. Events should be perceived as displaying Tithraustes' desire to get Agesilaus out of Sparda with a minimum of

damage and expense. Agesilaus receives 30 talents, a measure designed to prevent or at least limit looting and destruction of the satrapy's physical plant (Xen. Hell. 3.4.25-29, Plut. Ages. 10.4-5); a truce is arranged (Diod. 14.80.3: 6 months; Isocrates 4.153: 8 months) and Agesilaus agrees to do no damage (Hell. Oxy. 21.1). All of these features are complementary: If Tithraustes is to be blamed, it may well be for having too sanguine an expectation that Agesilaus and his forces would be cut up by the perennial recalcitrants of the far west, such as the Mysians (on them see Bruce 133-135; these setbacks are concealed by Xenophon).

¹⁷I leave aside Orontes who, although a son-in-law of Artaxerxes, was a lesser noble, and one among many. See chapter 2.

¹⁸On the uncertainty of precise boundaries and discussion of the southern Troad with precise reference to the late fifth century see Lewis Sparta and Persia 55, 80-81 n.198. His view is superior to the more mechanical resolutions offered by Andrewes in Gomme HCT V:VIII 356, and Meyer Grenzen 2-3 (who does recognize uncertainties in boundaries). Also consult my discussion of Arsakes and hyparchos (above, in the consideration of Droaphernes).

¹⁹Cook Troad 1. He makes Antandrus the southern limit of the Troad.

²⁰Str. 13.613 reports Lydian foundation and control. Steph. Byz. sv. Adramyteion reports a story in which a brother of Croesus founds the city and names it after himself. Nicolaus of Damascus FGrH 90 fr. 65 is the source of the story of Croesus' rule of Atramyttium during Alyattes' reign.

²¹The sectors in which Atramyttium, Assus, and Antandrus (see text below) are located are assigned a variety of names. In Xen. Anab. 7.8.7 Antandrus seems to be outside Mysia, but Atramyttium seems part of Mysia, coming after tēs Musias . . . pedion. Str. 13.613 says the region around Atramyttium is Mysia. Str. 13.581 places both Atramyttium and Assus in the Troad. In 15.735 Assus is in Aeolis.

²²See note 18 above.

²³For Eubolus' holdings see Str. 13.610 (he is not referred to by name) and Aristotle Pol. 2.1267a (also reporting the attack by Autophradates). Hermēias and Mentor are discussed in the next chapter.

²⁴Str. 13.610, 15.735.

²⁵For the significance of these cities to the grain route see Burnett and Edmonson Hesperia 30 (1961) 84. Note, too, that Philiskos,

an officer subordinate to Ariobarzanes, exercised some influence in Perinthus, probably at a later date: Dem. 23.142; Perinthus as Athens' ally: IG II² 43, line 84, with commentary in Cargill 34, 78 (on date of membership in Athenian Sea League).

²⁶ So in the standard study by Ryder, Koine Eirene, followed by Buckler Theban Hegemony 102-104. On pp. 79-80 Ryder argues that the conference was to arrange a "common peace" and that Ariobarzanes, as the King's officer, was following orders when he dispatched Philiskos. In his analysis on pp. 134-135, Ryder combines Diodorus and Xenophon to make the events of 368 an attempt at common peace, of which one element is to be removal of Theban influence from Messene. It is upon this that peace efforts founder. Ryder 80 does hint at Ariobarzanes perhaps having a private motivation, but fails to pursue this line of inquiry.

Moysey 50, 50n.27 believes the mission's aim to have been the arrangement of a common peace. Diodorus is generalizing, because he either misunderstood his source or Ephorus wished to keep Ariobarzanes' name out of the account (because Ariobarzanes was later an Athenian citizen). Moysey rules out ulterior motives for Ariobarzanes (54-59) because he has already decided that the mission was upon royal command and that Ariobarzanes will revolt because he is to be replaced by Artabazos.

As for Philiskos' mercenaries: Judeich 207n.2 suggests they were to replace the force funded by Dionysius.

Professor R. Sealey of the University of California, Berkeley, has suggested that Philiskos may have in fact made use of the term koine eirene--but only as diplomatic nicety. This is quite attractive.

²⁷ Quite adequately demonstrated in Moysey 51-53, note 29.

²⁸ On Philiskos see Hofstetter nr. 259 (pp. 50-51). For his activities around Abydos and his contact with Chabrias see Burnett and Edmonson Hesperia 30 (1961) 80-85.

Diomedon: Hofstetter nr. 87. Nepos Epamonidas 4.1 names Diomedon and makes him an emissary of Artaxerxes. He may well have been part of Philiskos' mission, Nepos assigning a local activity to a much higher source. Ariobarzanes would have been much too sanguine in his expectations if he hoped to bribe all major politicians into compliance. Other versions, somewhat more vague: Plut. Mor. 193c and Aelian v.h. 5.5 The most recent analysis, Buckler Theban Hegemony 134, sets no date for the attempted bribing of Epamonidas, but believes Diomedon acted on the behest of Artaxerxes. Buckler rightly notes the significance of "personal attachments" could have in the politics of the time.

³⁰ Xen. Hell. indicates Timagoras' agreement with Pelopidas' assessment of affairs (a fatal move: 7.1.38). Could this be an attempt by Athenians, or Timagoras alone, to salvage some measure of Persian support?

³¹The most recent modern treatment of the events at Susa is now Buckler Theban Hegemony 151-157 (with notes citing the older treatments). Both Sparta and Thebes are perceived as desirous of royal support for their schemes. The Shah causes the split in Athenian diplomatic ranks. He is also anxious to replace Sparta as prostates of the King's Peace. I believe this to be too formal an arrangement. Under the Peace all Greeks were to be compliant members of the native order--in 387 Sparta had managed to include itself in that group when it was at the nadir of its power.

The activities of Antalcidas (Hostetter nr. 18, p. 15) during these years is an issue raised by Plut. Artax. 22.6-7, who reports that after Leuctra, when Sparta needed money, Agesilaus went to Egypt, Antalcidas to Susa, where he was maltreated by the Shah. He returned to Sparta and committed suicide. The passage is often taken to refer to 367 (Hostetter p. 15, Ryder 81), but Xen. Hell. 6.3.12, the final reference in that work to Antalcidas, might be read as signifying a mission to Susa in 371. Buckler GRBS 17 (1977) 139-145 is a most satisfactory treatment of the issue. He accepts the synchronization of Agesilaus' and Antalcidas' activities in Plutarch. He recognizes the difficulties posed by the moralizing treatment of historical events, but does not ask whether moralizing was the prime cause for Plutarch's synchronization. Buckler seeks a context for the Spartans' activities and arrives at 361 as a date preferable to 367 (Agesilaus is in Egypt in 361). Antalcidas' aim in 361 would be (p. 143) the "gaining [of] additional support and desperately needed financial assistance."

There are serious difficulties with this view: such a mission would have stood little chance of success, and might have served only to exacerbate Artaxerxes' displeasure with events in the far west. Why should Artaxerxes help a state whose king was commanding troops for use against Achaemenid territory? Buckler recognizes the difficulty of Agesilaus' being in Tachos' service, but seems to minimize its deleterious effects on the chances for Antalcidas' success. By 361, Ariobarzanes had been arrested and shipped eastward for execution. Antalcidas would still have the advantage of familiarity to and with Susa, but his past ties to Ariobarzanes would be a further embarrassment. The new power in Dascylium, Artabazos, does not seem to have enjoyed any special relationship with Sparta.

In my reconstruction, Sparta believes Ariobarzanes' policy of 368 to be Susa's. Antalcidas, a figure familiar to and with personnel at Dascylium and Susa, would be the perfect choice as ambassador in 367. But he is not mentioned in Xenophon's account.

One is faced with a choice in reconstructing Antalcidas' final years. Choice no. 1: The synchronization in Plutarch is wrong. In spite of Xenophon's silence, Antalcidas was on the 367 mission to Susa. The shift in Artaxerxes' perception precipitated the diplomat's suicide. Choice no. 2: Plutarch is correct in his synchronization of Agesilaus' and Antalcidas' activities. Buckler is right in his assignation of these activities to 361. In spite of the difficulties for choice no. 2 and

the objections I have raised against Buckler's view, I feel that his reconstruction might well be the right one. Xenophon's silence would be most remarkable if Antalcidas had been at Susa in 367, and it would be a serious flaw in a detailed and believable account. We know nothing of the particular circumstances under which Antalcidas would have undertaken that desperate mission in 361--was it a final and private effort to exercise what little influence he might still have at Susa? There is only the slightest chance that Tiribazos, if he were still alive, might have assisted Sparta's case. Buckler's reconstruction possesses an additional attraction, more personal than historical: it allows the opportunity for praise of a career diplomat who displays grace under fire.

³² Naval affairs in 367 are an issue of great complexity. I believe that emphasis should be placed on the very general nature of Artaxerxes' demands concerning Athenian ships and his willingness to display flexibility, if that would not compromise his strength and security. For Leon's response as supposedly indicative of Ariobarzanes' rebellion: Judeich 199n.1, Moysey 59 ff. I would not see any serious implications for Amphipolis as does Judeich 199 and 199n.2. That city is some distance away from Achaemenid territory and would most likely be the concern of the satrap of Dascylium, if even he took much interest in its fate. The demand that Athens draw up its ships should be paired with the demand that Messene not be under Spartan domination: both hamper the revitalization of powers which would oppose Thebes.

There also exists the problem of the Theban navy. Buckler Theban Hegemony 160-161 and 308n.19 provides a good discussion, but one must stress that there exists no direct evidence for Achaemenid funding of a naval construction program (see Buckler 307n.9). Buckler himself states that Persia must have funded the navy because of its high cost: I do not rule out the possibility that Achaemenid funds were given in some form to the Thebans, but when Diod. 16.40.1-2 provides the first direct evidence for such funds (for the year 351/0), there is no indication that this is a continuation of earlier policy.

³³ Eg. Ryder 79 (cf. 134) believes Athenian representatives were present, but took no active role. P. 134: The "Athenians were probably represented as their absence would have surely been noticed." But only if this was conference designed to arrive at a common peace.

³⁴ The crown had three options: no response, reprimand, declaration of local policy as inimical to royal interests, i.e. Ariobarzanes regarded as rebel.

The situation in 387 which saw both Pharnabazos and Struthas removed is quite different than that in 367. In 387 there was quite a new policy: previous to that time it had been necessary to tolerate some mainland Greek presence in Anatolia as a means of combatting a larger and more hostile mainland Greek presence. After 387 no presence whatsoever (allowing some room for temporarily expedient and minor exceptions)

was to be permitted in Anatolia. The issue in 367 involved internal politics on mainland Greece, a region outside the limits of direct Achaemenid control.

³⁵Two incisive studies of the satraps' revolts have approached inking the types of motivations I have assigned to Ariobarzanes in 368. Meloni 9-10 believes Philiskos was to achieve peace, but also make contacts for Ariobarzanes. Meloni operates in the belief that Ariobarzanes held the satrapy of Dascylium in trust for Artabazos and had already decided to rebel. Hence he is made to carry out on one level policy not inimical to Susa, while on another building his own power base.

Buckler Theban Hegemony 102-104 (296-297 notes 45-48) had relied on and accepted Judeich's view that there was a secret agreement between Ariobarzanes and Datames, and that Ariobarzanes had already decided to rebel at the time he dispatched Philiskos. Buckler's reconstruction shares the difficulties noted just above for Meloni's. He does place emphasis on Ariobarzanes' self-interest in the mission (e.g. on p. 104: "No one in Greece gained as much from the Congress as Ariobarzanes."), but recognizes that self-interest only in the context of Ariobarzanes' previous decision to rebel.

³⁶If 367 saw the beginning of reconciliation between Susa and Datames, Autophradates (i.e. his envoys) could not have made use of the third charge listed above, collusion between Datames and Ariobarzanes. The former's envoys would have denied it, further damaging Autophradates' reputation.

³⁷A good discussion may be found in Buckler Theban Hegemony 249-30, itself dependent upon the chronology proposed on pp. 245-249.

³⁸I am uncertain what role, if any, Autophradates and his representatives played in effecting Susa's shift in policy. He certainly would benefit from this shift anyway for it cut some ground out from under Ariobarzanes, who was most comfortable with the personnel from Sparta.

³⁹Buckler Theban Hegemony 154.

⁴⁰Judeich, in his chronological table on 331-332, has operations extending into the 364 campaigning season. This is a result of his acceptance as accurate of the "synchronization" of Tachos, Maussollos, and Agesilaus' contact with both. Judeich 203, 203n.2. For my criticism see above on Maussollos in the satraps' revolt (chapter 5).

⁴¹For Samos, see text below. Note, that in the sources reporting setbacks for Timotheus Persian mobilization is not among them: Polyaeus 3.10.9, 3.10.10; Pseudo-Aristotle Oec. 2.1350b.

⁴²A discussion of these events may be found in my consideration of the Hekatomnids.

⁴³Praise must go to Buckler 166-168 for recognizing and stressing the importance of self-interest in the operations carried out by Greek forces while in and around Anatolia.

Some Greek operations were carried out in annoyance with the new more pro-Theban policy of Artaxerxes. See Diod. 15.90.3; Judeich 199 claiming the same for Timotheus.

⁴⁴Isocrates' passage is designed to praise Timotheus, and the Samos expedition is recounted as if Timotheus intended to go to Samos all the time. Nepos mentions Ariobarzanes only in Timotheus 1.3 and in relation to Sestus and Crithote (see text below): Ariobarzani simul cum Agesilao auxilio profectus est [Timotheus]. The comparatio with synchronization is designed to be favorable to Timotheus.

⁴⁵A discussion of this speech may also be found in the Hekatomnid chapter, on the charges of hostility between Susa and Halicarnassus.

⁴⁶Most modern scholars have attempted to resolve the issue of Timotheus' orders v. his actions by relying on a narrow construction of the King's Peace. Buckler Theban Hegemony believes that the reconciliation of orders and actions can be achieved by assuming that Samos (and Sestus, where Timotheus later appears) is held illegally by Achaemenid forces, i.e. the King's representatives have violated the "autonomy clause" of the peace, hence Timotheus is justified in seizing places. This perception is shared by Judeich 200, Hofstetter p. 113, Cargill 171. However, Achaemenid forces possessed superior power and would be the ones to define "autonomy".

Hofstetter nr. 329 (pp. 186-187) places the decision to send Timotheus to Ariobarzanes' aid before Ariobarzanes was declared a rebel, hence making him a mercenary in Achaemenid service. Ryder 82 proposed a similar solution (Moysey 79-81 rejects it).

Judeich 199-200 places Athens in something of a foolish position. Timotheus is sent against Achaemenid held territory because of Athenian anger over the Shah's pro-Theban stance. But Athens, while acting against the Shah, is made to send envoys to Susa to request him to recognize their claim to Amphipolis--and the aggressor's envoys meet with success! Buckler Theban Hegemony 251-255 makes out a good case that Athens never sent envoys to Susa over Amphipolis.

⁴⁷Date of operations: Judeich 200-201 n. 1, 201 n.1.

⁴⁸Hofstetter nr. 187 (p. 113).

⁴⁹He may be identified as Struthas' son-in-law: Xen. Hell. 4.8.21, Judeich 271 n.1, 271.

⁵⁰Isocrates 15.111-112. For possible opposition at Athens see Cargill 146 on Arist. Rhet. 1384b.

⁵¹Isocrates 15.111-112; Polyaeus 3.10.9-10; Pseudo-Aristotle Oec. 2.1350b.

⁵²Bosworth 140-141; Heisserer 192.

⁵³An excellent summary (with full documentation) of the operations at Samos is given Cargill 148-149, 149 n.8, 168. Judeich 271, 271 n.2 argues for an earlier attack in 369/8 by the Athenian Iphicrates, based on Polyaeus 3.9.36. In the anecdote Iphicrates seems interested only in booty and acts without reference to Athenian authorities.

⁵⁴Cargill 150 recognizes Timotheus' self-interest. Many accept Nepos' belief that the cities were a gift: Judeich 201 n.1, Moysey 82-83, Meloni 10 (who even posits aid to Ariobarzanes in the Troad). It is easy to give away what one is unable to continue to possess.

A subsidiary issue is the grants of Athenian citizenship given to Ariobarzanes, his 3 sons, Philiskos and Agauos, as reported in Dem. 23.141, 202. These grants are usually placed in 364 (Judeich 201-202 n.1, 332, Moysey 84), as an expression of Athenian "appreciation" for Ariobarzanes' gift. But then one must assume that open honors for a rebel were too minor a matter for Sparda or Susa to note.

Buckler Theban Hegemony 166 implies that the grants were made early on, at least before Timotheus was sent out. The suggestion of a date before operations in 366 is a significant one. Perhaps the best time for such grants would have been in 368 when Philiskos attempted to benefit Athens indirectly by assisting Sparta (Ariobarzanes, indicates Dem. 23.141, was responsible for Philiskos' citizenship). Alternatively, one may place the grants even earlier, before Philiskos' mission, perhaps as early as 375 (cf. Burnett and Edmonson Hesperia 30 [1961] 84-85). An early grant of Athenian citizenship would provide additional fodder for Autophradates.

One additional issue may be touched on here, the supposed "common peace" of 366-5, for which Diod. 15.76.3 is the only evidence of Susa's intervention. Buckler 251-255 has supplanted Ryder 137-139 as the standard treatment and successfully argues there was no common peace in 366/5 (another reason to doubt Diod. 15.70).

⁵⁵Buckler Theban Hegemony 104, 297 n.48 assumes a formal alliance, struck between 368-366.

⁵⁶ Nepos Timotheus 1.3, Agesilaus 7.2 (cf. Plut. Artax. 22.6-7) speak of the Spartan need for money. They do not mention troops. Discussion of possible troops: Judeich 202, 202 n.1-2; Moysey 79, 85.

⁵⁷ Synchronization in Xen. Ages. 2.27 accepted by Judeich 203-204, Moysey 85. See above, section two. Hofstetter nr. 3, accepting the synchronization in Nepos Tim. 1.3 and placing it after Samos, has Agesilaus in Ariobarzanes' service in 365 or 364.

⁵⁸ Judeich 332 (cf. 206 n.2) places Philiskos' death after spring 364. Hofstetter nr. 259 (p. 150): 362/1, a less preferable choice.

Demosthenes' attacks on Philiskos are to be expected. As for the friends and sons of Philiskos: there is no need for Weil's emendation in Dem. 23.143; "friends and sons" are the usual avengers.

⁵⁹ Buckler Theban Hegemony 168-169 rightfully stresses Timotheus' opportunism, his exploitation of king and rebel in Athens' interests. Surprisingly, he believes Timotheus intervened at Heraclea (309 n.36), a violation of his orders in Dem. 15.9: By now the victor at Samos and the straits could dispense with a good deal of discretion.

Judeich 275, 275 n.1 suggests a loyalist seige at Cyzicus. Cargill 77 cites Pseudo-Dem. 50.4 on continued difficulties at Cyzicus and Proconessus.

⁶⁰ Speculation of course is possible. Mithridates may have come to despise his father for not having defended himself as a loyal officer at Susa and for too readily assuming the proud garb of a wronged nobleman on the battlefield. Even this is unlikely.

⁶¹ There is no evidence relating directly to Artabazos' appointment: his first appearance in the historical record occurs in Diod. 15.91.2-6 when he fights Datames in Cappadocia (see below).

⁶² A full discussion of most of these incidents is presented in the Hekatomnid chapter under the heading of extension of Hekatomnid influence.

⁶³ Ephesus: Polyaeus 7.23.2, 7.27.2; Miletus: Polyaeus 6.8. Operations at Ephesus are placed by Judeich 207 n.1 at the time of Artabazos' arrest by Autophradates. As for Miletus, a possible explanation for the prominence of Hekatomnid forces may be that Autophradates needed to direct his attentions northwards towards Orontes' expansionism.

⁶⁴ Judeich 204 n.1 tries to couple these references with Polyaeus 7.21.4 and place the campaign before the "extension" of the satraps' revolt in 362/1.

⁶⁵For discussion consult the Hekatomnid chapter, chapter 5.

⁶⁶Judeich 221-225, 130, 164, 202, and esp. 333ff. Orontes is an Unterstaathalter in Mysia, emerging as the leader of an organized revolt in 363 and receiving aid from Egypt. In 362 he betrays the other rebels. As a reward, he was to return Armenia, but stayed in the west, rebelling shortly thereafter. By 360, he reached Syria. He again returned to the west, rebelling again in 358 and 356. In 355 he fought Autophradates. In 353 Ochos himself mobilized against Orontes. The following year saw peace: Orontes achieved control over the western portion of Asia Minor and then died. Note the second revolt *i.e. in the 350's), based on the interpretation of IG II² 207a, Dem. 14.31, Polyaeus 7.14.2-4, OGIS 264.

Similarly grandiose perceptions, but without the complexity of Judeich may be found in Olmstead 415-422, 427-429, and Moysey 104-111 esp.

⁶⁷Osborne's articles are cited in footnote 1, above.

⁶⁸The most circumspect examination is provided by the brief remarks of Starr IrAnt 12 (1977) 89, 89 n.62, 91, 91 n.67. Although dependent on earlier work, Starr is most cognizant of the difficulties in assigning putative Orontes coinage to mints and minting authorities. I concur with his view that the coinage should be placed in the 360's, issued for and/or by Orontes at the mints of Lampsacus, Cisthene, and Clazomenae (?).

Unsatisfactory are the discussions in Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 540-1 and Moysey 114-115. Both are derivative of earlier works cited below. In particular both favor the grandiose interpretation put forth by Babelon (e.g. in Traite II 105-120) that the coinage to be assigned to Orontes is indicative of his desire to replace Artaxerxes as Shah.

⁶⁹Hekatomnid coinage is a notable exception.

⁷⁰The standard examination is now Robinson NC 8 (1948) 48-56, supplemented by ANSMN 9 (1960) 4: The coin is struck on the Rhodian standard and is hence a sign of that city's growing commercial influence (the use of the Rhodian standard is hardly surprising in Iasus or Colophon). A discussion of this coin with some attention to portraiture may be found in Schwabacher Charites 27-32. The assignation of the coin to Tissaphernes is accepted in contemporary numismatic literature; e.g. Herbert A. Cahn "Dynast oder Satrap?" Schweizer Münzblätter 25 (1975) 84-91, esp. 84-85, 84 n.1, 85 n.4. New finds, and hence a larger sample, permit Cahn to make observations about portraiture on the coin. Also see the reference to Starr, cited in note 68, above.

Earlier scholarship (now supplanted): Head BMC Ionia 325 no. 13, pl. no. 16 (Iasus = mint?, for Tissaphernes?) based on Six NC³ 8 (1888) 107ff (cf. 114 for a curious view that flap disposition on the tiara is an index of political disposition). Less satisfactory are Babelon

Traite II 111-112 no. 62, pl. lxxxviii no. 26 and Howorth NC⁴ 3 (1903) 8-11. They are to blame for Osborne's and Moysey's mistakes.

⁷¹Orontes' Lampsacene silver: Babelon Perses Achemenides (1893) lxxiv, fig. 33 and notes 1-4; Head BMC Ionia 326 no. 15, pl. xxxi no. 8; Six NC³ 14 (1894) 309-310; Babelon Traite II 107-108 no. 56, pl. lxxxviii fig. 15.

⁷²Orontes' Lampsacene bronze:

Type I: Six NC³ 14 (1894) 309-310; Babelon Traits II 109-110 no. 59, pl. lxxxviii, no. 19 and no. 60, pl. lxxxviii no. 20 with rev. inscr. [OR]ONTA.

Type II: Babelon Perses Achemenides 56, no. 376, pl. 9 no. 12 (no mint assigned); Head BMC Ionia 326 no. 16, pl. xxi, no. 19 (to Lampsacus); Six NC³ 14 (1894) 309-310 (to Lampsacus); Babelon Traite II 109-110 no. 58, pl. lxxxviii, nos. 17 and 18.

The protome of a winged horse appears on a number of other coinages as a reverse or obverse type: Robert Et. Anat. 166-170 discusses the coinage of Iolla. Also see Wroth BMC Mysia 77 nos. 1-3, pl. xviii no. 2 (= 77, no. 1) for examples with the protome as a reverse type, with inscription IOLLA (assigned to fourth century BC).

⁷³Orontes' staters:

Specimen no. 1: Hunterian Collection, Glasgow.

Selected references to specimen no. 1: Babelon Perses Achemenides lxxiii, fig. 32; Six NC³ 8 (1888) 110-114; Wroth BMC Mysia xxiv no. 24; Six NC³ 14 (1894) 309-310; Howorth NC⁴ 3 (1903) 8; Babelon Traite II 107-108 no. 55, pl. lxxxviii no. 14; Baldwin 25 no. 21a, pl. II no. 15.

Specimen no. 2: Paris

References to Specimen no. 2: Babelon Traite II no. 2563, pl. clxxii, no. 7; Baldwin 26 no. 21b, pl. II no. 17.

Specimen no. 3: Cat. Jameson no. 1443a, pl. XCV (Paris, 1913)

References to Specimen no. 3: Baldwin 26 no. 21c, pl. II no. 17.

⁷⁴Babelon Traite II 107-108; Baldwin 16, 47. A cautionary note about portraiture: Wroth NC³ 8 (1888) pl. 1 no. 14 (pp. 17-18) publishes a silver drachm of Spithridates. His portrait does not differ substantially from Orontes'.

⁷⁵One may consult my discussion of the gold coinage of Pixodaros, above. One should accept the cautious remarks of Baldwin 38-40, not the grandiose perception of Babelon Perses Achemenides lxxiii.

⁷⁶Sic NC³ 8 (1888) 110-114 proposed a relative chronology for the staters (including Orontes'), cf. Wroth BMC Mysia xxii-xxv. Accepted by Baldwin 16, 38-40.

The Orontes' coinage consists of 3 obverse dies and 3 reverse dies (so Baldwin 25-26; I concur). In my view nos. 16 and 17 on plate III of Baldwin have the same reverse engraver; the horses' heads on nos. 15 and 18 seem to have stylistic similarities. I am uncertain if any of the obverse dies in particular represent a more serious attempt at portraiture.

Baldwin 36 used reverse dies style to try to arrange issues (cf. 9-10: the quality of workmanship begins at a high level and then degenerates). She holds that there are stylistic similarities between the reverses of plate II no. 15 and 14; no. 16 and no. 17 represent a development from no. 15 (why?); nos. 16 and 17 resemble stylistically the reverses of nos. 18 and 19 (but the wing and feather treatment of no. 17 differs, in my perception, from nos. 18 and 19).

⁷⁷ See Head BMC Ionia pl. vii nos. 2-3 (assigned to after 300 BC).

⁷⁸ Babelon Perses Achemenides lxxiv fig. 39, plus notes 5-6; Head BMC Ionia 326 no. 17, pl. xxxi no. 10; Six NC³ 14 (1894) 309-310; Babelon Traite II 115-116 no. 63, pl. lxxxviii no. 22.

⁷⁹ Babelon Perses Achemenides lxxiv fig. 35 and note 7 on the suggestion. Attributed to Orontes: Babelon Traite II 111-112 no. 61. lxxxviii no. 21. Bronze coins with the same reverse type and inscription KIS or KISTHE are assigned to the second century BC in Wroth BMC Mysia 17 nos. 1-3; pl iii no. 7 = p. 17 no. 1.

⁸⁰ Six NC³ 14 (1894) 331 attributed the coin to Orontes, but gave no explanation beyond a citation of Diod. 15.2, which mentions Phocaea as a mustering point for Tiribazos' and Orontes' troops for use against Euagoras.

Babelon Traite II 115-118 no. 64, pl. lxxxviii no. 23; no. 65 pl. lxxxviii no. 24 are given to phocaea on the basis of metal, style, and fabric, and to Orontes on the questionable basis of portraiture. The most recent study has altered Babelon's assignments: Bodenstedt Schweizer Münzblätter 26 (1976) 69-75. On pp. 70-71 Bodenstedt places Babelon no. 64 into the 450's, the coin supposedly depicting the satrap at Sparda who preceded Pissouthnes (ill. on p. 72 as no. 1). On p. 74 he concurs that Babelon no. 65 is to go to Orontes (ill. on p. 73 as no. 14). Hence we have only one Phocaeian coin for Orontes if Bodenstedt is right. The fact that no. 64 could be placed close to a century earlier suggests that the Phocaeian mint can serve Persian personnel and that the coin itself tells us nothing about the political disposition of the minting authority.

⁸¹ Certain other coinages were once assigned to Orontes by Babelon, but those assignments have been rejected:

a. assignation: Babelon Perses Achemenides 56 no. 378, pl. 9 no. 14 (AR); rejected: Six NC³ 14 (1894) 311 n. 41--a Cilician issue.

b. assignation: Babelon Perses Achemenides 56 no. 379, pl. 9 no. 15 (AE).

rejected: Six NC³ 14 (1894) 311 no. 1, 312; assigned to Mirthridates of Cius (337-302 BC).

reassignment: Babelon Traite II 121-122 no. 66, pl. lxxxviii no. 26; minted at Lampsacus by an unknown dynast.

c. assignation: Babelon Perses Achemenides 56 no. 377, pl. 9 no. 13 (AE)

rejected: Six NC³ 14 (1894) 311 n. 41; civic issue of Lampsacus.

response: Babelon Traite II 107-108 no. 57, pl. lxxxviii no. 6; still assigned to Orontes; note 4 on pp. 108-109 admits Six may be right.

⁸²For the date: Osborne ABSA (1971) 317 n.126; Historia (1973) 549. He has successfully dispensed with the illusory "second revolt" of the 350's. Older perceptions which occasionally place some of these incidents into the 350's may be found in Judeich 19, 207 n.1, 208, 212-213; Beloch² 3:2 140, Moysey 118.

⁸³Cyme is placed in Aeolis (Hdt. 1.149, 7.194.1), but may be regarded as part of Sparda's sphere (Diod. 14.36.6-7; Thucyd. 3.31.1 and Xen. Hell. 3.4.27 suggest a liminal nature). For Cyme's value as a base for naval operations: Hdt. 7.194, 8.130.1; Diod. 15.2.1. The city is occasionally paired with or tied to Clazomenae (Hdt. 5.123, Thucyd. 8.22.1, 8.33.3-4; esp. Diod. 15.18.2-4 concerning dispute over Leukae).

⁸⁴For the date: Osborne ABSA (1971) 317 n. 126; Historia (1973) 547-549 instead of Judeich 212, Beloch² 3:2 140.

⁸⁵This inscription has been published as: CIG 1118, IG IV 556, SEG 9.318 and 22.265; SIG³ 182: text and commentary; Tod II 145 (pp. 138-141) text with commentary; Bengtson St.V. 292. Analysis also in Ryder 85-86, 142-144, Moysey 144-148 (based on Ryder), Meloni 18-21 (the most sophisticated analysis of the reply's diplomatic tenor).

⁸⁶Lines 3-7: use of diplomacy; line 8: no hostility with king.

⁸⁷Excellent discussion of these points in Meloni 18-21.

⁸⁸Unfortunately most of this is restored; the use of axiōs (not restored) seems to point to the Greeks defining what actions they will take.

⁸⁹IG II² 207 is published as St.V. 324. See also Parke PRIA 43 (1936) 367-378. Cawkwell 131-132, St. V. pp. 303-305, Moysey 261-265, Pritchett II 40-41, 41n.41, 87, 87n. 155, 98n.167 all reflect the old dating, on which cf. remarks in Cargill 92n.7.

⁹⁰Osborne ABSA (1971). The old date depended upon the revisions of Pittakys' Nikomachou (he actually saw the stone) to Kamachou in Rangabe's copy, and then to Ka(lli)machou, with the lli simply inserted as a "restoration".

In the year Kallimachos was archon, 349/8, supposedly the generals mentioned in fragments b+c+d, Chares, Ckaridemus, and Phocion could be placed near Orontes' sphere of operations. Osborne ABSA (1971) 317-318 indicates (against Parke 375-6) that Charidemus need not have been an Athenian citizen to appear in the decree. Cargill 172-176, esp. 174-175 indicates that Chares was not at Corcyra in the late 360's (that he was, used to be an argument against a date of c. 361/0), but in the early 360's.

⁹¹Parke 376, 378 touches on this issue briefly.

⁹²IG II² 103 (= Tod II 133), which securely dated to the summer 369/8 (i.e. in 368, the end of the archon year), grants a crown to Dionysius. He had sent military assistance in the campaigning season of 369, i.e. before Nov. - Dec. 369.

⁹³Cf. Osborne's view in ABSA (1971) 319-320.

⁹⁴Kienitz 93-99, 166-181 provides the most recent thoroughgoing study of Persian Egypt. He cites all the sources, although one cannot sustain his interpretations in all particulars. His basic interpretation of the satraps' revolt and its effect on Egypt is a good one: the revolt frees Egypt from worry and encourages a forward policy in which anti-Persian states are supported. Rebellion within the Egyptian ranks cause the collapse of the forward policy. At the same time, Ochus mobilizes westward, but the death of Tachos and Ochus' concern over succession in Susa preclude moves against Egypt proper. Kienitz 180-181 argues that there was no strong tie between the revolt and the Egyptian theatre, but his explanation is a mechan=cal one based rather on the chronology he sets up on 175-178 than on examination of political and military events. He accepts the basic modern perception of the satraps' revolt as a massive and well-organized rebellion (in Anatolia). Using 362/1 as the foundation for events in Egypt, Kienitz argues that by the first half of 360 Artabazos was in control of Dascylium, Autophradates was again "loyalist", Ochus had moved west, Orontes was in Syria and surrendered. No joint campaign--but Orontes did invade Syria. How he did so is not explained.

Keinitz' predecessors held that there were strong ties between the theatres, and speak of a joint campaign carried out by Datames, Orontes, and Tachos (the map at the end of Moysey's dissertation carries

this to an extreme). Judeich 146, 164-169, 203; Beloch² 3:2 157 (grand alliance in 362, invasions in 361; Orontes may be as far east as upper Mesopotamia). Cf. Olmstead 417-421; Moyses 104-111 (derivative from Olmstead).

⁹⁵ Xenophon's account implies distrust by Tachos: those left behind in Egypt by Rheomithres are "hostages". The children of Rheomithres' friends are probably those belonging to men who were on Rheomithres' staff. His shift to "loyalist" is perceived as a display of treachery. That these actions are a display of caution and self-interest is suggested by the parallel of Memnon who sent his family east after being named high commander in the campaign against Alexander (Diod. 17.23.5; one should reject Diodorus' sneer that with the family of Memnon in his hands, Artaxerxes could expect the general to do a better job).

⁹⁶ Note the interesting parallel of Tachos, Glos' subordinate, in Diod. 15.18. Leukae is the object of dispute between Kyme and Clazomenae, cities later the scene of Orontes' activities.

⁹⁷ Berve nr. 685 details the career of a Rheomithres (Granicus: Arr. Anab. 1.12.8, Diod. 17.19.4; Issus: Arr. Anab. 2.11.8, Diod. 17.35.5, QC 3.11.10), whom he identifies with the Rheomithres of the 360's (p. 346; no need to suggest he was an Achaemenid). The identification has been accepted by Bosworth Arrian I 111 and Schachermeyr² 166-168 (suggesting Rheomithres was a large land owner). Rejected by Leuze 403 n.1 (without reason), Atkinson 231-2 (expects Arrian to have commented on Rheomithres' previous "treachery" because the historian was influenced by Xenophon).

The identification of the two Rheomithres suggests this reconstruction of his career: Rheomithres was a local noble in Dascylium (? or Sparda?) who threw support to Orontes. After his surrender to "loyalist" forces he remained in the northwest until the 330's. He may have received additional estates as the reward for his "defection". He has a grown-up son by the time of Dareios III: this plus his activities in the 360's would place Rheomithres' birth in the 390's. His son was Phrasaortes, named satrap of Persis by Alexander. Berve nr. 813, Bosworth I 330.

⁹⁸ There are textual difficulties: In Seel's Teubner edition Class I of the mss. reads Oronti in omnibusque (Oronta: B of Class I).

⁹⁹ Hofstettner nr. 3; sources: Plut. Ages. 36, Xen. Ages. 2.28, Nepos Ages. 7.2, 8.1-5, Plut. Mor. 214d, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 106a (= Athen 9.384a), 106b (= Athen 15.676 c-d), 108 (= Athen 14.616 d-e).

¹⁰⁰ Aristotle Oec. 2.1350b 33 - 1351a 11; 1351a 11-17; 1353a 19-24; Plut. Ages. 37, Diod. 15.92.3.

Nepos Chabrias 2-3 confuses service under Akoris (Diod. 15.29) for service under Tachos. His discussion serves only to display Chabrias' independence of action, his unwillingness to be outside by Agesilaus or bullied by Achaemenid envoys.

¹⁰¹Plut. Ages. 37, Aristotle Oec. 2.1350b 33- 1351a 11.

¹⁰²IG II² 119, a fragmentary inscription of uncertain date, seems to record honors for envoys sent by Tachos: Pigres, Apollodoros, and Zopyros. I would not press too far the nationality of these names.

¹⁰³Cited in note 101, above.

¹⁰⁴Plut. Ages. 37; Diod. 15.92.3.

¹⁰⁵In general Kienitz 166-181 is to be preferred to Beloch² 3:2 255-257.

¹⁰⁶Since the focus of my examination is Anatolia, I relegate my discussion of Strato of Sidon to this footnote. A case for Strato as rebel has been made by Austin JHS 66 (1944) 98-100, based on Xen. Ages. 2.30, Hieron. Adv. Jov. 1.45, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 114 (Athen. 12.531a-c, Ael. v.h. 7.2). Xen. Ages. 2.30 reports that Tachos fled to Sidon; hence Sidon by sheltering the rebel is itself disloyal to the Shah and with it Strato. Hieron. reports that Strato wished, but was not courageous enough, to kill himself ne imminentibus Persis ludibrio foret quod foedus Aegyptii regis societate (cum Persis) neglexerat. Austin would assign the passage to the 360's, although Hieronymos does not bless us with a precise chronological context for this anecdote. Olmstead 433 is well able to place the anecdote in the 350's when Persian armies were actually on the move against the openly rebellious Sidon. Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 114 merely establishes Strato as a contemporary of Nicocles (who ruled into the 350's) and a libertine by reputation. I note that book 13 of Theopompus considered Agesilaus and Tachos, while the discussion of Strato appears in book 15: it may be at a later time, in a context when Strato is to commit suicide, that stories of him being a libertine might appear in an account of the king.

It is possible that in the 360's Sidon was hard pressed, but not openly rebellious. As king of Sidon, Strato would have a great deal of freedom of action, unless those actions proved decidedly inimical to Achaemenid control. None of the evidence detailing his activities in the 360's need prove him a rebel. When Tachos fell from power in Egypt, he may have sought refuge at Sidon because it was not in the hands of Nektanebos' forces and could be reached by ships under the command of the still loyal Chabrias (see below, text). Presence in a relatively loyal Sidon and the assistance of a loyal Arabian chieftain (Diod. 15.92.5;

cf. Hdt. 3.7 on the position of Arabia vis-a-vis the invasion route to Egypt) assured Tachos eventual safe passage to the Shah.

Strato is known to have assisted Athenian envoys dispatched to the Shah. He is praised for his good works in IG II² 141 (Tod II 139, p. 116-119, SIG³ 185), an inscription of uncertain date which grants him and his descendants honors and his subjects trading privileges (symbolae are prepared). This, too, is interpreted as a sign of Strato's disloyalty. Austin believed the envoys were those sent in 367, the decree belatedly passed c. 360. Moysey AJAH 1 (1976) 182-189, in an article based on his dissertation, set the inscription's date to the period immediately before Timotheus' activities at Amphipolis in 364/3 (date rejected by Buckler Theban Hegemony 306-307 n. 5). Moysey believes that the envoys were sent at this time via a southern route because of the disorders in Dascylium and were charged with the mission of getting the Shah to withdraw his demand that they draw up their ships. This is puzzling: the Shah would have reason to reiterate his demand following Timotheus' siege of Samos. On the superfluous need to assume such an embassy see above notes 33 and 47.

There is really no way to set a definitive date for the Athenian mission or the Strato decree. By combining elements of both Austin's and Moysey's views, I can suggest another possibility in which Strato is not rebellious: Athenian envoys were sent through Sidon (to avoid the war zone in Dascylium) late in the 360's, but at the time of Ochos' movements westward (see text below). The envoys' mission was to blunt Persian anger at Athenian dealings on a state and personal level with Orontes and Egyptian rebels. The envoys were sent when it was apparent that Egyptian unity was collapsing and Orontes was losing ground. One may accept Austin's epigraphical arguments for a date close to 360 for the decree. As for the honors, personal and commercial, bestowed in the decree: nothing about them indicates a rebellious stance on the part of Strato. If anything, he has begun to revitalize "loyalist" influence on the Greek mainland. Athens' embassy and decree would be further examples of Greek self-interest, here a reaction to increasing stability in the Achaemenid far west in favor of Artaxerxes.

A reexamination of Strato's coinage should be in order: Betlyon ANSMN 21 (1976) 24-27, in his discussion of Strato's coinage, relies heavily on modern reconstructions of the historical record and assigns the exact regnal dates of 372-359/8 to Strato. One set of bronze issues have what Belyon believes to be regnal years: years 11 and 12 depict a Phoinician male head on the obverse; there is no year 13. This is supposedly evidence of Strato's disloyalty. On p. 27 he states that Sidon lost its privilege to mint for a few years, but fails to provide any evidence or explanation for the statement.

¹⁰⁷ Plut. Ages. 37-40, Xen. Ages. 2.30, Diod. 15.92.3-5, 15.93 (note Tachos is confused with Nektanebos in 15.93.6); cf. Plut. Mor. 191c, 214f, Polyaeus 2.1.22 (defeat of the Mendes rebel); Plut. Mor. 215, Xen. Ages. 2.31, Diod. 15.93.6, Pausanias 3.10.2, Nepos Agesilaus 8.6-7 on Nektanebos' rewards for Agesilaus.

¹⁰⁸Xen. Ages. 2.30, Diod. 15.92.5, Ael. v.h. 5.1, Athen. 4.150b-c (the discussion of food in Athenaeus is the reason for identifying the Egyptian with Tachos as reported in Aelian).

¹⁰⁹The evidence for this campaign leaves much to be desired: Diod. 15.90.3 (a grandiose statement about the difficulties Artaxerxes II will have in preparing a punitive campaign); Trogus Prol. 10 reports three Egyptian campaigns by Ochos (we know of campaigns in the 350's and 340's, hence one may exist in the 360's); Synkellos (cited on Judeich 167) indicates Ochos made a campaign while Artaxerxes II still alive; Athen. 4.150b-c.

¹¹⁰Few seem to have actually considered the mechanics of deployment. Diodorus' grandiose claims of destabilization once accepted remove any need to examine the issue. E.g. Olmstead 415 ignores the issues: to him it is the appearance of Orontes in Syria which causes southern Anatolia to fall. But, then, how did Orontes move through or by southern Anatolia a region where he had no support?

¹¹¹It is instructive to note two other invasions of Syria and Mesopotamia. Cyrus the Younger broke through the Cilician gates, but he was of highest status in birth and political office, had enjoyed highest status in Anatolia long enough to build a good power base, had still had trouble moving through Cilicia, and had been defeated in his first major encounter with Artaxerxes' forces.

Alexander entered Syria, but after two major battles which still left a dangerous Persian opposition in existence on land and sea. Orontes, a lesser officer could not expect to have an easy time.

¹¹²In 15.90.1 the expression hoi tēn paralion oikountes tēs Asias is used to place the "rebels" geographically. The same is used of Greeks who aid the Shah in 16.44.4. In 15.90.3 the expression tous archontas men tōn parathalattion topōn describes "rebels," in 17.23.6 it describes "loyalists." In all cases the expressions are not meant to be precise, but impressive.

¹¹³All the passages raise their own problems. Diod. 14.19.2 calls Cyrus ho tōn epi thalattes satrapeiōn hēgoumenos, i.e. one man controls many districts. However, the vexed issue of the exact nature of Cyrus' post is involved. In 14.35.2 Tissaphernes journeys paralēpsomenon pasas tas epi thalattēi satrapeias: here, too, we must deal with the issue of how to define a karanos.

Diod. 14.98.3 raises issues discussed above concerning the levying of troops for use against Euagoras.

Diod. 15.52.2 and 15.50.7 may seem helpful, but only raise additional problems. In 15.52.2 Mentor is called satrapēn tēs kata tēn Asian paralias, but it is uncertain whether satrapēs is here a term for the highest officer. His duties suggest that he holds a command of a special nature.

15.50.7 is overly grandiose: in general, Diod. 15.50.7-8 seeks to overemphasize the size of awards, and is seemingly more a description than juridically precise.

Three passages connect the term strategos with the "coast": 9.35.1 (of Harpagos, holding special command), 13.36.5 (a reference to Diodorus' "mega-Pharnabazos", a conflation of Tissaphernes and Pharnabazos), 14.99.1 (of Struthas, a satrap; see above).

Most scholars have seized upon the similarity in wording between 14.19.2 and 15.91.1 to argue that Orontes desired the post of karanos, or something similar to it, over Asia Minor. Judeich 206, 212 (cf. 218, 224). Osborne ABSA (1971) 315: satrapies meant are Lydia, Caria, Dascylium; Historia (1973) 542: a position with maius imperium, 544 n. 133 cites Cyrus as a parallel, p. 544 n.134 cites Mentor as parallel. Osborne does recognize the problems of terminology in both parallels.

¹¹⁴Cf. Osborne ABSA (1971) 316 n.119.

¹¹⁵Dem. 14.31, a passage in a speech delivered in 354 BC, cites Orontes and Egypt as the objects of Persian mobilizations in which the Greeks participated in the interest of Achaemenid control. The passage had been cited as evidence for a later revolt by Orontes and as evidence for his continued existence in the 350's: Judeich 213, Beloch² 3:2 140, Moysey 165-9, 172, 176, 189-195 (with reliance on IG II² 207). Osborne, however, presents the case that Orontes died shortly after his surrender (as stated in OGIS 264): ABSA (1971) 316, 317 n.126; Historia (1973) 544-551. The demosthenes passage is only a general reference in which the orator avoids contemporary references since the victorious Chares (operating for the "rebellious" Artabazos) had just been recalled by Athenian authorities. Demosthenes seeks to denigrate those who operate in support of Achaemenid control, and hence against Athenian interests. Orontes, in his simultaneous moves against Sparda and Dascylium, would be an excellent example of someone operating in Athenian interests.

¹¹⁶Noldeke (1884) 294-295 noted the reappearance among Artabazos' children of names associated with the sons of Pharnaces. This similarity in names and the fact Artabazos was the son of a royal princess suggested that Artabazos named his son Pharnabazos (Berve nr. 766) and his daughter Apame (Berve nr. 97) after his own parents, the satrap and the princess. Key evidence: Plut. Artax. 27, Xen. Ages. 3.3, Xen. Hell. 5.1.28 (marriage of Pharnabazos to Apame); Plut. Alex. 21 (Artabazos is son of a princess), Plut. Eum. 1, Str. 12.378, Plut. Demetr. 31 (Apame the daughter of Artabazos). His rejection of Curtius 6.5.3. on the age of Artabazos has been accepted by modern scholars.

¹¹⁷IG II² 356, also published as Tod II 199 pp. 281-284. Beloch Janus 8-12 (cf. Beloch² 3:2 147-50) was the earliest discussion to incorporate the inscription. Other standard treatments: Berve nr. 152 (pp. 82-84), Bosworth I 112-113, Brunt RFIC (1975) 24ff, which responds to Tarm JHS (1921) 26ff on Artabazos' daughter Barsine.

¹¹⁸I see no reason to believe the reference to the marriage in Dem. 23.154 is anachronistic. The expression aprosdokētai eutuchia in 23.157 is an exaggeration, and need not mean the marriage was sudden.

¹¹⁹This accepts Diodorus' statement that they were all children of the Rhodian woman. So Brunt RFIC (1975) 25. We can account for 5 sons and 3 daughters by name: Berve nr. 152 plus stemma on II 442.

¹²⁰Pritchett II 85: 360 BC. See below, text. On the Rhodians: Memnon in Berve nr. 497, Hofstetter nr. 215, Bosworth 112 (marriage in 362), Brunt RFIC (1975) 25 (marriage by 362). Mentor in Hofstetter nr. 220.

¹²¹Achaemenid officers often trained their sons by taking them along while conducting affairs of state. During Artabazos' childhood Pharnabazos was active at court and in Epirus. It is a possibility that Artabazos could have accompanied his father on campaign, particularly the Egyptian campaign of the mid-370's (when Artabazos was in his teens). Had he not been posted to Dascylium, perhaps Artabazos might have ended up as a commander of forces directed against Egypt. He would be familiar with and to other Achaemenid personnel who had worked with Pharnabazos against Egypt.

The Lacunose historical record prevents us from investigating a situation for Artabazos which the career of Arsames, fifth century satrap of Egypt, suggests. He owned estates in Egypt and Babylon and was, at times, an absentee landlord, with conservators running his estates. In the fourth century the young son of Parapita possessed estates in Dascylium. As a son of Pharnabazos, did Artabazos own any estates as an inheritance? What political role, if any, could or would the conservators of such estates play? Could these estates and the personnel on them act as a power-base for Artabazos once he arrived in Dascylium? Unfortunately we cannot answer any of these questions.

¹²²My chronology removes the assumption that Artabazos was in the west as early as 366, as a preemptive replacement for Ariobarzanes. So Olmstead 413-415, 421; Beloch Janus 9ff has Artabazos on his way west in 366 (the rest of Beloch's chronology follows accordingly).

Both Diod. 15.91.2 and Harpocration (sv. Ariobarzanes) imply the dispatch of an armed force westward. Krumbholz' emendation (p. 69) of Artabazos to Autophradates in Dios. 15.91.2 is unnecessary.

¹²³So Judeich 204.

¹²⁴The inscription mentioned here has been published as Tod II 149 (pp. 148-149), earlier as Lebas-Waddington 1140. The city of Cius honors Athenodorus for services rendered, but does not specify the services. The date of the inscription is uncertain: Tod placed it

soon after 360, but Judeich 217-218 n.1, 260 and Hofstetter pp. 35-36 have made out cases for a date in the 350's.

A survey of Athenodorus' career (Berve nr. 27, Hofstetter nr. 61) finds him frequently in Achaemenid service. His activities at Ilium (Aen. Tact. 24.10) suggest that in 360's he operates for Artabazos, at this city preventing unsuccessfully its fall to a free-booter. For Cius a further uncertainty is political disposition of the dynasts ruling near Cius (one Mithridates ruled at this time).

¹²⁵Stasis, without chronological context, reported in Aristotle Oec. 2.1347b 31-34 (no date assigned by van Groningen 93-94).

¹²⁶It is possible to reconcile a surrender by Orontes by the middle of the campaigning season 361 with IG II² 207. Relations would have been opened in previous years (fragments b+c+d). Fragment a would report honors Orontes did not live long to enjoy.

I cannot find evidence which might document Artabazos' operations against Orontes-held territory. There are two anecdotes in Aristotle Oec. which could be placed in this context, but which probably belong elsewhere (2.1347a 32-b 2: van Groningen 83 places in fifth century; 2.1351b 1-6: in the 350's according to van Groningen 175, Berve II 251).

¹²⁷On Charidemus in general one may consult: Hofstetter nr. 74, Berve nr. 823 (only his later career), Osborne Historia (1973) 541, 541 n.127 (Artabazos released in 360), Pritchett II 85.

Charidemus in Aeolis: Aristotle Oec. 2.1351b 13-34, placed in the 360's (van Groningen 177-179).

In Ilium: Aen. Tact. 24.3-14 discusses the fall of the city, during which Athenodorus is on his way to help. If Ilium knows Charidemus is not acting in Artabazos' interests (quite likely) then Athenodorus and the Ilians are favorably disposed toward the satrap. Cf. Plutt Sert. 1.6, Polyaeus 3.14.

¹²⁸Demosthenes 23.157 misrepresents an excellent managerial decision as a fear that Artabazos would be unable to resist forthcoming Athenian aid!

SIG³ 188 (also published as Tod II 148, pp. 147-148), assigned to c. 359 by Tod, reports Ilium's honors for Menelaus of Athens (cf. Tod II 143). Tod reports the suggestion that Menelaus helped negotiate Charidemus' release. In any case his removal meant a return to orderly Achaemenid control.

¹²⁹These passages are discussed by Burstein 48-55, who argues that the Mithridates is the son of Ariobarzanes (126 n.7: Mithridates of

Cius would not be operating so far east). Burstein's treatment is a good one: I would refine it, suggesting that his reconstruction of events be placed c. 363, not in 365, when we would expect Mithridates to be at Dascylium helping his father.

¹³⁰Burstein 54. I am uncertain how often envoys could have been sent to Artaxerxes before his death.

Chapter VII. Allied Forces: The Achaemenid Far West, 359-342

Modern treatments of the Achaemenid far west during the 350's and 340's are summary and most unfavorable towards the state of Achaemenid control. Events are perceived as a continuation of the widespread troubles which had supposedly afflicted the far west in the previous decade. Thus the 350's contain a smaller version of the "Great Satraps' Revolt" in which virtually the same personalities take part. Burdened by disloyalty, the empire continues to weaken until it is ripe for the Macedonian conquest.¹ It is the aim of this present reconsideration to demonstrate that the portrayal of Achaemenid Anatolia in the 350's and 340's as part of an empire in decline is overly simplistic. Although there existed considerable local variety in the types and degrees of control, overall Achaemenid control was strengthened by the activities of a multi-ethnic group of administrators.

A province by province examination of the officers active during these decades will elicit a number of different results. In Dascylium the career of Artabazos reveals the large amount of discretionary power with which and the limitations within which a highest officer could maneuver in his sector and its environs. Cappadocia illustrates the situation of multiple dynasts and regional nobles rather than control

exercised by a single very powerful highest officer, a transition from the time of Datames. The activities of Arsames exemplify the mobility of Achaemenid officials, while Mazaions' career in Cilicia demonstrates the possibilities for advancement open to loyal and competent officers. Events in Cyprus disclose the ability of the Shah to mobilize and transfer forces from a stable satrapy (Caria) to curb unrest elsewhere in the empire. Finally, the checkered careers of the non-Iranians Mentor, Memnon and Hermeias illustrate the complex interrelations between influential officers in the far west.

Some of the problems noted in Achaemenid administration during the previous decades are still present: rivalry among officers, leading at times to armed conflict; exploitation of that rivalry by other Achaemenid officers and foreign powers; the continued rebellious stance of Egypt. But none of these poses any serious long-term threat either to local or to central authority, and all are seemingly resolved by the end of the 340's. The 350's and 340's are a period of growth for the empire, not one of decline.

Section I. Diodorus' Account of the 350's and 340's

There is no connected narrative of events in the Achaemenid west during the 350's and 340's. Diodorus, as he was for the destabilizations in the 360's, serves as the basis for the modern reconstructions. Onto his account are hung the various anecdotal notations found in orators and their commentators and in sources such as Polyaeus. But the reconstruction of events in Anatolia must be approached in a round-about

way, for Diodorus focuses only on destabilizations in the southwest, in Phoinicia, Egypt, and Cyprus (16.40-52). In his accounts of the campaigns designed to restabilize the regions, Diodorus records the presence of officers posted from Anatolia (e.g. Mazaïos of Cilicia, 16.42.2; Rhoisakes of Sparda, 16.47.2). The implication is that during the course of these operations Anatolia is stable enough to permit the transfer of important officers with troops from their home sectors. The number and dates of the campaigns must be sorted out. As a result, one can determine not only at what point a given officer held a sector in Anatolia, but also the relative stability of that sector.

Diodorus' account, placed under the years 351/0 and 350/49, begins with a general overview (16.40.3-6) of events, which mirrors 15.90, but is somewhat more sophisticated and less confusing because Diodorus is dealing with only one set of closely related theaters: Egypt is destabilized (16.40.4), but Artaxerxes' men fail to restore it to Achaemenid control. Their failure and the success of rebel Egypt, led by Nektanebos, encourages Phoinicia and the Cypriote kings to rise against the Shah. As a result of these contemporary disorders Artaxerxes stockpiles and then mobilizes a large number of military forces (6). Diodorus has portrayed a widespread destabilization of the southwest in 351.

Accounts of the individual theaters then follow: Phoinicia (41-42.2), Cyprus (42.3-9, synchronized with the Phoinician events), Phoinicia again (43.1-45.6, roughly following the Cypriote activities). All are assigned to 351/0. Under 350/49 we find the restabilization of Cyprus

(to which are added later events, 46.1-3) and the campaigns against Egypt and the minor rebels of Anatolia (46.4-52.8). We must sort these events out.²

How many campaigns were waged against Egypt? Basic to the sorting out are statements, such as Trogus Prol. 10, which indicate that Artaxerxes waged more than a single campaign against Egypt.³ Trogus reports three in all, the first being the westward mobilization carried out against Tachos before Ochus had become Shah (see chapter 6). Diodorus describes the second and third. But in his account the second campaign is narrated in the form of a number of flashbacks and slurs directed against Artaxerxes and the Persian military. The campaign seems to have begun with policing actions (16.40.4), carried out on a limited scale by local men. These developed into a larger campaign in which Nektanebos, supported by Greek mercenary generals, faced Achaemenid personnel (16.48.1-2). Although many sources point to Artaxerxes as suffering a personal failure in the unsuccessful operations (Diod. 16.44.1, Iso. 5.101, Dem. 15.11-12, Orosius 3.7-8), it is extremely doubtful that he himself participated in the campaign. Regrettably, we know neither the identities of the Achaemenid staff nor the exact date of the larger campaign which ended in defeat. We may tentatively place the major campaign in 351/0 with the policing actions extending back some years.⁴

It is the third campaign under Artaxerxes which solves the Egyptian problem and in which officers drawn from Anatolia serve. We can date the final Achaemenid offensive on the basis of evidence relating to the fall of the rebel Nektanebos and to the recruitment of troops for the Achaemenid force which would crumple the rebels' defenses. Diodorus

16.44 reports the recruitment activities of envoys sent to Athens, Sparta, Argos, and Thebes: all were now regarded as compliant members of the native order. Argos and Thebes sent troops; Athens issued a self-serving reply reminiscent of SIG³ 182. The Didymos papyrus reports the same event, and permits us to place the recruitment in 344/3, more specifically at the start of the campaigning season of 344.⁵ Another papyrus, known as the "Dream of Nektanebos," places the rebel king at Memphis in July 343 (cf. Diod. 16.51.2). The date is supported by the letter of Speusippos.⁶ The campaigning season of 344 was spent in recruiting, 343 in the offensive: by fall Egypt was Achaemenid. The rehabilitation of the house of Artabazos (16.52) and the campaign against the Anatolian recalcitrants may be assigned to the later part of 343 and the campaigning season of 342.

As a result of these dates it is possible to draw conclusions about the Achaemenid officers from Anatolia who appear in the southwest and to date the operations in Cyprus and Phoinicia. Rhoisakes, satrap at Sparda (Diod. 16.47.2), held that office before 343/2, and may be made the direct successor to Autophradates. By the mid-340's the family of Ariamnes (Diod. 31.19.3) has become prominent enough in Cappadocia to dispatch one of their number southwards.

The successful campaign against Phoinicia, preceeded and permitted the offensive against Egypt. It occurred before the campaigning season of 344, and we may place the restabilization of Phoinicia during 345 at the latest. Mazaios (Diod. 16.42.2), who participated in the campaign while satrap of Cilicia, held that post before the late 340's. We should perceive the campaign itself as extending back a few years:

the difficulties in Phoinicia were precipitated by the stresses of the Achaemenid build-up for a third campaign against Egypt after 351/0, i.e. the economic and political discontinuities introduced into normal life by the presence of large numbers of military personnel and their relatively unknown--to the Phoinicians--commanders.

The Cypriote campaign was a relatively minor operation directed primarily against Salamis, and carried out under the aegis of Idrieus of Caria. The career of Phocion permits us to place the end of the serious operations before the campaign season of 343. But troubles did continue for a few years hence.⁷

Thus, by examining the chronology of Diodorus' account it is possible to establish the termini ante quos for the appointment of officers in Anatolia. Their ability to campaign at some distance from their home sectors is a very strong indication that by the mid-340's there were no major problems in Anatolia, thereby dismissing the claims made by Isocrates (5.104).

It was noted that as a result of the Egyptian campaign and Achaemenid victory in 343 the family of Artabazos was rehabilitated. The first issue to investigate is why the son of Pharnabazos fell into disgrace.

Section II. Artabazos' Fall From Grace: Dascylium, Phrygia, and Sparda, c. 359-352

Before examining the destabilizations of the 350's in Dascylium, it is advisable to summarize some of the conclusions reached in the

previous chapter. Until 366 Dascylium was held, in stability, by Ariobarzanes, son of the previous satrap, the great Pharnabazos. Ariobarzanes was an experienced and competent officer whose sphere of influence was quite large. He maintained friendly relations with Datames, satrap of Cappadocia; he held the Troad; by controlling both sides of the Hellespont he possessed an important strategic advantage. But success engendered rivalry and jealousy: as a result of tension with Autophradates and the subsequent campaign led by Autophradates and Maussollos the house of Ariobarzanes collapsed. The satrap appears to have been shipped eastward for execution. His betrayer, Mithridates, his eldest son, disappears into the interior of Anatolia after executing Datames in an attempt to win royal favor. The fates of the other two sons of Ariobarzanes are not recorded.

Ariobarzanes had been replaced by his younger brother, Artabazos, a grandson of Artaxerxes II. The sphere controlled from Dascylium was in total disorder. Athens and Kotys had made gains in the Hellespont: the strategic advantage achieved under Ariobarzanes (with the assistance of Philiskos) was lost. In the south Troad warfare was exploited by political recalcitrants who saw the chance for self-aggrandizement. The most serious of these was Orontes, whose brief expansionist period was ended by the efforts of Autophradates and, it seems, Artabazos. While Artabazos mobilized southwards to deal with Orontes, Autophradates moved northwards. The collapse of Orontes' sphere created a vacuum which included the southern Troad and over which Autophradates and Artabazos seem to have entered into brief hostilities, c. 360 (Dem. 23.154). A lesser political entity who

managed to hold onto his gains was Eubulos.⁸

One can perceive, then, the following issues with which Artabazos might have to deal during the 350's: What would be his relations with Autophradates; what of the southern Troad? To what extent would Artabazos be able to exercise control over the Hellespont? How far into the interior would Artabazos' sphere extend? What would be his relations with the officers in the interior? Ideally, we should analyze Artabazos' career in light of these questions. However, the evidence permits only partial answers to very few of the questions raised.

A. Artabazos as a "Rebel": Why?

We lose track of Artabazos' activities after 359 until 356/5, when we are faced with a problem very similar to that experienced with the career of Ariobarzanes. In the context of the Social War Diod. 16.22 reveals that for reasons unspecified Artabazos is in the midst of rebellion (apostantos apo tou basileōs) and carrying out military operations against tous satrapas, that is unspecified Achaemenid officers. A similar account appears in the scholia to Dem. 4.19--no cause in particular is assigned to the rebellion.⁹ The question of why Artabazos is called a rebel should be examined in a manner similar to the inquiry into Ariobarzanes' activities. Purely local tensions, in reality aimed neither against the crown nor designed to terminate Achaemenid control, may be regarded in some circles as a direct threat to the crown. Inquiry must be made into the question of what activities were directed against Achaemenid control, in the person of local authorities or in the person of the Shah, and into the question of motivation.

Why did Artabazos undertake activities which could be regarded as rebellious? Before undertaking the investigation one should recall that Orontes is dead and should not figure in attempts to resolve the questions above.

Modern scholars have fixed upon the command preserved in the scholia to Dem. 4.19: Artaxerxes III ordered tois epi thalasses satrapais to disband their mercenary forces as a cost-cutting measure. The satrapai obey. It is held that Artabazos revolted as a result of this command: the order, supposedly the reassertion of long-dormant royal authority by a new, biologically vigorous Shah, was perceived as a threat to the inordinate level of satrapial independence hitherto enjoyed. Artabazos acted out of self-preservation, and perhaps entertained hopes of supplanting the Great King at Susa. It is also held that Artabazos was joined in this rebellion by Orontes.¹⁰

The royal command, as preserved by the scholiast, is curious and unparalleled in Achaemenid administration. The recipients of the order are a vague group; tois epi thalasses satrapais is best interpreted as officers in Anatolia, but who? The motivation for the order is difficult to understand. As a cost-cutting measure the command to demobilize makes sense only if the Shah is somehow paying for mercenary forces under the command of local officers. Yet, ordinarily, royal expenditures on mercenaries in the far west seem to have been confined to larger campaigns, such as the attempted reconquests of Egypt. Occasionally, funds might be placed under the control of a high military or political official sent from Susa, such as Cyrus the younger. Between 359 and 356 no major operations orchestrated by Susa are attested in

Anatolia.

This preemptive order for demobilization makes little political sense: if a number of Achaemenid officers are dismissing mercenaries a situation arises which even Isocrates could perceive (To Archidamos 8-10). Large numbers of men, once under Achaemenid supervision, are left to follow their commanders, wander through the "King's House", and damage it (the difficulties which Tiribazos experienced with Xenophon's men should be instructive, Xen. Anab. 4.4.4-4.5.2). Whereas before these mercenaries' movements could be controlled by Achaemenid authority, they now become mobile potential recalcitrants--created upon command of the King! The foolishness of such a command can be seen upon examining the only parallel for an apparently preemptive demobilization, Alexander's order as preserved in Diod. 17.111.1. The Macedonian Great King commands tois satrapais, i.e. Argead officers, to release their men from hire. Apparently these forces were being used by officers to carry out activities not in Alexander's interests (17.106.2-3, but assigned to 326/5 B.C.). But Alexander did not gain by this move. Large numbers of armed men wander about the former Achaemenid far west. The deleterious effects emerge in the form of the Lamian War (Diod. 17.111.2-3). It was in the interest of Shah and satrap that large bodies of fighting men be kept under supervision. The command preserved by the scholiast does not serve that interest.

It is difficult to perceive how this command was the cause for Artabazos' rebellion. The scholiast reports that the satraps obeyed. If we assign to the words tois epi thalasses satrapais some degree of precision then certainly we must include Artabazos among those obedient

satraps. Rudiger Schmitt's study demonstrated that the terminology used at Susa for the satrapy at Dascylium is very similar to the words used by the scholiast.¹¹

There are additional difficulties in drawing up a cause and effect relationship between the Shah's command and Artabazos' rebellion. In the scholiast's account the royal command appears only as the explanation for the existence of the large numbers of men Chares is able to hire. The former employers of the mercenaries are unspecified. Chares, in turn, is hired by Artabazos, who is described as already being in revolt. The scholiast seems unaware that Artabazos is a satrap. If Artabazos is already in revolt, why did the Shah command other officers, i.e. those potentially loyal to the crown, to release mercenaries, who eventually serve one supposedly inimical to royal control? In sum, as a general, preemptive policy move the Shah's statement makes little sense: he saves neither money nor trouble; in fact, he damages his own empire.

If we wish to accept the existence of some sort of demobilization order at all we should perceive it not as a grandiose command (as it appears in the scholia) but as a command of limited impact, directed toward a specific recipient, and designed to curtail a specific activity perceived as threatening Achaemenid control or internal stability in the far west. What activities, and carried out by whom, could account for this order? Was Artabazos acting in a fashion which could be perceived as inimical to royal interests?

The sources which recount the military operations carried out by Artabazos are not very helpful in determining the cause for his campaigning. We are told little beyond the fact that Artabazos campaigned

in Achaemenid territory against Achaemenid officers.¹² Only one of Artabazos' opponents is singled out by name: Tithraustes, a man whom Chares will defeat. The scholiast indicates that Tithraustes commanded cavalry and infantry. The Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer (FGrH 105 fr. 4) provides us with Tithraustes' home sector: the scene of battle is Tithraustes' chora, located in Phrygia. Since Artabazos is described as invading (sunembalōn) Phrygia, that geographical term should refer to Inner Phrygia. Is Tithraustes the highest officer of Phrygia, i.e. its satrap, or a lesser officer, a local noble? Why is he at odds with Artabazos?

The administrative status of Tithraustes cannot be determined with any certainty. A chora need signify only the estate or estates of a local noble (as for Memnon in Arr. Anab. 1.17.8, Polyaeus 4.3.15). The term satrap is used to describe Artabazos' opponents, but neither Diodorus nor the Papyrus permit confidence in their use of precise administrative titles. The list of men known to be highest officers in Phrygia is exceedingly lacunose.¹³ The last attested Achaemenid highest officer in Phrygia is one Atizyes (Arr. Anab. 1.25.3, Arrian's terminology may be trusted), whose capital was Kelainai (1.29.1-2), a good distance south of Dascylium. If we make Tithraustes satrap and Kelainai his capital (it functions as a satrapial capital as early as Xen. Anab. 1.2.7-9), then either Artabazos has the military strength to move far from his own territory of Tithraustes owns territory some distance from his satrapial capital. But, other scenarios may be generated. On the basis of data available it is impossible to be precise. It is safer, perhaps, to make him a lesser officer, a local

noble in the satrapy of Inner Phrygia.

With Tithraustes a local noble, and one not too far from Artabazos' sphere (the former's chora seems the first object of attack in Phrygia in the accounts of the Papyrus and the scholiast), a reasonable reconstruction for the background to Artabazos' "rebellion" may be suggested. Artabazos and Tithraustes disputed over the sizes of their spheres of influence. Rivalry between the nobles developed into armed conflict. Artabazos may have sought to extend influence further into Inner Phrygia (perhaps to its limits as of Ariobarzanes' time).¹⁴ The scholiast's account of the demobilization command may be a confusion for Artaxerxes' order to Artabazos to desist from this expansion, and to release the mercenary forces with which he hoped to achieve it. When Artabazos continued these activities he faced Achaemenid officers, including Tithraustes, in battle.

The above is highly speculative: the imprecise nature of the evidence precludes greater certainty. The mercenary source tapped by Chares, according to the scholiast, becomes more puzzling. Diodorus implies in 16.22 that Chares already has a large force. What should be stressed is that Artabazos' "rebellion" should be viewed as a local disturbance, and not as a general movement in concert with the now dead Orontes against the Shah himself. We should question the impact of Artabazos' activities beyond Dascylium and its frontiers: Caria was certainly unaffected; the role of personnel from Sparda is unknown.

Tension with his neighbor Tithraustes seems to have lay behind Artabazos' "rebellion". It is now proper to examine those areas once

controlled from Dascylium (the south Troad, the straits, the interior regions of Anatolia) and Artabazos' activities within them. The disorders of 366-359 will have weakened satrapial control: the satrap at Dascylium may be an arbitor in these regions, but not the arbitor of events for all of them.

B. Artabazos' Sphere: The Interior and His "Rebellion"

It is apparently in the interior, i.e. in the eastern part of what Artabazos regarded as his sphere of influence, that we can see tension throughout the mid-350's. The unsatisfactory state of the evidence relating to the cause of tension and, ultimately, warfare has been discussed above. A reasonable reconstruction of events will have local activities occurring over a long period of time and possessing limited aims develop into armed conflict which is not directed against the crown. The Shah will take an interest only when the instability appears to offer opportunijies for past and potential recalcitrants to indulge in self-aggrandizement.

Two sets of armed conflict occurred between Artabazos and his neighbors. The fiist is introduced by Diodorus in the context of Greek affairs, the Social War. The focus is on Chares (Diod. 16.21) who has just gotten his colleagues in trouble with the home authorities in Athens. Hostilities extended southwards to Samos (but without any word of Persian dissatisfaction or intervention). Artabazos was already a rebel (356/5), and Chares appeared on the scene to offer timely assistance to the satrap, who seemed to face superior enemy forces (Diod. 16.22.1, so too in scholia to Dem. 4.19).¹⁵ Chares hoped that by

joining forces with Artabazos he will be able to show a profit in his own activities.¹⁶ The scholiast would have believed that Chares was somewhat unwilling to undertake service in Achaemenid pay and hire up all the mercenaries recently discharged upon command of the Shah.

As to the actual hostilities, we learn only a few events: Chares plundered Sigeum and Lampsacus, and, then, still in Artabazos' service, won a victory against opposing Achaemenid forces, a victory grandiosely characterized by the Athenian as equal to Marathon.¹⁷ The home authorities, anxious over possible Persian reaction to Chares' destruction in Achaemenid territory, summoned him home. Before leaving (cf. FGrH 105 fr. 4), Chares supposedly negotiated a peace between Artabazos and Tithraustes, leader of the defeated Achaemenid forces and only known opponent of Artabazos. Chares here parallels the diplomatic effort of Agesilaus at Assos, as reported in Xen. Ages. 2.26.

We may note some features of Chares' activities: He exploits his service in Achaemenid pay as a means by which to obtain money and fame, short-term benefits (scholia to Dem. 3.31, Diod. 16.22.1, Plut. Arat. 16.3). But he is definitely subordinate to Persian commanders: his activities become fodder for Greek moralizing as to how the Persians have become arbiters of destiny and for unfavorable comparisons between present fourth century circumstances and the illusory glorious Greek past when Athenians were able to pillage Anatolia at will (Dem. 4.24, Iso. 7.8, 10, 79-81; 8.44-48, 55). The Achaemenid response to Chares, although he acted in the pay of a satrap, was stern (Diod. 16.22.2 emphasizes it as a reason for concluding the Social War). The Athenians were warned to curtail their activities or face Achaemenid-orchestrated military action against them. Essentially, the King's

Peace was restated. The Athenians realized the need for discretion. Punitive action directed against Artabazos is not recorded.

The second set of armed conflicts between Artabazos and his neighbors occurred in 353/2, and is again placed in a Greek context. The imprecise terminology of Diodorus and other sources prevents us from determining either the identity of Artabazos' opponents or the scene of battles.¹⁸ We learn only that Artabazos faces Achaemenid officers (Diod. 16.34.1-2: satrapai), and has in his hire another Greek mercenary leader, Pammenes of Thebes.¹⁹ Artabazos wins two victories; during the course of the campaign Pammenes is suspected of disloyalty (i.e. consorting with Achaemenid forces opposed to Artabazos). The victorious satrap and his immediate family, including his brother-in-law, Mentor and Memnon, then disappear from the historical record until the mid-340's when we learn they are in exile: Mentor is in the service of Egyptian rebels (Diod. 16.42.3), Memnon and Artabazos are at the court of Philip (Diod. 16.52.3).

The state of the evidence for Artabazos' "rebellion" is extremely disappointing. Virtually the only specifics with which we are provided are the names of the mercenary generals hired by Artabazos, and the name and location of one enemy. To what extent did Dascylium's sphere expand as a result of Artabazos' victories? Why did he win? How many of his opponents were lesser officers; how many highest officers? Who were they? Where did they live? From where did each side draw their troops (Greek mercenaries aside)? Were there any elements in Dascylium who opposed Artabazos? What impact did the warfare have on Dascylium and its environs? In what ways did royal attitudes towards Artabazos

and his opponents alter during the course of troubles? What happened to Oxythras and Dibiktos, Artabazos' brothers who appear in the later stage of fighting (Polyaenus 7.33.2)? Why did Artabazos, a winner, go into exile with his family? None of these questions can be answered, a state of affairs symptomatic when evidence comes not from the Achaemenids, but from those outside their realm.

C. Artabazos' Exile

Two questions may be investigated--on the basis of the evidence--concerning Artabazos' exile, but definitive answers are not forthcoming. Why did he stay in Macedonia (it is not known if he went elsewhere first)?²⁰ What did he do while there? In investigating these questions one should keep in mind that hostility between Macedonia and Persia was not a foregone--or foreseen--conclusion.

Unfortunately, scholars tend to treat the tenure of Artabazos in Macedon (after 352 until later 343) as part of the "prehistory" of Alexander's invasion: Artabazos sought Macedonia because Philip was already planning anti-Achaemenid activities. Once he arrived he spurred Philip on. His mere presence in the court was evidence of Philip's future hostility toward the Great Kings. But the true reason or, rather, a more reasonable motive, why Artabazos and his family stayed in Philip's kingdom may be far more mundane. Of all the regions close to Dascylium, yet outside direct Achaemenid control, Macedon was one of the few most like an Achaemenid satrapy.²¹ Macedon was ruled by a man not unlike Artabazos (or Persian noblemen in general), one who could trace his ancestry back to early kings. Philip owned

estates, maintained a court (with honorific titles and personal followings), fought tribally organized and highly mobile recalcitrants, and dealt with his own version of the Greek problem. In sum, he did the types of things Artabazos did. Artabazos could expect to be treated as a noble in Macedon. Philip would have reason to welcome the family of Artabazos: its grown male members possessed impeccable military talents which might be used to Philip's advantage. It is doubtful to the extreme that the Shah would take any unfavorable notice of Artabazos' place of exile: it certainly did not hinder his family's rehabilitation.

Of Artabazos' activities in Macedon we know only that he raised his family (Diod. 16.52.4)--this opening the possibility that young Alexander will have met in Macedonia some of his future enemies in Persia, at least Barsine and her brother, the younger Pharnabazos. As for political and military activities, only speculation is possible.²² The anecdote in Polyaeus 5.44.1 concerning Memnon and Leukon (see appendix) may have occurred while the former was in Philip's kingdom. Perhaps it is best not to rule out the possibility that Artabazos and Memnon helped their host build his realm: they could have been of service against Thracians, Illyrians, and Greeks. Though little is known of the exile, its significance should not be underestimated: Men in power at Dascylium in the reigns of Artaxerxes III, Arses, and Darius III knew Philip and had first-hand knowledge of his kingdom.

D. Dascylium After Artabazos' Exile

The successor of Artabazos was one Arsites, who does not appear by name in the historical record until the end of the 340's, when he becomes

involved in a proxy war with Philip (Paus. 1.29.10; Arr. Anab. 1.13.8-10, Diod. 17.19.4). It may be suggested that Arsites appeared among the opponents of Artabazos reported in Diod. 16.34.1-2. His appointment should follow Artabazos' flight.

Arsites' ancestry is unattested, but a reasonable speculation would make him a member of the sons of Pharnakes.²³ By the 350's that family had become so entrenched in Dascylium that it is difficult to perceive Artaxerxes shunting aside the family totally in naming a new highest officer for their ancestral satrapy. Less reasonable speculation will make of him one of the two surviving sons of Ariobarzanes, who is known to have had three at least (Dem. 23.202). If we accept the premise that Arsites is of the sons of Pharnakes and even a son of Ariobarzanes, thus a scion of the senior house descended from Pharnabazos, then we may perceive the council at Zeleia in a more realistic light, as more than a foreshadowing of the failure of haughty Persians in the face of Greco-Macedonian military superiority. Rather, the council would be a display of tension between the sons of Pharnakes, perhaps among the scions of Pharnabazos, over the issue of who is to take the leadership role in formulating strategy. Memnon, brother-in-law of Artabazos, and hence a member of the junior house descended from Pharnabazos, possessed first-hand knowledge of Macedonia and urged a policy in which the property of Dascylium of potential service to Alexander would be destroyed (Arr. Anab. 1.12.8-10, Diod. 17.18.2-4). This territory will have almost certainly included part of Memnon's chora, his estates in the Troad. Indeed, Alexander had landed near Ilium. But this strategy was overruled by Arsites, Memnon's political

and, possibly, social superior, who refused to countenance the willful destruction of his territory by Achaemenid officers.²⁴ Under Memnon's strategy Dascylium would not have been damaged--only the lands to the west. The strife among the sons of Pharnakes and houses descended from Pharnabazos also might explain Arrian's statement (1.12.10), hypopton ti autois (Persians at Zeleia) ēn es ton Memnona tribas empoiein hekonta tōi polemōi tēs ek Basileōs timēs houneka.

A few observations may be made about Arsites' sphere. Apparently he was able to exercise some control over Paphlagonia, drawing cavalry from it (Diod. 17.19.4). The identities of some local nobles are revealed in the council at Zeleia: Niphates, Petenes, Rheomithres. The connection of the first two to the sons of Pharnakes is unknown.²⁵ Further east, Bithynia was a land of native chieftains whose power increased upon the collapse of Achaemenid authority.²⁶

APPENDIX FOR SECTION II: Artabazos' Sphere?: The South Troad and the Straits

It is difficult to perceive an extension of Artabazos' sphere southwards into the southern Troad, once the scene of warfare between the satraps of Dascylium and Sparda. The minor political entity Eubulos rose to power and was tolerated by Autophradates of Sparda (Aristotle Pol. 2.1267a). Eubulos' sphere extended southwards from Assos to encompass at least Atarneus (Strabo 13.610, Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 291), and would seem to have been nominally under Sparda's control. We have no information concerning Artabazos' relations with Autophradates or

his successor, Rhoisakes (whose own appointment may have not come until after Artabazos' fall from grace). I do not know whether either satrap at Sparda is to be included among Artabazos' enemies of the mid-350's.

The lacunose historical record does indicate that political instability was now the rule in the straits region. Artabazos did not possess the political and military advantage which accrued to Ariobarzanes by holding both Abydos and Sestos. Fortunately, no single power emerged in the Hellespont which could threaten Achaemenid control further inland. Those Greeks who do operate in Achaemenid territory in Anatolia do so in the pay of Achaemenid officers, i.e. of at least Artabazos. Demosthenes 23 speaks at length about the straits: a picture of confusion and divisiveness emerges. Thrace is in disorder following Kotys' death (23.8ff); mercenary generals such as Athenodorus (170ff; once in Artabazos' service) and Charidemus (144ff) operated for powers on both sides of the straits. The former, in fact, was now tied by marriage to Thracian nobility (23.10). Athens and Philip of Macedon, a new-comer and age-mate to Artabazos, joined the Thracian chieftains as political entities operating on the western side of the Hellespont. Sestos, no longer within the Achaemenid sphere, would fall to Chares and be "maltreated" (Diod. 16.34.3, 353/2).

On the eastern side of the straits Abydos was politically unstable, but posed no external threat to Achaemenid control.²⁷ The status of Lampsacus and Sigeum are uncertain. The former, once under Orontes' control, was raided by Chares when he entered Artabazos' service (356/5; Dem. 2.28. 23.139; scholia to Dem. 3.31). The satrap made no hostile response--Chares may have been commanded to render the city compliant

to Artabazos. Memnon is also described as taking control of the city (Aristotle Oec. 2.1351b 1-6), but the anecdotes (Oec. 2.1351b 1-18) concerning his activities there are of uncertain date.²⁸ Sigeum was also attacked by Chares when he entered Artabazos' service (sources as for Lampsacus); again, no hostile response from the satrap. The mercenary seems to have made that city a second home, and exercised a modicum of political influence in it over the next twenty years (Athen. 12.532AB = Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 105; Nepos Chabrias 3.4). It is uncertain whether he held any formal post, but he was tolerated by both Artabazos and his successor, Arsites, and ended his career in the service of Darius III.²⁹ One may suggest that neither Lampsacus nor Sigeum were under continuous tight Achaemenid control. Artabazos had made a more successful use of Chares in these regions than he had of Charidemus elsewhere in the Troad.

Artabazos' interest, influence, and control over regions touched by the Black Sea are problematic as well. Pausanias 8.46.4 reports troubles at Cyzicus, but they are of uncertain date and impact. Polyaeus 5.44.1 is a rather curious anecdote which reports a stratagem by which Memnon is described as epitithemenos, and will use as a ploy the desire to arrange philia and xenia with Leukon. Local men are used as envoys: Archibiades of Byzantium and Aristonikos of Olynthos. The key--and complementary--issues concerning this anecdote are when and in whose service does Memnon carry out these activities. According to Diodorus 16.31.6 Leukon died in 354/3 (cf. 14.93.1), but IG II² 212, which honors his sons Spartokos and Pairisades, and which can be dated to 346 (in the archon year 347/6), seems to indicate that Leukon died shortly

before, i.e. earlier in the archon year 347/6.³⁰ As a result, the terminus antequem for this anecdote is 347/6.

But Leukon's regnal years (387/6-347/6) cover the period when Memnon was an Achaemenid nobleman living in Dascylium and the period when he was in exile in Macedon. It would be in the interests of both Artabazos and Philip to arrange closer relations with Leukon, a major grain supplier to Greece, as a means by which to regulate Athenian activity. For Artabazos such a move might help in rebuilding Achaemenid power on both sides of the straits. If Memnon acted in the service of Philip, while in exile, we can perceive the obvious use by Philip of his guest's talents as a man supposedly familiar with the Black Sea regions. Although neither the exact date of Memnon's investigation nor the exact power for which it was carried out can be determined, the desire for philia and xenia with a power outside direct Achaemenid (or Macedonian) control should not be rejected as unreasonable.

In sum, it is not possible to speak of Artabazos as holding an overwhelmingly superior position in the south Troad or the straits regions. This is a situation we can well expect Artabazos to wish to remedy. Perhaps Memnon had already taken steps. The evidence is too scanty to permit further observations.

Section III. Sparda After 359 B.C.

The construction of the list of satraps of Sparda for the period after 359 B.C. is rendered difficult by spotty documentation of such officers in the sources and the resulting modern conflation of

homonymous figures and excessive reliance on impressive titles.

It is uncertain how far into the 350's Autophradates remained satrap. His last attested activity seems to have been a brief campaign against Eubulos at Atarneus (Aristotle Pol. 2.1267a). Favorable relations with Caria seem to have continued, and Hekatomnid influence was allowed to supplant Autophradates' in Lycia. The activities of one lesser officer, Aristotle of Rhodes, are attested at Phocaea (Aristotle Oec. 2.1348a 35 - b16): he restabilized the city after it experienced a stasis, perhaps set off by the operations of Orontes.³¹ If Autophradates was about thirty at the time of his earliest attested activity, the campaign against Euagoras, he may well have died in his late sixties, at about the same time as his friend Maussollos. His heirs are unknown: a man named Autophradates appears in the west in the 330's as a commander subordinate to Memnon and Pharnabazos the younger.³² No lineage is given for him. Perhaps he is a local noble named after a famous predecessor.

The man who appears as Autophradates' successor, but who is not attested until his participation in the Egyptian campaign in 344/3 - 343/2 is one Rhoisakes (Diod. 16.47.2). He was descended from one of the Seven and exercised control over a sphere which included part of the west coast of Anatolia (Ionia).³³ Apparently Sparda was stable enough to permit him and men from his sector to campaign outside the satrapy. Should trouble have arisen, Arsites and Idrieus were available.

By the time of Darius III two brothers appear in Sparda, both active in the affairs of the satrapy. One, Spithridates, was satrap,

holding that office until his death at Granicus (Arr. 1.12.8, 1.16.3; Diod. 17.19.4, 17.20.2). His brother, Rhoisakes, fought alongside him: the use of family, particularly in times of crisis, is not surprising (Arr. Anab. 1.15.7, Diod. 17.20.6, cf. Plut. Alex. 16.8). Although a number of scholars persist in identifying Rhoisakes II (Spithridates' brother) with Rhoisakes I (the satrap), thereby producing the unusual situation in which a seemingly older and experienced man is supplanted while still alive by a younger brother, Beloch and Bosworth have presented a more reasonable construction.³⁴ Rhoisakes I passed the satrapy on to his son Spithridates, who, in turn, is assisted by the other son of Rhoisakes I, Rhoisakes II. This is an excellent illustration of continuity in personnel, and the personal nature of politics in the Achaemenid far west. Bosworth adds the suggestion that the family of Rhoisakes I was descended from the magnate, Spithridates of Dascylium, who fled to Sparda in the 390's after breaking with his superior, Pharnabazos.³⁵ Did Artaxerxes hope to fend off satrapial rivalry by placing Sparda under the control of a family once prominent in Dascylium?

The evidence permits a few observations about Sparda under Spithridates: His sphere, like his father's, included Ionia (Arr. Anab. 1.12.8, Diod. 17.19.4). Military settlers whose national origins lay in the east continued to exist in the province (Diod. 17.19.4; the Median and Bactrian forces may also be settlers from Dascylium; cf. Xen. Anab. 7.8.15). Spithridates maintained a court with honorific titles (Diod. 17.20.1), as most likely did his father and neighbors. When pro-Hellenic elements are removed from Arrian (Anab. 1.17.3-8), we learn that the acropolis of the city of Sparda served as a treasury,

and contained garrison forces and the old palaces of the Lydian kings. The people of Sparda had their own civic leaders and used their own laws. The old and new had co-existed throughout the history of Achaemenid Sparda.

Section IV. Cappadocia

In tracing the career of Datames one could note that he expanded his sphere of influence outward from his home sector in Cilicia (Nepos Datames 1.1). After his promotion to satrap of Cappadocia, Datames enjoyed a sphere which reached north to the shores of the Black Sea. The officers subordinate to Datames are ill-documented, but it is reasonable to assume that the families of men such as Megaphernes of Dana (Xen. Anab. 1.2.20) continued to exist. Datames' death, and the ensuing disorder, would have permitted lesser officers and local nobles to increase their own influence as they filled the gap left by the deceased satrap.

This theoretical multiplicity of political entities after 360 is reflected in Strabo's statement (12.534) that at the time of the Macedonian conquest Cappadocia was divided into two satrapies. Such a division would be due to a possible combination of at least two factors: Artaxerxes III (or one of his successors) wished to prevent the emergence of a single figure of nearly unchallengeable supremacy; Artaxerxes III (or one of his successors) simply recognized that after Datames' death there was more than a single very prominent family within the sphere known as Cappadocia.

The basic question concerning Cappadocia after 359--and the only one for which the evidence permits an even partial answer--is the identities of the various officers operating within the satrapy. In the past there has been a tendency to misuse numismatic data, to attribute coinages to whatever names might be gleaned from the literary record. In addition, scholars have attempted to identify various political leaders with each other so as to reduce their number to one (highest) officer per satrapy of Cappadocia.

A. Officers Attestd in the Numismatic Record

Numismatic evidence indicates that a number of political entities of seemingly Iranian nationality held power near the Black Sea. The evidence consists of a number of coins which bear the obverse and reverse types normally associated with the civic coinage of the city Sinope (Obv.: the nymph Sinope; rev.: an eagle grasping a dolphin). The chief difficulty in dealing with the coins was their Aramaic inscriptions: how were these to be transliterated?

While coins could be attributed to Darames without problem (the Greek and Armaic inscriptions were clear), those examples placed stylistically after his series and before the relatively well documented Ariarathes caused the greatest difficulties and engendered a series of weak and contradictory attributions.

Robinson takes the crown for providing a scientific numismatic study which decisively supplanted the work of his predecessors.³⁶ Dividing the coinage with Sinope-types into groups, he argued that his Group III represented the minting activities of "at least two

Persian 'dynasts'," of which the latest was Ariarathes.³⁷ By using stylistic data to achieve greater precision in the sequence of issues, Robinson created a gap between the coinages of Datames (pre-360) and later "Persian issues", c. 345 BC. Into this gap he placed those coins with Sinope-types which bore what seemed to be magistrates' personal names.³⁸ His work is significant in that he recognized the multiplicity of dynasts, not all of whom will appear in the literary evidence, and in that he did not perceive Achaemenid control as static; it might expand or contract, having various degrees of impact on Sinope and its environs.

The most recent work on Sinope-type coins, carried out by Troxell and Waggoner, vindicate Robinson's approach. Those coins once assigned to, among others, Sysines, Datames' son, have been down-dated to c. 340-330 (on stylistic grounds), their Aramaic inscriptions now read as Abdssn.³⁹ New finds have added an additional political entity to Cappadocia, one Mtrpsny (Motarnapsi?). His coins can be dated with no greater precision than c. 360-320 BC.⁴⁰

The numismatic evidence indicates that after Datames' death there existed a number of political entities whose careers overlapped (and may have begun during Datames' lifetime) and who either had access to the mint at Sinope or simply used its coin types. The numismatic record complements the literary record (in particular Strabo's statement about two Cappadocian satrapies), but does not mirror it--there is only a small area of intersection. Abdssn and Mtrpsny are attested only in coinage; Ariarathes in both coinage and the literary record.

B. Officers Attested in the Literary Record

Accounts of Cappadocia from 360 to 330, like the numismatic evidence, reveal that there existed a number of officers whose careers overlapped. The name Datames reappears, but not until the very end of the Achaemenid Empire, when it is borne by an officer, subordinate to the younger Pharnabazos and the younger Autophradates, and identified only as andra Persen (Arr. Anab. 2.2.2). Although we are safe in making him a lesser officer and local noble in Anatolia, Datames' home sector and relation to the earlier Datames are unknown.⁴¹

During the middle of the fourth century we are able to trace the rise to prominence of the family of Ariamnes (Diod. 31.19). This is not an easy task, for it is necessary to deal with both the reality of the Achaemenid period and the fantasy of a noble pedigree drawn up in Hellenistic times, one designed to match the later prominence of the family. The true ties of the family of Ariamnes are not known, but one should not rule out a priori co-existence and intermarriage. In the 340's the sons of Ariamnes, Ariarathes (I) and Orophernes were of political importance, the elder (Ariarathes) assisted by the younger in the administration of their sphere. When the Shah mobilized for the Egyptian campaign (Diod. 31.19.2), Orophernes was sent southwards, where he fought with great honor. Later the deceased Orophernes' sons, Ariarathes (II) and Aryses, adopted by their uncle, rose to greatness upon the collapse of the Achaemenid empire. Elder and younger Ariarathes maintained their independence, if not their homeland's, from Macedonian control, and founded the Hellenistic kingdom of Cappadocia,

thereby giving a display of continuity in personnel beyond the empire's lifespan.⁴²

To the family of Ariamnes we may add at least four more political entities of various status. Ariakes is attested in the 330's, but his career will have extended back into at least the 340's. Arrian (Anab. 3.8.5) indicates that he was a local man leading troops (drawn from his sector) in defense of the empire. We need not erase Ariakes' existence by identifying him with Ariarathes: satrapies had more than one loyal nobleman.⁴³

One man who can be identified as satrap in Cappadocia is Mithrobouzanēs (Arr. Anab. 1.16.3, Diod. 17.21.3). Because Ariarathes' name appears on the Sinope-type coins, it is held that he was satrap of "north" Cappadocia, and Mithrobouzanēs was satrap of "south" Cappadocia. The latter's career should extend back at least one decade since he has attained the status of highest officer in the 330's.⁴⁴

One may briefly note two nobles who are attested only when they have dealings with Alexander. Sabiktas (Arrian Anab. 2.4.2) and Abistamenes (Curtius 3.4.1) were tolerated and coopted by Alexander and advanced to apparent high office. It is uncertain to what extent these two may have been disgruntled nobles who attempted to exploit the Macedonian presence to achieve a position superior to their rivals.⁴⁵

Cappadocia, then, emerges as a portion of Anatolia for which many nobles are attested. Although we cannot speak with certainty about how they interacted, the fragmentation of leadership--possibly centrally inspired--seems amply attested.

Section V. Cilicia

While the problem for Cappadocia was to correct the tendency for scholars to reduce the number of officers attested in the final decades of Achaemenid rule, the problem for Cilicia is to reduce the number of highest officers assigned by moderns to that sector. This is an issue raised by imprecise terminology in the ancient sources, and has implications for how we perceive the position of Cilicia after Darius' death and for the mobility of officers in the far west.

A. Arsames: Satrap of Cilicia?

One will find often in the standard treatments of Alexander the argument that Mazaios, known to have been satrap of Cilicia in the 350's and 340's (Diod. 16.42.1), was replaced sometime in the 330's by one Arsames. This officer appears in our sources in 334, at the council of Zeleia (Arr. Anab. 1.12.8). Arrian assigns him no title beyond naming him as one of the Persian strategoi who meet at Zeleia. However, in that same passage, Arrian (1.12.8-10) clearly labels Arsites and Spithridates as highest officers.⁴⁶ When Arsames appears in Arr. Anab. 2.4.5 and 2.11.8, the historian gives him no title. The latter passage does seem, however, to set the cavalry-commanders, including Arsames, apart from Sabaces, a satrapēs.

Diodorus, while describing the Persian battleline at Granicus (17.19.4), mentions Arsamenes the satrapes, who commands his own (idious) cavalry force, i.e. his personal following. Arsamenes can be identified without difficulty as the Arsames in Arrian. But the term

satrapes in Diodorus is notoriously imprecise and no sector is specified for Arsamenes/Arsames. We learn only that Arsamenes/Arsames is an Achaemenid officer of Persian ancestry.

Curtius 3.4.3 refers to an Arsames qui Ciliciae praeerat. In the major Alexander historians this is the closest we come to an administrative title connected with a particular sphere of influence.⁴⁷ On the basis of this expression scholars have concluded that Arsames was satrap of Cilicia, the highest officer for that sector.⁴⁸

However, Arsames' presence and activities in Cilicia are during a time of great crisis--the highest officers of Sparda and Dascylium are already dead. Those in Caria are under severe pressure as Alexander moves southward. Arsames is now in the region of the Cilician gates and must decide, before the arrival of Alexander, whether Tarsus should form a base from which to hinder the Macedonian advance. Arrian (2.4.5-6) indicates that Arsames decided to abandon the city, fled, and joined his King at Issos, where he met his end. Curtius (3.4.3) describes him as initiating--although too late--the policy advocated by Memnon at Zeleia. The word praeerat is the only hint we have that Arsames enjoys an administrative position in Cilicia. It may apply only to this particular time of crisis, and may also be Curtius' own conclusion based on his understanding of the sources, i.e. an ancient parallel to recent scholarly conclusions about Arsames' status based on his activities.

I would suggest that a reexamination of Arsames' career will reveal that his home sector is not Cilicia, but Dascylium (or Sparda), and that like other Achaemenid officers who survived the initial Macedonian

victories Arsames fled southwards to resist Alexander. Arsames first appears at the council of Zeleia. Arrian 1.12.8 presents the most detailed list of participants: none of them can be placed outside Sparda and Dascylium with any certainty. There are the satraps of Sparda and Dascylium, Spithridates and Arsites. Memnon is a lesser officer and local noble in Dascylium's sphere. Rheomithres, Petenes, and Niphates would seem to be local nobles, lesser officers. I would include Arsames among this class. The council of Zeleia is to be perceived as a meeting of personnel drawn from Dascylium, the satrapy under attack, and Sparda, the satrapy closest to the theater of war and one already damaged by Macedonian troops under Parmenio and Attalus.

At Granicus, Arsames, with men drawn from his sector, fights the invader (Diod. 17.19.4). I would find it most surprising for officer of Cilicia, with his following, to be sent to the far northwest corner of Anatolia to face what was still a relatively minor threat on the coast. Indeed, Arsames' presence at Zeleia indicates that he would have been dispatched from his homesection some weeks before. This is not an efficient use of military personnel.

Granicus was a tragedy for the empire because of the number of officers who perished. Among those who had planned strategy at Zeleia, Spithridates, Niphates, and Petenes were dead (Arr. Anab. 1.16.3), Arsites would commit suicide. But those officers who survived continued to fight the invader, although their home sectors and estates may have already been lost.⁴⁹ The service rendered by Memnon and his nephews are well-known. Rheomithres, who had been at Zeleia, stood beside his king at Issus (Arr. Anab. 2.11.8, Curtius 3.11.10, Diod. 17.34.5). Cilicia, like Cappadocia, was a sector in which survivors gathered to

resist the invaders.⁵⁰

B. Mazaios: Competence and Promotion

While the career of Arsames tells us about the mobility and loyalty of lesser officers, the career of Mazaios demonstrates the liminal nature of Cilicia and the chances for advancement enjoyed by competent and loyal Achaemenid nobles. The earliest data about Mazaios⁵¹ come from Diodorus 16.42.1: there he is described as ho tēs Kilikias archōn, the word archōn a variatio for satrap, used immediately before to describe his colleague, Belesys of Syria. In the years before 344 Mazaios was a local man called out with Belesys probably to serve on the staff of the campaign to be launched against Egypt.⁵² The campaign was postponed and the two men's efforts redirected towards the restabilization of Phoinicia, parts of which had risen in rebellion as a result of the political and economic pressures put on the sector by the Persian build-up (Diod. 16.41.2-6). This rebellion, whose focal point seems to have been Sidon, now under Tennes, was exploited by Nektanebos, the king of rebel Egypt. With the Achaemenid victory in Phoinicia (Diod. 16.45.6) seems to have come a promotion for Mazaios. His sphere of influence was expanded to include those territories which had been controlled by Belesys, Syria and Phoinicia, i.e. Ebir-nari.⁵³ Belesys' fate is not known. Cilicia in this case had served as a base for a southwards expansion. The evidence for the promotion comes not from the literary evidence, but from numismatic evidence, which has not been the subject of recent careful scrutiny.

Mazaios was quite prolific in the minting of coins; in all, it is possible to distinguish five groups.⁵⁴ Three will be of interest

here. Babelon Group I can be assigned to Mazaios on the basis of Aramaic inscriptions on the coins, and were minted in Cilicia (perhaps at Tarsus). While the date and political function of the coins are uncertain, they do complement Diodorus' description of Mazaios' post. The coins of Babelon Group II reflect the officer's promotion: the coin inscriptions name him as in control (Aramaic: over) Cilicia (Hilik) and Ebir-nari.⁵⁵ This is a logical extension of Mazaios' sphere. As satrap of Cilicia he will have had some familiarity with and to neighboring regions. While preparing for the Egyptian campaign, Mazaios will have had the chance to become more familiar with Belesys, his subordinates, and their spheres. To determine when this promotion took place, scholars have turned to a third set of coins.

Babelon Group III is called the "Sidonian" series, because the types on the coins are those normally found on the issues of that city (obv.: galley; rev.: king on chariot). The series bears the name of Mazaios, the Aramaic Mazdai, plus a series of numerals, 1-4 and 16-21. Scholars hold that these numbers represent years, i.e. the regnal years of Persian Shahs. But which Shahs? By resolving this question it would be possible to pin down the time Mazaios would have had access to the mint or mint personnel at Sidon in his capacity as satrap, and so determine when the promotion recorded in Babelon Group II had taken place. Years 16-21 could be assigned to the reign of Artaxerxes III (344/3-399/8): these are years in which Mazaios was known to be an officer of high standing and which follow the restabilization of Phoinicia.⁵⁶ Promotion followed victory.

Years 1-4 are problematic. To assign them to Artaxerxes III's

reign creates a gap of years 5-15 and places the coins in a context in which it is difficult to see Mazaios as an important officer in Phoinicia.⁵⁷ It would be more reasonable to place years 1-4 after years 16-21, in a period when Mazaios is known to have held high power in the southwest.⁵⁸ But problems still remain. The reign of Arses is too short (the coins would require 338/7-335/4; Arses rules into 336). The reign of Darius III offers a more promising possibility: years 1-4 would be 336/5-333/2, dates agreeing with the fall of Sidon. But why are there no coins from Arses' reign?

At the present time, one can state that Mazaios was satrap of Cilicia and was promoted to become Achaemenid highest officer in Syria and Phoinicia as well. The promotion should follow Mazaios' success in restabilizing Phoinicia. The satrap had grown sons (Curtius 5.1.17) by the time of Alexander's invasion; a potential for continuity in personnel existed. That the Shah placed both sides of the Cilician gates under the same man was a mark of great royal trust.

Section VI. Caria and Cyprus

During the 340's Cyprus became destabilized, but hardly posed the threat Euagoras had in the 380's. A good deal of the credit for the stability in Anatolia and for the quick resolution of these new Cypriote difficulties should go to the Hekatomnids, who had made of Caria a third significant satrapy on the Anatolia west coast. Before examining the Cypriote problem, it is proper to summarize those features of Hekatomnid administration which added to the Achaemenid strategic advantage: There

was a lack of tension between Sparda and Caria. The Hekatomnids cooperated with Autophradates, and apparently with the family of Rhoisakes. The Hekatomnids developed a coastal satrapial capital which served as a base for their fleet, used against the western barbarians. Their support of compliant politicians on the coast hindered the development of bases for operations to be carried out against the interior. The extension of Hekatomnid control over Lycia added new stability in south Anatolia and complemented the work of Mazaïos.

A. Cyprus Before the Destabilization

Diodorus begins his account of the Cypriote difficulties with a surprisingly accurate picture of the nature of Achaemenid control in the mid-fourth century (Diod. 16.42.3-4). There was no single Achaemenid highest officer in Cyprus, rather the Shah tolerated and supported the native political structure, so long as it was compliant. There were nine major cities, each ruled by its own indigenous political leader, each with its own sphere of influence, which encompassed smaller, outlying settlements. Such an arrangement set up a pattern for rivalry based on disputes over the extent of these spheres.

In the years after 380, the defeat of Euagoras, Cyprus was relatively peaceful and posed no external threat to Achaemenid control on the Anatolian mainland. Cyprus appears to have been untouched by the destabilizations of the 360's. There were some problems in Salamis in these decades, but they attracted the attention neither of the Shah nor the western officers: the difficulties were purely internal.

The last years of Euagoras' reign were marked by social incontinence and family strife which ended with Euagoras' death by poison

(374/3: Diod. 15.47.3).⁶⁰ Nicocles succeeded his father, emulated his character flaws, but did manage to restore a measure of political and economic stability to Salamis (Iso. 3.31).⁶¹ More importantly, Nicocles knew his place. In spite of his claims that he was Greek (Iso. 3.28) and Isocrates' obsequious compositions, Nicocles obeyed the Shah and avoided angering unfriendly neighbors (Iso. 3.33-34). Salamis was no longer paramount on the island. Its neighbors seem to have controlled those sectors once its sphere. Nicocles died by the earlier 350's.⁶² Thereafter we find a period of troubles which were to be resolved by a force of Cypriotes and Achaemenid paid mercenaries, all coordinated by Idrieus, satrap of Caria.

B. Destabilization and the Achaemenid Response

Diodorus' explanation of the origin of troubles says little: destabilization in Egypt spilled over into Phoinicia and Cyprus, Cypriote political leaders imitated their rebellious mainland counterparts (Diod. 16.40.3, 40.5, 42.3, 42.5). But since his account of operations focuses on Salamis, it seems that that city was the focal point of trouble or its instigator (16.42.8, 46). A more complete explanation for renewed trouble should take into consideration both the demands made on the west in general by the preparations against Egypt and the internal conditions in Salamis.

Dynastic strife had characterized Salamis sometime after Nicocles' death. Euagoras II, who may be Nicocles' son, had been king of Salamis (Diod. 16.42.7), but was expelled by a man who is known as Phytagoras from his coins, Protagoras from Diodorus. He, too, seems to be connected with the royal house.⁶³ The date of Euagoras' expulsion is not

known; Isocrates 5.102 seems to suggest before 346. Mobilization for the Egyptian campaign, before the Phoinician troubles, would have drawn naval forces, commanded by loyal local men, from Cyprus and somewhat denuded the island, providing an opportunity for local recalcitrants to create difficulties. These difficulties need not be perceived as being directed against the Shah, but as being directed by local political enemies against each other. In this context we may place Pnytagoras' rise: Euagoras would be absent on the mainland or on Cyprus, but with fewer forces than normal. Upon expulsion, Euagoras would have sought out aid from Achaemenid officers, obtaining it when the Phoinician situation would have permitted it. It is at this stage that Diodorus' account really begins: Euagoras has obtained assistance to take back his crown and realm, i.e. Salamis.⁶⁴ It is very questionable that the entire island willfully rose up against the Shah (as Iso. 5.102 would have us believe); rather, Phyttagoras' Salamis was the cancer.

The Achaemenid response to the troubles at Salamis and to Euagoras' appeal was the standard one used to deal with minor border rebels. A punitive campaign was orchestrated by a local man with naval capacity, Idrieus of Caria, whose father had attended to similar troubles in 390. Idrieus may have had a chance in 390 and thereafter to become acquainted with Cyprus and its personnel. The staff, subordinate to the satrap and which would undertake the actual operations, was composed of compliant members of the native order (Diod. 16.42.6-9). Phocion of Athens commanded the mercenaries;⁶⁵ Euagoras II, the former king, a local man who was familiar to and with the object of the campaign and would have personal stake in its success, was co-commander. Hence, there is one of the usual divisions of command: one outsider, one local man.

The campaign itself focused on Salamis (Diod. 16.42.8) as Achaemenid forces swelled with the arrival of men from Syria and Cilicia (mercenaries in part?)--troubles in Phoinicia will have abated--anxious for a cut in the anticipated booty (16.42.9). Cypriote resistance crumbled as Salamis fell. Euagoras II was restored (Diod. 16.46.1-2).

Sometime thereafter new local information presented to Artaxerxes III convinced him (in the late 340's?) to supplant Euagoras II with the ex-rebel Pnytagoras (Diod. 16.46.2-3). The specific charges are not known, but they were not serious enough to warrant Euagoras' execution. Instead, he was granted allēs hēgemonias . . . kata tēn Asian meizonos. Diodorus is vague, but modern suggestions that he became king of Sidon are unsatisfactory.⁶⁶ Euagoras did poorly; he fled back to Cyprus where he was arrested and punished (executed?). Pnytagoras was left to rule Salamis; like Nicocles, he knew his place and continued to do so.

The events in Cyprus and Salamis, although poorly attested, permit us to examine some features of Achaemenid administration: The ability of the Shah to deal simultaneously with multiple problems because of the emergence of Caria as a significant satrapy (difficulties in Phoinica did not preclude Cypriote operations); flexibility in maintaining the most compliant members of the native order, to which is connected the desire to reuse the talents of rebels and recalcitrants in Achaemenid interests; and, above all and the reason for the above, the now unchallengeable position of Achaemenid leadership. The Shah and his representatives could do as they pleased at Cyprus and in Salamis to achieve the most stable and friendliest government.

Section VII. The Rehabilitation of the House of Artabazos

In a previous section, the fall from grace of Artabazos was presented. The 350's were a time of strife for Dascylium as Artabazos tried to reestablish the earlier, larger bounds of its sphere of influence. Border warfare with at least Phrygia had taken place. Although initially victorious, Artabazos, with the rest of his family, i.e. the ruling satrapial house, fled Achaemenid territory, and went into exile. Mentor appears in the service of rebel Egypt, Artabazos and Memnon in Macedonia, the European closest equivalent to an Achaemenid satrapy. The satrapy at Dascylium was next held by one Arsites, concerning whom I have speculated, reasonably, that he was a member of the sons of Pharnakes and, less reasonably, that he was one of the sons of Ariobarzanes, Artabazos' elder brother and predecessor.

The rehabilitation of the house of Artabazos permits the examination of the Achaemenid practices of reusing rebels and promoting competent officers. The multinational nature of Achaemenid administration is elucidated. Most significantly the process of the rehabilitation reveals Achaemenid power in the far west to have reached a high point in the fourth century.

A. Mentor and Sidon

An Achaemenid nobleman is in the service of those inimical to Achaemenid control. Diod. 16.42.2 indicates that Mentor was in the service of Nektanebos of Egypt, who, upon the destabilization of Phoenicia, sent Mentor, along with mercenaries, to assist Tennes of

Sidon.⁶⁷ From Nektanebos' viewpoint Mentor's service is not surprising: he had retained an experienced commander who was familiar to and with the Achaemenid Empire.

Mentor's role in the Phoinician revolt is clouded by Diodorus' confusing treatment of the Phoinician response to the superior military forces brought to bear against the revolt by the Shah and his subordinates (Diod. 16.43.1-2). A reexamination of the circumstances surrounding the collapse of Sidon, the focal point for rebellion, should reveal a standard occurrence in warfare: a seemingly impregnable fortress or city falls to the enemy because of the treachery of those non-locals hired to defend it. In Mentor's case, it is not treachery, but delayed loyalty to the Persian crown.

The difficulty in Diodorus' account is posed by the proper names read in the texts. Someone in 16.43.1-2 decides to betray Sidon to the Shah. His negotiating point will be his familiarity with the approaches to rebel Egypt, the initial object of Artaxerxes' military preparations. The betrayer sends an emissary, Thettalion (a Greek?), to make contact (16.43.2) with the Shah, who has now arrived to supervise personally operations. A troublesome point in negotiations is Thettalion's demand that Artaxerxes give his "right hand", a token of surety. The Shah grows annoyed, threatens to execute the emissary, but eventually decides to grant the token. Here is the standard Greek presentation of an irascible despot who will allow gain to slip away by quibbling on a minor point.

Upon examination of P and X, the best mss., the identity of the traitor emerges as follows:⁶⁸ Tennes Mentor (16.43.1-2), dynast of Sidon, but a coward, sends Thettalion. The Shah is initially willing

to coopt Thettalion's master, Mentor (16.43.3). The Shah is told Tennes Mentor wishes the "right hand" (16.43.3). Thettalion indicates what Mentor will do, returns to Sidon, and reports to Mentor, in secret from the rest of the Sidonians.

Additional problems emerge when the treachery is to be carried out. In 16.45.1 betrayer I reveals to betrayer II that Sidon will be handed over to Artaxerxes. Betrayer II is labeled in the mss. as general of the mercenaries from Egypt. Mss. F and M have betrayer I as Tennes and betrayer II as Mentor. X has Tennes Mentor as betrayer I; betrayer II is given no proper name. Dindorf, the Teubner editor, accepted F and M. However he does not give the text of P (I suspect it read Tennes for betrayer I, Mentor for betrayer II).

Betrayer I proposes to meet Artaxerxes with 500 soldiers and 100 prominent citizens (16.45.1). In 16.45.2-4, betrayer I, now called Tennes in all mss., betrays the 100 to Artaxerxes, who has them executed as prominent recalcitrants. 500 Sidonians (Diod. implies these are not the soldiers mentioned above) approach the Shah as suppliants. Tennes is summoned, but Artaxerxes has decided already to make an example of the city. Assured of the city's surrender, the Shah executes the 500. He and Tennes are escorted into the city by the mercenaries originally sent from Egypt. Tennes is executed.

Sorting out the names of the betrayers is not easy. P and X are the best mss., but Dindorf cites readings for only X in his apparatus criticus for both 16.43 and 16.45.1. In X, Tennes Mentor and then Mentor initiates contact with the Persians, while the man kept in the dark is not named at all. If my observations about P are correct,

Tennes Mentor and later Mentor initiates contact in 16.43, but in 16.45.1 Tennes seems to have initiated contact while Mentor is in the dark. With the best mss. confused about proper names, modern scholars have focused on titles in the two passages in attempting a resolution of the problem of who was responsible for the betrayal at Sidon: Diod. 16.43.1, which describes the man who initiates the betrayal as ho de tēs Sidōnes dunastēs (so all mss.) of the mercenaries sent to Phoinicia by Egypt. On the basis of these descriptions scholars have concluded that Tennes, king of Sidon, arranged to betray his own city. But this reconstruction does not accord very well with the specifics of Diodorus' account, particularly the preparations undertaken for the defense of Sidon (16.44.5-6).

The confusion in the manuscript tradition over names assigned to titles does not seem to offer an approach to a solution. A better account of Sidon's fall, and one in which the particulars make sense, emerges if one assigns to Mentor the role of the man initiating a betrayal which compels Tennes and his citizen body to break off their defense and take measures to placate Artaxerxes. Betrayal of a strong-point by a mercenary commander was not uncommon in warfare. If Mentor is the prime mover, the events occurring during the betrayal become more understandable: Mentor would send a Greek, Thettalion. The former had served in Egypt and was related to Achaemenid royalty: he could expect the Shah to listen, and his claim of familiarity with Egyptian defenses would be a true one. Artaxerxes would have cause to be angry at the demand of a mercenary general for a token of surety. The secrecy surrounding Thettalion's report to his superior would have been necessary and becomes quite believable. Tennes' activities, too, are not out

of place: Once Mentor tells him that his mercenary forces will betray the city, Tennes is placed in the position of attempting to stay Persian anger with a display of suppliants and a promise of surrender. It is reasonable to believe that if it had been Tennes who had arranged the betrayal, he would have been toppled by his own countrymen. Hence, in spite of confusion over names and titles, an account emerges in which Mentor is the prime betrayer and betrayer I, Tennes the man presented with a fait accompli.

Mentor emerges as a figure keenly aware of his own self-interest and the chance his importance in Sidon affords him for advancement--and rehabilitation in the eyes of superior power. Tennes emerges as a rebel who does his best to defend his city, and, when betrayed, to blunt his conqueror's anger. We may remove the unfavorable characterization of him in Diod. 16.43.1. Sidon's fate was characteristic of him in Diod. 16.43.1. Sidon's fate was characteristic of Achaemenid policy: The rebel city was made into an example designed to cow recalcitrants into compliance (Diod. 16.45.6). Artaxerxes simply punished those who had betrayed him (16.45.2-6).⁶⁹

B. Mentor in the Egyptian Campaign

As a result of his activities at Sidon Mentor joined the staff of Artaxerxes for the Egyptian campaign. On the basis of the reconstruction given above, Artaxerxes obtained a general skilled in both the political and military aspects of warfare, and one familiar with the best means by which to take the next military objective, Egypt (Diod. 16.43.2). Mentor worked alongside the highly valued Bagoas in the attack force (16.47.4), a pairing representative of the command structure at this

time.⁷⁰ The campaign against Nektanebos was a display of Achaemenid political and military expertise: after rebel forces were driven back, they were put under siege and demoralized. Many strongpoints fell without pitched battles. Mentor displayed the diplomatic skill of Tissaphernes and the military skill of Pharnabazos.

Following the fall of Pelusium (Diod. 16.49.4-6), Diodorus' account shifts to Bubastos, which will fall demoralized and by treachery. The account emphasizes (16.49.7-50.8) the role of tension between Greek and non-Greek on both the Persian and Egyptian sides and, as a result, presents an unfavorable portrait of Mentor. In Bubastos both groups work in secret from each other to effect surrender: Egyptian forces seek to negotiate with Bagoas, while the Greek mercenaries try with Mentor (16.50.1-3). Diodorus presents the fall of the city as an incident in which Mentor betrays Bagoas for personal gain (16.50.3-8). This is a point which requires reexamination.

Mentor is supposed to have given secret encouragement to the Greeks inside Bubastos to attack Bagoas and his occupation forces (16.50.3). Hence, when Bagoas entered the city he was captured (16.50.4), and was dependent upon Mentor to save him (5). Mentor emerged a hero (6). Bagoas promised to do nothing in the future without Mentor's advice: this was to be the beginning of a great friendship? The element which is to be removed is Mentor's putative treachery, whose purpose was to reap personal gain from a close and trusted friend of Artaxerxes (Diod. 16.47.3-4). A more reasonable account is the result. It is conceivable that both desperate parties within Bubastos sought to make the best possible deal with the Achaemenid commanders, and did so in secret to each other. It is not very conceivable that either Bagoas or Mentor would

damage their chances for success by operating in secret and against their common interest. When Bagoas entered the city, the Greeks resisted and Mentor put an end to resistance. Putative treachery is replaced by continued cooperation.

The settlement of Egypt, so long rebellious, was necessarily harsh towards the rebels: potential strong points for the rebels were destroyed; anti-Achaemenid Egyptians such as the priesthood, were punished (Diod. 16.51.2). Pherendates was installed as satrap (16.51.2). Those who had benefitted the crown, such as the Achaemenid paid mercenaries, were rewarded. In reality, the Shah's policy was the same toward rebel and ally: *kata ten axian hekaston* (Diod. 16.51.3). The Egyptian problem at long last seemed solved. Nektanebos fled into Ethiopia--and legend.⁷¹

C. Mentor's Promotion

Mentor's and Bagoas' performances in the successful campaign earned both of them new--and higher--offices. But their exact nature is uncertain because of Diodorus' tendency toward the grandiose and his imprecise use of terminology. Bagoas seems to have received some sort of a post involving the upper satrapies (Diod. 16.50.8): en tais anō satrapeias hapanta tōi basilei diōikēkōs. So little basic research has been done on Achaemenid administration in Central Asia and Eastern Iran that it is difficult to specify the nature of this position. A special officer may have been needed to supervise operations against those peoples outside the sphere of influence of the satrap at Bactra.

Mentor was held in high regard (Diod. 16.52.1) and in addition to

cash prizes, he received a post described as satrapēn tēs kata tēn Asian paralias, to which was added the title of autokratora stratēgon in the operations to be carried out against rebellious elements in Anatolia. Diodorus has provided job descriptions, not precise titles. Satrapēs, here, does not seem to indicate anything more than Achaemenid officer--Arsites held Dascylium as satrap, Rhoisakes, Spardā. Mentor, although called hegemon megistos of the far northwest (Diod. 16.50.7), is actually a local noble and lesser officer; as was his distant relation, the first Artabazos, Mentor is on the frontline of the Achaemenid frontier. He was rewarded with real estate, the property his brother Memnon later held in the Troad (Arr. Anab. 1.17.8, Polyaeus 4.3.15). That Mentor should become a local noble and lesser officer in his region is not surprising: he had experience in the Troad in the 360's (Dem. 23.156f); he was a member of the satrapial house in Dascylium. As an Achaemenid noble who was Greek he was ideal for the far western tip of the empire. To this may be added the attraction that his immediate family had lived in Europe and possessed a first-hand knowledge of those regions immediately beyond Achaemenid control. It is not unlikely that he had held estates in the Troad in the 350's during his brother-in-law's tenure as satrap. Mentor's reward was a display of continuity in personnel.

The posts of autokrator strategos and hegemon megistos can be regarded as a temporary special command to deal with those recalcitrant elements in western Anatolia (i.e. in more than one satrapy) who had been allowed to exist while the attention of Artaxerxes and Rhoisakes had been directed toward Egypt. The objects of Mentor's operations were to be Hermeias, boss at Atarneus, and other unspecified hegemonas

(Diod. 16.52.3-4).

With Mentor's promotion came the rehabilitation of his family, the family of Artabazos and Memnon (Diod. 16.52.3-4), who had been living in Macedonia. Artabazos, after returning to Achaemenid territory, disappears from the historical record until late in the reign of Darius III. It may be that he was posted to Susa and served as an advisor concerning the far west, a position which would grant him honor while avoiding a potential conflict with Arsites. Such a post need carry no implication of impending hostility with Philip. Rather, new first-hand local information provided by an experienced officer would be invaluable at Susa, as would be the ability to judge the veracity of later data.⁷² Memnon appears to have remained in the west. He, like the eldest sons of Artabazos, probably joined Mentor's staff.⁷³ The use of one's family, and the training of youth in the arts of diplomacy and war were additional aspects of continuity in personnel.

To sum up Mentor's activities: While in exile, Mentor had been in the service of Nektanebos, in a capacity in which he commanded mercenaries and became familiar with the defenses of rebel Egypt. When Hektanebos exploited the troubles in Phoinicia, Mentor and a body of mercenaries were posted to Tennes, ruler of Sidon, the focal point of destabilization. Mentor recognized the possibility of turning his former and present commands to his own advantage: he arranged with Artaxerxes the betrayal of Sidon. The ex-rebel was coopted, and joined the staff of the Egyptian campaign. His diplomatic and military skill (and his rescue of Bagoas) led to further promotion, and to the rehabilitation of his family, some of whom joined his own staff. Artaxerxes

benefitted those who benefitted him. Mentor's fortunes display the Achaemenid tendency to coopt ex-rebels, but his repeated shift in loyalties seems paralleled only by Orontas, garrison commander at Sardis in the late fifth century (Xen. Anab. 1.6).

D. Mentor and Hermeias

Following the Egyptian campaign, Mentor went to Anatolia to take up his estates in the Troad and to clear the coast of minor recalcitrants. The best attested of the military operations was carried out against Hermeias, who appears in sources relating to both political history and the history of major philosophers. The reasons are threefold: Mentor's victory was a display of diplomatic skill; Aristotle, later famous, had lived with Hermeias (hence biographies of the former discuss the latter); Didymos' work on Demosthenes 10 was discovered on a papyrus in which the commentator attempted to elucidate a curious passage in the orator by citing extracts from a number of earlier authors.

The foundations of Hermeias' power as a political boss at Atarneus and Assos were laid in the 360's by Eubulos, who took advantage of disturbances among the satraps at Sparda and Dascylium to create his own power base (Strabo 13.610, Theopompus FGrH 115 fr. 291). He was permitted to buy Autophradates' tolerance (Aristotle Pol. 2.1267a). Hermeias, a eunuch and Eubulos' former slave, succeeded his master.⁷⁴ There is little to suggest that the new tyrant was perceived as a threat to Achaemenid control, in fact it is suggested that he held power less tightly (so the heavily restored Didymos 5.57-59). SIG³ 229, a fragmentary and undated inscription found at Erythrae, describes arrange-

ments reached between that city and Hermeias.⁷⁵ The latter has a staff of officers known as hetairoi, a title paralleling contemporary and later monarchial usage. He and Erythrae have made agreements regulating the mutual deposit of goods for safe-keeping, and struck a bilateral alliance in which both parties are equals. Although Hermeias is on friendly terms with a city which had such relations with Maussollos (SIG³ 168), arrangements concerning protection of property and military assistance may be characterized as a theoretical extension of orderly Achaemenid control. Nothing points to Hermeias as being inimical to royal control.

At some point--again chronological data are lacking--Hermeias was viewed as inimical, as one of the aphestēkotas (Diod. 16.52.5). By the time of Mentor's attack in the campaigning season of 342, Hermeias controlled a number of cities and strong points (Diod. 16.52.5-7), exercising influence at Assos, Atarneus, Katane, and, in some form, in territories claimed by Mytilene and Chios.⁷⁶ It is the extension of his sphere and the perceived threat it posed which seems to have turned Achaemenid authorities against him. Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 291 (Didymos 4.63ff) reports, with some hyperbole, that Hermeias was threatening to, among others, Mytilene and Chios; their complaints should account for the charges reported by Diodorus (16.52.6). Such untoward activity may be placed during the time the satrap Rhoisakes was in Egypt (Diod. 16.47.2).

Mentor's punitive campaign was a model of diplomatic and military skill.⁷⁷ Hermeias and his subordinates were captured by the clever use of the Achaemenid practice of offering cooption to rebels. The general's

status rose again; the mark of a good military leader was knowing when one could achieve goals without a massive capital outlay. The other recalcitrants in Anatolia soon fell as well (Diod. 16.52.6-8). This is the last we hear of Mentor. He may have died soon after, his role filled by his equally competent brother Memnon and Artabazos' sons.⁷⁸

E. Hermeias and Macedon

On the surface there seems nothing truly remarkable about Hermeias: a political leader inherits power from his predecessors, extends his sphere of influence, is regarded as a threat, and is eliminated by military action. But Hermeias' connection with Aristotle, while of no interest to Achaemenid authorities, plus the movements of the philosopher and an obtuse passage in Demosthenes have instigated commentators, ancient and modern, to create of Hermeias a hero. During his lifetime Hermeias was a philosopher-king. His contact with Aristotle led to the opening of discussions with Philip of Macedon concerning Hermeias' support for a Macedonian invasion of Achaemenid territory. When this secret diplomacy was made public Hermeias was attacked, captured, and tortured by Achaemenid authorities. Aristotles fled to Macedon. Hermeias was found guilty of the highest treason. So hyperbole: what of the sources?⁷⁹

One should first note that there is no hint of such intrigue in Diodorus 16.52, a passage in which the historian speaks both of the exile of Artabazos and Memnon in Macedonia (52.3-4) and the fall of Hermeias (52.5-7). Book 16 is one which Diodorus pointedly wishes to encompass the career of Philip (16.1, 16.95, cf. 17.1); the author speaks early on (16.1.5) about Philip's plans to conquer Persia and free the Greeks

of Asia in such a way as if they were an integral part, if not the culmination, of his career. It is therefore very surprising that Diodorus failed to draw together Philip and Hermeias, for here we would have an illustration that Philip, early on, tēn Persōn basileian epebaletō katalusai (16.1.5).

At the heart of the reconstruction presented above is a passage from Demosthenes 10, a speech delivered in 341 Dionys. Hal. Ad Amm. 10.738). Demosthenes 10.32 occurs in that part of the oration in which Demosthenes is trying to convince the Athenians to look to Persia for assistance against Philip (10.31-34). He argues that (10.31) those whom the king holds as benefactors hate (misousi) and fight (polemousi) Philip, i.e. a state of war exists between Macedon and those who owe allegiance to the Great King. In 10.32 Demosthenes claims that all of Philip's plans will be revealed to the Shah by Philip's own ally (ho prattōn kai suneidōs). The Shah will hear (akousetai) Philip's plans, i.e. at the present time Philip is laying plans, and Demosthenes knows both that he has and that he has an ally under arrest by the Shah; in the future, the Shah will learn specifically what the plans are. In view of these statements, or asseverations, Athens, argues Demosthenes, should send envoys (10.32-33) to Susa to urge Artaxerxes III to cooperate with Athens in action against Philip. Athens must convince the Shah that Philip's moves against Athens pose a threat to Persia. Demosthenes (10.34) concludes with an attack on those who would oppose such an embassy.

But Demosthenes' claims are drawn from the realm of political fantasy. Who are the benefactors? Warfare of a sort with Persia will

not begin until the campaigning season of 340 when Arsites initiates a proxy war. Demosthenes specifies no plans of Philip, nor does he explain how he knows them. He does not tell us who Philip's ally is, although the man's identity would certainly strengthen Demosthenes' case. But as of yet the ally has said nothing. It is difficult to see how Philip's moves against Athens pose a threat to Persia, who is only benefiting by the Greeks being kept in their place by a guest-friend of Achaemenid officers in the far west. Indeed, the complete absence of specifics and of names is quite surprising: elsewhere Demosthenes does not hesitate to provide details (even if inaccurate) about Philip's activities.⁸⁰ This absence should be reason to cast the highest doubt on the historical value of Demosthenes 10.31-34.

Commentators, rather than emphasizing the vague content of this passage and recognizing it as an attempt to convince the Athenians to undertake a new policy, have devoted their efforts to assigning names to the figures alluded to by Demosthenes. Scholiasts on Dem. 10 suggested that the benefactors were satraps. More recently, Mr. Griffith suggested they were Mentor and Memnon and the hostilities were the operations in Thrace alluded to in Arrian (Anab. 2.14.5).⁸¹ But 341 is too early for the supposed Achaemenid activities in Thrace and there is no reason to suppose that the two nobles would perceive Philip's activities--at this point--to be anti-Achaemenid.

Philip's ally--the one who had said nothing at the time of Demosthenes' speech, has been identified, without exception, as Hermeias of Atarneus. The scholiasts claimed Hermeias was the ally and that he revealed all. They do not give a reason for the identification or list

the information given by Hermeias. The discovery of Didymos' commentary on the passage failed to clarify the identification. Didymos himself (6.50-62) was aware that both the site of Hermeias' capture and his fate--and this is significant for the veracity of Demosthenes' statements--were not agreed upon by those sources available to him. After citing many sources, Didymos provides his own view (8.23-32). He is commenting on the embassy which Artaxerxes sent into Greece to raise forces in 344/3, i.e. June 344, for use against rebel Egypt. Didymos states that Artaxerxes was suspicious of Philip, the object of a future war, because he had learned that Macedonian's plans from Hermeias. But Hermeias did not fall until 342: The statement is anachronistic and not borne out by the evidence Didymos himself cites.

None of the sources cited in the commentary divulge either the details or the nature of Hermeias' contact with Philip. Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 250 (Didymos 5.21ff) simply slurs Hermeias in a letter to Philip. Others (Didymos 6.50ff) give various accounts of his death, but none speaks of ties to Macedonia. The most elaborate deathbed scene, provided by Kallisthenes FGrH 124 fr. 2 (Didymos 5.64ff), depicts a noble Hermeias, before his death, shaming the Shah and exciting the jealousy of Bagoas and Mentor. The extract says nothing about Macedonia or Philip. Kallisthenes himself (fr. 3) states Hermeias said nothing about Philip: mēde tōn Philippōi sunegnōsmenōn homologēsonta, kathaper ho Kallisthenēs. None of the data cited by Didymos advances us beyond Demosthenes' vague statements.

The connection between Philip and Hermeias, if one can be made at all, can be arrived at only by weaving a tissue of supposition and spec-

ulation based on the movements of some prominent figures in the 340's. One begins with the observation that Mentor conquered Hermeias. To this is added the observation that Mentor is related to Memnon and Artabazos. These two figures lived at Philip's court. They returned to Asia before the operations against Hermeias. Aristotle lived with Hermeias and was related to him. Aristotle took up residence in Pella at the time Memnon and Artabazos were ending their stay.⁸² Only by collecting these "surface features" does speculation become possible. Philip was intriguing with Hermeias. Memnon and Artabazos learned of this and reported it to Mentor and Artaxerxes (remember that the first pair are also supposed to have urged Philip to become hostile towards Persia). Hermeias became the object of attack. He was captured and revealed nothing. Aristotle, too, had been involved in the intrigue since he appeared at both Atarneus and Pella. Demosthenes refers to all of the above in 10.31-34. We have now probably run into circular reasoning and contradiction, but most certainly into confusion.

Behind all of this lies hindsight, the a priori assumption that because hostility developed between the Argaeid and Achaemenid houses in the mid-330's, such hostility was a foregone conclusion, an unavoidable result of Philip's successes.

The difficulty is that we are dealing with two separate issues which cannot be joined together within the realm of historical reality. The first is the identification of the people alluded to by Demosthenes. It is quite possible to state that Demosthenes' "benefactors" were Memnon and Mentor, the "ally" Hermeias. Demosthenes may well have been thinking of these men, but did not list them by name. But if they had

been mentioned by name, Demosthenes' arguments would have been shown to be patently false. His insinuations could not be backed up with hard evidence--and this is the second issue. Although the names may fit, the motivations and activities of 342-341 do not. War did not exist between Philip and Achaemenid officers. Artabazos and Memnon were Philip's guest-friends. Hermeias was disliked in Anatolia because of his activities in Anatolia. He was a local dynast whose encroachments on his neighbors and whose possession of many strongpoints made him a potential serious threat to stability--and not far from where Mentor's estates seem to have been situated (the Troad). He was only one among many recalcitrants against whom Mentor campaigned. More significantly, Mentor's success depended upon Hermeias' belief (Diod. 16.52.6) that he would be coopted--after all, Autophradates had done the same for Eubulos. Only after war had broken out between Persian and Macedon could the fall of Hermeias take on its false importance. The "surface features" could be examined under the light of the inevitable hostility between the kingdoms, and secret plots could be woven. It should have been disturbing far earlier that Didymos, who had access to far more evidence than we, could do no better than anachronism.

Concluding Remarks: Allied Forces

By the beginning of 341 Achaemenid control in the far west reached a high point not achieved since the reign of Darius I. Both the Greek and Egyptian problems had been solved decisively. Achaemenid power, embodied in a multi-national staff, had acted as does a wave, when

rolling in towards the shore with the weight of the ocean behind it, rises up and submerges all obstacles. That success had been achieved through a combination of administrative flexibility and regional diversity.

Rivalry among officers which had led to warfare seems to have abated. Such rivalry created difficulties for both Dascylium and Inner Phrygia, and was exploited to a degree by Chares. Flexibility led to a resolution: Although initially forced into exile, Artabazos and his brothers-in-law, the Rhodians Mentor and Memnon, were rehabilitated by an Artaxerxes willing to make use of skilled personnel, regardless of nationality, so long as they acted to strengthen Achaemenid control. By 341 Artabazos appears to have been at Susa, now an advisor with first-hand information about the new power in the west, Macedonia. Mentor, and later Memnon, held estates in that portion of the empire closest to Artabazos' and Memnon's old host, Philip. The fate of Tithraustes, Artabazos' foe, is not known, but Inner Phrygia, now under Atizyes, was at peace with its coastal neighbor, Dascylium. Artaxerxes also appears to have balanced the houses descended from Pharnabazos, if my speculation about Arsites is correct. Arsites held Dascylium as highest officer, a post superior in status to that of Artabazos' brothers-in-law, masters of the Troad. But the sons of all these men had begun training in the arts of diplomacy and war; a new generation of competent officers was assured.

Rivalry between Sparda and Dascylium seems to have disappeared. The former was under the control of Rhoisakes, assisted by his sons Spithridates, a future satrap, and Rhoisakes. The family may have been able to trace its ancestry back to the satrapy of Dascylium, and a man

once at odds with the great Pharnabazos. But that did not hinder later prominence in an adjoining sector.

The problems created by a single officer--regardless of original status--growing too powerful were avoided. In Cappadocia, a number of different political figures coexisted, no one holding a sphere comparable to Datames'. Hermeias had been dispatched quickly, before he could pose a serious threat to Sparda and Dascylium. But competent and loyal officials who acted to strengthen Achaemenid control were held in honor. Mazaios controlled the coast and interior of Cilicia and to his sphere, as a reward, were added Syria and Phoinicia, once the satrapy of his old colleague Belesys. Mazaios' promotion and the expansion of his sphere to encompass regions in which he campaigned represented continuity in personnel, a continuity seemingly assured in the persons of his young sons. Continuity and competence could be found in Caria, now administered by Idrieus' widow, Ada. Her family maintained favorable relations with Sparda, and extended their control into Lycia, once a sector in full destabilization. Their fleet kept order in the islands of the west.

The competence of officers in Anatolia and that region's ensuing stability facilitated simultaneous campaigns in Egypt and Cyprus which rendered both regions stable. The success of Rhoisakes, Idrieus, Ariamnes, and Mazaios in administering their own sectors permitted them to be transferred southwards to subdue rebels elsewhere in regions west of the Tigris and Euphrates.

There remained one development which Achaemenid officers in the far west might have to subject to closer scrutiny and about which to plan strategy. Since the mid-350's the empire had benefitted, without cost,

from the activities of Philip: he wore down the sides in Greece, as Tissaphernes once hoped to do; he prevented a recrudescence of Greek forward policy, thereby enforcing the King's Peace; he posed no threat to Achaemenid Anatolia. How might this state of affairs be guaranteed for the future? How would Macedon fit into an Achaemenid scheme on the far western frontier?

Hostility between Macedon and Persia was not inevitable. In the time of Darius and Xerxes the Argaeid house had intermarried with Achaemenid nobility and assisted Achaemenid forces in major campaigns. Now the careers of Memnon, Artabazos, and their sons suggested an accommodation was within reach. The sons of Pharnakes and the Argaeid house might be joined together. In 341 the expectation would not be unreasonable that the pignora hospitii (Curtius 6.5.2) had every chance of coexisting with fides in regem conservata--ad perpetuitatem.

Footnotes for Chapter VII

¹Judeich discussed the 350's and 340's as part of his chapter on satraps' revolts (209-220); his consideration of Macedon and Persia (298-306) begins (298-9) with the belief that hostility was a foregone conclusion. These lines of treatment have been followed as late as 1975 (Moysey 165-196, 222-3, 227-9, 234-7) and 1976 (Brunt, ed. *Arriann Anabasis* vol. I, Loeb Classical Library, p. lxiv.).

²In general on chronology see Cawkwell *CQ* 13 (1963) 121-3 and 136-8, which rightly dismisses Sordi *Kokalos* 5 (1959) 107-118.

³Synkellos 486, cited in Judeich 167; Solinus 35.4 (Mommsen's edition, p. 171).

⁴Isocrates 5.101 permits only the establishment of a date before 346 BC; Dem. 15.11-12 places his account in the context of Artemisia's reign (353/2-351/0). Better attested campaigns against Egypt, such as that of 374, were preceded by at least one season of preparation.

Keinitz 99-101 places the (major) operation in 351/0 and believes Artaxerxes to have been present. Judeich 170 places the campaign between 357-351, arguing for 354 as the start of the major operation, 353 for failure (cf. 186-9, 338).

⁵Didymos 8.5-31: Androtion *FGrH* fr. 53, Anaximenes *FGrH* 72 fr. 28, Philochoros *FGrH* 328 fr. 157. The archon is Lykiskos.

⁶The "Dream": Cawkwell *CQ* 13 (1963) 122 n.1; Olmstead 438-440; the Letter of Speusippos: section 12 contains the passage. See Bickermann and Sykutris 33, 34, 38, 78-82 on the passage and its validity as evidence.

In addition to the accounts cited in note 2, one may consult Kienitz 166-73 (a summary of previous work in tabular form), 102-105; Beloch² 3:2 284-7; Judeich 172 is now supplanted.

⁷Isocrates 5.102 claims Phoinicia and Cyprus are destabilized before 346. Operations were taking place around Sidon in 345, so indicated by a cuneiform tablet (it dates only operations, not the fall of Sidon): Cawkwell *CQ* 13 (1963) 136, Beloch² 3:2 286 n.1. On Phocion and Cyprus: Diod. 16.42.7, Aischines 2.184; Gehrke 225-30, 13 n.81. In general consult Kienitz 181-4, and Beloch² 3:2 285-7.

⁸Hofstetter nr. 102 p. 65; Strabo 13.610, Aristotle *Pol.* 2.1267a; a discussion of him and his successor, Hermeias, appears below in section VII.

⁹The scholiast calls Artabazos a Persēs anēr; his activities are directed against the Shah: apostas basileos, polemon pros auton. His opponents (loyalists) are Persian officers.

¹⁰Judeich 210, Olmstead 424-5, Moysey 165ff, 177.

¹¹R. Schmitt "Die achaimenidische Satrapie TAYAY DRAYAHYA," Historia 21 (1972) 522-7, esp. 525 bottom.

¹²Imprecise terminology abounds, and the sources are quick to characterize the Shah as the principal enemy of Artabazos. The scholiast for Dem. 4.19 talks about Artabazos fighting the king and invading tēn basileōs chōran, i.e. Achaemenid controlled territories. Diod. 16.22.1 characterizes Artabazos' opponents as satrapai, i.e. Achaemenid officers, and the king's army. The Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer speaks of Chares, who is in Artabazos' service, as fighting the king and his satraps. Plut. Arat. 16.3 uses the colorless, but more accurate, strategoi to describe Artabazos' opponents.

Diod. 16.34, which describes a later operation (353/2), indicates that Artabazos' opponents are satraps sent by the king.

¹³The names associated with the highest post in Phrygia from the 360's to the 330's are Arsames, Atizyes, and Tithraustes. Arsames appears in Polyzenus 7.28.2 as an apostates who has gained control of "large" Phrygia. The anecdote has no chronological context and need not be associated with the "satraps' revolt" of the 360's, nor need Arsames be emended to Datames on the basis of the stratagem described. See Beloch² 3:2 153 on this last point.

As for Atizyes (Arr. Anab. 1.25.3, 1.29.1-2), we do not know when he was appointed. He appears at Granicus (Arr. Anab. 2.11.8, Diod. 17.21.3--mistakenly called dead) and dies at Issus (Arr. Anab. 2.11.8, Curtius 3.11.10, Diod. 17.34.5). For his career: Berve nr. 179 p. 91, Krumbholz 71, Beloch² 3:2 153, Bosworth Arrian I 151, 155, 164, 174, 216, Atkinson 231.

Tithraustes should not be identified with the Tithraustes who was chiliarch (Judeich 210 n. 2, 210, 370 identifies the two). Moderns tend to make him satrap of Phrygia: Beloch² 3:2 152-3, Wessley 101, Graf Stauffenberg RE 6A:2 nr. 2, Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 542, 542 n.31.

¹⁴

Could Dem. 23.156, an inaccurate description of territoris under Artabazos' control, be a reflection of the satrap's pleonexia?

¹⁵On Artabazos' campaigns in the 350's see: Krumbholz 74-5 (chronology wrong), Beloch² 3:2 148-9, Berve nr. 152 (pp. 82-4). Judeich 209ff and Moysey 165-196, 222-3 are no longer satisfactory.

¹⁶ Pritchett II 82-85 indicates that Athenian fleets were sent out regularly with insufficient funds, thereby placing a strain on the commander, who was liable to be indicted for mismanagement if his attempts to secure adequate funds were not carried out with the proper discretion. Thus looting Achaemenid territory as part of the service rendered to an Achaemenid officer seemed a potentially "no-fault" method of raising capital--unless a hostile imperial reaction was forthcoming.

¹⁷ Scholiast to Dem. 4.19; Plut. Arat. 16.3; Diod. 16.22.1; the Papyrus Erzherzog Rainer reports that Chares acted against the Shah and plundered Tithraustes' land in Phrygia.

¹⁸ Front. 2.3.3, Polyaeus 7.33.2, Polyaeus 5.16.2 may not refer to the campaign.

¹⁹ For Pammenes in general: Hofstetter nr. 241 (pp. 140-1), Pritchett II 90-2, he was not on bad terms with Philip: Dem. 23.183; Diod. 16.34.1-2, Polyaeus 7.33.2 (where we learn of Artabazos' brother Oxythras and Dibiktos--their only appearance in Achaemenid history), Front. 2.3.3, Polyaeus 5.16.2.

²⁰ I am uncertain that Memnon wishes to arrange philia and xenia with Leukon so that he and his family might flee there. The Spartocids were too friendly with Athens.

²¹ Kienast might have reached the same view. He attempted to prove that Philip used and adopted Achaemenid court and administrative practices. However, he simply synthesized occasionally erroneous secondary materials, compared surface similarities, and looked almost exclusively to Susa (not nobles closer to Philip) for models. He concludes that the office of satrap formed the model for the Macedonian stratēgos epi Thrakēs; that Philip's court and harem were modeled on Susa's. For him hostility between Macedon and Persia was a foregone conclusion. Dietmar Kienast "Philipp II. von Makedonien und das Reich der Achaimeniden," Abhandlungen der Marburger Gelehrten Gesellschaft, 1971, no. 6, 243-294.

In my perception the similarity in surface features in Macedon and Persia was due to a similarity in nobles outlook. Kienast's articles is valuable in elucidating the ways in which Macedonia would appear not very different from a sphere of influence presided over by an Achaemenid noble.

²² Badian Hernes 95 (1967) 179-80 sought to identify the Memnon of Diod. 17.62.4ff (the strategos over Thrace) with that member of the house of Artabazos honored in IG II² 356, i.e. at least one member of the family of Artabazos remained behind. Unfortunately, I must support Brunt's view in RFIC 103 (1975) 27 that the Memnon of the inscription

was a son of Artabazos; the Memnon of Thrace was a different man (could he have been named in admiration for the famous Memnon?).

²³I can find only one other Arsites, Kübler nr. 60, a son of Artaxerxes I in Ktesias FGrH 688 fr. 15. For our Arsites: Berve nr. 151, Beloch² 3:2 149, Krumbholz 75-77. He died nobly: Arr. Anab. 1.16.3.

²⁴Briant "Forces Productives" 25-26 tries to make Arsites an ideologue; for other perceptions see Bosworth Arrian I 113.

²⁵Niphates: Berve nr. 573 (p. 280); Petenes: Berve nr. 632 (p. 317); see Bosworth Arrian I 111, Arr. Anab. 1.12.8, 1.16.3 on both men. Rheomithres has been discussed in the previous chapter under the discussion of Orontes.

Arsites' son was Mithropastes, Berve nr. 528. He seems to have been exiled as a result of his father's failure at Granicus, according to Bosworth Arrian I 113. See Nearchos FGrH 133 fr. 27-28 (Strabo 16.766).

²⁶Bas, son of Boteiras: Berve nr. 208 (p. 104), Memnon FGrH 424 fr. 1.12, Bosworth Arrian I 127; Zipoites, son of Bas: Berve nr. 338 (p. 163). A prominent family continued to remain prominent.

²⁷Aristotle Pol. 5.1306b; Dem. 23.176 ff.; Aen. Tact. 28.6; Polyaeus 1.37; Aristotle Oec. 2.1349a 3-8. Discussion about the chronological context of the passages: Judeich 278 n.1, van Groningen 121.

²⁸van Groningen indicates that Lampsacus may have been part of Memnon's chora (quite reasonable), and that the passages are to be placed after 344. On p. 175 he indicates that the incident in Aristotle Oec. 2.1351b 1-6 may occur as late as 335. So Hofstetter nr. 73, p. 41.

²⁹His activities in Arr. Anab. 1.12.1 (cf. Bosworth Arrian I 103) represent judicious respect for temporarily superior military force.

That Chares was officially tyrant of Sigeum: Hofstetter nr. 73 (pp. 40-42 with bibliography); Six NC 1884 306-309, p. 306 nos. 1-7, had attempted to assign coins to him on this basis. For the later stages of Chares' career: Arr. Anab. 3.26, Curtius 4.5.22, Berve nr. 8.9 (pp. 403-4), Atkinson 331-2, Bosworth Arrian I 179-80, 267.

³⁰See Beloch² 3:2 91-3.

³¹Aristotle is called archōn, which van Groningen 104-5 accepts as a formal title. He prefers to see (105-111) the anecdotes as occurring c.360, and makes Aristotle a subordinate of Maussollos. But Phocaea is quite a distance from Caria, and would be subject to the satrap at Sparda. Aristotle does not appear in Hofstetter; see Gschnitzer Gnomon 52 (1980) 251-2.

³²Arr. Anab. 2.1.3-5, 2.2.1ff; Berve nr. 188 (p. 96), Bosworth Arrian I 181, 266-7, Atkinson 289.

³³That Rhoisakes controls Ionia does not make of him any sort of special officer as claimed by Beloch² 3:2 136-7.

³⁴Conflating the two Rhoisakeis: Krumbholz 70, Hamilton 40, Berve nr. 687 (p. 346). Two different men: Beloch² 3:2 136-7, Bosworth Arrian I 111-112, 123.

On Spithridates: Beloch² 3:2 136-7; Berve nr. 715 (p. 358) reflects the conflation of the Rhoisakeis. Krumbholz 70-71 and Bosworth Arrian I 123 dismiss as a confusion Diod. 17.20 on Spithridates being ton Dareiou gambron. On Spithridates' coins: Wroth NC³ 8 (1888) 17-18, BMC Ionia 327, Babelon Traite II 125-8 nos. 169-173, pl. lxxxix nos. 1-5.

³⁵Bosworth Arrian I 111-112.

³⁶Robinson NC⁴ 20 (1920) 1-16.

The coins of Ariarathes could be assigned without problem: the Aramaic inscriptions were legible; the man is attested in the literary record. For coins see: Six NC³ 5 (1885) 29-32 nos. 47-49 as an example.

Nearly illegible Aramaic inscriptions and an insistence to match the numismatic evidence to the literary evidence exactly created great difficulty. E.g. Six NC³ 5 (1885) p. 26 no. 37 looked to Atizyes of Phrygia (assigning the coin to c. 364-350 BC) or to an unattested "Asasos".

The Abdssn coins are the classic example. Six NC³ 5 (1885) 28 n. 46 accepted Waddington's identification of the minting authority as Abdemon and placed the coins c. 350-333. Babelon felt uneasy because Abdemon did not appear in the literary evidence and so argued that the coins should be assigned to a man who was attested--Abrocomas, an officer active in the late fifth and early fourth centuries, but in Syria and Phoenicia (Xen. Anab. 1.3.20, 1.4.3, 5, 18; 1.7.12, Iso. 4.140). He was to be Datames' successor! Babelon Perses achemenides lxxix-lxxxii, no. 386 on p. 387 (pl. lx, no. 20), assigned to c. 360 BC. Six then decided that the Aramaic (now read as Abdssn) should stand for Sysines, Datames' son, and a more likely successor. Six NC³ 14 (1894) 302-305, cf. the confusing discussion in Six NC³ 15 (1895) 169-172 where "hyparchs" are created for Datames so that coins can be tied to the literary evidence. On the weak nature of the assignation to Sysines' activities c. 370 he does not seem a likely candidate for high office.

Finally, Babelon, basing his arguments on the transliteration of the Aramaic, maintained the coins still belonged to Abrocomas. Traite II 423-32 nos. 627-42, pl. cx nos. 4-16.

³⁷Robinson NC⁴ 20 (1920) 11.

³⁸Ibid., 12-13.

³⁹Troxell and Waggoner ANSMN 23 (1978) 11, p. 2 no. 20 (AR drachm).

⁴⁰Ibid., 9-11, pl. 2 nos. 18-19.

⁴¹Berve nr. 245 (p. 128) and Bosworth Arrian I 183 suggest a descent from Datames.

A view is commonly found, based on the abuse of numismatic evidence (cf. n. 38, above), that Sysines succeeded his father Datames: Judeich RE 4 col. 226 (sv. Datames), Osborne Historia 22 (1973) 544, 544 n. 130, Olmstead 422. Beloch² 3:2 154-5 produces a list of desperation: Sysines (son of Datames), followed by Mithrobouzanēs/Mithrobarzanēs (a son of Sysinas; cf. Diod. 17.21.3, Arr. Anab. 1.16.3; I shall come to him presently).

⁴²Ariarathes I: Berve nr. 113 (pp. 59-60), Bosworth Arrian I 189.

⁴³Berve nr. 111 (p. 58) rejected the identification of Ariakes for Ariarathes, but for the wrong reason. Berve held that Ariarathes could not be identified with Ariakes because the former was striving to maintain his independence. But he did so against the Macedonians, not Achaemeniads. Bosworth Arrian I identifies the two men.

⁴⁴Berve nr. 527 (p. 263); Bosworth Arrian I 111, 125 on Arrian's use of hyparchos as variatio for satrapes.

⁴⁵The two nobles are sometimes identified with each other: so Bosworth Arrian I 189, the man's original name form unknown. Berve rejects the identification, suggesting Abistamenes (nr. 4, p. 5) may be the successor to Sabiktas (nr. 690, p. 348). Atkinson, uncertain (135-6) of which view to accept, goes on to draw an artificial distinction between the Persian "officer class" and native Cappadocian nobility. Generations of intermarriage will have rendered this distinction quite shadowy and of very limited political value.

⁴⁶Spithridates is called satrap; Arsites, for variation, hyparch. Bosworth Arrian I 112.

⁴⁷Bosworth Arrian I 111 attempted to use Itin. Alex. 27 (Arsamenes satrapa) to prove Arsames a highest officer. But in sections 19 and 49 the use of satrap seems to parallel that of Diodorus (who also calls Arsames Arsamenes), i.e. standing for an Achaemenid officer in general.

⁴⁸So Bosworth Arrian I 111, 286, 325 (with further references); Berve on Arsames: nr. 149 (pp. 81-2); Krumbholz 77-8 (his use of Polyaeus 7.28.2 to trace Arsames' early career is unconvincing). Leuze 403-5 argues that Arsames was an important officer, but not a satrap; he (399-405) recognizes the problems with Diodorus' use of satrapes and suggests Diodorus may have reversed Arsamenes with Arsites in Diod. 17.19.4. Atkinson 138 subscribes to the view that Arsames was not satrap, but like Leuze places him in Cilizia as an officer.

⁴⁹A somewhat later parallel: Orontopates flees eastward and fights at Gaugemela: Arrian Anab. 3.8.5, 3.11.5, Curtius 4.12.7. Bosworth Arrian I 290, 390 implies the Orontopates at the battle was not the old satrap of Caria.

⁵⁰The name Arsames was found among the sons of Pharnakes, the satrapial family at Dascylium. Arsames was the grandfather of the first Artabazos; for the grandson of Pharnabazos called Arsames: Arr. Anab. 3.23.7, Curtius 8.3.17, Berve nr. 148 (p. 81).

⁵¹The later portions of Mazaios' career are discussed in Berve nr. 484 (pp. 243-5). He places Mazaios' birth before 385 BC Cf. Krumbholz 77, Noldeke 292.

Mazaios' ties with Datames are unknown.

⁵²Isocrates 5.102 is wrong in regarding Cilicia as unstable (cf. 4.161 for the same statement, but for the 380's): it could afford the absence of its satrap.

⁵³Leuze 351-6 presents an excellent discussion concerning Mazaios' sphere of influence.

⁵⁴Babelon Traite II 445-6, Leuze 386-7.

⁵⁵Leuze 387-390 decisively replaces his predecessors' wrangling about the definition of Ebir-nari by examining Mazaios' activities. Note that the Aramaic inscription reflects a vagueness in Achaemenid terminology; Mazaios is on top of affairs in Cilicia and places west of the Euphrates.

⁵⁶Leuze 386-7.

⁵⁷That years 1-4 belonged to Artaxerxes III's reign: Babelon Traite II 587-590, nos. 934-5, pl. cxx nos. 11-17. Rejected by Leuze 393-7.

⁵⁸So Leuze 397-406, for whom the position held by Arsames posed something of a problem (398 n.2).

⁵⁹On Mazaios' coins: Six NC³ 4 (1884) 97-159 is a somewhat chaotic study; Arsames is made satrap of Cilicia, while an officer known as "Tarcamos" (cf. acceptance by Judeich 209) is created by misreading an Aramaic coin inscription. Babelon Perses achemenides xliii-xlix, 28-40, nos. 201-276 (266-76 bore numbers misread as 1, 2, 3, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 20, 21). Babelon Traite II 443-78.

Mazaios' coins enjoyed wide circulation: Bellinger ANSMN 10 (1962) 36, nos. 5-7. He may have minted gold: Robinson NC⁶ 8 (1948) 59 no. 12, Starr Iran. Ant. 12 (1977) 98, 98 n.3.

⁶⁰Diod. 16.47.8 (provides date, but garbles story), Theopompas FGrH 115 fr. 103.12; Aristotle Pol. 5.1311b; Judeich 131-133, 328 (supports Diodorus' date).

⁶¹Theopompas FGrH 115 fr. 114 (Athenaeus 12.531d); Anaximenes FGrH 72 fr. 18 (Athenaeus 12.531 de); Athenaeus 8.352d.

⁶²Judeich 131-3 places his death in 354/3 (but 336 says 358/7!). Hill BMC Cyprus ciii-civ places it in the 360's.

For Nicocles' coins: Babelon Perses achemenides cxxi-ii, cxliii-iv fig. 67 may indicate an extension of influence; pp. 88-89 nos. 600-603. Hill BMC Cyprus ciii-civ, p. 58-59, nos. 61-3, pl. xi 22-4. Babelon Traite II 711-16, nos. 1160-3, p. cxxviii, nos. 1-3.

⁶³Euagoras II: Hofstetter nr. 106 (p. 64), included in the work although not Greek.

The name Phytagoras occurs in the royal house: Iso. 9.62, Diod. 15.4, Theopompas FGrH 115 fr. 103. See Berve nr. 642 (p. 321).

Phytagoras' coins: Babelon Perses achemenides cxxv, 92-3 nos. 627-633; Hill BMC Cyprus cx-cxii, 62-4 nos. 76-84, pl. xii nos. 11-18; Babelon Traite II 723-726 nos. 1184-1187 pl. cxxviii nos. 25-29.

⁶⁴Judeich 134-6, 340-1 gives a chronology which is too early, but is right in seeing the expulsion of Euagoras as being followed soon after by the campaign.

⁶⁵Berve nr. 816 (pp. 402-3), Hofstetter nr. 262 (pp. 151-2), Gehrke 36-40, 225-30.

⁶⁶Certain coins which had types found on the issues of Sidon bore the letters OO, which were supposed to stand for the Phoinician pronunciation of the first sounds in Euagoras' name. Babelon Perses achemenides cxxii-iv perceived Euagoras as beginning his career as king of Salamis, then satrap (i.e. while leading forces to regain his throne and thereafter), and finally king of Sidon. Pp. 91-2 nos. 620-26, pp. 231-2 nos. 1579-82: his Sidonian issues. Hill BMC Cyprus civ-cx, pp. 59-61 nos.

64-75 pl. xii nos. 1-10 accepted but reformulated some of Babelon's views. Babelon Traite II 715-24 nos. 1164-83, pp. 580-96 nos. 946-52; (the Sidonian issues), pp. 159-179 nos. 117-33 as satrap. Cf. Hill BMC Phoenicia xcvi, 151 nos. 65-8.

All the arguments about Euagoras' Sidonian issues are supplanted by Betlyon 30-32, notes 42-48, nos. 33-34: that OO stands for Euagoras is linguistically impossible. The coins are assigned to Sidon and attributed to an 'Abd 'Ashtart II (345-343/2). OO is a variant abbreviation for a Phoinician name. Betlyon's view, although the regnal years of this monarch are uncertain, is attractive because it recognizes that the numismatic record can provide new data and that it does not always overlap the literary evidence exactly.

⁶⁷Diod. 16.41 reports that Sidon was the focal point of the rebellion and that the "Phoinicians" sought out an alliance with Egypt. The rebel activities (Diod. 16.41.5) entail the destruction of the Achaemenid physical plant and personnel, i.e. the impairment of preparations for the Egyptian campaign. The rebel request for assistance from Egypt follows (16.42.2) the royal threat to return to a compliant stance (16.41.6).

⁶⁸P=Patmuis cod., saec. X vel XI; X=Venetus s. Marci n. 376, saec. XIV vel XV. For 16.43.1 R (Parisinus 1665, saec. XI vel XII) read Mentor until a second hand, recognizing the problem deleted it and wrote Tennes below. The same correction appears in the remaining troublesome passages.

⁶⁹On Achaemenid Sidon at this time: Bondi Rivista di Studi Fenici 2 (1974) 149-160. Tennes' coinage: Betlyon 27-30 (note misprinted regnal years on p. 27, he should write 355/4-345/4). He assumes that issues with "regnal years" belong to the years 355/4-351/0, since Diodorus gives 351/0 as the year of the revolt and coinage is supposed to have stopped once hostilities began (no explanation why is given). He accepts Judeich's (p. 175) belief that Sidon fell in 348/7. Cf. Babelon Perses achemenides clxxxiii-v, pp. 230-1, nos. 1574-8, pl. xxx fig. 1-2. Traite II 578-80 no. 928-32, pl. cxx nos. 6-10.

For Phoinician troubles: Oros. 3.7.8, Trogus Prol. x, Justin 18.3 (confused). Effects on Judea?: Oros. 3.7.6, Josephus AJ 11.7.1, Judeich 171. General discussion in Kienitz 181-4.

⁷⁰In general a Persian commander was paired with a non-Persian: Rhosakes of Sparda with Lakrates of Thebes (Diod. 16.47.2, Hofstetter nr 189, p. 113-4); Aristazanes with Nikostratos of Argos (Diod. 16.47.3, Hofstetter nr. 237, note in particular Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 124). On Bagoas: Diod. 16.47.1, 3, 4. The Persians are local (Rhosakes) and from the court (Bagoas, Aristazanes).

⁷¹Ochos became a second Herodotean Cambyses in the sources: Diod. 17.49.2; Ael. v.h. 4.8, 6.8., h.a. 10.28; Oros 3.7.8; Plut. Mor. 355c, 363c (Deinon FGrH 690 fr. 21); Josephus Apion 2.11 (179); Suda sv. Apidis, Asato, kakois episōreuōn kakia.

⁷²On Artabazos' surrender to Alexander: Arr. 3.23.7, Curt. 5.9.1, 6.5.1-5; Bosworth Arrian I 351, Atkinson 259-60. Curtius 3.13.13 (Artabazos' wife captured at Damascus) seems to indicate he moved westward with Darius III in defense of the Empire.

⁷³The eldest sons of Memnon can be seen as those who received tas epiphanestatas en tois stratiōtikois hēgemonias. Most certainly Pharnabazos the younger was among them; he succeeded Memnon as high commander against Alexander. Berve nr. 766 (pp. 379-80), Beloch Janus 8, Beloch² 3:2 149; Arr. 2.1ff, 3.2, Curtius 2.3-4.4, Pl. Eum. 7.

Below is a list of the final attested generation of the sons of Pharnakes:

Sons of Artabazos (except Pharnabazos the younger)

Memnon in IG II² 356 (plus p. 660), Tod II no. 199; best perception of him appears in Brunt RFIC 103 (1975) 26-7, who concludes he was born before 348. For a part-Iranian with a non-Iranian name cf. Hdt. 8.136.1 on Amyntas, son of Bubares and Gygaia of Macedon. Older and less satisfactory treatments: Tod II pp. 281-4, Beloch Janus 11, Kirchner in IG II² 356, Tarn JHS 41 (1921) 24, Berve nr. 498 (pp. 253-4), Hofstetter nr. 216 (pp. 217-8). On these see Badian Hermes 95 (1967) 180, 180 n. 1-3.

Arsames: Berve nr. 148 (p. 81), Beloch Janus 8, Beloch² 3:2 149, note that there are textual difficulties in Arr. Anab. 3.25.7, 3.29.5, 4.7.1: these passages refer to one Arsakes (Bosworth Arrian I 357.374); Arr. 3.23.7, Curtius 8.3.17 refer to Arsames, who makes no appearance before Gaugamela.

Kophen: Berve nr. 459 (p. 230); Beloch² 3:2 149; Bosworth Arrian 233, 357; he is active before Issus: Arr. Anab. 2.15.1, 3.23.7, 7.6.4, Curtius 7.11.5, 22-3.

Ariobarzanes: Arrian Anab. 3.23.7, Bosworth Arrian I 351. He is almost always conflated with the homonymous satrap of Persis: so Berve nr. 115 (pp. 60-1), Atkinson 404, Beloch² 3:2 149, Beloch Janus 8. See Bosworth Arrian I 325. These passages do not refer to the son of Artabazos: Arr. 3.8.5, 8, 18, Curtius 4.12.7, 5.3.7ff, 5.4.33.

Daughters of Artabazos

Barsine: Brunt RFIC 103 (1975) replaces all previous work except Berve nr. 206 (pp. 103-4). Barsine is a daughter of Artabazos; she married Memnon and was about the same age as Alexander.

Apama, aka Artakama: Berve nr. 97 (p. 52), Beloch Janus 9.

Artonis: Berve nr. 155 (pp. 84-5), Beloch Janus 9.

Son of Mentor

Thymondas: born about mid-350's; Berve nr. 380 (p. 182), Beloch Janus 11, Bosworth Arrian I 183, Atkinson 100-1, 105, 114-5, 206, 284.

I am uncertain if Pharnakes (Berve nr. 767, p. 380, Bosworth Arrian I 125) belongs to the family descended from the father of the first Artabazos.

⁷⁴ On Eubulos: Hofstetter nr. 107 (p. 65) for sources. Hermeias succeeded him by foul play: Diogenes Laertius 5.3. For Hermeias in general: Hofstetter nr. 143 (pp. 79-80); the most important sources are Strabo 13.610, 614, Diogenes L. 5.3, Suda sv. Hermias and Aristotles.

⁷⁵ Tod II no. 165, pp. 188-90.

⁷⁶ On Hermeias' sphere in general: Diod. 16.52.5-7 (pollōn ochurōmatōn kai poleōn; chōria; pōlesi; ta phrouria kai tas poleis); Aristotle Oec. 2.1351a 33-37; Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 220, i.e. Didymos 5.27ff. Suda (Hermias) describes Atarneus as being in Mysia, in Asia, near the Hellespont--all this pointing to its liminal nature. Assos: Strabo 13.610, Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 291; Atarneus: Diogenes L. 5.3, Strabo 13. 610, 614, Suda (Hermias, Aristotles), Diod. 16.52.5, Theopompos FGrH 115 fr. 291; Katane: Didymos 6.58; Mytilene's and Chios' territories: Theopompos fr. 291, i.e. Didymos 4.63. On Mytilene cf. Cargill 95, 142.

⁷⁷ Diod. 16.52.5-7, Polyaeus 6.48, Aristotle Oec. 2.1351a 33-37 (on epimeletes see van Groningen 171-2), Strabo 13.610 (Memnon is given as commander).

⁷⁸ For Memnon's pre-Alexandrine operations see Polyaeus 5.44.3 (Bosworth Arrian I 179-180) concerning Memnon's ancestral friend, Aristonymos of Methymna, c. 340. That man's connection with the later boss Aristonikos is uncertain: Berve nr. 131, Hofstetter nr. 48, Arr. Anab. 3.2.4-7.

⁷⁹ Modern treatments may be characterized politely as unsatisfactory. Jaeger Aristotle (Oxford 1934) begins (117) with the premise that secret contact between Hermeias and Philip existed, but that Hermeias revealed nothing. How did Demosthenes know about the contact? He had secret agents (119-120). Aristotle's travels concealed political missions.

Wormell YCS 5 (1935) 57-92 studied the Hermeias-tradition, but was no more a historian of politics than Jaeger. Contact was a fact (57-8); Aristotle had wide-ranging political plans. Wormell fails to realize just how vague Demosthenes 10.31-4 actually is.

Chroust Aristotle (London 1973) is unsatisfactory; the author seems to fabricate evidence.

The ghost of Hermeias lives on: Bosworth Arrian I 230.

⁸⁰See Cawkwell CQ 13 (1963) 200-205, esp. last sentence, paragraph two on p. 200, and last sentence on p. 205.

⁸¹Griffith ap. Cawkwell CQ 13 (1963) 135.

⁸²One is supposed to ignore the fact that Aristotle does not go directly from Atarneus to Pella (see Dionysius Halic. Ad. Amm. 5 for chronology). Aristotle moved to Pella to take up his father's old job, and act as tutor for young Alexander. At the end of the campaigning season of 343 Memnon and Artabazos were preparing to leave Pella for their homeland, and it is uncertain whether they were even in Macedonia while Aristotle was. The educations of their children do not seem to have suffered.

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